1. IAG
Policy Brief
Bangsamoroism and the
Nexus of Identity Politics
and Violent Extremism in
the Southern Philippines
AUGUST 2012 ISSN 2243-8173-12-08

2. 2 | Policy Brief
Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern
Philippines* Prof. Rommel C. Banlaoi
Introduction
V iolent extremism is a highly contested and
a very fuzzy concept in the field of violence
studies and terrorism research. If it means a
in a society dominated by Christian Filipinos.
It is also through the prism of identity politics
that some Bangsamoros are radicalized to
justification of the use of violence as an extreme protect and enhance their identity, which they
measure in furtherance of a certain religious think are being suppressed by the Christian
belief or a particular political goal as well as majority of Filipinos.
the protection or enhancement of a certain
ethnic, class, religious or political identities, Other Bangsamoros fall prey to extreme
the Southern Philippines then is enormously ideas that endorse the use of armed violence to
prone to many acts of violent extremism. alter their current social, economic and political
situation that they think is utterly oppressive
There is no doubt that identity politics of their cherished identity.
is one of the many lenses from which to
examine the complex challenges of the so- Identity politics serves as an explanatory
called violent extremism in the Southern logic for Muslims in Mindanao to understand
Philippines. Identity politics is, in fact, a how they acquire a sense of sameness with one
major analytical framework to examine how ethnic group or belongingness to an oppressed
the Bangsamoro people justify their violent and nascent nation they call Bangsamoro and
struggle for their right to self-determination so distinguish themselves from a dominant and
that they can govern themselves in their own “exploitative” nation of the Christian Filipinos.
way, according to their customs, traditions, This imagined ethnic community of a Moro
religions and socio-cultural identities.1 It also nation creates a worldview that defines the
serves as the organizing concept to grapple “self” identity of the Moros and distinguishes
with the development of Bangsamoroism, a themselves from other nations.2 This sense of
Moro ideology in Mindanao that justifies the “self” and “other” has permeated sharply into
use of armed violence to protect and enhance a bitter clash of identities in Mindanao that
the “Moro national identity” and to advance has brought the “minority Muslim Moros” and
the cause of Islamic state in Mindanao, even if the “majority Christian Filipinos” to a bitter
its adherents claim to have been upholding the ethnic and sectarian violence for more than
peaceful struggle for nationhood. four decades and to the seemingly intractable
internal armed conflicts that have become so
Through the wisdom of identity politics, costly and damaging to both opposing identities.
Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao identify
themselves with a common identity they call There are currently four major armed
Bangsamoro, which is both an ethnic and Muslim groups in the Southern Philippines
religious construction. Identity politics makes that promote the concept of a Bangsamoro
sense of the minority status of the Bangsamoros identity: the Moro National Liberation Front

3. Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines | 3
(MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front With its concept of a Bangsamoro identity,
(MILF), the Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah (AHAI), the MIM aimed to establish a separate Islamic
more popularly known as the Abu Sayyaf Group state in Mindanao. Leaders of the MNLF came
(ASG), and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom mostly from the MIM, which later on would
Movement (BIFM). These groups are arguably soften its stand on Moro independence.
engaged in various acts associated with violent
extremism that is currently being passed on to Echoing the Bangsamoroism of the
the younger generation. MIM, the MNLF believes that the Moros have
their own national identity that deserves
The Moro National Liberation Front independence. The MNLF intensified the
promotion of Bangsamoroism as the rallying
Founded by Nur Misuari, the MNLF used ideology of the Bangsamoro people for national
to be a united front of Moro rebels pursuing the liberation through arms struggle. This ideology
cause of Muslim independence in Mindanao. At regards the Bangsamoros as oppressed people
present however, the MNLF has been heavily colonized by Filipinos. The Manifesto of
factionalized. Some MNLF members have the MNLF released on 28 April 1974 aptly
entered the mainstream Philippine politics articulates the ideology of Bangsamoroism
while others have been integrated in the when it states:
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP). The rest are We, the five million oppressed
still waging arms struggle, particularly those Bangsamoro people, wishing to free ourselves
identified with the so-called Misuari Break form the terror, oppression and tyranny of
Away Group (MBG). The MBG is currently Filipino colonialism which has caused us
being accused of spreading violent extremism untold sufferings and miseries by criminality
in the Southern Philippines. usurping our land, by threatening Islam
through wholesale destruction and desecration
Despite its many factions, adherents of its places of worship and its Holy Book, and
and followers who associate themselves with murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and
the MNLF continue to adhere to the socially folks in a genocidal campaign of terrifying
constructed idea that Muslims in Mindanao magnitude’ hereby declares ‘the establishment
are Moros and not Filipinos.3 This idea, in fact, of the Bangsamoro Republic’.5
originates from the position of the Mindanao
Independence Movement (MIM) formed in 1968 Nur Misuari endorses arms struggle
after the gruesome Jabidah Massacre.4 The to emancipate the Bangsamoro people from
Manifesto of the MIM asserts that the Moros the “oppression” and “colonialism” of Imperial
have their own identity, culture and history that Manila. Misuari regards arms struggle as “a
are distinct from that of the Filipinos. The MIM revolution for national salvation and human
even used the slogan, “We are not Filipinos, we justice based on jihad, which is the path of
are Bangsamoros” during their major rallies. struggle of Muslims, either in the moral, ethical,
It was through the MIM when the ideology of spiritual or political realm, to bring about a
Bangsamoroism started to develop. positive transformation of the inner self and the

4. 4 | Policy Brief
socio-economic and political order.”6 Thus, the by conducting a war against the Philippine
MNLF formed the Bangsamoro Armed Forces military for “defensive” and “counter-offensive”
(BAF) as its armed wing. The Organization of purposes.9 Salamat even argues that the war
Islamic Conference (OIC) recognizes the MNLF being waged by the MILF is part of the war
as the “sole and legitimate representative of the fought by the ancestors of the Bangsamoro
Bangsamoro people.” people. He elaborates:
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front The war we are engaged in is part of the
war fought by our ancestors. It flared up since
The Bangsamoroism of the MNLF, the first half of the 16th century, that is, since
however, is viewed to be very secular and even more than four hundred years ago. At present,
Marxist in ideological orientation. Thus, a we have no choice but either to wage Jihad
splinter group was formed within the MNLF. in the cause of Allah plunging ourselves into
This group called itself as the MILF to advocate ferocious war in order to survive in a prosperous
a more “Islamist cause”. life and to remain as Muslims, or to submit to
subjugation and humiliation.10
Founded by Hashim Salamat in 1984,7
the MILF describes itself to be more Islamic The Abu Sayyaf Group
in orientation and religious in conviction that
the MNLF. While both the MNLF and the Amidst the two Moro groups with their
MILF share the same narrative of Bangsamoro own versions of Bangsamoroism, another group
identity that views Muslims in Mindanao as emerged in 1989 with the establishment of the
marginalized Moros and not Filipinos, the AHAI by Abdurajak Janjalani, a former MNLF
MILF provides a more “Islamic” identity into member.11 More known as the ASG, this
the Bangsamoro identity. group intended to bridge the divide between
the MNLF and MILF. Aiming to establish a
The MILF also justifies the use of armed “purely Islamic government” of Bangsamoros
violence to advance the Bangsamoro people’s in Mindanao, Janjalani formed the ASG/AHAI
struggle against oppression and colonialism.8 when the MNLF started to enter a peace talk
Thus, it formed the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed with the government.
Forces (BIAF) to wage a “genuine”jihad of the
Moros. The MILF also has its Special Operation There were allegations that the ASG
Group (SOG) that is accused of various crimes was created by the Philippine military.
associated with terrorism. The MILF-SOG is But Janjalani argued that he founded the
also being linked with the Jemaah Islamiyah ASG as an alternative resistance group of
followers operating in the Southern Philippines, Bangsamoros who were disappointed with
particularly in Central Mindanao. the secular leaderships of the MNLF and the
moderate Islamist position of the MILF. In
While the MILF recognizes the value of fact, most of the original founders of the ASG
peace talks with the government to advance the were disgruntled members of the MNLF and
right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro the MILF. In his undated public proclamation
people, it also leans towards violent extremism containing many elements of violent extremist

5. Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines | 5
ideology, Janjalani explained what it called the The ASG, however, rapidly degenerated
“Four Basic Truths” about the ASG, to wit: into a band of bandit soon after the death
1. t is not to create another faction
I of Abdurajak in 1998.13 Yet, the ASG, at
in the Muslim struggle, which would present, has proven to be a resilient group of
be against the teaching of Islam, Bangsamoros engaged in banditry, terrorism
especially the Quran, but to serve and violent extremism.14 Its links with
as a bridge and balance between personalities associated with Jemaah Islamiyah
the MILF and MNLF, whose and Al-Qaeda have even strengthened the
revolutionary roles and leadership violent extremist leaning of the ASG in order to
cannot be ignored or usurped; promote the cause of a Bangsamoro identity.
2. ultimate
Its goal is the The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
establishment of a purely Islamic
government whose “nature, A newest Moro rebel group that is
meaning, emblem and objective” are currently engaged many acts of violent
basic to peace; extremism is the BIFM. The BIFM started
as an armed faction of the MILF headed by
3. ts advocacy of war is a necessity
I Ameril Umbra Kato, the former commander
for as long as there exists oppression, of the MILF 105th Base Command. Kato
injustice, capricious ambitions, and originally called his group the Bangsamoro
arbitrary claims imposed on the Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF) of the MILF
Muslims; during its inauguration in December 2010. But
he renamed his group as BIFM in August 2011
4. believes that “war disturbs
It when his group attracted more adherents from
peace only for the attainment of the both armed and non-armed Bangsamoros.
true and real objective of humanity
— the establishment of justice and The BIFM rejects the on-going peace
righteousness for all under the law talks between the Philippine government the
of the noble Quran and the purified MILF. Kato even argues that the right to self-
Sunnah”.12 determination of the Bangsamoro people cannot
be negotiated - it can only be won through arms
Like Misuari and Salamat, Janjalani struggle. Kato criticizes the “endless” peace
adheres to the narrative of Bangsamoroism that negotiation between the government and the
embraces the idea of a separate Bangsamoro MILF.
identity that deserves its own sovereign state.
His group also leans towards violent extremism Though the exact ideology of the BIFM
as part of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah or fighting for has not been fully discussed in the public
the cause of Allah. Janjalani claims to have domain, Kato adheres to Bangsamoroism of
founded the ASG to seek kaadilan or justice for Salamat. Kato claims that his BIFM represents
the Bangsamoro people through Jihad. the united front work of the Bangsamoros

6. 6 | Policy Brief
struggling for genuine freedom through Jihad. This primordialist and even ethnocentric
Its armed-wing, the BIFF, aims to pursue this view of Moro national identity, which some
freedom through arms struggle. scholars describe as a “myth of Morohood”, is
a strong tie that vigorously binds all Muslim
Identity Politics and Violent Extremism of the rulers, rebels and even warlords involved in
Bangsamoros everyday politics of armed separatism and
Muslim insurgencies in Mindanao.18 Even
Identity politics may be viewed as the unarmed and non-violent groups of Muslims
principal driver of violent extremism of the in Mindanao share this primordialist and
Bangsamoros. It is the major source of the ethnocentric understanding of a Bangsamoro
ideology of Bangsamoroism, which regards identity. The internationalization of the
the Morohood as a single and transcendent Bangsamoro struggle has even strengthened the
national identity that is entitled to have its claim of the Moros to vigorously fight for their
sovereignty and independence.15 The formation identities and their right to self-determination
of this Bangsamoro identity is said to have in the form of an independent state.19
developed through more than 400 years of hard
and painful struggle for self-determination in The global and regional trends in Islamic
the “Bangsamoro” homeland in Mindanao.16 resurgence in the aftermath of the cold war
have further intensified this assertion for a
This idea of a Bangsamoro identity Bangsamoro identity.20 The rise of transnational
currently informs the violent behavior of armed Islam after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
Muslims groups in Mindanao. This idea of a attacks on the United States has also heightened
national identity (that is believed by Moros to the Islamic consciousness of Muslims in
be under assault, persecution, oppression, and the Philippines, largely encouraging their
even “annihilation” by other national identities) continued struggle for self-determination.21 The
provides a moral ground to some Moros to adopt Moro conception of a separate national identity
an extreme measure that compels them to resort is said to have entitled its people to enjoy their
to violence in order to protect and enhance this right of self-determination, to wit:
identity in accordance with the system of life
that is deemed suitable and acceptable to the The Bangsamoro people qualify as a
Bangsamoro people. people who hold the right of self-determination
because they have a common historical tradition
The ideology of Bangsamoroism endorses and religious affinity and share many cultural
some religious values and political beliefs that practices. They occupy contiguous territory
uphold a worldview of what is just and unjust (being maritime societies connected by the sea)
for the Muslims in Mindanao. In fact, leaders of with rich natural resources.22
armed Muslim groups, particularly the MNLF
and the MILF, contend that the Bangsamoro In other words, the internal armed
identity extends to oppressed non-Muslim conflict in Mindanao on the Moro Front, more
inhabitants of Mindanao: the Christians and popularly known as the “Moro Problem”, is
the indigenous people (IP), locally known as the considered as a “manifestation of the aspiration
lumads.17 of the Bangsamoro people to retain their

7. Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines | 7
cultural, religious, and ethnic identity and to violence as a rightful and even necessary tool
gain greater control over their own lives.”23 to redress the injustices committed against the
Moro people.
But the concept of a Bangsamoro
identity is being challenged. It is argued that Minoritization. The Moros feel that
the notion of Bangsamoro nationhood is very the “Christian-dominated” government of the
new (only more than 40 years old) and is yet to Filipinos has systematically minoritized them.
be crystallized and even internalized by other The process of minoritization began during
Muslims in Mindanao.24 Spanish colonial period that lasted until the
American colonial rule of the archipelago now
Nonetheless, this so-called myth of known as the Philippines. The minoritization
national identity continues to define the violent of Muslims in Mindanao continued when the
struggle of Muslims in Mindanao for self- Philippines acquired its independence from the
determination. Though Muslims in Mindanao United States in 1946.
were given autonomy as a result of the 1976
Tripoli Agreement, 1989 Organic Law on the By the 1960s, minoritization of the Moros
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao had become a fait accompli.26 In 1900, Muslims
(ARMM), and the 1996 Agreement between the in Mindanao represented 76 percent of the total
Philippine government and the MNLF, this type population. By 2000, Muslim population in
of autonomy is currently rejected by the MILF, Mindanao dropped to 20 percent.
the ASG and the BIFM because of allegations
of corruption, incompetence of co-opted Muslim The minoritization of the Moros was
officials, and lack of real autonomy (as the attributed to misdirected state policies on
ARMM is said to have been under the control of agrarian reforms that encouraged Christians
a central government in Manila).25 The so-called in Luzon and Visayas to settle in Mindanao.27
“Paper Autonomy” in the ARMM compels other These agrarian reform programs made the
Moro rebels, particularly from the MILF, ASG Moros to “become a minority in many parts
and BIFM, to resume their violent resistance. of their traditional homeland, with many
losing their land to the immigrant settlers
Identity Politics and a Justification for Violence through dubious legal transactions or outright
confiscation.”28
From the perspectives of identity politics,
the Moros justify their violent resistance because Economic Marginalization. The land
of the following reasons: a) “minoritization”; reform program for the Christians in Luzon
b) economic marginalization; and c) social and and the Visayas resulted in the landlessness
political exclusion. of the Muslims in Mindanao. Thus, the Moros
feel that they have been dispossessed of
Young generation of Bangsamoros are their ancestral lands. With no lands at their
exposed, socialized, and even “brainwashed” to disposal, the Moros have also been economically
these underlying reasons. These reasons are, marginalized. In fact, all Muslim areas of the
in fact, being used to radicalize the minds of Philippines are considered to be at the bottom
the Bangsamoro youth and to glorify the use of of the heap.29

8. 8 | Policy Brief
In terms of Human Development Index, • Lack of provisions for the customary
Muslim-dominated provinces of Maguindanao, and traditional practices of Muslims
Sulu, Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi in official and public settings; and,
have the least access to education, health,
electricity, transportation, and water and • Loss of Bangsamoro ancestral
sanitation services.30 These provinces also properties because of discriminatory
have the highest number of armed encounters land registration policies.33
between the government and rebel forces.
These conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao Thus, the Moros feel powerless and this
are considered to be the poorest among the sense of powerlessness drives them to behave
77 Philippine provinces and are found to violently to empower themselves.
have the highest levels of dissatisfaction with
government services.31 Conclusion
Social and Political Exclusion. Being Identity politics strongly resonates
minoritized and economically marginalized, as the main driver of the so-called violent
the Moros also suffer from social and political extremism in Mindanao. A strongly held idea of
exclusion under a unitary system of the a Bangsamoro identity that creates the ideology
Philippine government.32 Through decades of of Bangsamoroism provides a strong moral
negative stereotyping, the Christian Filipino justification for the Moros to accommodate
majority has developed built-in biases against extreme measures and to pursue their struggle
the Muslim minority in terms of employment. for self-determination through the use of force.
Even in national elections, Muslims have The centrality of national identity also inspires
difficulties winning a seat in the national posts. the Moros to be very resilient in their violent
Moros who occupy government positions are struggle for freedom and nationhood, which
deemed to have been co-opted and corrupted and until now informs the behavior of armed Moros
acting like oppressors. In the study conducted associated with the MNLF, MILF, ASG and
by the World Bank, the social and political BIFM.
exclusion of the Moros is exacerbated by the
following factors related with minoritization The MNLF, MILF, ASG, and BIFM cling
and economic marginalization: to the general notion of a Bangsamoro identity.
They all subscribe to the general ideology
• Philippine history texts that of Bangsamoroism that justifies the use of
do not acknowledge the historic violence to protect and enhance this identity.
contributions of the Bangsamoro; But they have different interpretations of
Bangsamoroism and approaches on how to
• Biases and prejudice in media protect and enhance the Bangsamoro identity.
accounts and reports;
While there is no doubt that the
• Apparent discrimination against quest for national identity drives people to
Muslims in job placements; act violently, there are many other drivers

9. Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines | 9
of violent extremism.34 These drivers are Verso, 1991).
context-and-time-bound and even culture-and-
3
For a seminal work on this concept, see Abdurasad
society-specific. A more nuanced examination
Asana, Moros Not Filipinos(Marawi City: Bangsamoro
of these drivers is therefore essential to have a
Research Center, nd).
better grasp of the many challenges of violent
extremism not only in the Southern Philippines 4
The Jabidah Massacre pertains to the summary
but also elsewhere. execution of a number of Moro recruits being trained for
Operation Merdeka, a codename for clandestine military
But there is a need to emphasize that plan to infiltrate Sabah as part of the Philippine’s strategy
while identities unleash several problems to establish its ownership of the said territory. For an
excellent investigative report on the Jabidah Massacre,
associated with violent extremism, identities
see Marites Vitug and Glenda, Under the Crescent Moon:
are not static, immutable and frozen in time Rebellion in Mindanao(Quezon City: Ateneo Center for
and space.35 Identities are dynamic, socially Social Policy and Public Affairs/Institute for Popular
constructed and products of the so-called Democracy, 2000).
invention of traditions. Identities can, in fact,
accommodate changes and therefore contribute 5
The Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front
to conflict resolution and social transformation. (28 April 1974).
As such, identities can also provide just and 6
Nur Misuari, MNLF Guidelines for Political Cadres
lasting solutions to the problems of violent
and Military Commanders, n.p.: (Bangsa Moro Research
extremism. Center of the Moro National Liberation Front., 1984), pp.
6-7.
End Notes 7
Salamat traces the origin of MILF in 1962 when he
formed in Cairo a Islamic group of Moro students called
* Presented at the International Workshop on “The Impact Moro Liberation Front (MLF).
of Identity Politics on Violent Extremism” organized by
the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) 8
Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle
of the Nanyang Technological University and the Global Against Oppression and Colonialism (Camp Abu Bakar,
Futures Forum (GFF) at Marina Mandarin Hotel, Maguindanao: MILF Agency for Youth Affairs, 2001).
Singapore October 23-25, 2011
9
Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the
1
For my initial use of identity politics to examine GRP-MILF Peace Process(Cotabato City: Institute of
Philippine national security predicaments amidst Bangsamoro Studies, 2007), p. 18.
terrorist threats, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Identity
Politics and Philippine National Security in the Age of 10
Salamat Hashim, Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized,
Terror” in Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the
Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges Mindanao Conflicts (Camp Abu Bakar, Maguindanao:
in the Post-9/11 World (New York and London: CRC MILF Agency for Youth Affairs, 2002), p. 13.
Press/Taylor and Francis, 2010), pp. 3-26.
11
For a more detailed analysis of the origin, evolution
2
For the concept of imagined community, see Benedict and dynamics of the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Al
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Harakatul-Al Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised (New York: Group (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace,

10. 10 | Policy Brief
Violence and Terrorism Research, 2009). 20
Mehol K. Sadain, Global and Regional Trends in
Islamic Resurgence: Their Implications on the Southern
12
Samuel K. Tan, “Beyond Freedom: The Juma’a Abu Philippines (Pasay City: Center for International
Sayyaf (Assessment of Its Origins, Objectives, Ideology Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service
and Method of Struggle)”, in Internationalization of the Institute, 1994).
Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Center for Integrative and Development 21
See Rommel Banlaoi, “Transnational Islam in the
Studies, 2003), revised edition, p. 96. Philippines” in Peter Mandaville, et. al., Transnational
13
For details, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements,
Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism”, in Networks, and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle: National
Dalijit Singh and Lorraine Salazar (eds),Southeast Asian Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), pp. 167-188.
Affairs 2006 (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006), pp. 247-262. 22
Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Bangsamoro Self-
Determination” in Peter Kreuzer and Rainer Werning
14
See Rommel C. Banlaoi,“The Sources of Abu Sayyaf ’s (eds), Voices from Moroland: Perspectives from
Resilience in the Southern Philippines”, CTC Sentinel, Stakeholders and Observers on the Conflict in the
vol. 3, Issue 5 (May 2010), pp. 17-19. Southern Philippines (Petalling Jaya, Malaysia: Strategic
Information and Research Development Centre, 2007), p.
15
Kit Collier calls this identity as the “myth of Morohood”. 32.
See Kit Collier, “Dynamics of Muslim Separatism in
the Philippines” in Damien Kingburry (ed),Violence 23
The International Bank for Reconstruction and
in Between: Conflict and Security in the Archipelagic Development/The World Bank,Joint Needs Assessment
Southeast Asia(Victoria and Singapore: Monash for Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected
University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Areas in Mindanao: Volume 5, Local Governance and
Studies, 2005), pp. 155-176. Institutions Report (Pasig City: IBRD/WB: 2005), p. 2.
See Salah Jubair, Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless
16 24
Rizal Buendia, The Politics of Ethnicity and Moro
Tyranny (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin SDN BHD, 1999). Secessionism in the Philippines (Murdoch University,
Working Paper Number 146, November 2007), p. 13.
17
This tri-people concept of Bangsamoro identity,
however, is contested. The Bangsamoro identity may 25
See Benedicto R. Bacani, Beyond Paper Autonomy:
even be regarded as an excellent example of an invented The Challenge in Southern Philippines (Makati City
tradition. See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. and Cotabato City: Konrad Adenauer Foundation and
Ranger (eds), The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge: the Center for Autonomy and Governance, 2004).
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
26
Astrid Tuminez, “Rebellion, Terrorism, Peace: America’s
18
Thomas M. Mckenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Unfinished Business with Muslims in the Philippines”,
Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume 15, Number 1
Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2000). (Fall/Winter 2008), p. 214.
27
For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Eric
19
Samuel K. Tan, The Internationalization of the Guttierez and Saturnino Borras, Jr., The Moro Conflict:
Bangsamoro Struggle , 2ndprinting (Quezon City: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies (Washington
University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and DC: East-West Center Policy Studies Number 8, 2004).
Development Studies, 2003). The MNLF is advancing
an independent secular state. But the for the MILF, the 28
See Andrew Tan, “The Indigenous Roots of Conflict
ASG, and the BIFM, it should be an independent Islamic in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao”, in Kumar
state. Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), After Bali: The

11. Bangsamoroism and the Nexus of Identity Politics and Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines | 11
Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro
World Scientific Publishing and Institute of Defence and People (Quezon City: Center for People Empowerment in
Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 99. Governance, 2008).
29
Ibid., p. 2. 33
The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/The World Bank,Joint Needs Assessment
30
Ibid. Also see Philippine Human Development Report for Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected
2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development Areas in Mindanao: Volume 5, Local Governance and
in the Philippines (Manila: Human Development Institutions Report (Pasig City: IBRD/WB: 2005), p. 2.
Network, 2005).
34
See United States Agency for International
The World Bank, Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected
31
Development, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism
Areas in Mindanao(Manila: The World Bank Philippines (Washington DC: USAID, 2009).
Post Conflict Series Number 1, 2003), pp. 9-10.
35
For an excellent review of existing knowledge on this
32
For a good read on this topic, see Mark Turner, R.J. topic, see Sumuna Das Gupta, “Editorial”, Peace Prints:
May and Lulu Respall Turner (eds), Mindanao: Land of South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, No. 3, Vol. 2
Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, (Winter 2010).
1992). Also see Bobby Tuazon (ed), The Moro Reader:
Opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of IAG and KAS.
IAG as a policy platform continues to create more “tables” in our common search for genuine autonomy and governance.
IAG Policy Brief is published monthly. Associate Editor: Ramie Toledo. Lay-out Artist: Omar Tadeja. Go to www.iag.
org.ph to download the pdf version. Above Photo: Ameril Umbra Kato (seated) the commander of BIFM grants interview to
the media inside his rebel stronghold in Maguindanao in this photo taken on Aug. 16, 2011 (AP).

12. Shaping
Public Policy
for Peace and
Good Governance
The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG)
is an independent and non- partisan think tank
founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making
autonomy an effective vehicle for peace and
development in the Southern Philippines. IAG is
an institutional partner of the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung in the Philippines.
IAG is located at Notre Dame University, Notre
Dame Avenue, Cotabato City,Philippines, Telefax
(64)421-2071.Email: info@iag.org.ph and Website:
www.iag.org.ph
KAS is in 5th floor, Cambridge Center Building,
108 Tordesillas Corner Gallado Street, Salcedo
Village, Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
telephone 894-3737.