1. The Impacts of Air Strikes on
Islamic State VBIEDs in Iraq during 2014
January 31, 2016
Matthew Gulino

2. Introduction
My research attempts to determine what impacts the airstrikes that are being conducted by the
coalition (headed by the United States) in Iraq are having on the Islamic State’s (aka ISIS, Daesh, and
ISIL) ability to conduct military and terrorist attacks. This is an important question to answer because the
question about what to do next is currently dominating military and political discourse in the United
States. The only way that this can be answered is to evaluate the military actions against the Islamic State
thus far. This paper does not make recommendations for what types of military action needs to occur to
defeat the Islamic State. Rather it outlines a methodology that could be useful in determining how
effective airstrikes have been.
This is not a theoretical question. The U.S. is currently utilizing a great deal of air power against
the Islamic State in an attempt to “degrade, and ultimately destroy ISIL” (Harrison 2014, 37-46). There
have been various claims to how successful this campaign has been thus far, and extensive arguments
about what steps should be taken next. In order to determine what should be done next, the U.S. must first
determine how effective airpower has been in influencing the Islamic State. If this question can be
answered, perhaps we can intelligently determine what other steps need to be taken in addition to air
power.
The Islamic State’s military and terrorist actions are designed to gain territory, resources, and
popular support. Its military and terrorist attacks specifically are designed to demonstrate to the
opposition and its’ followers that the Islamic State can strike anywhere and at any time. These terrorist
and military attacks are also designed to prompt the opposition into over reacting against anyone who
might be suspected of supporting the Islamic State. This over reaction by the opposition (mainly the Iraqi
government and Shia militias) against Sunni civilians causes these groups to seek the help of the Islamic
State, and increases its popular support.
I decided to focus my research on the possible impacts of airstrikes on vehicle borne improvised
explosive device (VBIED) attacks because the Islamic State’s most effective military and terrorist tool is
the VBIED. For example, VBIEDs were instrumental in forcing government forces to leave the city of
Ramadi on May 17, 2015 (Alkhshali and Shoichet 2015, 1). Out of 3874 terrorist and military attacks
attributed to the Islamic State, Muslim Fundamentalists, or Unknown actors in Iraq in 2014, 779 of these
attacks were explosives delivered by vehicles. Additionally, over 31% (331 of 1058) of U.S. led coalition
airstrikes involved bombings of vehicles. I was very interested to see if these large numbers of airstrikes
had any impacts on the frequency and location of VBIED attacks.

3. Literature Review
There appear to be two ends of the spectrum in literature on how effective air power can be. One
school of thought holds that the Islamic State is a problem that cannot be solved through airstrikes alone.
This school of thought indicates that ground troops, most likely U.S. ground troops, will be necessary to
defeat the Islamic State (Johnson 2015, 7-17). The contrasting school of thought is that airpower can be
effective even without a ground offensive. It uses the example of the U.S. use of air power in Bosnia in
1999 as an example of this capability (Haulman 1999, 6-21). Other arguments that I found concerning the
utility of air power versus foes such as the Islamic State fall somewhere in between these two extremes.
Many articles discussing the combat of U.S. enemies (including the Islamic State) make the case for or
against the utility of air power because air power is currently the primary means that the U.S. uses against
its foes.
The articles used in this research mostly agree that air power is tremendously effective on the
battlefield. However, even one of the strongest proponents for air power that I found (Krause 2015, 42-
56) details the limitations that air power has in being the primary cause of coercion against an enemy.
Krause says that the U.S. can use airpower proficiently in contemporary risk and casualty-averse conflicts
but that the U.S. must first understand the broad evolution and maturation of airpower theory as well as
the state of the strategic environment in which we operate today. He argues that air power has
demonstrated that it can be the decisive element in compelling the enemy. However, the phenomenon of
the "Atrocity Threshold" severely limits the utility of air power when used against U.S. forces in
situations where the existence of the U.S. is not threatened. While this article is definitely arguing that air
power can be the decisive element in U.S. coercion, I think that it does the best job of all the articles I
read in explaining how U.S. opponents can systematically reduce the effects of air power.
Perceived limitations on air power are echoed in other writings that are decidedly less convinced
that air power can be the decisive element in coercing an enemy. One article in particular argues that the
very nature of the Islamic State makes air power less effective. Kan argues that air power is limited in
what it can accomplish versus the Islamic State because it is largely a criminal enterprise (Kan 2014-
2015, 71-80). By relying on criminal enterprises, the Islamic State has made itself into a highly adaptable
and resilient organization not easily swept from the battlefield. Some military actions, taken in a vacuum,
could actually strengthen the Islamic State. As a result, due to the significant role that crime plays in the
Islamic State’s power, the Unites States requires a more integrated financial and military strategy to
undermine the group’s territorial control and reach.

4. Kan argues that there are some clear limits to what the United States and coalition can achieve
without seizing and holding the Islamic State’s territory (Kan 2014-2015, 71-80). This sentiment is also
reflected in the writing of Press, who claims that while air power may play a decisive role in future U .S.
operations to halt an enemy's mechanized assault on a U.S. ally (Press 2001, 5-44). It will not likely be
decisive, however, if the United States or its allies need to conduct an offensive to take enemy-controlled
territory.
Other articles argue that the tactics that the Islamic State has adopted are making air power less
effective. Shafer claims that while air power has become overall more deadly on the battlefield, it is
decidedly less effective in the urban terrain that the Islamic State is operating in (Shafer 2014-2015, 93-
106). This limitation of air power is echoed in Johnson and Hashim (Johnson 2015, 7-17) (Hashim 2014,
69-83). Where Johnson and Hashim differ however is that Johnson argues for the introduction of large
numbers of U.S. ground forces to defeat the Islamic State, whereas Hashim states that while U.S. special
operations forces and air power are very effective, that the Islamic State cannot be defeated through
military means alone. This difference in opinion is reflected in other writers as well. Pape argues that air
power can be decisive when coupled with ground forces (Pape 1997, 93-114) and Head argues that air
power can be decisive in urban terrain when supporting ground forces (Head 2013, 32-51), while in
contrast Terrill and Harrison argue that military force can only be one element in a comprehensive
strategy to defeat the Islamic State (Terrill 2014, 13-23) (Harrison 2014, 37-46).
The vast majority of the literature that I reviewed (especially the more recent literature that deals
specifically with the Islamic State) seems to agree that air power cannot be the decisive factor that coerces
the Islamic State. The literature however seems to be evenly split as to what will be the decisive factor.
About half of the articles that I read argue for large numbers of Western ground forces to be utilized in
defeating the Islamic State, while the other half argue that military force alone will not defeat it. The
articles that question the ultimate utility of military force in determining a solution call for a grand
strategy based on political coalitions in the region. In essence, the difference in opinion appears to center
on who can be the decisive ground element against the Islamic State, western military forces or regional
powers. The articles calling for regional powers to take the lead deemphasize the military elements of this
strategy and instead look for regional countries to combat the Islamic State through interdiction of men,
money, and supplies.

5. Methodology
The independent variable in this research is the airstrike data and the dependent variable VBIED
attacks. A thorough exploration and analysis of the available data will help me determine if there are any
other variables of importance, such as locations of airstrikes or locations of VBIED attacks.
The difficulty of this project is that the locational data from the daily rollups of airstrikes were
extracted from text files and placed in a tabular form similar to the GTD. The limitation of this type of
research is that the GTD is only current through the end of 2014. Jane’s does have a similar database that
is more current, but you have to pay in order to get access (Vinograd 2015, 1).
My research is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. In that sense, it is an
exploratory case study. I didn’t expect a clear cut set of outcomes, but I did hope to determine if there are
any possible patterns or linkages between two sets of data. The study had five steps (Wollman 2012, 1):
1. Capture and Analyze the Data
2. Develop a Research Objective
3. Categorize the Data
4. Identify Patterns and Connections
5. Interpret the Data
The sources include press reports (and databases built from press reports), official government
documents, and academic studies. In the case of terrorist attacks in Iraq, a database has already been
created by the University of Maryland. It is called the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). In the case of
U.S. led coalition airstrikes, I created a database utilizing U.S. government press releases. I have also
analyzed academic studies concerning air power and the Islamic State in order to determine what major
questions and concerns about this subject exist. It appears that studies are pretty unanimous in their
conclusion that air power alone will not defeat the Islamic State, but they are evenly split on whether the
remaining effort should be accomplished by countries in the region, or by U.S. ground forces.
The second step involves developing a set of questions and determining how the data can be used
to answer these questions. In my study the relevant questions appear to be whether air strikes have
influenced the Islamic State’s number of terrorist and military attacks, or targets of terrorist and military
attacks.

6. The third step, categorizing the data, involves developing themes or categories that the data fits
into. In my research, I will largely be categorizing air strikes and terrorist attacks by numbers and
location. The location of air strikes will be difficult to accurately categorize and identify because the press
reports typically don’t provide a precise location. I will likely have to categorize them by cities and/or
Governates (Provinces) where they occur.
The fourth step determines how the categories that I have established are connected. These
patterns will give an insight into why things are occurring. I attempt to determine connections and
patterns by analyzing the numbers and locations of air strikes over time, and comparing this data in Arc
GIS, CartoDB, Tableu, and Excel to the number and terrorist attacks over time. This allowed me to
determine if there are country wide patterns, or perhaps patterns in particular governates and/or cities.
This involved creating choropleth maps in which regions of in the map (in this case governates of Iraq)
are given various colors that match the numbers of terrorist attacks and/or air strikes, and creating maps
of air strike and VBIED intensity and density at specific locations. Lastly, I interpret the data in the
paper’s conclusion.
The limitations of the study are based on the data available. I am not privy to exact locational data
of the airstrikes. If I had better geospatial locations for both airstrike and VBIEDs I would likely be able
to conduct more advanced geospatial analysis on these datasets. I also don’t have data on particular
personalities that may have been killed in particular airstrikes. Neither do I have data on what were the
intentions of the particular air strikes. I cannot evaluate if killing particular Islamic State leaders were
effective with this data. I cannot determine if the U.S. led coalition was placing interdiction of terrorist
attacks as a priority to be combatted by air strikes. I can only evaluate the air strikes geospatially and
compare this with a geospatial depiction of terrorist and military attacks to determine if there are any
linkages to be found. I think that this is a valid approach however because I am trying to see the
cumulative effects of air strikes on the Islamic State in the country of Iraq, and not the effectiveness of
particular air strikes.
Analysis and Findings
The first thing I did (once the airstrike data had been captured in tabular form) was to compare
the frequency of airstrikes on vehicles and buildings, to the frequency of VBIED attacks on government
(military, police, and government) and civilian (businesses, educational institutions, journalists, religious
institutions, private citizens, and transportation methods) targets. VBIED attacks on government targets
could be termed acts of warfare, while VBIED attacks on civilians would typically be seen as terrorist
attacks. My aim was to determine what impacts airstrikes had on the Islamic State’s ability to conduct

7. both types of attacks. The chart below shows that VBIED attacks on both government and civilian targets
were declining in the months leading up to the August 8, 2014 commencement of airstrikes. It also shows
that the number of airstrikes began to dramatically increase in December, 2014.
Chart 1: Airstrikes and VBIEDs by Month in 2014
Based solely on this chart, it appears that airstrikes could be having an impact on the ability of the
Islamic State to conduct VBIED attacks. There is a dramatic decrease in VBIED attacks on both
government and civilian targets in the month of December, just as there is a dramatic increase in the
number of airstrikes on both vehicles and buildings. I believe that analyzing trends is the most important
aspect to making this determination. You can see that between August and November 2014, both types of
VBIED attacks increased. However, once the numbers of airstrikes dramatically increase in December,
both of these types of attacks begin to decrease.
Next I compared the locations of airstrikes to the locations of VBIED attacks to determine if there
was any geospatial correlation that could be responsible for this decrease in VBIED attacks. The
following series of maps depict the locations of airstrikes against vehicles (and their relative intensity)
compared to the location of probable Islamic State VBIED attacks (and their relative density). I made a

8. map for each month in 2014 where airstrikes were conducted. What is striking in each month is that
airstrikes against vehicles and VBIED attacks are happening in different locations of the country. In
retrospect, this should not have been surprising because VBIED attacks are occurring largely in urban
areas where airstrikes are more difficult to conduct due to the proximity of large civilian populations.
Additionally, I assume that airstrikes would likely be used in conjunction with Iraqi ground forces rather
than as an over watch of civilian population centers.
Figure 1: August 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

9. Figure 2: September 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

10. Figure 3: October 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

11. Figure 4: November 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

12. Figure 5: December 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs
By comparing Figure 5 with Figures 1-4 you see that not only did the numbers of VBIEDs
decreased, but the expanse of territory over which they were conducted decreased significantly as well.
And while there were still large numbers of VBIED attacks in the Baghdad area, even here the numbers
significantly declined.

13. Figure 6: Comparing July and December 2014 VBIED Attack Locations
Figure 6 geospatially compares VBIED attacks in July 2014 (the month before airstrikes began)
with VBIED attacks in December (when the numbers of airstrikes dramatically increased). In July,
VBIED attacks on government targets occurred primarily in the central part of the country, especially in
Baghdad. In December, VBIED attacks on government targets become more common in the Western part
of the country (Anbar Governate) but less common everywhere else. In July VBIED attacks on civilian

14. targets are the most common in the central part of the country, but also occur elsewhere. In December,
VBIED attacks on civilian targets occur only in the central part of the country but in reduced numbers.
Figure 7: Comparing July and December 2014 VBIED Attack Locations in Baghdad
The most dramatic change in the numbers of VBIED attacks between July and December
occurred in Baghdad. VBIED attacks against government targets declined by 75%. Figure 7 shows the
reported locations of 8 VBIED attacks on government targets in July, and the 2 VBIED attacks on

15. government targets that occurred in December. VBIED attacks against civilian targets also declined by
21%. Figure 7 shows the reported locations of 14 VBIED attacks on civilian targets in Baghdad in July,
and the 11 VBIED attacks on civilian targets that occurred in December. This reduction in attacks cannot
be explained by coalition kinetic strikes in Baghdad however because there were no coalition airstrikes in
the Baghdad area in December 2014.
Conclusion
The analysis that I have conducted is not conclusive, but it does raise the possibility that U.S. led
coalition airstrikes could be significantly impacting the Islamic State’s ability to conduct VBIED attacks
targeting the government and civilians. There was a significant increase in airstrikes in Iraq in December
2014 that coincided with a significant decrease in the number of probable Islamic State initiated VBIED
attacks. The most striking change was a 75% reduction of VBIED attacks against government targets in
Baghdad. This study is limited by the fact that only 2014 VBIED attack data was available however. I
would be very interested to see if this trend continued into 2015 and 2016. It is possible that the decrease
in VBIED attacks was not a long term trend.
It is important to note that the 75% decrease in VBIED attacks against government targets in
Baghdad in December 2014 contrasted sharply to a 21% decrease in VBIED attacks against civilian
targets. This could be an indicator of the relative value that the Islamic State places on these types of
attacks. The coalition airstrikes destroyed a large number of Islamic State vehicles (and hopefully drivers)
in 2014. The Islamic State appeared to dedicate many of its remaining vehicles to conducting VBIED
attacks against civilians in Baghdad rather than against government targets. I would be interested to see if
this prioritization of VBIEDs against civilians in Baghdad continued.
The geospatial analysis conducted in this research project determined that there was no geospatial
correlation between airstrikes and VBIED attacks in Iraq in 2014. These types of events happened in
mostly different regions of the country. Airstrikes occurred most frequently in the North and West of
country, while VBIED attacks occurred primarily in the center of the country (especially near Baghdad).
The geospatial signature of VBIED attacks against government and civilian targets appears to be
drastically different however. VBIED attacks against government targets appear to become more
dispersed after the airstrikes begin, while VBIED attacks against civilian targets appear to become more
concentrated on Baghdad after the airstrikes begin.
Although airstrikes are not geospatially correlated with VBIED attacks, this does not mean that
they are not having a significant impact on the Islamic State’s ability to conduct these types of attacks.
331 (over 31%) of airstrikes in 2014 were conducted against vehicles. It is possible that the large amount

16. of vehicles (and drivers) destroyed by airstrikes caused the Islamic State’s to reduce using VBIEDs by
December 2014.
I would recommend conducting this same type of research for VBIEDs and airstrikes in 2015 and
2016 when this data becomes available. The University of Maryland is slated to release the GTD data for
2015 in the summer of 2016. This type of research could inform and influence the current political
argument about how effective airstrikes are against the Islamic State.
References
Ross Harrison. “Confronting the “Islamic State”” Parameters 44, (Autumn 2014): 37-46.
Hamdi Alkhshali and Catherine E. Shoichet, “ISIS seizes control of key Iraqi city Ramadi as government
forces pull back,” CNN, last modified May 17, 2015, accessed January 31, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/17/asia/isis-ramadi/.
Ross Harrison, “Confronting the “Islamic State” Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS,” Parameters
44 (Autumn 2014) 37-46.
Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 21
(2014), 69-83.
Daniel L. Haulman. “The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999 “ Air Power History, (Summer
2015): 6-21.
David E. Johnson, “Fighting the “Islamic State” The Case for US Ground Forces,” Parameters 45 (Spring
2015), 7-17.

17. Paul Rexton Kan, “Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy,” Parameters 44 (Winter
2014-2015), 71-80.
Merrick E Krause, “Airpower in Modern War,” Air & Space Power Journal (May/June 2015), 42-56.
Robert A. Pape, “The limits of precision‐guided air power,” Security Studies 7:2 (1997) 93-114.
William Head, “The Battles of Al-Fallujah: Urban Warfare and the Growth of Air Power,” Air Power
History (Winter 2013) 32-51.
Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”
International Security 26 (Fall, 2001), 5-44.
Stephen William Shafer, “Three Models of Air Power as an Asymmetrical Asset,” Journal of Applied
Security Research (Winter 2014-2015), 93-106.
W. Andrew Terrill, “Confronting the “Islamic State” Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of
ISIS,” Parameters 44 (Autumn 2014) 13-23.
Cassandra Vinograd, “ISIS Attacks Soared in Past 3 Months: HIS Jane’s Database,” NBC News, October
22, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-attacks-soared-
past-3-months-ihs-janes-database-n448401

18. Lauren Wollman "Qualitative Analysis", Learning Materials from the NPS Center for Homeland Defense
and Security, last modified on October 12, 2012, accessed on January 10, 2016,
https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_qualitative_methods/player.html

19. Data
VBIED_2014.xls
AirStrikes_2014.xls