This chapter discusses the development of international relations theory in China. It traces how IR theory began to take shape in China in the 1980s following Deng Xiaoping's reform policies. Several universities and research institutes established departments and programs on international relations during this time. While early studies focused on interpreting Marxism and Maoism, Chinese scholars began exploring IR theory with Chinese characteristics in the post-Cold War era. The chapter examines the evolution of IR studies in China and implications for analyzing Philippines-China security relations. It provides context on how China views itself and its role in international affairs.

1. Philippines-China Security
Relations: Current Issues and
Emerging Concerns
Rommel C. Banlaoi
Yuchengco Center
De La Salle University Manila

2. © Copyright 2012
by the Yuchengco Center
Printed in the Philippines. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any information storage and retrieval system, without the
permission in writing from the Center.
ISBN: 978-971-94089-5-6
Please address all inquiries to:
Yuchengco Center
2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall
De La Salle University
2401 Taft Avenue, Manila, 1004
Philippines
email: yuchengcocenter@dlsu.edu.ph
fax: (632) 525-3457
url://yc.dlsu.edu.ph
Cover photo source: Voice of America at http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-
news/2012/07/27/is-china-overplaying-its-hand-in-the-south-china-sea/

3. Preface
Since the publication of my book, Security Aspects of
Philippines-China Relations: Bilateral Issues and Concerns in
the Age of Global Terrorism, in 2007, my scholarly activities
on Philippines-China security relations have not stopped.
Within a period of more than five years (from 2007 to early
2012), I felt the strong need to revise and update my book in
order to accommodate current developments in Philippines-
China security relations.
Because of some technical issues associated with the
revision of my 2007 book published by Rex Book Store
International, I decided to just publish another book based on
conference papers, academic essays, and opinion pieces I wrote
from 2007 to the first half of 2012. This effort resulted in the
publication of Philippines-China Security Relations: Current
Issues and Emerging Concerns.
Like my 2007 piece, this present book critically
examines the security aspects of Philippines-China relations.
My 2007 book discussed how the global campaign against
terrorism provided various opportunities for both countries to
sustain their diplomatic friendship and enhance their defense
cooperation. The publication of that book coincided with the
32nd anniversary of the establishment of Philippines-China
relations. Two years before that, the Philippines and China
celebrated the “golden years” of their bilateral ties in 2005 on
the occasion of their 30th anniversary. But the renewed security
tensions in the South China Sea that started in 2007 created
various difficulties for Philippines-China security relations to
really move forward.
This present book is published to describe current
issues and emerging concerns in Philippines-China security
relations. The publication of this book coincides with the
commemoration of the 37th anniversary of the establishment of
Philippines-China relations, an odd occasion in the light of the
standoff between the two countries in the Scarborough Shoal.
Electronic version of this book has been published by
the Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies
(CINSS) of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and
Terrorism Research (PIPVTR). This print version is updated to

4. make the book more current. The author is very grateful to the
Yuchengco Center, through its President, Dr. Trinidad Osteria,
for publishing this print version.
Readers can consider the publication of this present
book as a sequel to my 2007 book. It is my fervent hope to see
this book adding value to the existing literature on Philippines-
China security relations.

5. Table of Contents
Page
Preface iii
List of Tables vii
List of Figures vii
List of Abbreviations viii
1 International Relations Theory in 1
China: Evolution and Current State
2 A Philippine Perspective on China- 11
US-ASEAN Security Relations
3 Philippine Policy in the South China 22
Sea: Implications for Philippines-
China Security Relations
4 The Taiwan Factor in Philippines- 36
China Security Relations
5 Philippine Foreign and Security 46
Policy Towards China in the Post-
9/11 World: Current Realities and
Future Prospects
6 Renewed Tensions and Continuing 62
Maritime Security Dilemma in the
South China Sea: Current and
Emerging Concerns on Philippines-
China Security Relations
7 Philippine Solution to the South 83
China Sea Problem: More Problems,
Less Solutions in Philippines-China
Security Relations?
8 Standoff in the Scarborough Shoal: A 100
Difficult Challenge in Philippines-
China Security Relations
9 The Philippines and U.S. Pivot to 108
Asia: Implications for Philippines-
China Security Relations
References 114
Annex 1 Brief Essays on Philippines-China 130
Security Relations and the South

6. China Sea Disputes
A West Philippines Sea: What’s in a 130
Name?
B West Philippines Sea: An American 132
Lake?
C PH Problematic Protest vs China 134
Over Spratlys
D A Mischief Reef in the Making 137
E Anarchy in the South China Sea 140
F Emerging Cold War in the Spratlys 143
G Risks of War in the Spratlys 145
H Clash of Sovereignties in the Spratlys 147
I Word War in the South China Sea: A 152
Diplomatic Crisis in Philippines-
China Relations
J PHL, China Row on Spratlys: Time 154
for Good Manners and Right Conduct
K What’s Needed: More Dialogues 157
Among Spratlys Claimants
L Peace and Stability: Way Ahead in 160
Spratlys
Annex 2 List of Bilateral Agreements between 162
the Philippines and China
Postscript 175
About the Author 178

7. List of Tables
Table 1 Oil and Natural Gas Potential in the South
China Sea
Table 2 Filipinos workers in Taiwan and the
undocumented (runaways, overstayers, etc.),
November 2006
Table 3 Breakdown of Filipino Workers in Taiwan by
Area of Destination, November 2006
Table 4 Presently Occupied Areas in the Spratlys and
Estimated Number of Troops
List of Figures
Figure 1 South China Sea
Figure 2 Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea
Figure 3 Overlapping Baselines in the South China Sea
Figure 4 Overlapping Fishing Activities in the South
China Sea
Figure 5 Navigational Activities in the South China Sea
Figure 6 Lagos Island or Spratly Island (Vietnam)
Figure 7 Pugad Island or Southwest Cay (Vietnam)
Figure 8 Pentley Reef (Vietnam)
Figure 9 Pag-Asa Island (Philippines)
Figure 10 Structure in the Rizal Reef (Philippines)
Figure 11 ST 57 Docked at the Ayungin Shoal
(Philippines)
Figure 12 Mischief Reef (China)
Figure 13 Johnson Reef (China)
Figure 14 Swallow Reef (Malaysia)
Figure 15 Ardasier Reef (Malaysia)
Figure 16 Itu-Aba (Taiwan)
Figure 17 Oil and Natural Gas Fields in the South China
Sea
Figure 18 Joint Cooperation Area

8. List of Abbreviations
ADMM+ ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting
Plus
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
BFAR Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
CAFIU Chinese Association for International
Understanding
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness Training
CBM confidence building measure
CCPIT China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFAU China Foreign Affairs University
CMR cooperative management regime
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Company
COC Code of Conduct
COMELEC The Commission on Elections
CPRF Carlos P. Romulo Foundation
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs
DND Department of National Defense
DOC Declaration on the Conduct
DOST Department of Science and Technology
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EAS East Asia Summit
EDA Excess Defense Articles
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EU European Union
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FSI Foreign Service Institute
GDOFA Guandong Ocean Fisheries Administration
GWOT global war on terrorism
ICT Information and Communications
Technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations

9. IRT International Relations Theories
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
JCA Joint Cooperation Areas
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
JMSU Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking
JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Philippines
KIG Kalayaan Island Group
LME Large Marine Ecosystem
MBA Military Bases Agreement
MDT Mutual Defense Treaty
MECO Manila Economic and Cultural Office
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MLSA Mutual Logistic Support Agreement
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MNNA Major Non-NATO Ally
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce
MRA Mutual Recognition of Academic Degrees in
Higher Education
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCP National Defense College of the Philippines
NFPC Navotas Fish Port Complex
NPA New People’s Army
OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines
OFWs Overseas Filipino Workers
OPVs Offshore Patrol Vessels
OSTEX Operation Sea Training Exercise
PAGASA Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical
and Astronomical Services
Administration
PCCI Philippine Chamber of Commerce and
Industry
PCYPL Philippine Council of Young Political
Leaders
PD Presidential Decree
PDR Philippine Defense Reform
PETROVIETNAM Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PN Philippine Navy

10. PNOC Philippine National Oil Company
PNP Philippine National Police
PROC/PRC People's Republic of China
RBN Royal Brunei Navy
RMN The Royal Malaysian Navy
ROC Republic of China
RP Republic of the Philippines
RSIM Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
SBMA Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
SCS South China Sea
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SLOC Sea Lines of Communications
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
Tcf Total cubic feet
TECO Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
WB World Bank

11. CHAPTER ONE
International Relations Theory in China:
Evolution and Current State
Introduction
In the context of China’s rise as a global power, it is
imperative to study its current International Relations (IR).
This will give a sense of how it views itself in the global
community. Understanding how it grapples with international
relations at the theoretical level is essential at this juncture
where it plays a pivotal role in shaping the current trends and
future directions of international relations.
This chapter examines the development and current
state of IR in China in the context of its rapid rise as a global
power. It intends to describe the implications of the whole
gamut of issues for analyzing Philippines-China security
relations.
Development of IR Theory in China
Though China is proud of its more than 3,000 years of
civilization, IR as a field of study came much later than in the
West.1
It is interesting to note that as early as 1926, a book on
China’s international relations had been published by a foreign
observer in Shanghai. 2 In 1955, the People’s University of
China established the Foreign Affairs College, which in 2005
became the Foreign Affairs University. It is the only university
in China affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3 The
China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) offers not only
foreign language courses but also those international relations,
diplomacy, international economics and business, international
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12. law, and foreign policy. It offers bachelor’s, master’s and
doctoral degrees in International Relations, International
Politics, Diplomacy, International Economy, English Language
and Literature, Foreign Linguistics and Applied Linguistics,
etc. 4 Since its establishment, the CFAU has published
numerous textbooks such as History of Contemporary
International Relations, History of Modern Diplomacy of
China, Diplomatic Documentation, Deng Xiaoping’s Art of
Diplomacy, An Introduction to Diplomacy, China and the USA,
China’s Diplomacy: A New Presentation, US China Policy and
the Issue of Taiwan, Studies of Legal Issues on Multimodal
Transportation of International Goods, Fourteen Lessons on
Communication, and Economic Diplomacy.5 The CFAU also
has the Institute of International Relations, which focuses on
the IR theory “with Chinese characteristics.”
The 1960s saw the establishment of the international
relations department in key universities in China aside from the
People’s University. In 1963, for example, Peking University
and Fudan University set up their own Department of
International Politics. During the same period, ten research
institutes on international relations were built under the control
and supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the New
China News Agency. 6 These research institutes published
textbooks and journals on international relations and some even
translated the works of Western international relations theorists
like Nicholas Spykman, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan and
Herman Kahn, among others. 7 The People’s Press and the
World Affairs Press have a long-standing reputation of
publishing IR-related books in China. However, no IR theory
was taught in China in the 1960s to the 1970s at the height of
the Cold War. During the prime of ideological propaganda of
the Cold War, IR studies in China were interpretations of
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Stalinism. University IR
courses were offered “just to explain Marxist theories of
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13. imperialism colonialism, national liberation movements, and
war and peace.”8
It was in the 1980s when China started thinking about
IR theoretically with the primordial objective of highlighting
Chinese characteristics. The landmark event was the holding in
1985 of the conference of the China Society of the History of
International Relations, culminating to the publication of the
book entitled Essays on the History of International Relations.
Thereafter, Chinese universities began to offer IR subjects,
which consequently encouraged schools to publish IR
textbooks annotated by Gerald Chan. 9 Though the 1989
Tiananmen Square Incident posed a challenge to IR theory-
building in China because of the negative international image it
projected as a result of what the Chinese government called
“Western propaganda,” theoretical studies on IR continued.
The development of IR theory cannot be understood
without a deep understanding of the evolution of IR studies in
the country. The major milestone in the growth of IR studies
was in 1979 when Chairman Deng Xiaoping enunciated the
policy of opening People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the
world. It is, therefore, not a surprise why IR theory-building
began in the 1980s as a result of the open policy of Chairman
Deng. The end of the cold war in 1989 accelerated IR theory-
building with the enthusiasm of students specializing in
international studies. Professor Wang Jisi of the Institute of
American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
categorized the evolution of IR studies in China in the post-
cold war era into three periods:10
First Period (1989-1991). This was characterized by the
security uncertainties unleashed by the end of the cold war and
the international ramifications of the Tiananmen Incident. The
period also saw the rapid economic growth of Japan and the
phenomenal economic integration of Western Europe. Having
these events as a backdrop, Chinese scholars found it difficult
to engage in IR theorizing as most of them were preoccupied in
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14. observing current and emerging international events. Their
enthusiasm on IR theories never waned as seen through the
translations of the works of well-known IR theorists like
Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffman, Robert Gilpin and Joseph
Nye, Jr.11
Second Period (1992-1998). Wang Jisi (1995)
described this period as the start of “fascinating growth of IR
scholarship in China,” which coincided with the promotion by
the Chinese government of cordial and friendly relations with
key countries in the Asia Pacific and Africa. 12 Though Asia
was disturbed by the harsh impact of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis aggravated by Taiwan’s growing pro-independence
sentiments, IR studies “became increasingly consolidated,
diversified and pluralized.” 13 This led to intense scholarly
discussions on various IR topics like peace and development,
multipolarization, economic globalization, strategic
partnership, international cooperation, international political
economy, security outlook, human rights and international
intervention, the clash of civilizations, democratic peace, and
comprehensive national strength.14
Third Period (1999 – present). The third period
describes the current state of IR studies in China where
scholars discovered new unfamiliar areas in IR. According to
Wang Jisi, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the US spy plane-
Chinese jet air collision in 2001 further increased the
enthusiasm of Chinese scholars on IR issues not seriously
discussed before. These issues are ethnic relations and tensions,
the impact of religion on world politics, comparative party
politics, crisis management, domestic sources of foreign policy,
human rights diplomacy, the role of the media in IR, mutual
images and perceptions between nations, and other topics like
good governance, non-governmental organizations, new
peoples’ organizations and civil society.15
Though Wang claimed that Chinese scholars have a
tradition of attaching great importance to IR theories, he
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15. underscored that IR theorizing in China is different from IR
theorizing in the West in terms of content, discourse and
approach. Thus, Chinese scholars attempted to develop IR
theories with “Chinese characteristics.” Professor Liang
Shoude of Peking University was the leading IR scholar who
argued for the development of IR theory with Chinese
characteristics to challenge other IR theories that were
constructed and developed to “serve the Western countries.”
As mentioned previously, Professor Song Xinning, a Professor
of International Relations at the Renmin University of China
(also known as the People’s University of China), also
advanced the idea of building an IR theory with Chinese
characteristics. Professor Yiwei Wang of Fudan University
stressed the end of IR theories of the West and the rise of the
Chinese school. 16 Yiwei Wang summarized his arguments in
the following words:
International Relations (IR) is both a
science and an art: The unity of object and
subject. Traditional International Relations
Theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an
attempt to become the universal science. IRT
developed into a class doctrine that defends the
legitimacy of Western International System as a
result of proceeding from the reality of IR while
neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking
the meaning of art and the presence of multi-
international systems. In other words, IRT have
turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed
as the Vulgar International Relations Theories
(VIRT). Thus, the end of international relations
theories. This phenomenon will be negated by
the so-called Chinese School, which will set the
sustainable and harmonious relations among
nations, between state and non-state actors, and
within states and non-state actors (in one word
“global-society”) in five life-forces of economy,
politics, military, culture and religion.
Consequently, this will bring about a real
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16. regression of nationality and compatible
development of various international systems.17
Current State of IR Theory in China
According to Song Xinning (2001), there are three
major groups of IR scholars in China: a) Researchers in
institutes under various government agencies, who focus more
on policy-oriented studies to justify government policies and
provide policy reports to the government; b) University
professors and researchers who concentrate more on theoretical
and general IR studies; and, c) Researchers in the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and various academies
of social sciences at the provincial level, who conduct both
activities of the first two groups.
Despite the efforts of these three groups, Xinning
lamented that IR theory in China remains backward compared
to IR theory-building in North America and Europe. He,
however, expressed hopes for progress because of increasing
interests in IR theory in China both by Chinese and foreign
scholars. Since the 1980s, IR as a field of scientific inquiry has
grown dramatically amidst ideological constraints and political
inhibitions.18 The 1990s saw the publication of some excellent
books on IR theory. In 1998, Wang Yizhou published a book,
The Discipline of International Politics in the West: History
and Theory19 while Zi Zhongyun published the Explorations of
Theories of International Politics in China.20 In 1999, Lu Yi,
Gu Guanfu, Yu Zhengliang, and Fu Yaozu edited a volume
entitled Research on International Relations Theories in
China’s New Era.21 These publications strongly demonstrate
that intense discussions on IR theory have been taking place in
China. Professor Alastair Ian Johnson of Harvard University
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17. observed that Chinese IRT has gone through three stages or
three styles of IR theorizing in China: traditional, realist and
social scientific stages.22
Traditional stage or style, which became predominant
in the 1960s and 1970s, views theory not as an explanatory
device but more of a guiding philosophy. As a guiding
philosophy, “it was politically important to get this ‘theory’
right.”23 It means that “the correctness of theory rested in its
consistency with the political interests of the state as defined by
the CCP. Theory was both positivist in the sense that it rested
on understanding objective laws of historical development (the
legacy of historical materialism in PRC scholarship), but it was
also normative in the sense that what was often cast as an
objective process was, in fact, desired by China’s leaders.”24
The realist stage or style, which became popular in the
1980s and early 1990s, saw some Chinese scholars abandoning
the traditional style of IR theorizing with the waning of
ideological influence of Marxism. During this stage, some
Chinese scholars, particularly the younger ones, were attracted
to realist schools advanced by Hans Morgenthau and Henry
Kissinger. These younger IR Chinese scholars expressed their
dissatisfaction over the idea of an IR theory with Chinese
characteristics arguing that this is “backward” and it isolates
Chinese scholars from Western IR discourses. 25 This
theoretical debate among Chinese scholars has positive effects
in terms of acquiring a “higher level of awareness of the meta-
theoretical issues behind social sciences, and the need to think
more systematically about ontology what is researchable) and
epistemology (how to research it).”26
The social scientific stage refers to events of the mid
1990s when some Chinese scholars became more conscious
about “understanding and situating Chinese research in
relationship to US and Western IR theory.”27 There are three
major sources of this “turn to theory.” The first was a group of
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18. Chinese scholars who returned to China after acquiring IR
education in the US and Western Europe. These returning
scholars who were required to teach IR in China “brought with
them their specific training in theory and methods which they
passed on to their students.”28 The second was the translation
into Chinese major classic IR works of Western theorists like
Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, Peter Katzenstein, Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye. The third was the entrepreneurship
of a key group of younger IR scholars in Beijing and Shanghai
who took over the editing of IR journals and book series.29
According to Johnson, though there is the current
growth of IR theory consciousness in China, explicit theorizing
is still relatively new in the PRC. In fact, in IR studies in
China, there are more discussions on current international
events than on IR theory.
Is There an IR Theory With Chinese Characteristics?
Though at present there is an increasing interest on IR
theory in China, which encourages other scholars to develop an
IR theory with Chinese characteristics, the state remains
nascent or embryonic. Even in the more specific area of
foreign policy, the scientific theory and method are still new.30
William A. Callahan (2001) expressed doubts about the
existence of IR theory with Chinese characteristics.31 Professor
Qin Yaqing contended that China is yet to develop a Chinese
IRT. He identified three reasons why there had been no
Chinese IRT, to wit:
There is not yet a Chinese international
relations theory (IRT) mainly due to three factors: the
unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’ in the
traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the
Western IR discourse in the Chinese academic
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19. community, and the absence of a consistent theoretical
core in the Chinese IR research. A Chinese IRT is likely
and even inevitable to emerge along with the great
economic and social transformation that China has
been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the
Chinese intellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview
and the Tributary System in the two millennia of
China' history, the radical thinking and revolutions in
s
the nineteenth and twentieth century, and reform and
opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of
China' ideational and practical development and
s
therefore could provide rich nutrition for a Chinese
IRT. In addition, a Chinese IRT is likely to develop
around the core problematic of China' identity vis-à-
s
vis international society, a century-long puzzle for the
Chinese and the world alike.32
One of the major reasons why IR theory remains
undeveloped in China is that there is no fully developed IR
research institutions in the PRC that are academically
independent from state institutions. 33 Most IR research
institutions are regulated by the government whose principal
interests are not in theories but in strategies and tactics. IR-
related research works and studies are heavily influenced by
the state’s demand to justify its present political ideology and
strengthen its current foreign policy. According to Gustaaf
Geeraerts and Men Jing (2001), “if social scientists pay much
attention to what the government requires, they will not be
scientists but rather aides and staff to government officials.”34
This argument was reinforced by Wang Jisi (1995) who
underscored that without academic independence in the field of
IR, there can be no scientific theory.35 IR theories developed by
Western scholars will continue to be used by Chinese
counterparts to analyze PRC foreign policy strategy and its
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20. place in the international community.36 Even China’s security
practice will still be analyzed within the prism of Western
theories.37 With the rise of China as global superpower, some
scholars argued that China can present a challenge to existing
international relations theory.38
Summary and Conclusion
Though China can be proud of its 3,000 years of
civilization with excellent statecraft on foreign relations, IR
theory remains undeveloped. It was only in the 1950s when
serious academic interests on IR began. IR as a field of study
became more popular in 1979 during its economic opening.
The end of the cold further accelerated the interests of scholars
on IR studies. Yet, IR theorizing continues to be nascent
because of limited academic independence of IR research
institutions. The government is more interested in strategy
development and foreign policy-making rather than on theory-
building. Without greater academic independence in the field
of IR, scholars will find it difficult to develop their own IR
theory.
3)
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21. CHAPTER TWO
A Philippine Perspective on China-US-ASEAN Security
Relations39
Introduction
To maintain regional stability and promote regional
security, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)
has been constructively engaging all major powers in the Asia
Pacific. This has been manifested in ASEAN’s dynamic
dialogue partnerships with Australia, Canada, China, India,
Japan, Russia, and the United States. ASEAN also has dialogue
partnerships with the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and some
regional and international organizations.
Among its dialogue partners, ASEAN relations with
China and the US are considered to be the most challenging
because of the prevailing perception that the security of the
Asia Pacific region, as well as of Southeast Asia, rests
enormously upon the status of China-US relations.40 The two
major powers are also seriously competing for influence in
Southeast Asia,41 which test the ability of ASEAN to deal with
the rising dragon and the American eagle. 42 Being a founder
member of ASEAN, the Philippines also confronts the
formidable challenge on how to engage the rising China
without creating unnecessary discomforts with its American
security ally.
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22. This chapter presents a Philippine perspective of China-
US-ASEAN relations in the post-9/11 world. It starts with the
discussion of the background of China-US-ASEAN relations
during the cold war followed by an analysis on the status of
these trilateral relations after 9/11. It then examines the
implications of China-US-ASEAN relations on Philippine
foreign and security policy towards China.
Background on China-US-ASEAN Relations
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN foreign policy
has always been influenced by the behaviors of major
powers.43 Southeast Asia became the fulcrum of major power
rivalries in the Asia Pacific. During the cold war, the founding
members ASEAN sided with the Western powers to contain
the spread of communism in the region.
Among the Western powers, the US became the most
important partner of ASEAN in preventing communist
expansionism in Southeast Asia. In fact, "support for and
cooperation with ASEAN is a linchpin of American Pacific
Policy" during the cold war in order to protect ASEAN states
from falling to communist rule. 44 The US also entered into
military alliances with Thailand and the Philippines to support
American regional security strategy in Southeast Asia. It even
attempted to form a NATO-type security organization in
Southeast Asia in 1955 through the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO). SEATO met its untimely demise
when it was dissolved in 1977. Nonetheless, the US remained
committed to security in Southeast Asia through its existing
military alliance with Thailand and the Philippines.
During the cold war, ASEAN viewed China as an
ideological enemy. 45 Beijing’s support to the communist
insurgency movements in Southeast Asia created negative
feelings and hostility towards China among the non-communist
93
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23. Southeast Asian states. 46 In fact, none of ASEAN founding
members had normal relations with China in the 1960s. 47
ASEAN-China security relations improved in the late 1970s
when Southeast Asian countries normalized their relations with
the People’s Republic of China (PROC). China’s security
relations with ASEAN improved further in the 1980s when
Beijing rallied behind ASEAN in opposing Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia.48
With the end of the cold war, the ideological conflict
among the major powers subsided. The interests of major
powers on ASEAN persisted, as they re-defined their interests
in the region. ASEAN, on the other hand, deliberately pursued
a post-cold war strategy of engaging all major powers though
bilateral and multilateral means. A scholar called this strategy
“omni-enmeshment,” which refers to the process of engaging
an actor or entity to draw it into deep involvement into a
system or community, enveloping it in a web of sustained
exchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim of
integration.”49
Meanwhile, the post-cold war period increased tensions
between the US and China. With the disintegration of the
former Soviet Union, the US was freed of a former archrival.
American attention was then focused on China considered by
many Western security analysts as a great threat to the security
of the world. 50 Though China resisted this perception, the
Tiananmen Incident in 1989 created a negative image of China
in the world. American security analysts viewed China as the
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24. “great American foreign policy problem in the 21st century”51
and a “potential peer competitor to the U.S. in world affairs.”52
News reports and experts’ analysis demonizing China
dominated Western literature after 1989. The EP-3 incident in
April 2001 exacerbated the negative view about China.
This “aura of tragedy” surrounding US-China security
relations in the post-cold war era resonated strongly in
ASEAN. 53 Though ASEAN carried an ambivalent view of
China after the cold war and was aware of American
preeminent power in the Asia Pacific, the fragile China-US
security relations was a source of security concern in Southeast
Asia.54
China’s assertive attitude in the South China Sea since
the 1990s left a negative effect in China-ASEAN relations.
China recovered from this when it played a constructive role in
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Since then, China’s image in
ASEAN dramatically improved while American image
deteriorated since it left Clark and Subic in 1992.55 China’s
negative image in Southeast Asia resurfaced in 2011 when
PRC displayed anew its assertive attitude in the South China
Sea.
Though the US continued to be the most important
security partner of ASEAN (particularly of the founding
members), China’s effective “charm offensive”56 of Southeast
Asia marked by American “neglect” of the region in the late
1990s, made ASEAN relations with US and China tilting in
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25. favor of the latter. 57 It was argued that US relations with
ASEAN became problematic in the 1990s because “ASEAN’s
interests and concerns have never been a major consideration
in the formulation of US policy towards the Asia-Pacific
region.”58
China-US-ASEAN Relations after 9/11
The 9/11 event served as a significant milestone in
China-US-ASEAN relations. After a decade of neglect, the US
declared Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the global war
on terrorism. This occurred amidst China’s strengthening
relationship with ASEAN after 9/11.
While the US reinvigorated its security alliance with the
Philippines, strengthened military relations with Thailand,
improved defense relations with Indonesia and Malaysia and
enhanced strategic partnership with Singapore in the aftermath
of 9/11 using its “hard power,” China also improved its
bilateral ties with Southeast Asian states and deepened its
dialogue partnership with ASEAN using its “soft power”
diplomacy. 59 This was reinforced by a new policy of
multilateralism which created a benign image of Beijing in
ASEAN.60 On the other hand, American use of “hard power”
aggravated by a strategy of unilateralism isolated itself from
Southeast Asian affairs.61
To assure ASEAN that China’s international behavior
was peaceful and constructive, it signed in 2002 the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
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26. (DOC) and acceded in 2003 to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC). The US upholds its neutral position
on the South China Sea disputes and has not ratified the TAC.
Though the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia brought
renewed US attention to ASEAN, Washington failed to match
Beijing’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia. There is even
the view that the US was so preoccupied in Iraq and
Afghanistan that it exhibited a strategic neglect of Southeast
Asia.
While China was busy forging economic ties with
ASEAN countries using its soft power, the US was using its
hard power, hunting for so-called terrorist personalities in
Southeast Asia associated with Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This shift in China-
ASEAN relations affected not only American interests but also
the US status in the region.62
The post-9/11 era was a period of China’s tactical gain
in ASEAN vis a vis the US.63 China’s soft power re-emergence
in Southeast Asia resulted in a dramatic change of ASEAN
states’ attitude towards the PROC – they are now “less-biased,
less anti-communist and less anti-Beijing.” 64 On the other
hand, American assertiveness to use its hard power to achieve
political and strategic ends in the global war on terrorism has
created dissent and anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia. 65
Though ASEAN needs American presence to balance China’s
growing influence in the region, it detests American
predominance. ASEAN also expressed disappointment that the
US after 9/11 has become less consensual and more coercive.66
This is in stark contrast with China, which has become more
consultative, cooperative and socializing in the aftermath of
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27. 9/11. 67 Now, ASEAN no longer views China as a threat.
Though the rise of China poses security challenges in
Southeast Asia, ASEAN regards Beijing as a partner in
regional security. 68 This new reality in China-US-ASEAN
relations endangered American primacy in Southeast Asia.69
Implications for Philippine Foreign and Security Policy
Towards China in the Post-9/11 World
The growing China-ASEAN ties unleashed profound
effects on Philippine policy towards China. While 9/11
resulted in the reinvigoration of Philippine-American security
relations,70 it also led to the enhancement of Philippines-China
defense and military cooperation.71Since the establishment of
Philippines-China diplomatic ties in 1975, both countries have
gone a long way in their relations. After 9/11, Philippines-
China relations became comprehensive. In 2005, in fact, the
Philippines and China celebrated the 30th anniversary of the
establishment of Philippines-China diplomatic relations.
According to Chinese President Hu Jintao who visited the
Philippines that year, the 30th anniversary represented the
“golden-age” of Philippines-China relations. That year was
also a landmark period in both countries’ bilateral relations as
);
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28. they launched the First Philippines-China Defense and Security
Dialogue in May 2005. 72 The Philippines even played the
China card when Manila’s relations with Washington cooled
off in 2004 as a result of the withdrawal of Filipino troops in
Iraq.73 Conservative analysts in Washington regretted the fact
that China’s relations with the Philippines improved amidst the
crisis in Philippines-American relations, to wit:
China has developed and refined a policy of
helping regimes in trouble by offering considerable
political and economic support. This will become true
for the Philippines, as China moves away from
threatening rhetoric on territorial disputes in the South
China Sea and employs a new approach. Beijing
offered Manila $3 million for the establishment of a
Chinese language-training program for the Philippine
military, donated engineering equipment, and invited
the Philippines to participate in naval exercises.
Moreover, in the midst of stern U.S. criticism of the
withdrawal of the Philippine medical team from Iraq,
President Arroyo signed a confidential protocol with
China on the exploitation of South China Sea
resources. With her presidency in dire straits, Arroyo
will gladly accept more largesse from Beijing.74
To understand the post-9/11 Philippine foreign and
security policy towards China, there is also a need to
comprehend ASEAN policy in the post-9/11 era. The
improvement of China’s security relations with ASEAN
provided a conducive regional environment for the Philippines
to improve its foreign and security policy towards China.
ASEAN’s benign attitude towards China in the post-9/11 era
created a kindly attitude of the Philippines towards China, even
if Manila is known in ASEAN as Pentagon’s long-standing
security ally in Southeast Asia. China-US-ASEAN political
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29. and security dynamics greatly informed Philippine foreign and
security policy towards China in the post-9/11 world.
In the midst of the strategic uncertainty of the security
environment in the post-cold-war/ post-9/11 era, ASEAN faced
the dilemma of balancing its relations with China and the US.
Rather than pursuing a balancing act in traditional realist terms,
ASEAN, instead, adopted a strategy of what scholars of
international relations called “soft-balancing.” 75 This concept
departs from “hard balancing,” which requires the formation of
military alliances. According to the traditional realist
conception of hard balancing, ASEAN should side with the
weak to balance the strong. However, “ASEAN did not act
this way; it rejected the strategy of balancing against the
stronger power because it saw the stronger power (the United
States) as less of a threat than the weaker but rising power
(China or Japan).” 76 There is also view of hard balancing,
which contends that states form or join military alliances to
counter-check the rise of a new power. 77 In the case of Asia,
this new power may refer to China. Instead of “hard balancing”
China, ASEAN states were soft-balancing China by welcoming
American presence but at the same time engaging the new
power. One school of international relations calls this approach
as “bandwagoning” that is “crouching under” rather than
“containing” the new power. 78 Bandwagoning is a form of
acceptance of “a subordinate role to the dominant power in
exchange for material or ideational gain.” 79 It is argued that
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30. instead of balancing, ASEAN is, in fact, bandwagoning with
China.80
There is the view, however, that balancing and
bandwagoning “may not fully account for the range of
strategies state actors adopt to preserve and promote their
interests.” 81 To accurately explain ASEAN relations with
China and the US, scholars of Southeast Asian security affairs
adopted the concept of “hedging strategy.” It is defined as “a
purposeful act in which a state seeks to ensure its long term
interests by placing its policy bets on multiple counteracting
options designed to offset risks embedded in the international
system.”82 In the context of China-ASEAN relations, hedging
has five components: economic-pragmatism, binding
engagement, limited-bandwagoning, dominance-denial and
indirect-balancing.83
ASEAN strategy of hedging with China and the United
States also explains Philippine foreign and security policy
towards the two major powers. Instead of strictly balancing or
bandwagoning with the two powers, the Philippines is hedging.
Though the Philippines comprehensively engages China, it also
maintains its security alliance with the US. Like ASEAN, the
Philippines is relating with China and the US to get the best of
both worlds. More of China in the Philippines does not mean
less of the United States. As rightly underscored by then
Philippine foreign affairs Secretary Teofisto Guingona, “In our
relations with an old friend, China, and with a perennial ally,
the United States, we Filipinos should be guided by one sure
canon: national interests.”84
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31. Summary and Conclusion
ASEAN adopted a strategy of constructively engaging
all major powers in the Asia Pacific. Among the great powers,
ASEAN relations with China and the US are considered to be
the most challenging.
During the cold war, ASEAN sided with US to contain
the spread of communism. ASEAN had animosity China at
that time because of its support to communist insurgency. After
the cold war, however, China’s relations with ASEAN
dramatically improved. The US, on the other hand,
strategically neglected Southeast Asia. After 9/11, China-
ASEAN relations improved further, despite American
declaration of Southeast Asia as its second front in the global
war on terrorism.
In the post-9/11 era, ASEAN adopted a hedging
strategy towards China and the US. Consistent with the
ASEAN strategy, the Philippines also pursued a foreign and
security policy towards China and the US on the basis of
hedging. ASEAN’s hedging strategy informs Philippine
foreign and security policy towards China.

32. CHAPTER THREE
Philippine Policy in the South China Sea: Implications for
Philippines-China Security Relations85
Introduction
In March 2008, the Philippines and China faced a
serious controversy concerning the implementation of Joint
Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in the South China Sea.
The JMSU, signed in Manila on 14 March 2005, is a tripartite
agreement among the petroleum companies of China, the
Philippines and Vietnam that requires the three countries to
conduct joint marine seismic explorations of the designated
area in the Spratly Island. Both houses of the Philippine
Congress urged for an investigation of the deal to examine the
culpability of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for possible
violation of the Constitution, which is, under the Philippine
law, a grave offense that can lead to impeachment.
The JMSU raised many collateral issues that have
bearings on Philippine position in the South China Sea and on
the status of Philippines-China security relations. The
controversy demonstrated that the South China Sea dispute
remains a lingering challenge in Philippines-China relations in
the post-9/11 world. This challenge not only affects
Philippines-China security relations but it also has impact on
regional security.
This chapter re-examines Philippine foreign and
security policy on the South China Sea in the light of the JMSU
scandal. It describes the strategic significance of the South
China Sea in Philippine foreign and security policy and
analyzes its implications for Philippines-China security
relations. It concludes with a discussion on how to manage the
dispute in the South China through what many analysts call
“cooperative management regime.”
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33. The South China Sea in Philippine Foreign and Security
Policy86
There is an avalanche of literature on the South China
Sea, one of the largest bodies of waters in the world after the
five major oceans. 87 Located in the Pacific, it encompasses
areas from the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Strait measuring
around 3,500,000 km.² The South China Sea is composed of
four major groups of islands, namely the Pratas Islands, the
Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands.88
Ownership of these islands has been contested by several
claimants for various reasons including among others historic
rights, discovery, effective occupation and sovereign
jurisdiction provided for by the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the SEA (UNCLOS). Since the South China Sea is
a strategic waterways surrounded by rich marine resources as
well as oil and gas potential, the area is marred by international
diplomatic disputes that, if not effectively managed, can
escalate into military conflicts.89 The South China Sea Dispute
has been creating a security anxiety for being one of the
flashpoints of conflict in the Asia Pacific.90
Among these groups of islands, the most controversial
is the Spratlys having been claimed in whole by China and
Taiwan and in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnam. Indonesia, though strictly not a claimant state, is an
important stakeholder in the on-going conflict in the Spratlys
because of its overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
with other claimants, particularly its Gas Field in Natuna Island
being contested by China and Taiwan.
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34. The Philippines is claiming parts of the Spratlys that belong
to what it calls the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). The KIG lies
in the Western section of the Spratlys. It is composed of 53
islands, islets, reefs, shoals, cays, rocks, and atolls with an area
of 64,976 square miles. The biggest island in the KIG is Pag-
asa (Hope), more internationally known as Thi Tu Island. The
Philippines has also occupied the following islands:
• Patag -Flat Island (Feixin Dao)
• Lawak -Nanshan Island (Mahuan Dao)
• Likas -West York Island (Xiyue Dao)
• Panata -Lankiam Cay (Shuanghuang Shazhou)
• Kota -Loaita Island (Nanyue Dao)
• Rizal Reef -Commodore Reef (Siling Jiao)
The Philippine government laid its claim in the South
China Sea in 1947, a year after the Philippines gained its
independence from the United States. During that time, the
Philippine government described the Spratlys as the “New
Southern Islands.” Then Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary
Carlos P. Garcia requested the Allied Forces to put the “New
Southern Islands” under Philippine jurisdiction for security
reasons. The Philippines asserted its sovereignty to the KIG
before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in the
1950s. Since 1968, the Philippine military has occupied and
administered at least eight of the islands in the KIG.
On 11 June 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
signed Presidential Decree No. 1596 declaring the KIG as a
municipality of Palawan. PD 1596 reflects the Philippine
policy position on this claim when it stated that the KIG “does
not belong to any state or nation, but, by reason of history,
indispensable need, and effective occupation and control
established in accordance with international law, such areas
must not be deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of
the Philippines.” It has also declared the area as vital to the
security and economic survival of the Philippines. Since then,
residents of KIG have been holding local elections there to
demonstrate Philippine sovereignty in the area. 91 The
Philippines recognizes the fact that there are other claimants on
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35. the KIG. PD 1596 articulates the Philippine perspective on this
matter when it said that “while other state have laid claims to
some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonment
and cannot prevail over that of the Philippines on legal,
historical, and equitable grounds.”
Another basis of Philippine claim of the KIG is the
principle of terra nullius. This principle states that the islands
being claimed by the Philippines are owned by no one and
without a sovereign authority. The discovery and occupation
of Filipino navigator Tomas Cloma of around 33 islands, cays,
sandbars and coral reefs in the South China Sea on 15 May
1956 provided the Philippines a historical justification of the
claim. The Filipino navigator collectively called these islands
and islets as Free Territory of the Freedomland. In 1956,
Cloma wrote to Garcia to inform him of the occupation of the
islands, which were described, as outside of Philippine waters
but not within the jurisdiction of any country. When the
Philippine media publicized the Philippine claim, China,
France, South Vietnam, the Netherlands and Taiwan reportedly
laid their respective claims to this group of islands. 92
Eventually, France and the Netherlands dropped their claims.
The Philippines also laid its claim on the basis of the
principle of proximity and the principle of the 200-nautical
mile EEZ embodied in the UNCLOS. The Philippines argues
that the KIG falls within the EEZ of the Philippine archipelago.
The final basis of the Philippines is the principle of the
continental shelf. The KIG lies in the continental shelf abutting
the Western boundaries of Palawan Province. 93 Filipino
geologists argued that Palawan is a mini-continent. On the
basis of geological evidences, the KIG belongs to the
continental shelf of Palawan. PD 1596 asserts this basis of
claim when it states that the KIG “is part of the continental
margin of the Philippine archipelago.”
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36. Strategic Significance of the South China Sea in Philippine
Foreign and Security Policy
The South China Sea is strategically significant for the
Philippines because of the following considerations: a) The
politics of oil; b) The geopolitics of navigation; and c) The
politics of marine resources.
The Politics of Oil. It has been projected that oil
consumption in Asia will going to increase dramatically in the
next few decades. Over the next 20 years, oil consumption
among developing Asian countries will rise by 4 percent
annually.94 If the current oil demand persists, oil consumption
in Asia will double in 2020. Though the Philippines only
represents 1.2 percent of the total oil consumption in Asia, its
oil production is extremely limited making the country heavily
dependent on oil imports.
Due to the development of new offshore deepwater oil
deposits, the Philippines experienced a modest increase in oil
production in 2007 estimated at 23 thousand barrels per day
(bbl/d). 95 The Malampaya Project is the country’s largest
natural gas development project. Nonetheless, the Philippines
continue to rely on imported oil, particularly from the Middle
East, to meet the increasing domestic demand. This situation
encourages the country to consider the South China Sea as an
alternative source of its power supply.
There are conflicting claims on the oil potential of the
South China Sea. Based on the research conducted by Chinese
experts, the total gas resources of the South China Sea can
reach 900 Tcf with an annual production of 1.8 Tcf. Other
sources indicate that the potential oil resources of the South
China Sea are 213 billion barrels. In the 1995 study conducted
by Russia's Research Institute of Geology of Foreign
Countries, there were around 6 billion barrels of oil in the
Spratly Islands, of which 70 percent would be natural gas.96 It
had also been estimated that the hydrocarbon resource potential
of the Spratlys area fall into the very broad range of between
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37. one and 17.7 million tons of oil. 97 Despite these competing
estimates, the South China Sea is perceived to be “oil rich,”
Chinese media described the area as the “Second Persian
Gulf.”
Table 1. Oil and Natural Gas Potential in the South China
Sea
Countries Proven Oil Proven Gas Oil Production Gas
Reserves Reserves (Barrels/Day) Production
(Billion (Trillion (Billion
Barrels) Cubic Feet) Cubic Feet
Brunei 1.35 14.1 145,000 340
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0 0
China* 1 3.5 290,000 141
Indonesia* 0.2 29.7 46,000 0
Malaysia 3.9 79.8 645,000 1,300
Philippines 0.2 2.7 <1,000 0
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0 0
Taiwan <0.01 2.7 <1,000 30
Thailand 0.3 7.0 59,000 482
Viet Nam 0.6 6.0 180,000 30
Total 7.5 145.5 1,367,000 2323
Source: GlobalSecurity.Org, “Oil and Gas in the South China Sea,” 2008.
Among the claimants in the Spratlys, the Philippines
has been to be the most active in licensing exploration
activities. As stated earlier, the Malampaya Natural Gas to
Power Project is its largest venture that started to sell gas in
January 2002. The Malampaya Gas Field has proven to be a
source of 3.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas with 118 million
barrels of condensate.
Geopolitics of Navigation. The South China is one the
world’s maritime superhighways. More than 50 percent of the
world’s supertanker traffic passes through the South China Sea.
Annually, almost half of the world’s merchant fleets sail
through the South China Sea.
According to US Energy Information Administration,
“tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca at the
southwestern end of the South China Sea is more than three
times greater than Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times
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38. more than the Panama Canal.”98 Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOCs) in the South China Sea are therefore a matter of life
and death for the Asia Pacific countries considering that around
41,000 ships use its waterways. 99 The South China Sea is a
strategic waterway as it also provides the key maritime link
between the Indian Ocean and East Asia.100
Figure 1. South China Sea
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2008.
As an archipelagic state, the Philippines heavily
depends on the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea
for its development and survival. With a total coastline of
17,500 km, of which 1,200 km face in the South China Sea, the
Philippines has enormous interest in the maritime security of
SLOCs in the area considering that around 400,00 fishing
vessels and 20,000 other commercial vessels navigate in
Philippine waters. 101 However, almost one third of the
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39. country’s sea lanes are found to be “unsafe” for navigation.
Moreover, shippers and mariners do not use the Philippine sea
lanes is extensively as the Strait of Malacca and the South
China because voyages in the Philippine waters take longer.
Thus, the Philippines has to pursue its claims in the busy
waterways of the Spratlys to promote its navigational rights.
Politics of Marine Resources. Marine scientists
contend that the South China Sea is rich in marine resources. It
is described as “the center of maritime generic richness and
diversity in the world” with a macro-ecosystem characterized
by “high bio-diversity and fisheries productivity” due to the
“intrinsic connectivity of coral reefs, sea-grass, and mangrove
forests.”102 The United Nations Atlas of the Oceans declares
the South China Sea as Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) with
the world’s highest level of bio-diversity.103
Since the South China Sea is the locus of complex
ecological connectivities, the area is considered a “savings
bank” of all claimant states.104 Marine production in the area
represents 12 percent of the total marine global production.105
Culture fisheries, in fact, contribute 54 percent of worldwide
culture production. 106 Due to its rich marine endowments,
claimants, including the Philippines, are competing for control
of the fishing area of the South China Sea. The situation is
aggravated by the overlapping EEZ not only among claimants
but also other littoral states of the South China Sea.
In the study of Pakjuta Khemakorn of the United
Nations – The Nippon Foundation, “The average per capita
consumption of fish in East and Southeast Asia during the
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40. period 2000-2003 was 26.1 kg/year. This is much higher than
the world average of 16.3 kg/year.” 107 Khemakorn also writes:
Fisheries also contribute to the employment and
income of millions of people in the region. In 1994, the
estimated numbers of full and part-time fishers engaged
in marine and inland fisheries were 8.7 million and 1.7
million, respectively. According to FAO, around 85
percent of the world' fishers are concentrated in Asia,
s
particularly in the SCS region, compared to 77 percent
in 1970. China has the largest number of fishers
followed by Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. In
total, at least 31 million people are engaged in the
fisheries sector (including aquaculture) and related
industries in the region.
Fisheries, therefore, play a very vital role in the
food and economic security littoral states in the South
China Sea.
The South China Disputes After 9/11: A Continuing
Challenge in Philippines-China Relations
With the politics of oil, geopolitics of navigation and
politics of marine resources, there is no doubt that the South
China Sea is a continuing security challenge in Philippines-
China relations even after 9/11 with significant impact on the
security of Southeast Asia and its neighboring regions. Though
both countries are parties to the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea, which, according to a study, is
a product of de-escalation of dispute in the area,108 competing
claims on the ownership of the islands continue to be a source
of security anxieties not only between the Philippines and
China but also other claimants and stakeholders in the conflict.
One of the main sources of controversies involving the
Philippines and China over the issue of the South China Sea
was the JMSU scandal. Though Vietnam was part of the
JMSU, the issue primarily involved the Philippines and China
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41. because of domestic political dynamics in Manila. The three
petroleum companies of the three countries signed the JMSU
on 14 March 2005 in Manila in order to undertake joint marine
seismic exploration of designated areas in the Spratlys. The
three countries regarded the JMSU as a significant step in the
implementation of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea. It is a manifestation of pragmatic
cooperation in the South China Sea in order to promote peace,
stability and development of the contested area.
The original JMSU only signed between the Philippines
and China on 1 September 2004 as part of their efforts to
enhance their bilateral relations. Vietnam protested for being
excluded in the initiative. Being a strong claimant, the
Philippines and China accommodated Vietnam after less than a
year of negotiations that led to the signing of the tripartite
agreement.
China described the JMSU as “landmark agreement”
while the Philippines called it a “historic breakthrough.”
According to President Arroyo, "This is a historic event
because it is the first, it is the breakthrough in implementing
the provisions of the code of conduct in the South China Sea
among ASEAN and China to turn the South China Sea into an
area of cooperation rather than an area of conflict." Arroyo
added, "It is not only a diplomatic breakthrough for peace and
security in the region, but also for our energy independence
program because one of the elements of this program is to
work on strategic alliances with friends and allies so that we
can have more supply of energy for the region and our
country.” A $15 million budget was allotted for the
implementation of the JMSU for a period of three years
covering 2005 to 2008.
However, the JMSU was put in the cloud of
controversy in the Philippines because of the allegation that the
Philippine government sold out parts of its territory to China in
exchange of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The
short article written by Barry Wain triggered the scandal. Wain
criticized President Arroyo for her “bungle in the South China
Sea.”109 He argued that President Arroyo entered into “unequal
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42. and surreptitious” agreement with China, which lawmakers in
Manila linked with a $329 million contract with the Chinese
company, the ZTE, for a national broadband network. What
made the JMSU highly suspicious was the lack of transparency
in the agreement. The JMSU was “shrouded in secrecy” and
broke ranks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), which “was dealing with China as a bloc on the
South China Sea issue.” He contended that:
President Arroyo’s agreement with China for a
joint seismic study was controversial in several
respects. By not consulting other ASEAN members
beforehand, the Philippines abandoned the collective
stance that was key to the group’s success with China
over the South China Sea. Ironically, it was Manila that
first sought a united front and rallied ASEAN to
confront China over its intrusion into Mischief Reef a
decade earlier. Sold the idea by politicians with
business links who have other deals going with the
Chinese, Ms. Arroyo did not seek the views of her
foreign ministry.110
With the allegation that the Philippines has soften its
claim in the South China Sea in favor of a multi-million dollar
loan package from China, Congressman Roilo Golez
sponsored an inquiry into the alleged anomalous agreement and
argued that if found guilty of treason, President Arroyo should
be held accountable and be subjected to impeachment
procedure. 111 Golez said that the JMSU was illegal and
unconstitutional because it did not pass the approval of the
Philippine Congress.
Government officials contended that the JMSU did not
violate the Philippine Constitution and it was intended to ease
the country’s dependence on imported oil.112 Local officials in
Palawan even expressed support to the JMSU arguing that this
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43. “will open the gates for us to really know the resources we
have.” 113 Moreover, the Philippine government exclaimed that
the JMSU was a tripartite commercial agreement among three
oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam. The
agreement was not “a sell-out” of Philippine territory as the
JMSU did not alter the territorial claims of three parties. The
Philippine government also explained that the JMSU was an
exemplary confidence building measure (CBM) to convert the
region of conflict in the South China into a region of peace and
cooperation.
The heat on the JSMU scandal slowed down when it
expired in June 2008. The Philippine government organized a
committee headed by the Department of Foreign Affairs to
look into the possibility of extending the JMSU for mutual
benefits of all parties concerned.114 Despite the controversy, the
Philippine government remained steadfast in its position that
the JMSU was needed to manage the South China Sea Dispute
peacefully.
Managing the South China Sea Disputes: Towards A
Cooperative Management Regime?
After 9/11, Philippines-China relations improved
tremendously based on the various agreements the two
governments entered into in various fields. Their bilateral
relations also became comprehensive when they started their
defense and security dialogue in 2005 and enthusiastically
pursued thereafter a series of exchange visits of their military
and security officials.
The JMSU scandal also demonstrated that their bilateral
security relations remain fragile and the issues of territorial
integrity in the South China Sea continue to be a sensitive issue
in their bilateral relations.
There have been many proposals to peacefully manage
the South China Sea Dispute. One proposal is through a
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44. functionalist approach where claimants will start cooperating in
non-political aspects of the issue to “put under the rag” all
sensitive issues that trigger conflict. 115 Another is through
“joint development”, which inspires the JMSU. 116 There is
also a concept of “sharing the resources” of the South China
Sea as a peaceful option.117
The most recent is called “cooperative management
regime” (CMR) conceptualized in 2007 in an international
conference in Singapore organized by the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies of Nanyang Technological
University.118 Apparently influenced by a “Regime Theory” in
international relations, the CMR is consistent with the
functionalist option in upholding the idea of functional
cooperation to manage conflict in the South China Sea. Though
the CMR remains embryonic in its conceptualization with little
clarity and coherence, it urged claimants to engage in
cooperation in non-traditional security as part of the over-all
CBM and trust building in the South China Sea. The CMR is
deemed to be alternative “conflict-avoidance” approach for the
establishment of a regime of peace and stability in the South
China Sea.
The Philippines and China can contribute in the
development of CMR in the South China Sea by pursuing a
bilateral fisheries agreement. China and Japan entered into this
kind of agreement in 1997 while China and South Korea
followed suit in 2000. In fact, the Philippines proposed in 2007
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45. a ’fisheries corridor’ in the South China Sea to avoid potential
conflicts that could affect peace and stability in the region.119
Though the Philippines and China held in 2005 the First
Meeting of the Philippines-China Joint Commission on
Fisheries to explore bilateral cooperation on fishery
investments, research and technology, and safety of property
and life at sea, the momentum to talk was disturbed by the
JMSU controversy. There is a need to sustain talks on this
issue to find a more pragmatic, peaceful and non-
confrontational solution to the South China Sea conflict.
Summary and Conclusion
The Philippines has a policy to pursue what it calls a
legitimate claim in the contested areas of the South China Sea.
Immediately after the end of the cold war, territorial issues in
the South China Sea became a source of tension in Southeast
Asia because of China’s passage of territorial waters law in
1992 and occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. However,
the tension deescalated after 9/11 due to China’s “charm
offensive” in Southeast Asia, which resulted in the signing of
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China in
2002. The Declaration was hailed as a historic landmark in
managing disputes in the South China Sea. But the South
China Sea continues to be a security challenge between the
Philippines and China because of lingering concerns over the
sensitive issue of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
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46. CHAPTER FOUR
The Taiwan Factor in Philippines-China Security
Relations120
Introduction
Though Philippines-China security relations have gone
a long way since the establishment of their diplomatic ties in
1975, both countries continue to confront the perennial
challenge of Taiwan. Every now and then, the issue of Taiwan
surfaces in Philippines’ relations with China causing some
irritants and occasional hiccups in their bilateral ties. In fact,
the Taiwan issue has been a major source of China’s security
dilemma when dealing with other nations.121
While the Philippines upholds a “One-China Policy,” it
maintains its relations with Taiwan in the economic, social and
cultural realms. There was even an allegation that the
Philippines has discreet security ties with Taiwan making
China suspicious of Manila’s strategic intention in the Cross
Strait conflict.122
This chapter examines the issue of Taiwan as a factor in
Philippines-China security relations. It describes Philippines-
Taiwan security relations after 9/11 and how these relations
affected the direction of Philippines-China security relations.
Background on Philippines-Taiwan Relation123
Prior to the establishment of Philippines’ relations with
the People’s Republic of China (PROC), the Philippines first
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47. had a diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC).
When the Philippines became an independent republic in 1946,
the very first Treaty of Amity it entered into was with the ROC
then called as the Nationalist China. Establishing diplomatic
relations with the ROC was considered to be a foreign policy
priority of then President Manuel Roxas.124 As reciprocation,
the ROC, on the other hand, was one of the first countries to
recognize the Philippines as an independent republic.
Common historical experiences during the war,
geographic proximity and cultural familiarity were crucial
factors for the close ties with Taiwan. During the 3 October
1946 presentation of credentials of Chen Chih-ping, the first
Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, President Roxas
stressed that the Philippines and China had common ties due to
geographic propinquity, a mutual wartime cause, and Chinese
contribution through industry and thrift over the centuries to
Philippine economic life. 125 The negotiations on Philippine-
Chinese treaty of friendship were not easy. They were stormy,
surrounded with controversies because of domestic
considerations. Both countries finally signed the treaty on 18
April 1947, which provided that “the nationals of each country
were at liberty to enter or leave, to travel or reside in, the
territory of the other upon the same terms as the nationals of
any third country in accordance with domestic laws and
regulations.”126
With the signing of the Treaty of Amity between the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the ROC, Manila
established its Consulate General Offices in Amoy and
Shanghai in 1947. To strengthen RP-ROC diplomatic ties, the
Philippines opened a legation in Nanking in March 1948 with
Senator Proceso Sebastian as the first Philippine ambassador to
Nationalist China. 127 However, the Philippine Legation was
short-lived due to domestic political changes in China. When
Mao Tse Tung proclaimed the PROC in 1949, the Philippines
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48. closed its legation in Nanking, established a liaison office in
Guangzhou, and in 1950 finally transferred to Taipei.
The establishment of a communist government in
Mainland China posed two major problems for the Philippine
government. The first was internal: increased control over
Chinese immigration. The second was external: recognition of
a communist regime.
On the first problem, the Philippine government, having
adopted a staunch anti-communism policy, decisively
prohibited Chinese immigration and banned travel to or from
Mainland China. 128 While being very strict with anything
related with PROC, the government pursued strong diplomatic
and economic relations with Taiwan. It signed a trade
agreement with Taiwan and even intensified exchange of
specialists and information leading to the development of a
close ideological and economic partnership with ROC. In 1956,
it raised the legation in Taipei to embassy level. The
establishment of a Philippine Embassy in Taiwan clearly
demonstrated the interest of the government to have strong
economic and political partnership with Nationalist China.
Being both security allies of the United States, the
Philippines and Taiwan established security relations. Military
officers from the Philippines and Taiwan had regular
exchanges. Taiwan’s War College inspired the establishment of
the National Defense College of the Philippines in 1963. Both
countries established regular exchanges of military officers and
even intelligence information.
On the second problem, the Philippine government
attempted not to get entangled with Beijing-Taipei conflict.
During the administration of former President Elpidio Quirino,
the Philippine government did not explicitly take an anti-
communism posture. The establishment of Philippine Embassy
in Taiwan was a lucid expression of Manila’s political leanings
with Taipei. Philippine support of democratic and nationalist
China represented by ROC was revealed as early as 1951 when
the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with
the United States. The MDT was an anti-Communist treaty that
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49. aimed to deter communist expansionism in Asia. When the
Philippines became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), then President Ramon Magsaysay
declared support to the US commitment to the defense of
“Formosa” against communist China.129 Succeeding Philippine
presidents (Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal) pursued a
more vigorous anti-Communist foreign policy.
It was only during the time of President Ferdinand
Marcos when the Philippine government considered
establishing diplomatic relations with communist countries for
economic, strategic and security reasons. On 9 June 1975, the
Philippines formally established diplomatic relations with
PROC and proclaimed a one-China policy treating Taiwan as a
province of China. In October 1975, the Philippines established
an embassy in Beijing. Since then, Philippine-China diplomatic
relation has become one of the most important bilateral
relations of the Philippines with foreign countries. Thereafter,
both countries have entered into various cooperation
agreements covering wide-ranging areas like trade and
investment; tourism and air services; cultural, scientific and
technical cooperation; agricultural cooperation; avoidance of
double taxation; postal parcel agreement; and even defense
cooperation. 130 As result, Philippine relations with Taiwan
were officially downgraded.
Though upholding a one-China policy, the Philippines
continues its substantial relations with Taiwan. Philippines’
one-China policy does not prohibit commercial, economic,
cultural and other unofficial or people-to-people contacts with
Taiwan. To continue relations in these areas, the Philippine
government converted its embassy in Taipei into Manila
Economic and Cultural Office (MECO). Taiwan, on the other
hand, converted its embassy in the Philippines into Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office (TECO).
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