This document discusses the rise of national populism in Europe and its implications. It makes three key points: 1) There is currently a clash between ethnic nationalism promoted by national populists and civic nationalism constrained by rule of law in the EU. National populists imagine the nation as having common ethnic roots while civic nationalism is more inclusive. 2) National populism in countries like Hungary and Poland has led to the deterioration of democracy, including attacks on the media, judiciary, and civil society. This threatens the core values of the EU. 3) National populists claim to defend national sovereignty but their version of ethnic nationalism is incompatible with the civic, inclusive form of nationalism that underpins the EU. Their

1. Civic European cities in the age of national populism
Adam Balcer
Main thesis
• In recent years Europe has been experiencing the wave of national populism and a clash
between antagonistic forms of national identities within its societies. Currently, we can
observe a clash between antagonistic forms of national identities (ethnic nationalism versus
civic nationalism). The national populism and ethnic nationalism are strongly intertwined
because they both imagine the nation as a monolith which allegedly possesses the sovereign
will and common ethnic roots (nativism). Currently, the attitude towards immigrants and
citizens of immigrant background (particularly Muslims) as members of a nation constitutes
the key expression of difference between ethnic and civic nationalisms (exclusiveness vs.
inclusiveness).
• The way in which the meaning of a given nation is being framed and defined can translate
into the kind of democracy that is being promoted at home. National populists
enthusiastically embraces the democratic system, but consider only one ethnic group to be
full members of the society. In consequence, they deny (explicitly or implicitly) the
universality of human rights.
• In the age of globalization cities are often presented as an alternative, or even opposition, to
nation states. However, the relationship between the city, the nation and the state is much
more complex. It seems that cities, because of its civic-oriented identity and ability to engage
citizens in public life, are particularly predestinated to counter the rise of national populism
in Europe.
• Cities are particularly predestinated to play such a role because for many centuries they have
distinguished themselves by a higher level of social pluralism and cultural diversity than the
countryside, including in their religious and ethnic structure, and stronger relations with the
external world. Such social features that characterize today’s cities created an environment
of cultural syncretism and diffusion where building modus vivendi (common inclusive public
space) between various communities became a necessity.
1

2. Introduction
One of the most important developments taking place in the EU in recent decades is the
continuous rise of support for national populist parties. which was described as a populist wave in
the media.1
The support for national populists increased substantially in more than half of the EU
member states as has been demonstrated by various elections, opinion polls and referenda.
However, their popularity varies substantially among the EU member states and is caused by
different social, economic, cultural and political reasons. The diversity of national populism can be
seen among other things in the repeated difficulty in creating joint groups of parties in the European
Parliament to the right of the European People’s Party. This is only partly due to personal
disagreements, but primarily reflects significant differences in ideology and policy (more or less
radical). In fact, the recent success of certain national populists - for instance the Front National in
France - is based on their shift towards the political center.2
Box no.1: The national populist wave
According to statistical data provided by the Swedish liberal think tank TIMBRO national populist
parties in Europe increased their support in the parliamentary elections from one percent in the
1980s to twelve percent in 2017.3
At the same time, support for left wing populists decreased from
around ten percent to six percent. Moreover, in recent years national populists have gained power
in Poland and Hungary and joined the coalition governments in four EU countries (Bulgaria, Finland,
Latvia, Slovakia). By comparison, in mid 1980s such parties were not present in any European
government. In other cases, national populists, even staying in opposition, managed to influenced
the course of internal politics. In most of them the level of support for national populist parties does
not exceed 10-15 percent (Germany, Greece, Finland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Netherlands). In some
countries it oscillates around 15-25 percent (Sweden, Denmark). In Slovakia it approaches even 30
percent. Italy is an especially interesting case. Two national populist parties enjoy a support of 20
percent but the Movement of Five Stars, which is enjoying the largest support in many opinion polls
(almost 30 percent) should be described as a partly national populist.
National populists gained the strongest foothold in France, Austria, Poland and Hungary. In France,
Marine Le Pen the leader of Front National won almost 35 percent of votes in the runoff of 2017
presidential elections. However, in certain opinion polls of the second round conducted before the
voting, Le Pen gained more than 50 percent of support against candidates representing the Left.
Norbert Hofer, a candidate of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), scored even higher than Le Pen,
receiving 46 and 49 percent of votes in two presidential elections of 2016. Against this background,
Poland and Hungary are unique cases in Europe because they are ruled by single party governments4
of national populists, namely the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary and the Law and
Justice (PiS) in Poland. Moreover, in the most recent elections in both countries (2014-2015) the
combined vote for all national populist parties exceeded 50% in Poland and 65% in Hungary.
1
German politics is about to tip rightwards, Economist, 17.09.2017,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/09/next-bundestag
2
During the second round of presidential elections in 2017 Le Pen managed to gain for the first time in history a
support of around 10 percent of French citizens of Muslim origin.
3
TIMBRO, TIMBRO Authoritarian Populism Index 2017, https://timbro.se/ideologi/timbro-authoritarian-
populism-index-2017-2/
4
In fact both parties established electoral coalitions with very small right wing parties.
2

3. Seemingly, the question of identity constitutes one of the crucial common denominators of national
populists. Cas Mudde, a prominent Dutch scientist, defines populism as an ideology that assumes the
society to be divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the
corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale
(general will) of the people.5
In consequence, populism by definition, is preoccupied with the issue of
identity. It can be much easier merged with an ethnic variety of nationalism that the civic one. Ethnic
nationalism treats language, culture, religion or common ethnic roots as the main pillars of national
identity, while civic nationalism puts more emphasis on the state and citizenship. Certainly, civic
nationalism cannot be mechanically presented as a positive antithesis of ethnic nationalism. In the
past, the civic version often played a negative role as an instrument of forcible assimilation of
national minorities. In fact, as a prominent theoretician of nationalism, Anthony Smith, pointed out
“nationalism is not just Janus-headed, it is protean and elusive, appearing in a kaleidoscopic variety
of guises”6
. Civic nationalism may often remain only a beautiful idea and transform into the ethnic
one. Even more, certain forms of civic nationalisms create a positive environment for national
populists.7
Nevertheless, Smith admits that “the civil nationalist project requires a degree of
sophistication and mass political tolerance, and a sufficient degree of political solidarity to hold
together various ethnic and regional segments of the society”.8
In fact, it is not an accident that civic
nationalism constrained by the rule of law protecting individual rights and national minorities gained
the status of official nationalism in Western countries after World War II. Currently, the attitude
towards new potential members of nations constitutes an important difference between ethnic and
civic nationalism. The former assumes that the nation has an organic character; thus certain
individuals, because of their ethnic or religious background, can never be assimilated. Meanwhile,
the latter perceives the concept of nation in a voluntarist way, envisaging assimilation or integration
of any individual. Identity politics, division and exclusion constitute the basic foundations of populism
and ethnic nationalism. Populists assume also, in the same as do the ethnic nationalists, the
existence of an imagined homogenous demos/people/nation above and beyond social divides and
diversities. Populism defines the world in simple terms through a Manichean division into good and
bad, friends and foes. The latter elements in all oppositions can be defined in the easiest way
through xenophobia in ethnic terms. In fact, such a transformation (when it occurs) makes populism
5
Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge 2007, p.23.
6
A. D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations, Cambridge 2004, p. 243.
7
In case of French nationalism as Roger Eatwell rightly points out “The Jacobin tradition has celebrated the
‘Republic one and indivisible’, and has been hostile to parties and pressure groups. Clearly the latter tradition
serves further to legitimize a discourse which demonizes mainstream parties, and backroom parliamentary
deals. An element in the French political tradition also celebrates strong leadership, which also helps legitimize
forms of extreme right politics.” Roger Eatwell, Ten theories of the extreme right, [in:] Right-wing extremism in
the twenty-first century, ed. Peter Merkl, Leonard Weinberg, London 2005, pp.59-60.
8
Smith, p. 244.
3

4. particularly assertive and appealing and, in consequence, destructive. Ruth Wodak created the most
appropriate definition of national populists:
Right-wing populist parties focus on a homogenous demos, a populum (community,
Volk) which is defined arbitrarily and along nativist (blood-related) criteria, thus endorsing a
nativist body politics9
. Second, and related to the former, right-wing populist parties stress a
heartland (or homeland, Heimat) which has to be protected against dangerous outsiders. In
this way, threat scenarios are constructed – the homeland or ‘We’ are threatened by ‘Them’
(strangers inside the society or from outside: migrants, Turks, Jews, Roma, bankers, Muslims
etc.). Protecting the fatherland (or heartland, homeland) implies belief in a common
narrative of the past, where ‘We’ were either heroes or victims of evil (of a conspiracy, evil
enemies, enemies of the fatherland etc.). In this way, revisionist histories are constructed,
blending all past woes into success stories of the Volk or stories of treachery and betrayal by
others. ‘They’ are different and are conspiring against ‘Us’. Conspiracies are part and parcel
of the discursive construction of fear and of right-wing populist rhetoric. Such conspiracies
draw on traditional antisemitic and anti-elitist tropes – conspiracies are, it is believed,
organized by bankers, the media, oppositional parties, traitors to the fatherland and so forth.
Furthermore, apart from nationalism and nativism as well as the populist agenda, right-wing
populist parties endorse traditional, conservative values and morals (family values,
traditional gender roles) and want to maintain the status quo. They also support common
sense simplistic explanations and solutions (anti-intellectualism), and need a saviour, a
charismatic leader who oscillates between the roles of Robin Hood (protecting the social
welfare state, helping the ‘man and woman on the street’) and ‘strict father’. Such
charismatic leaders necessarily require a hierarchically organized party and authoritarian
structures in order to install law and order and to protect the Christian Occident against the
Muslim Orient10
.
In the context of identity politics the real, or possible, immigration brining changes of
religious and ethnic structure became the main issue used by national populists in Europe in
order to gain votes. Particularly the manifold increase of Muslim population in the West
occurring in the last several decades was defined as the key threat. The scale of immigration
from Muslim countries and its negative consequences (crime, terrorism, ghettoization, etc.)
are often greatly exaggerated by national populists. They treat highly diverse Muslim
9
The nativist body politic s should be defined as a perception of the nation through the prism of biology (nation
as an organism).
10
R. Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, London 2015, pp. 66-67.
4

5. communities as a monolith and sort of a fifth column undermining allegedly national unity
which cannot by integrated. At the same time, they are silent about positive developments
which can be observed in the integration process of European Muslims of immigrant
background.
The attitude of national populists towards the EU also manifests the significance of
identity politics. National populism in Europe is predominantly characterized by Euro-
scepticism or at least a very lukewarm approach to the EU integration process (in simple
terms it says: membership in the EU – yes, membership in the Eurozone – no) . In the case of
the EU, as it has become more integrated, more people who, in certain EU countries, are
attached to the idea of traditionally defined state sovereignty perceive such developments
with anxiety and switch votes to national populists. National populists try to present
themselves as the defenders of nations against the supernational and federal European
utopias. However, the main ongoing confrontation takes place between ethnic nationalism
promoted by national populists and civic nationalism constrained by the rule of law,
protecting the rights of minorities and individuals and which constitutes the key pillar of the
EU. It means that the acceptance of the main proposals of national populists in regards to the
definition of the nation will signify the beginning of the end of the EU. It is not an accident
that Poland and, to a lesser degree Hungary, found themselves under the national populist
governments on an unprecedented collision course with the EU institutions which was
caused by their respective governments’ undermining the rule of law. As a result, Poland as
the first EU member state is under the new Rule of Law Framework in structural dialog with
the European Commission.
National populists and democracy
The Polish and Hungarian cases can be treated as a warning call for other European countries
about the negative implications that the rule of national populists may have on their democracies.
Since 2010 democratic governance has been deteriorating systemically and substantially in Hungary.
At the beginning of 2017 Hungary, though still was recognized as a “free country, fund itself
balancing on the edge between being a ‘free country’ and a ‘partly free country’ with the worst score
in the EU, to evoke the Freedom House terminology.11
Moreover, Hungarian media were relegated
by the FH to the latter category immediately after the victory of Fidesz and continued to slide
towards the category of ‘not free’.12
Taking into consideration, current negative developments in
Hungary concerning fight against corruption, NGOs, media, asylum rights and the autonomy of
11
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2017
12
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-
press-2017
5

6. towards the category of ‘not free’.12
Taking into consideration, current negative developments in
Hungary concerning fight against corruption, NGOs, media, asylum rights and the autonomy of
universities in 2017 Hungary will most probably slip into the category of partly free countries in the
next year’s report “Freedom in the World” prepared by the FH. If this happens, it will be the first such
a case in the history of the EU. Poland is trying rapidly to “catch up” with Hungary. At the end of
2016, just one year after PiS electoral victory, the Freedom House issued a statement saying that “PiS
has openly targeted Poland’s basic democratic institutions – the media, the Constitutional Tribunal,
non-governmental organizations, and now parliamentary procedures. (...) These actions amount to a
coordinated assault on the rule of law”.13
According to the FH the situation in Poland has
substantially deteriorated in 2016. For instance, its media were relegated in the most recent report
“Freedom of the Press 2017” to the category partly free. In fact, it can be said that Poland and
Hungary do not currently fulfil the Copenhagen criteria which serve as a basic requirement for the
membership in the EU.
The de-democratization processes taking place in Poland and Hungary suggest that the way in which
the meaning of a given nation is being framed and defined can translate into the kind of democracy
that is being promoted at home. The national populists enthusiastically embraces the democratic
system, but consider only one ethnic group (natives, people) to be full members of the society. In
consequence, they deny explicitly, or implicitly, the universality of human rights. Their motto could
be limited to the famous Orwell’s sentence ‘All men are equal but some are more equal than others’
On the other hand, liberal democracy, assumes that the “people” or the “nation” and the “majority’”
do not coincide. In liberal democracies the majority is seen as transient, and also as constrained in
two important senses. Firstly, its power is mediated, that is, exercised by a variety of institutions
whose respective responsibilities have been assigned to them in advance and are normally vested in
the people’s representatives. The power of the majority should be limited through checks and
balances because it can never be exercised at the expense of individual liberties, no matter how
numerically overwhelming the majority is. As Anton Pelinka, an Austrian political scientist, describing
modus operandi of national populists rightly points out “populism is a general protest against the
checks and balances introduced to prevent ‘the people's’ direct rule”.14
The will of a sovereign
nation should not be limited. Therefore, national populists share a negative attitude towards the rule
of law presenting it as undemocratic by nature (judges are not elected by the nation).
12
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-
press-2017
13
Freedom House, Poland:LawandJusticePartyShouldStopConstitutionalCrisis,21.12.2016
https://freedomhouse.org/article/poland-law-and-justice-party-should-stop-constitutional-crisis
14
Anton Pelinka "Right-wing populism: Concept and typology", [in:] Right-Wing Populism in Europe:
Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik and Brigitte Mral, London 2013, p. 3.
6

7. If the will of a sovereign nation expressed in elections is seen as the main foundation of democracy,
the ruling party may have a serious problem to reconcile the political system with individual
freedoms. The individual is perceived as existing mostly through membership in the politicized
nation. This means that their role in public life is mostly limited to political activism, especially voting.
It is no accident, then, that Kaczyński, Le Pen or Orbán avoid the term ‘human rights’. “ Moreover, in
the name of the alleged national unity, right wing populists may even constrain the political
rights of their own voters. According to Giovani Sartori the key point to be stressed is that the
effort to impose the vision of nation divided between people and alienated elites brings potentially a
considerable loss of freedom for every citizen, including those who currently happen to agree with
the majority of the day (people) on most issues, since they would be prevented from ever changing
their minds, under penalty of losing their status as ‘one of the people’.15
The reconstruction of a
nation (reestablishment of national unity), which is pursued by national populists, is a very ambitious
project, so it requires a determined elite. The case of Poland and Hungary confirms that anti-elitist
egalitarian national populists while in power, allegedly in the name of democracy, promote a larger
political engagement of ordinary people, but in fact they strive for a more hierarchic society and less
participation in the elections of their opponents (demobilization).
The national populists attack multiculturalism, permanently and vehemently. Their criticism
is, to a certain degree, based on justified grievances regarding abuses of freedom of speech by radical
Islamists promoting totalitarian ideas which were sometimes tolerated by state institutions.
However, the intensity of populist assault on multiculturalism suggests that in fact it is an expression
of a wider rejection of social pluralism as such in the name of imagined alleged national unity.
Multiculturalism, because of its emphasis on the community, is often misinterpreted as a threat to
individual freedom. However, as Charles Taylor, a prominent Canadian philosopher, underlines, the
universal demand of respect to all individuals “powers an acknowledgment of specificity”, where
specificity refers to the distinct nature of different cultural communities as the basis for individual
identity. A democratic society dedicated to the value of equal respect of all individuals must also
recognize the multiplicity of cultural sub-groups that constitute it and whose members’ identities are
constituted in interaction with them. Therefore, members of each sub-group require cultural
recognition. However, Taylor’s view is not an argument for cultural conformism or mindless devotion
to collective identities. In Taylor’s opinion individuals are capable of shaping their inherited group
cultural identity in unique and idiosyncratic ways. Taylor stresses that the individual self-formation
goes through interaction with others and our socio-cultural environment. Nevertheless, according to
15
G. Sartori , The Theory of Democracy Revisited, NJ 1987, p. 32.
7

8. Taylor’s account, respecting “someone” means recognizing the way in which my personal identity is
constituted in interaction with a specific group cultural identity.16
In such a complex social environment that exists in Europe an assertive promotion of the
vision of a nation as a monolith based on one culture turns out to be paradoxically dangerous for the
cohesion of the society. Instead of making it more cohesive, it brings a very sharp polarization which
is undermining the community. In the name of the fight against the naïve and elusive multi-kulti and
political correctness, national populists propose a total rejection of the complexity which is inherent
to social reality. The push for a national monolith, intertwined closely with hyperactive political
activism (mobilization of the electorate, nation-rebuilding), favours the domination of identity
discourse in internal politics (everything is national). The overlapping of the nation and political
community transforms the internal political conflict into a quasi-civil war within the nation. In effect,
political opponents start to be defined not as rivals (and thus, in theory, potential coalition partners)
but as enemies whose belonging to the same nation is questioned or even rejected. They are
described as traitors and finally excluded from the community as non-Poles or non-Hungarians.
Unfortunately, the opposition in both countries has adopted the same language towards the ruling
elite (e.g. calling them “traitors” or representatives of a “totalitarian regime”). This kind of mutual
exclusion is, by nature, much more dangerous than a normal, “boring”, political dispute.
City, nation, state and democracy
The relationship in the pair a modern nation state17
vs. a city is very complex and ambivalent,
particularly in the age of globalization. The impact of globalization on these social entities is
interpreted very differently by various thinkers. According to Benjamin Barber, in the face of the
most perilous global challenges of our time—climate change, terrorism, rising income inequalities
and unemployment, economic decline, deindustrialization, trafficking of drugs, guns, and people –
“the nation state is failing us on the global scale”. According to Benjamin Barber “Today, after a long
history of regional success, the nation-state is failing us on the global scale. It was the perfect political
recipe for the liberty and independence of autonomous peoples and nations. It is utterly unsuited to
interdependence.” In his opinion, the problems are too big, entrenched, and divisive for the nation
state to solve them and it is the cities that offer the best new forces of good governance. Barber
argues that “for all the contradictions and obstacles presented by cities, they remain a formidable
alternative to the conventional nation-state paradigm”. Also Jan Zielonka, the author of a book “Is
the EU is doomed?” is highly critical towards performance of nation states in Europe. In his opinion:
16
Charles Taylor, Philosophical arguments, London 1995, p. 225-255.
17
According to Charles Thilly, a modern state should be defined as a political unit characterized by the very
process of law giving and payment for that service, persistence in time; fixation in space; permanent,
impersonal institutions; agreement on the need for an authority with power to make final judgments; and
acceptance of the idea that subjects should give loyalty to that authority. Charles Tilly, Foreword, [in:] Joseph R.
Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton 2004, p. 2.
8

9. actually a lot of other actors, cities, regions, NGOs, businesses, they all take things in their
hands, because those nation states, political theatres which used to be legitimate, are just totally
inefficient. This means that the world we used to know with nation states negotiating, competing,
clashing, it has become increasingly an irrelevant reality, a reality of the past.18
Zielonka considers European cities as particularly predestinated to undertake the role of engine of
the EU integration. Thus, their role in decision-making process should be elevated. Zielonka argues
that:
The cities which now generate from 80 to 90 % of economic growth and where do they have a space
on the European table, of decision making? At these decision making tables you have countries which
had either failed like Greece or are so small like Estonia, that they don’t match cities like London or
Hamburg. What is their legitimacy? Well, you can also ask, what is the legitimacy of nation-states.
Look at dysfunctional parliaments, parties, constitutions. Cities are not doing much worse in the field
of democracy. 19
On the other hand, Dani Rodrik, insists that it is “one of our era’s foundational myths (…) that
globalization has condemned the nation-state to irrelevance.” He perceives such an approach as
“wishful thinking” and dismisses those who “decry the artificiality of national borders” as
“cosmopolitan ethicists” caught up in “wishful thinking”.20
Rodrik’s as well as the supporters of his
position main argument is the recent rise of nationalism in Europe observed in opinion polls and
during elections. Indeed, opinion polls confirm that in many countries a nation state is perceived by
many Europeans as a safe-heaven in the age of insecurity. Meanwhile, Zielonka considers that this
attractiveness of nation state is a short-term phenomena. The European societies will realize that the
weakening of the EU means also the weakening of nation states which will not be able to deliver in
the time of crisis. 21
It seems that the participants of the debate on nation states vs. cities put too much emphasis
on the difference between them and do not take into sufficient consideration the overlapping
between these phenomena. Moreover, they often treat them in an essential way as homogenous
entities defined almost entirely as positive or negative. The difference between cities and nation
18
The EU at the Crossroads. Interview with Prof. Jan Zielonka
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309174539_The_EU_at_the_Crossroads_Interview_with_Prof_Jan_
Zielonka
19
Ibid.
20
Dani Rodrik, “The Nation- State Reborn,” Project Syndicate, 2012,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-nation-state-reborn?barrier=accessreg
21
9

10. states are even placed in time sequence. For instance, Zielonka describes the rise of new actors,
including cities as “neo-medievalism” in the opposition to the modern or post-modern paradigm. In
Zielonka’s view “new medievalism symbolizes a break with the Westphalian era and the failure of its
modernist institutional embodiment: the EU.”22
However, many social scientists (for instance,
Anthony Smith) support the idea that besides revolutionary changes which occurred in Europe in
modern times (18th
-19th
century) the continuation existed between this era and Middle Ages.23
It
found in particular an expression in the evolution of the pre-modern, proto-national identity to
modern national identity. Joseph Strayer in a classical work ”On the Medieval Origins of the Modern
State” proved, in a convincing way, that “the modern state, wherever we find it today, is based on
the pattern which emerged in Europe in the period 1100 to 1600.”24
In his opinion the success of the
modern state derives from the fact that it “combined, to some extent, the strengths of both the
empires and the city-states.”25
In the case of the city-states, their strength was based on identity and
political activism. “Their citizens participated actively in the political process and in associated
community activities. Loyalty to the state was strong; at times it approached the intensity of modem
nationalism.”26
In fact, Barber also admits that cities were often political precursors to modern nation
states. According to Baber “we sometimes forget that modern nation-states, seemingly the very
nullification of urban autonomy, originated in many cases from the interaction and cooperation of
towns and principalities. Eric Corijn recalls that one of the first modern states, Holland, arose out of a
federation of cities (staten generaal) whose first “president” was the Stadhouder (head, mayor) of
Amsterdam. Both Italy and Germany owe at least an aspect of their modern nationality to
cooperative agreements among the city states and principalities.”27
The intertwining between the
modern nation, the state and the city may be confirmed also by the social, economic and political
modernization taking place in Europe since the 18th
century. It is not an accident that the
development of the modern state and nation was closely correlated with the process of urbanization
in Europe. The industrial revolution stimulated the growth of cities which served as basic pillars of
modern state structures (universal education, bureaucracy, mass media). However, it should also be
underlined that Europe became in the Middle Ages a continent with the highest level of urbanization.
Exactly here, the urban population became the majority for the first time in the history of
humankind. At the beginning of the 19th
century throughout Europe only slightly more than 15
percent of the population lived in cities. By the middle of the 19th
century, the percentage increased
to 35 percent, and at the end of the 19th
century it crossed 50 percent.
22
J. Zielonka, The EU is doomed?, Cambridge 2014, p.81.
23
A. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Cambridge 2013.
24
Joseph, R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton 2004, p.12.
25
Ibid.
26
Joseph, R. Strayer, op. cit. , p.11.
27
B. Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities, Yale 2013, p. 114.
10

11. However, the role of cities as pillars of civic national identity seems to originate from the premodern
period. In fact, their characteristic feature was for centuries a larger cultural (ethnic and/or religious
and/or social) diversity and stronger ties with other regions in comparison to the countryside. This
diversity was sometimes a source of serious inter-ethnic, class or religious conflicts but more often
contributed to the cultural syncretism and enforced co-existence. The latter resulted in the
emergence of inclusive public space and self-government. Moreover, as Patrick J. Geary, a British
historian of medieval period, rightly points out due to globalization (multinational corporations and
international universities) and massive migration
there are signs that the older pattern of stratified linguistic and cultural diversity is re-emerging. This
is particularly evident in the great cities of Europe, where linguistic and cultural stratification once
more characterizes both ends of the population’s spectrum. [..] These developments which are
greeted by hostility and fear as novel occurrences, are actually a return to a much more ancient
pattern of ethnic diversity. Europe is indeed beginning to resemble its past.28
Box no. 2: Linguistic roots of ci(vic)ty identity
The word city in a linguistic sphere is strongly intertwined with civic nationalism. In fact, the word
“city” in many languages, including English, originates from the Latin word “civitas” which means
membership in a community, precisely citizenship/civic. Meanwhile, the word “civitas” stems
from proto-Indo-European root *kei- which has a secondary and genuinely inclusive sense of
"beloved, dear”. It may be said that the inclusiveness of cities stemmed from more diverse and
pluralistic character of social, economic and political life in urban environment, often larger than
those in the countryside. In fact, the prosperity of cities has been for centuries interdepended on
the mobility of various groups. Florida insists, “it turns out that what matters most for a city’s
metabolism— and ultimately for its economic growth— isn’t density itself but how much people mix
with each other.” The specific intertwining between the state and the city and civil identity is
confirmed in the linguistic sphere by the etymology of the word polity. A polity can be manifested in
many different forms, but mostly as a state. The singular polity comes from the Greek politeia
"state, administration, government, citizenship" and the latter from polites "citizen," from polis
"city, state". The role of the city as a proponent of civil inclusion can be observed in terms used to
describe municipal institutions. Democracy started at agora, which means an “open assembly place,
chief public marketplace of a town” in opposition to the “close” council of chiefs. In the Middle Ages,
town halls became the main building and a self-government institution. The name of this institution
in German rathaus means literally “a house of council” namely a place where consultations are
taking place and a permanent debate is going on. The word rathaus was transferred to Scandinavian
and Slavic languages. Such an etymology suggests that from the perspective of municipal democracy
more important than voting is the inclusive decision making process. In many European languages
the term used to describe city self-government (municipality) derives from the Latin word
municipalis which originally meant "pertaining to a citizen of a free town, whose citizens have the
privileges of Roman citizens and are governed by their own laws”.
Source: Online etymology dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com
Consequently, it is not an accident that civic national identity correlates more with the city as a
political precursor of the state than its ethnic versions which mostly defined the nation as a one-class
28
Patrick J. Geary, The Myth of Nations. The Medieval origins of Europe, Princeton 2003, p. 40.
11

12. community (people=peasants). In fact, the legacy of interaction in the triangle (city-nation-state)
often seems to be forgotten or neglected. As Benjamin Barber rightly points out “the so-called state-
of-nature philosophers who rationalized the emergence of new nation-states in the early modern
period ignored cities as political precursors to the state. Instead, they looked back to family and tribe
and beyond, back to simpler forms of community life”.29
However, even in that case we can observe a
certain overlapping between these allegedly separated or antagonistic categories (city and
clan/tribe). In fact, the etymology of the word democracy refers to Athens’ tribes (demes) which
gave names to city districts.
National populists and cities
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned context it is not an accident that the national
populists found themselves to a large degree on a collision course with the cities. It is worth recalling
that the role of cities as pillars of democratic political system was confirmed during the interwar
period. Countries with a very large rural population developed traditional semi-authoritarian
regimes. Strong fascist movements tend to appear in countries undergoing transition from mostly
rural (villages and small cities) to urban society. Meanwhile, the most urbanized European countries
with a small share of inhabitants living in the countryside, regardless of the severity of economic
crisis, remained democratic in the interwar period. The difference in the worldview between a
national populistic mindset and a ci(vic)ty identity are often striking. National populists in the name
of the alleged national unity quite often share the vision of centralized state which perceives the
dissolution of power towards local government with a great suspicion. The decentralisation allegedly
may undermine the unity of the nation. Moreover, big cities are often presented in a national
populist discourse as a hotbed of multi-cultural, liberal and cosmopolitan thinking which allegedly
results in a decay of genuine “native” national identity. In Poland and Hungary, that is countries ruled
by national populists, big cities have become the main arena of pro-democratic demonstrations
organized in the name of defence of the rule of law, independent judiciary, media pluralism, NGOs
and autonomy of higher education organized by the civil society. In both countries, the population of
big cities distinguishes itself by a much more positive attitude towards immigrants and refugees than
the rest of the society. In both countries support for the European integration (the accession to the
Eurozone) is substantially higher than the country’s average. In consequence, the demonstrations
gained a very outspoken pro-European character.
Box no. 3: Gdańsk as a case study
In 2013 Gdańsk was one of the first cities in Poland that introduced participatory budget which
assumes that city residents vote and decide directly how to spend a part of the city’s budget.
Gdańsk is also one of the few Polish cities that runs an open data program. It is the only city In Poland
29
B. Barber, op. cit., p. 60.
12

13. that publishes daily data on its expenses. In autumn 2016 Gdańsk launched a project called “Civic
Panel. Residents decide.” Gdańsk is the first city in Poland to take such an initiative, and probably
one of the few in the world. The Civic Panel, which is a gathering of city residents, debates on issues
related to the city life and votes on recommendations for actions of the city hall.
In June 2016 Gdańsk established, as the first city in Poland, its own comprehensive model of
integration of immigrants which was prepared in cooperation with NGOs, academic institutions and
business organizations. The council of immigrants is composed of people of diverse backgrounds,
including, among others, representatives of the Muslim community from Chechnya, Tunisia,
Palestine and Syria. In 2016 the president of Gdańsk visited the mosque and took part in iftar
(evening ceremonial meal) during the Ramadan, which is exceptional in Poland. Gdańsk was also a
driving force behind the declaration signed by the mayors of the main Polish cities in June 2017
which supports the integration of immigrants of all backgrounds on the local level. The mayors
created also a working group which is dedicated to sharing the know-how and best practices in this
field and is supposed to coordinate closely its activities with the civic society and international
institutions.
This kind of politics can count on a huge social support among citizens. In the 2015 parliamentary
elections national populists gained less than 40 percent of votes in Gdańsk (including suburbs). It
was one of their worse results in a big Polish city. During the demonstrations in defence of
independent judiciary taking place in July 2017 Gdańsk hosted one of the largest protests in the
country, proportionally to the number of inhabitants.
Gdańsk established also a close cooperation with smaller cities located in its surroundings within the
framework of The Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot Metropolitan Area. It is symptomatic that during the last
parliamentary elections in the province of Pomerania national populists received the smallest
proportion of votes among the Polish provinces.
The current worrying developments in Poland concerning the recentralization of power may serve as
a good exemplification of a sceptic attitude of national populists towards local self-government. After
gaining power in autumn 2015, the Law and Justice transferred important public institutions (Funds
for Environmental Protection and Water Management, Voluntary Fire Fighters, Agricultural Advisory
Councils) from the control of local self-governments to central authorities or constrained radically
their finances. Moreover, in June 2017 the Polish parliament endorsed an amendment to the law on
regional account chambers which substantially increased the control of government over budgets of
local self-government and provided central authorities with competences to dismiss local authorities
on a dubious base of a vaguely defined mismanagement. A very controversial amendment was met
with criticism of many local politicians, even those who are members of the Law and Justice. Finally,
it was vetoed by the president of Poland who won the presidential elections on the Law and Justice
ticket. Nonetheless, the Law and Justice announced that it would slightly change tly the amendment
and attempt to once again pass it in the parliament. Currently, the ruling party is working on a new
electoral law on local self-government. According to media reports, the government is planning to
exclude non-party committees from participating in elections at certain levels of local self-
government, which inclines implementing gerrymandering, and have only one round of voting for
13

14. city mayors whose cadency will be limited to two terms. Several concrete proposals presented in the
draft of the bill seem to be borrowed from Hungary. In spring 2017 several non-party mayors under
the leadership of Szczecin (the seventh largest city in Poland) established the Movement of Self-
Government “Non Partisan”. In June 2017 they presented their own amendments to the Electoral
Law which foresee an introduction of considerable limitations of parties’ engagement in local
elections. The Movement also launched talks with urban activists to establish coalitions in upcoming
local elections.
The clash between national populists and cities may be observed the most during the
elections. Indeed, the EU countries with a higher share of rural population and a large proportion of
population living in small towns are often more prone to the allure of national populists (see box no.
4).
Box no. 4: Different forms of urbanization in Europe
Currently, we can witness a wide scope of various forms of urbanization in Europe. That fact is
recognized by the Eurostat which divides the EU population according to the place of living into
three groups: cities (around 40 percent), towns and suburbs (above 30 percent) and rural areas
(almost 30 percent).30
According to the Eurostat in Hungary and Poland around 40 percent of the
population still live in the countryside. Also in Austria their proportion oscillates at around 40
percent and in France around 35 percent, respectively. Italy constitutes an interesting case as an EU
member with the biggest share of population living in towns and suburbs, approaching 50 percent.
Hungarian urban landscape is dominated by one mega-polis (Budapest) whose population living in
the metropolitan area accounts for around 25 percent of the entire country’s population. The
second largest city is almost 12 times smaller than the capital. The case of Austria, where Vienna
within the metropolitan area is inhabited by one-third of the country’s population, is very similar. It
is very indicative that after 1989, the social, political and economic transition in post-communist
countries was not accompanied by the second wave of urbanization. The share of urban population
decreased in certain countries or mostly stagnated in others. Similar stagnation of urbanization
might be observed in Austria.
The national populists receive considerably less votes in cities than in countryside. Moreover, the
level of connections between a city and its surroundings may determinate the vote of rural areas.
According to the research conducted by IFOP, a French research center, in case of the countryside
and small towns electoral behavior during local elections in France in 2015 depended substantially on
the level of their connections with big cities and the presence of local public services and institutions
related with the cities.31
Most importantly, the analysis of elections in Austria, Poland and France
30
Cities are defined by the Eurostat as densely populated areas where at least 50 percent of the population
lives in urban centers. Towns and suburbs are according to the Eurostat intermediate density areas where less
than 50 percent of the population lives in rural grid cells and less than 50 percent of the population lives in
urban centers. Rural areas constitute thinly populated areas where more than 50 percent of the population
lives in rural grid cells.
Eurostat, Urban-rural typology,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Urban-rural_typology
31
IFOP, L’influence de l’isolement et de l’absence de services et commerces de proximité sur le vote FN en
milieu rural, March 2016, http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/896-1-document_file.pdf
14

15. shows that the city electorate played a key role in counterbalancing the wave of national populism.
(see box no. 5).
Box no. 5: National populists, elections and cities
In France, in all cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants Marie Le Pen gained substantially
less votes than the country average. Le Pen scored the lowest in big cities with prominent
universities. Le Pen achieved better results only in Marseille (35 percent), Nice (40 percent) and
Toulon (almost 45 percent) located in southern France. By comparison, she got only 10 percent of
the vote in Paris, slightly more than 15 percent in Lyon (the third largest city) and Toulouse (the
fourth largest city). Her high results in certain cities shows that a city is not ex definitione immune to
the allure of national populists. Le Pen’s success in towns in southern France should be explained by
social, religious and ethnic structure of that region. However even in these southern departments,
Le Pen received substantially better results in countryside than in cities.
The electoral polarization between cities and the countryside was particularly prominent during the
presidential elections in Austria. During the first vote in May 2016 Alexander van der Bellen, a liberal
candidate, won 60-65 percent of votes in big cities and Norbert Hofer did not manage to win in any
state capital even in small towns such as Eisenstadt (15 thousand) and Klagenfurt (100 thousand).
On the other hand, Hofer received 60-70 percent of votes in rural area. Moreover, in big cities, for
instance in Vienna, there was a very large discrepancy in support for both candidates between city
centers and suburbs. Van der Bellen in some of Vienna’s districts won more than 75 percent but he
lost slightly against Hofer in one of the suburbs located in the metropolitan area.
In Poland in 2015 national populist parties won slightly more than 40 percent of votes in Polish
parliamentary elections in big cities. Meanwhile, in the countryside they gained almost 65 percent,
in small cities (with less than 200 thousand inhabitants) above 50 percent which was exactly the
national average.
Support for the national populists can be often weaker in local elections than parliamentary and
presidential ones. For instance, according to the opinion poll conducted in Poland in September
2017 around 65 percent of Poles announced that they would like non-party committees to
participate in elections. Among citizens with defined voting preferences almost 15 percent declared
that they would like to vote for non-party committees.
Source: Electoral commissions
Cities as the fifth pillar of democratic nation states
Cities are sometimes presented by political scientists as non-partisan by nature which is supposed to
be their main advantage. For instance, Benjamin Barber in his famous book If Mayors Ruled the
World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities demonstrated that local elites (mayors, city councils)
exhibit mostly pragmatic style of governance that is insufficient in central halls of power. In the
immortal words of the former New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia, “There is no Democratic or
Republican way of fixing a sewer.” However, the activities of local authorities dedicated to “fixing a
sewer” are only at the first glance without implications for identity and politics. For instance, the
initiative “Smart Cities” is not only focused on technological efficiency but, above all, the ability of
local authorities to establish successfully a civic community. Priorities, such as smart governance and
smart citizens , can be defined as an incubator for the creation of a socially inclusive environment by
increasing civic awareness and the education level of city-dwellers and contributing to the
acceptance of new co-citizens who come from different parts of the world. It means that cities do not
15

16. avoid a political agenda but promote a more inclusive, civil and pragmatic approach in politics,
evoking the civic definition of the nation.32
In addition, cities constitute engines and driving forces of civil and political activism on the country
level. It is indicative that the turnout in the parliamentary and presidential elections across Europe is
generally noticeably higher in cities than in rural area. For instance, the turnout in 2015 in the
parliamentary elections in Poland was around 20 percent higher in big cities than in the countryside
and substantially larger than in small and medium towns (around 10 percent higher). It should be
also added that the activism of national populists does not limit itself only in the institutional political
sphere on the central level (elections). In fact, they are very active within the society at the local
level. Their actions at the grassroots’ level can be described as the building of an uncivil society.33
The
latter is far more fluid in nature and structure than the political party and thus presents an even
greater challenge to democratic political regimes. ‘Uncivil society’ and national populist parties often
operate jointly to promote similar goals and thus present a double threat, one operating from within
the parliaments and city councils and the other from the social environment and at the local level.
The uncivil society fills the gap between parties and society. “Uncivil society” includes well-
established non-government groups, which enjoy close relations with politicians. The aim of these
groups is to spread and promote their nationalistic and populist ideas by means of persuasion,
lobbying and contacts with ordinary people in the neighborhood. While “civil society”, induced by
high amounts of ‘social capital’, is supposed to help democracy work, ‘uncivil society’, characterized
by either extremely low levels of ‘social capital’ (distrust, xenophobia, conspiracy theories, existential
fear, economical resentment, ignorance) or high social capital entrenched within sectarian
communities, yet very low with regard to society as a whole, may damage democracy. It seems that
municipal authorities, because of their more pragmatic approach and proximity to ordinary citizens,
may more successfully challenge, in cooperation with the civil society, the offensive of the uncivil
society and the national populistic politicians who want to expand to gaps between society and state
structures.
National populists define democracy as the rule of demos, namely of the people-nation.
However, it is worth reminding that the word demos originates from the Indo-European root “da”
which means “to divide”. Division constitutes an immanent element of any genuine democratic
system but the “division” could also mean “the division of powers”, which can happen only within
the limits of the rule of law. In any democratic system of government, there much be three
independent pillars of power: 1) a parliament, 2) a government or/and a president 3) a judiciary
32
Smart Cities, https://smartcities.ieee.org/
33
Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, Modern European democracy and its enemies. The threat of the
extreme right, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.2, No. 1, (Summer 2001), pp. 52-72.
16

17. body. In the absence of any of these three bodies, the democratic system cannot survive in the long
term perspective. Gradually, independent, reliable and pluralistic media started to be considered the
fourth pillar of democratic nation states. This position of the media has become particularly relevant
in the age of digital revolution when the Internet and social media are often misused by various
enemies of democracy (trolling, fake news). However, as at the beginning of 21th century more than
a half of all human beings live in the urban area worldwide, it is the high time that we recognize cities
as the fifth pillar of democratic nation states.
17