Democracy Promotion: Unpacking Key Concepts
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A quick framework and analysis of democratic promotion initiatives with a focus on assessment
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Democracy Promotion: Unpacking Key Concepts
- 1. Democracy promotion: Unpacking the concept Mateo Porciúncula 13th March 2015 Master in Development Evaluation and Management
- 2. How to study democracy promotion? What lies inside/outside the “box” ? Is this definition contested? What kind of activities are involved? What are the expected results? What are the implications for assessment and evaluation?
- 3. Methodology
- 4. Democracy promotion and democracy assistance Narrow and broad definitions “Demprom” and good governance
- 5. Sector Goal Electoral process Free and fair elections Strong political parties Institution building Democratic constitution Effective judiciary / law institutions Representative legislature Responsive local governments Prodemocracy military Civil Society Active advocacy NGOs educated citizens Independent media Strong unions Democracy promotion core Top down / bottom up Linkage / leverage Source: Carothers, 2011 and Fritz, Rakner and Rocha, 2008
- 6. Concepts Political Approach Developmental Approach Value of Democracy Democracy and political freedom. Democracy is mostly a contribution to development. Democracy “Elections plus rights” Broad definition Democratizatio n Key junctures of change. Democrats vs. Status quo. Slow, iterative process. socioeconomic development state building. Methods Pro-democratic coalitions Challenging regime? More indirect. Accountability > contestation. non-confrontational. Human rights approach. Political vs Developmental Source: Carothers, 2008
- 7. Measuring from inputs to outputs Process assessment Measuring what? why? Scope Aggregation Core functions and weighting Data availability Timing conundrum
- 8. Concept Attributes Components Democrac y Conflict Right to form political parties and compete (association, assembly, etc.) Freedom of the press Participation Right to vote Fairness of the elections (financing, media, processes .etc.) Outcomes: democracy measurements Datasets Limitations Hybrid Regime mimicry Picture by Igor Siwanowicz (c) + Accountability: horizontal, vertical Source: Dahl, 1971
- 9. Impact Democracy determined? Geography, culture, economy + process, institutions and agency Qualitative and quantitative Known unkwons Form and function of democracies Isolating the treatment’s effect
- 10. Final considerations Realistic expectations A deeper look at program theories Political thinking Time lag considerations Meso-level indicators Complexity
- 11. Thank you!
Notas do Editor
- The promotion of democracy has become the focus of considerable international efforts, and has seen a resurgence in funding and activity in recent years. Presently, reported democracy promotion programs as part of international assistance involves more than US$5 billion annually (Burnell, 2008), not including other efforts outside of official assistance. The biggest players in the assistance sector include the US, the European Union, plus the United Nations. However, in a period of renewed international interest on democratization, and despite that the track record of democracy promotion is considered by many authors to be a bad one, there are very few studies regarding assessment of democracy promotion activities and, particularly democracy assistance programs and projects. There are indeed many challenges particular to the study of democracy promotion, not the least of which is a generalized lack of definitions, particularly at the policy level. The focus of this paper is to problematize and discuss the approaches on how to study democracy promotion. What lies inside/outside the concept? Is this definition contested? What kind of activities can be considered/excluded in the democracy promotion menu and what is their link to the theory? What are the implications for process and impact assessment?
- Methodology In order to discuss different approaches to studying democracy promotion I will make use of a logical sequence of generic process of interventions. Using a literature review I will discuss how the different elements in the treatment-to-impact equation and work on how these concepts are delimited in the field, as well as the most prominent discussions regarding conceptualization. This work is divided according to the two sides of the equation: inputs and activities and outcomes and impact. Each section will be finished by a short discussion of the implications of conceptualization to assessment.
- In order to define and assess democracy promotion initiatives there is a shifting focus between a broad definition of democracy promotion and a narrower one, this is parallel with two mainstream approaches to democracy promotion practice that will be discussed later on. First, according to the European Council of Ministers (Burnell, 2008), the term democracy promotion is “to encompass the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in third countries,” which is to say “all measures designed to facilitate democratic development”. According to this definition, focus both on assistance activities and inputs on foreign relations approach are important. On the other hand, a more narrow definition focuses only on democracy assistance. One conceptual step below promotion, democracy assistance refers to non-coercive, largely concessional, usually grant-aided transfers of support (material, technical, and financial) to initiatives explicitly geared to improving one dimension of democracy. Examples of activities in this sense include: elections observation; improving electoral management capability; capacity building in civil society, legislative strengthening, support to political parties and the party system, etc. Lines of delimitation for specific assistance initiatives can be blurry and, for assessment purposes, borderline cases should be looked at carefully. For example, in post conflict situations democracy assistance initiatives might take up into reconciliation efforts and negotiation/mediation training. Conversely, there is overlap between the democracy and the good governance agenda, which has relevant theoretical and practical implications. I will develop this distinction below. Democracy Assistance and good governance Democracy promotion has constituted a significant part of development assistance during the past years. However, it is important to note that democracy assistance can be considered a subset of a much broader international agenda to support ‘good governance’. Countries and donor usually categorize programs under the name of ‘good governance’ that include activities and topics that go beyond what we define as democratic assistance. While the concept of ‘good governance’ is as well difficult to define, there is a focus on how states should govern – that is, on one hand about the rules and practices according to which governments are chosen and, on the other hand, also on how the state’s power and authority are exercised (Kjær, 2004). In the words of Fukuyama, governance is defined “as a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.”(Fukuyama, 2013:350) Clearly, accountability and checks and balances, as rule of law, are part of what I call the “republican” aspect of democracy promotion efforts, but other aspects of the good governance agenda, such as state capacity and effective service delivery are not, and are the object of different types of intervention.
- This set of activities fulfill the condition to be directly and explicitly geared towards the political/accountability aspects of democracy promotion. Activities oriented to socio economic goals might be considered by some agencies and authors as part of broadly defined initiatives to promote democracy. This is a consequence of a long lived discussion linking democracy and economic aspects, mostly poverty and, more recently, inequality. For example, early theories of modernization focus on the importance of economic factors in setting up the stage for democracy. A crude summary of the case is that as industrialization and technology develop, they conform more complex societal interactions and a more demanding constituency that “pushes” for participation and democratic reforms. The discussion around this theory is quite lively and its major proponents were Lipstet and Rostow, while others like Przeworski and others have argued with them (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 1996). Despite the initial deterministic bent of modernization theorists, the broad consensus today is that there is correlation but not necessarily causation between income and democracy, as many significant exceptions to this rule like China (industrialized, growing, autocracy), Weimar Germany (industrialized, developed democracy, fell into dictatorship) or Kenya (poor, non-industrial, relatively stable democracy) have occurred. Evidence in these papers shows that dictatorships are not necessarily better at growth and that, at the highest levels of income, democracies tend to survive. There is also a limited link of descending inequalities are statistically conducive to democracies. Despite statistical probability tendencies, the theories of a natural “exogenous” development of democracy have been mostly refuted in favor of more complex, process oriented theory alternatives. In short, in order to promote democracy, first and foremost, one must work on democracy. Therefore, and despite the evident interest on linking these two important aspects of development, they are still two different concepts, and the discussion on the links between the two is still inconclusive. Interventions which focus on socio-economical goals do not satisfy neither the narrower definition of democratic assistance initiatives nor the public opinion perception of what should belong in the category. For study and assessment of democracy promotion assistance initiatives, the focus is and should be in the political dimensions, economy is a given. Shifting focus The emphasis of democracy-based assistance programs has evolved in the recent years, while the 3 components of elections, civil society and political institutions have remained core. In the 80s, democracy promotion was mainly oriented towards electoral processes, particularly to electoral monitoring. This evolved into more complex forms of electoral process support which also involves administrative and institutional support to electoral process. A focus on elections is what is generally considered –and criticized- as the mainstream of democracy promotion interventions. The experience of Latin America in the late 80s and 90s, together with the experience of transition to democracy in several former authoritarian regimes brought about a stronger focus on the judiciary, accountability and rule of law assistance. The 90s were characterized for a greater emphasis on civil society projects, while in recent years the more attention has been paid to political parties and parliamentary support (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz, 2007). Touching ground The steps from inputs to activity to desired outcome are not automatically given. Conceptualization of democracy, program goals, funding, past history and institutional relations of both local and external actors influence decisions regarding the nature of activities and the entry point. Both top-down and bottom up approaches are considered viable options. The first focuses on elites and government to promote willingness to change (many times combined with political-foreign relations influence). In other cases, the preferred approach is a “grass roots” support to push for democratic change. In this cases, some groups of actors (INGOs, Media) have been preferred while others systematically neglected (Churches, Unions). This trend has arisen by ease of access, and because of a natural tendency of international actors to mirror local institutions and their workings with their experience at home. At the same time, the “sector” focus of the intervention is another relevant variable. Usual suspects are rule of law, media, electoral systems and parties and human rights. Some programs focus on institution building while others try to support pro-democratic coalitions, and some stay at the legal or civil society levels. Interactionist inputs in democracy promotion. For the cases when researchers are considering nations and international agencies as actors in democracy interventions, there are inputs at the foreign policy level that are also part of the left side of the treatment-outcome equation. Moreover, from a foreign policy perspective, democracy assistance programs and activities can be considered only as a smaller, less relevant part of a broad friendly strategy that might include trade benefits, association benefits and pro-democratic political discourse. The main debate regarding this aspect is the dilemma between a hard stance that focuses on sanctions, isolation and conditionality (leverage) and a persuasive stance in which promotion of democracy is fostered through association, communication and cultural and trade links (linkage). In this sense, the findings of Levitsky and Lucan (Levitsky and Way, 2006), they prove that connections between states and their elites, together with mutual commercial interests and connections raise the cost of autocratic behavior and heighten the salience of autocratic abuses in the international sphere. Conversely, isolation and hard leverage might be effective in deterring the worst authoritarian abuses, particularly in contexts of high asymmetry, but may also be counterproductive, as they legitimize and polarize local elites by providing them a convenient external enemy as a scapegoat. Evidence shows that policies of engagement and interaction are more likely to have a positive effect in democratization, but only if sufficiently significant, and only in the medium-long term. Most of times high linkage is not determined politically but is more a consequence of vicinity. Policy coherence/incoherence. When regarding promotion of democracy, researchers also might take a look at the externalities of other policies as a whole, in order to better understand the effects of efforts of promotion and development of democracies. Certain policies, like ruthlessly extractive business practices by some international corporations, support of armed groups, or arm sales have clear negative externalities to stability and healthy development of democracies and might be undermining the more explicit policies conducted by pro-democracy agents, perhaps of the same country. They also affect the credibility of present and future pro-democracy interventions by external actors. When many international actors are involved, excess input or even conflicting activities might overload and undermine weak institutions. Evidence from the field in “donor darling” cases supports these findings (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz, 2008)
- Two streams of democratization In democracy promotion practice and analysis there is a conceptual divide between two mainstream approaches to promotion of democracy. These are the “developmental” and “political” approaches (Carothers, 2008). A summary of both approaches can be found in the table above: These are ideal types, as understood by Max Weber, actual interventions in the field run the gamut from the more political to the more developmental, frequently including actions and initiatives of both kinds. Typically, Europe has been characterized by a developmental style (Van Hüllen, 2012) and the U.S. by the political. Both political and developmental approaches to democracy promotion have their critiques. The political style has been criticized by an excessive focus on elections and for taking a minimalist, sometimes too partial approach. On the other hand, developmental approaches to democracy promotion can be “toothless” and disregard the political aspects of democracy promotion too much.
- Discussion and implications for assessment There are many reasons why studies on democracy promotions are to be undertaken. First and foremost, as great deal of time and resources are invested into them, it is relevant to find out what is working and what is not. The approach may be from the side of the researcher, usually ex post, and the interest might lie in comparing different approaches or initiatives and finding patterns to inform future endeavors. Conversely, the approach might be more practical, interested in ex ante or during-process studies of interventions in order to identify possible biases and inform practice with findings from the field. Looking, for now, only at the input-output side, it is first relevant to define the scope of the analysis, whether it is case, sector, country or multi-country level and whether the focus should be on democracy assistance interventions, foreign policy inputs, or both. There is an evident trade-off between the more comprehensive analysis and data collection and availability. Usually case studies focus on a combined approach where multi-country research takes up mostly one variety of input data. An analysis of democracy promotion intervention should look for the “core” elements (electoral processes, institutions, civil society) that are common to democracy promotion, and also determine the main focus of the program or policy. These 3 dimensions, and the conceptual divide between “political” and “developmental” focus could be useful for comparative studies. Quantitative study (for example, financial) can provide “weight” to different program sectors and goals to establish the focus and provide insight to complement the usual qualitative focus of analysis in the literature. There are also some data collection and aggregation challenges to democracy promotion study (Green and Kohl, 2007). Data is usually not available or insufficient for many of the relevant sectors for the intervention (typical examples are civil society or political parties). At the country level, or worse, at the multi country level, aggregation is very complicated, as each actor defines similar activities in different ways (in the same country, different donor agencies, in different countries both them and governments), and each subsequently makes different choices about how to classify their data. The broad categories extracted from the literature above might come helpful, but will require work and decision making on part of the researcher or evaluator when confronted with raw data. When process data is available, it is usually problematic, indicators tend to change over time when programs are revised and/or are usually subjective. Most studies of DG programming rely on qualitative data, partially because quantitative data is seldom useful or existent for democracy dimension at a more detailed ground level. This qualitative data is sometimes prepared by experts who may be subject to moral hazard when reporting (in the case they are part of the program and thus are interested in its continuity or are local experts from other organizations who then would also be rivals for funding, or may not know enough about the program in question)(Green and Kohl, 2007) For case studies, a look at program theory is also relevant to establish the intended links between the inputs and outputs in the program in question. They are also significant to determine selection of entry points and aid modalities. Recent critiques to (mostly in-house) studies of democracy assistance programs point to a lack of more systematic approaches to account for the state of affairs pre project and include a careful mapping of local actors and their actual political relevance. This is particularly useful for process-evaluation and ex ante appraisal, in order to correct for possible donor bias in actor selection and to identify assumptions regarding functioning of, say, civil society or, political parties based on extrapolation of experience at home. Many agencies and countries have adopted a political analysis in their practice(Green and Kohl, 2007), while some authors proclaim the shift to ex ante appraisal of pro-democracy interventions (Burnell, 2008).
- A minimalistic definition of democracy focuses in procedure, in short, how to get to power. Democracy is then an institutional arrangement for making political decisions in which individuals get to power through a “competitive struggle for the people’s vote” Schumpeter, in (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz, 2008) According to Dahl, (Dahl, 1976) democracies –polyarchies- can be studied according to two fundamental axes, participation and contestation of power. Concept Attributes Components Democracy Conflict Right to form political parties and compete (freedom of association, freedom of assembly, etc.) Freedom of the press Participation Right to vote (extent of suffrage rights, Fairness of the elections (access to public financing, access to media, fair and transparent electoral processes etc.) Figure 5: anatomy of modern democracies according to Dahl. Source: own, based on similar figure in (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) Following from his contribution, there are seven fundamental dimensions that are vital for democracy, as follows (ODI and ODI, 2007): 1. Control over governmental decisions about policy constitutionally vested in elected officials 2. Relatively frequent, fair and free elections 3. Universal adult suffrage 4. The right to run for public office 5. Freedom of expression 6. Access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by either the Government or any other single group. 7. Freedom of association/assembly (i.e. the right to form and join autonomous associations such as political parties, interest groups, etc.). Accountability. An even more demanding definition of democracy focuses less on procedure and the conflict for power and more on the role of accountability (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003). The rocky experience of democracy in Latin America after the “third wave of democratization” has shown that a well-functioning democracy also needs checks and balances that work. In other words, this dimension refers to the republican aspect of modern democracy and it is indeed relevant to the quality of it, particularly if in the consolidation phase. There are three dimensions of accountability to be taken care of: 1. vertical (i.e. electoral accountability of governments to the citizens), 2. Horizontal (i.e. checks and balances of state institutions by other state institutions) and (for some) 3. Societal accountability -media and other organizations function of holding the state accountable. It should be apparent now the link between these items on the outcome side: electoral processes, media, civil rights, plus accountability and the relevant dimensions of input and activities mentioned in the previous section. It should also be evident that, while similar, they are not exactly the same. In fact, the link between theory and practice has been colored by institutional preferences, politics, path dependency and trends in democratic thought. Of special relevance then for research is to clarify the links between outcomes of interventions and outputs of activities. At both the international and domestic level, being able to call oneself as a “democracy” is desirable and can work a long way towards attracting prestige, legitimacy and international support. Therefore, in recent times, many non-democratic regimes have adopted a strategy to focus on minimal pro-democratic reforms to conform to the appearance of procedure and avoid international pressure, but at the same time make sure to continue and keep their hold on power uncontested. These semi-authoritarian regimes are “adept at imitating the forms of democracy while undermining the substance of it”(Carothers, 2008). Discussion and implications for assessment, measuring outcomes Democratization is a process, thus, studies need to measure progress against some kind of benchmark. Usually, baseline at the intervention level is mostly output related and not of sufficient quality or quantity to use for outcome assessment(Green and Kohl, 2007), so researchers and evaluators require external data sources. Researchers can count on many datasets that measure democracy and rank it, four out of these are the most popular: the Polity IV dataset, the Freedom House Democracy Index, The Economist’s Intelligence Unit Democracy Index and, though it includes other economic aspects, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. None of these datasets are considered perfect, and in all cases, decisions had to be made in order to construct a reliable methodology. However most of them focus on the dimensions proposed by Dahl, adding in some cases other aspects of democracy discussed previously. When combined they roughly correlate, with some differences, naturally, regarding “grey area” cases. Of special interest is the Polity IV set, in which on a scale of 21 values from -10 to 10, a score less than -5 is considered an authoritarian regime, a value over 5 is considered democracy, and those in between are “anocracies” (Marshall and Cole 2014), our gray area instances. Despite being lacking in the extent of participation and suffrage dimension of democracy, the Polity IV dataset contains relevant and reliable data about competitiveness, regulation of participation and checks to the executive’s power, as such it is useful enough for the discussion if its limitations are taken into account. For a more detailed account of measures of democracy and how to improve them, please see Munck and Verkuilen (2002). For a robust, multidimensional assessment of anodemocracies and hybrid regimes see (Gilbert and Mohseni, 2011). Unfortunately, these measurements are at a very high level of aggregation, whereas most democracy promotion endeavors are limited in scope and time. Consequently, it is very difficult to isolate effect of programs from noise (effects from other programs, national or international trends -knows as “waves”-, etc.). Furthermore, this aggregate level measurements are also not very sensitive to small changes. Outcome data for specific dimensions like trade union development, political parties institutionalization, or civil society activity might be either constructed from scratch, and (if available) triangulated with other sources, such as national reports (when they exist), regional level data like the Mo Ibrahim dataset or large sample survey data like LAPOP or the Latino / AfroBarometer. In most cases, these datasets are unavailable or inadequate to answer any but the most superficial of inquiries (Green and Kohl, 2007). The dimension of horizontal accountability considers mechanism of state to state accountability outside of electoral processes and include, for example, both parliamentary and judiciary oversight of the executive. I would like to thank my colleague Mathias De Roeck for his contribution with this reference.
- Impact of democracy promotion initiatives If classifying, sorting and measuring inputs to democracy promotion initiatives was already complicated measuring the impact of such programs is undeniably much more difficult. One analogy I would like to bring to the democracy promotion debate is that interventions here are similar to dropping a pebble in a pond. Effects of an intervention are often indirect and may be situated many “ripples” away from the initial, usually small scale treatment. Problems of attribution and causality are at the forefront of attempts to measure impact of pro-democracy interventions. Moreover, even before taking that step, it is difficult to know whether interventions actually set out to achieve what was intended to achieve firstly and in which ways. This is due in part to lack of systematic assessment and monitoring and can be addressed with better program and process assessment, for which funding and time are usually not abundant. However, the mostly important challenge to measuring impact is that the mechanics that translate from actions into democratic outcomes have been extensively studied but are still not completely understood. Discussing the casual chain of democracy By merit of its definition, democratization processes require to be driven from within and supported by key domestic actors. Not surprisingly, it has been found that democratic assistance originated and demanded by the local actor is more likely to be successful, while little can be achieved from the outside (Brown, 2005). External factors can play a significant role in democratization processes, acting as triggers (the end of the Cold War or the Arab Spring, for example) and influence preferences and capabilities of domestic actors in favor of political democracy reform, but the ball is in eventually in their court. Democracy as a development issue is in essence an endogenous product. More than others it requires to be driven by local actors, so the expectations of impact of foreign interventions would always be limited. Despite the discussion about the structural determinants of democracy (culture, geography, economy), the convergence among development theorists that the success or failure of democracy promotion depends mostly on the interaction of actors and formal and informal institutions. This “process” school is less deterministic and places a more important role in individual agency and decisions. Context, political, economic, historical and cultural do play a very important part in shaping and setting up these interactions. Therefore, similar interventions and structures would work very differently in diverse settings (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz, 2008). Impacts on democracy, form and function. There are two levels of impact to be considered. First of all, and the easiest to measure is the effect in the procedures related to democracy, namely elections, creation of accountability institutions and pro-democratic law reforms. Second, and more complicated, is the measurement of the effectiveness of such institutions and the creation of functioning democratic accountability mechanisms, both of which require norms plus active and effective domestic constituents.
- Recently, there is a resurgence of political thought among the international community, precisely as reaction to mimicry and failure of developmental interventions (both pro-democracy and otherwise) in contexts of clientelism, “big man politics” and fragile institutions. One of the problems of mainstream thinking of democratization in the developing world is that most programs and initiatives are based upon the assumption that emerging democracies are being built on the foundations of coherent, functioning states (Carothers, 2002). A better understanding of the rationale and functioning of democratic institutions, especially in anodemocratic, hybrid regimes will help assess impact (both intended and not) of interventions and help practitioners tailor solutions for them. Discussion and implications for assessment, measuring impact of democracy promotion initiatives. External actors need to be realistic and humble about expectations. What is defined as success should vary according to the scope and focus of the intervention. It is regime change? Institutional reform? Improved democracy outcome scores? In which dimensions? More enabling conditions? Perception adjustment? The state of the art in impact assessment for this subject has resulted in very modest findings. For example, an empirical study of impact of EU have used a number of qualitative sources (interviews, focus groups, etc.) as well as quantitative analysis to measure the impact of democratic promotion endeavors and have found that environment in the partner countries that is the main determinant of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of democratization support (Bossuyt et al, in Burnell, 2007) Complementing this findings, a report commissioned by the US Agency for International Development used strictly quantitative data (budget assigned to democracy promotion as the main independent variable) and concluded that over the period studied, 1990–2003, USAID’s democracy and governance assistance programs to over a hundred countries on average resulted with higher Freedom House and Polity IV scores for democracy than they could have been expected to achieve otherwise(Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, 2011). The study uses regression analysis tools to control for competing alternative explanatory determinants, such as vicinity or culture. However, the results, while statistically significant, were very small, and the authors attribute this result to the fact that budget allocation to democracy promotion, even for the higher spender in the matter, is still relatively very small. A study such as the one done for USAID is an exception, as the majority of studies are still localized and qualitative. For comparative studies, as it happened at the input level, aggregation and comparison is better suited for quantitative analysis. The problem is more aggravated in impact assessment, so it makes it a discretionary judgment to assign relative values to qualitative measurements of dimensions such as accountability or independence of the media. The main challenge in impact assessment comes from the isolation between program outcomes and the influence of other factors. These might be other programs in the same country or countries and/or in related topics. Also, complex situations where international involvement in state-building, peacemaking and other forms of foreign political influence make this endeavor particularly challenging. As mentioned before, another crucial matter in impact and outcome assessment is attribution. As the theory in democracy promotion is still in flux, methods to prove that a certain consequence was caused by specific outputs in democracy promotion are also difficult to conceive. It is extremely hard to construct the counterfactual in democracy endeavors, as the domestic context factors are particularly relevant. Also, country case data is mostly available for those countries where interventions by the same actor were taking place, making it hard to find matching data and make control cases. Time lag considerations are also important. Of the little that is known about impact of democracy promotion initiatives is that processes take time and are oftentimes cumulative in their results(Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, 2007). This would mean that the horizon of impact assessment should be more delayed in time in order to capture change, but how long? This fact is, moreover, in tension with the need of donors and policy makers of rapid impact results in order to sustain commitment for democracy promotion efforts. Democratic processes and interventions of the sort share many characteristics of “complex” issues: they are highly context-sensitive, suffer from non-linear causal effect relations and include subsets of complicated issues that are not easily reducible in a model theory. Thus, they are less suitable to more procedural assessment methods. Together with a renewed interest in democracy promotion initiatives, the field is buzzing with discussion about how to measure and improve them (Green and Kohl, 2007). Participatory approaches to impact assessment, more attention to the political drivers of change and the construction of intermediate meso-level indicators that help make connections between outputs and outcomes are some of the answers that are being developed nowadays.
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