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Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries
Marcus Botacin1
1Informatics - Federal University of Parana (UFPR) - Brazil
mfbotacin@inf.ufpr.br
November 2018
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
About Me
Malware Analyst (2012)
BsC. Computer Engineer @ UNICAMP (2015)
Sandbox Development
MsC. Computer Science @ UNICAMP (2017)
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis
PhD. Computer Science @ UFPR (Present)
Hardware-Assisted Malware Detection
AntiVirus Evaluation
Future Threats
Contextual and Social Malware effects
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Why Monitoring ?
Policy Enforcement
Logging
Forensics
Debugging
Malware Analysis
Reverse Engineer
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Real Trace Examples
1 7/4/2014 −13:5:1.895| DeleteOperation |2032|C:
deposito . exe |C: ProgramData r r . t x t |
1 7/4/2014 −13:3:48.294| CreateProcess |3028|C: Monitor 
Malware v i s u a l i z a r . exe |2440|C: WindowsSysWOW64
 d l l . exe
1 2014−05−14 20:02:40.963113 10.10.100.101 XX.
YY. ZZ.121 HTTP 290 GET /. swim01/
c o n t r o l . php? i a&mi=00B5AB4E−47098BC3 HTTP/1.1
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Function Interposition
Figure: Source: https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/01/
inline-hooking-for-programmers-part-1.html
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Techniques I
Kernel Tables
System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT)
Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
Global Descriptor Table (GDT)
Userland Tables
API hooking
DLL injection
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Techniques II
Binary Patching
Inline hooking
OS Support
Detours
Callbacks
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
In Practice...
Figure: Real malware claiming a registry problem when an anti-analysis
trick succeeded.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
In Practice...
Figure: Commercial solution armored with anti-debug technique.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
In Practice...
Figure: Real malware impersonating a secure solution which cannot run
under an hypervisor.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Detecting Analysis Procedures
1 i f ( IsDebuggerPresent () )
2 p r i n t f (” debuggedn ”) ;
3 e l s e
4 p r i n t f (”NO DBGn ”) ;
1 cmp [ eax+0xe9 ] , eax ; ; 0xe9 = JMP
2 pop rbp
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Anti-Analysis Summary
Table: Anti-Analysis: Tricks summary. Malware samples may employ
multiple techniques to evade distinct analysis procedures.
Technique Description Reason Implementation
Anti Check if running Blocks reverse
Fingerprinting
Debug inside a debugger engineering attempts
Anti Check if running Analysts use VMs Execution
VM inside a VM for scalability Side-effect
Anti Fool disassemblers AV signatures may Undecidable
Disassembly to generate wrong opcodes be based on opcodes Constructions
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Transparency
1 Higher privileged.
2 No non-privileged side-effects.
3 Identical Basic Instruction Semantics.
4 Transparent Exception Handling.
5 Identical Measurement of Time.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Hardware Features Summary
Technique PROS CONS Gaps
HVM Ring -1
Hypervisor High
development overhead
SMM Ring -2
BIOS High
development implementation cost
AMT Ring -3
Chipset No malware
code change analysis solution
HPCs Lightweight
Context-limited No malware
information analysis solution
GPU Easy to program
No register No introspection
data procedures
SGX Isolates goodware
Also isolates No enclave
malware inspection
SOCs Tamper-proof
Passive
Raise alarms
components
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
HVM
Figure: HVM operating layers
.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
HVM
Figure: Ether Sandbox Exits.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
SMM
Figure: Operation modes. Source: https://tinyurl.com/l2uqr8d
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Figure: SMI generation.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
A ring to rule them all!
Figure: Privileged rings. Figure: New privileged rings.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Isolated Enclaves
Figure: SGX Memory Protection
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
DMA Attacks I
Figure: Hypervisor Attack
.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
DMA Attacks II
Figure: Source: https:
//www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
reference-guides/pcie-device-security-enhancements.pdf
.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
SGX Malware
Figure: SGX Malware
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
References
Who watches the watchmen: A security-focused review on
current state-of-the-art techniques, tools and methods for
systems and binary analysis on modern platforms—ACM
Computing Surveys.
Enhancing Branch Monitoring for Security Purposes: From
Control Flow Integrity to Malware Analysis and
Debugging—ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security.
The other guys: automated analysis of marginalized
malware—Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking
techniques.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Conclusions
Thanks Tilo for hosting me.
Open to hear your questions.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Software-Based Solutions
3 Evasion Techniques
4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
5 Attacks
6 Conclusions
7 Extra
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Proposed Framework
Figure: Proposed framework architecture.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Could I isolate processes’ actions?
Figure: Data Storage (DS) AREA.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Could I isolate processes’ actions?
Figure: Local Vector Table (LVT).
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Table: ASLR - Library placement after two consecutive reboots.
Library NTDLL KERNEL32 KERNELBASE
Address 1 0xBAF80000 0xB9610000 0xB8190000
Address 2 0x987B0000 0x98670000 0x958C0000
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Table: Function Offsets from ntdll.dll library.
Function Offset
NtCreateProcess 0x3691
NtCreateProcessEx 0x30B0
NtCreateProfile 0x36A1
NtCreateResourceManager 0x36C1
NtCreateSemaphore 0x36D1
NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject 0x36E1
NtCreateThread 0x30C0
NtCreateThreadEx 0x36F1
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Figure: Introspection Mechanism.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
_lock_file+0x90printf+0xe3__iob_funcprintf+0xcaprintfNewToy
Figure: Step Into.
scanf+0x3f NewToy printf
Figure: Step Over.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is CFG reconstruction possible?
Figure: Code block identification.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the final solution transparent?
Identified tricks
1 0x190 xor eax , eax
2 0x192 jnz 0x19c
1 0x180 push 0x10a
2 0x185 r e t
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the final solution transparent?
Identified tricks
1 0x340 cmp eax ,0 xe9
2 0x345 jnz 0x347
1 0x400 QWORD PTR f s :0 x0 , rsp
2 0x409 mov rax ,QWORD PTR [ rsp+0xc ]
3 0x40e cmp rbx ,QWORD PTR [ rax+0x4 ]
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the final solution transparent?
Deviating Behavior
Figure: Deviating behavior identification.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the final solution transparent?
Deviating Behavior
Figure: Divergence: True Positive. Figure: Divergence: False Positive.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a Debugger?
Inverted I/O
Figure: Debugger’s working mechanism.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a Debugger?
Suspending Processes
EnumProcessThreads + SuspendThread.
DebugActiveProcess.
NtSuspendProcess.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Could I develop a Debugger?
Integration
Figure: GDB integration.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
ROP Attacks
Figure: ROP chain example.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
CALL-RET Policy
Figure: CALL-RET CFI policy.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
Gadget-size policy
Figure: KBouncer’s exploit stack.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
Exploit Analysis
Table: Excerpt of the branch window of the ROP payload.
FROM TO
—- 0x7c346c0a
0x7c346c0b 0x7c37a140
0x7c37a141 —-
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
Exploit Analysis
1 7 c346c08 : f2 0 f 58 c3 addsd %xmm3,%xmm0
2 7 c346c0c : 66 0 f 13 44 24 04 movlpd %xmm0,0 x4(%esp )
1 0x1000 ( s i z e =1) pop rax
2 0x1001 ( s i z e =1) r e t
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the solution easy to implement?
Lines of Code comparison
100
1000
10000
100000
1×106
Ether:Comp
Ether:Xen
Ether:Patches
Ether:Patch
Ether:Ctl
MAVMM:Comp
MAVMM:Rep
Bit:Comp
Our:Comp
Our:Cli
Our:Drv
Our:Scr
Lines of Code by solution
Solution
Figure: Lines of Code by solution.
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the solution portable?
Talking about Linux
1 s t a t i c i n i t i n t b t s i n i t ( void )
2 bts pmu . c a p a b i l i t i e s = PERF PMU CAP AUX NO SG
| PERF PMU CAP ITRACE
3 bts pmu . t a s k c t x n r = p e r f s w c o n t e x t ;
4 bts pmu . e v e n t i n i t = b t s e v e n t i n i t ;
5 bts pmu . add = b t s e v e n t a d d ;
6 bts pmu . d e l = b t s e v e n t d e l ;
7 bts pmu . s t a r t = b t s e v e n t s t a r t ;
8 bts pmu . stop = b t s e v e n t s t o p ;
9 bts pmu . read = b t s e v e n t r e a d ;
10 r e t u r n p e r f p m u r e g i s t e r (&bts pmu ,
11 ” i n t e l b t s ”,−1)
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is the solution portable?
Talking about Linux
1 p e r f i n i t (&pe , MMAP PAGES) ;
2 f c n t l ( g b l s t a t u s . fd evt , F SETOWN,
get pid () ) ;
3 monitor loop ( p i d c h i l d , s o u t f i l e ) ;
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra
Is solution’s overhead acceptable?
Could the solution run in real-time?
Task Base value
System
monitoring Penalty
Benchmark
monitoring Penalty
Floating-point
operations (op/s) 101530464 99221196 2.27% 97295048 4.17%
Integer operations
(op/s) 285649964 221666796 22.40% 219928736 23.01%
MD5 Hashes
(hash/s) 777633 568486 26.90% 568435 26.90%
RAM transfer
(MB/s) 7633 6628 13.17% 6224 18.46%
HDD transfer
(MB/s) 90 80 11.11% 75 16.67%
Overall (benchm. pt) 518 470 9.27% 439 15.25%
Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen

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Monitoring Systems & Binaries

  • 1. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries Marcus Botacin1 1Informatics - Federal University of Parana (UFPR) - Brazil mfbotacin@inf.ufpr.br November 2018 Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 2. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 3. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 4. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra About Me Malware Analyst (2012) BsC. Computer Engineer @ UNICAMP (2015) Sandbox Development MsC. Computer Science @ UNICAMP (2017) Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis PhD. Computer Science @ UFPR (Present) Hardware-Assisted Malware Detection AntiVirus Evaluation Future Threats Contextual and Social Malware effects Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 5. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Why Monitoring ? Policy Enforcement Logging Forensics Debugging Malware Analysis Reverse Engineer Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 6. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Real Trace Examples 1 7/4/2014 −13:5:1.895| DeleteOperation |2032|C: deposito . exe |C: ProgramData r r . t x t | 1 7/4/2014 −13:3:48.294| CreateProcess |3028|C: Monitor Malware v i s u a l i z a r . exe |2440|C: WindowsSysWOW64 d l l . exe 1 2014−05−14 20:02:40.963113 10.10.100.101 XX. YY. ZZ.121 HTTP 290 GET /. swim01/ c o n t r o l . php? i a&mi=00B5AB4E−47098BC3 HTTP/1.1 Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 7. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 8. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Function Interposition Figure: Source: https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/01/ inline-hooking-for-programmers-part-1.html Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 9. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Techniques I Kernel Tables System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Global Descriptor Table (GDT) Userland Tables API hooking DLL injection Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 10. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Techniques II Binary Patching Inline hooking OS Support Detours Callbacks Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 11. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 12. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra In Practice... Figure: Real malware claiming a registry problem when an anti-analysis trick succeeded. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 13. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra In Practice... Figure: Commercial solution armored with anti-debug technique. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 14. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra In Practice... Figure: Real malware impersonating a secure solution which cannot run under an hypervisor. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 15. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Detecting Analysis Procedures 1 i f ( IsDebuggerPresent () ) 2 p r i n t f (” debuggedn ”) ; 3 e l s e 4 p r i n t f (”NO DBGn ”) ; 1 cmp [ eax+0xe9 ] , eax ; ; 0xe9 = JMP 2 pop rbp Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 16. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Anti-Analysis Summary Table: Anti-Analysis: Tricks summary. Malware samples may employ multiple techniques to evade distinct analysis procedures. Technique Description Reason Implementation Anti Check if running Blocks reverse Fingerprinting Debug inside a debugger engineering attempts Anti Check if running Analysts use VMs Execution VM inside a VM for scalability Side-effect Anti Fool disassemblers AV signatures may Undecidable Disassembly to generate wrong opcodes be based on opcodes Constructions Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 17. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 18. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Transparency 1 Higher privileged. 2 No non-privileged side-effects. 3 Identical Basic Instruction Semantics. 4 Transparent Exception Handling. 5 Identical Measurement of Time. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 19. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Hardware Features Summary Technique PROS CONS Gaps HVM Ring -1 Hypervisor High development overhead SMM Ring -2 BIOS High development implementation cost AMT Ring -3 Chipset No malware code change analysis solution HPCs Lightweight Context-limited No malware information analysis solution GPU Easy to program No register No introspection data procedures SGX Isolates goodware Also isolates No enclave malware inspection SOCs Tamper-proof Passive Raise alarms components Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 20. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra HVM Figure: HVM operating layers . Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 21. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra HVM Figure: Ether Sandbox Exits. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 22. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra SMM Figure: Operation modes. Source: https://tinyurl.com/l2uqr8d Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 23. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Figure: SMI generation. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 24. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra A ring to rule them all! Figure: Privileged rings. Figure: New privileged rings. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 25. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Isolated Enclaves Figure: SGX Memory Protection Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 26. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 27. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra DMA Attacks I Figure: Hypervisor Attack . Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 28. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra DMA Attacks II Figure: Source: https: //www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/ reference-guides/pcie-device-security-enhancements.pdf . Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 29. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra SGX Malware Figure: SGX Malware Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 30. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 31. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra References Who watches the watchmen: A security-focused review on current state-of-the-art techniques, tools and methods for systems and binary analysis on modern platforms—ACM Computing Surveys. Enhancing Branch Monitoring for Security Purposes: From Control Flow Integrity to Malware Analysis and Debugging—ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. The other guys: automated analysis of marginalized malware—Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking techniques. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 32. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Conclusions Thanks Tilo for hosting me. Open to hear your questions. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 33. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Agenda 1 Introduction 2 Software-Based Solutions 3 Evasion Techniques 4 Hardware-Assisted Solutions 5 Attacks 6 Conclusions 7 Extra Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 34. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Proposed Framework Figure: Proposed framework architecture. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 35. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Could I isolate processes’ actions? Figure: Data Storage (DS) AREA. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 36. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Could I isolate processes’ actions? Figure: Local Vector Table (LVT). Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 37. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Table: ASLR - Library placement after two consecutive reboots. Library NTDLL KERNEL32 KERNELBASE Address 1 0xBAF80000 0xB9610000 0xB8190000 Address 2 0x987B0000 0x98670000 0x958C0000 Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 38. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Table: Function Offsets from ntdll.dll library. Function Offset NtCreateProcess 0x3691 NtCreateProcessEx 0x30B0 NtCreateProfile 0x36A1 NtCreateResourceManager 0x36C1 NtCreateSemaphore 0x36D1 NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject 0x36E1 NtCreateThread 0x30C0 NtCreateThreadEx 0x36F1 Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 39. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Figure: Introspection Mechanism. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 40. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? _lock_file+0x90printf+0xe3__iob_funcprintf+0xcaprintfNewToy Figure: Step Into. scanf+0x3f NewToy printf Figure: Step Over. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 41. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is CFG reconstruction possible? Figure: Code block identification. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 42. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the final solution transparent? Identified tricks 1 0x190 xor eax , eax 2 0x192 jnz 0x19c 1 0x180 push 0x10a 2 0x185 r e t Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 43. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the final solution transparent? Identified tricks 1 0x340 cmp eax ,0 xe9 2 0x345 jnz 0x347 1 0x400 QWORD PTR f s :0 x0 , rsp 2 0x409 mov rax ,QWORD PTR [ rsp+0xc ] 3 0x40e cmp rbx ,QWORD PTR [ rax+0x4 ] Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 44. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the final solution transparent? Deviating Behavior Figure: Deviating behavior identification. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 45. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the final solution transparent? Deviating Behavior Figure: Divergence: True Positive. Figure: Divergence: False Positive. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 46. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a Debugger? Inverted I/O Figure: Debugger’s working mechanism. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 47. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a Debugger? Suspending Processes EnumProcessThreads + SuspendThread. DebugActiveProcess. NtSuspendProcess. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 48. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Could I develop a Debugger? Integration Figure: GDB integration. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 49. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Does the solution handle ROP attacks? ROP Attacks Figure: ROP chain example. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 50. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Does the solution handle ROP attacks? CALL-RET Policy Figure: CALL-RET CFI policy. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 51. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Does the solution handle ROP attacks? Gadget-size policy Figure: KBouncer’s exploit stack. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 52. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Does the solution handle ROP attacks? Exploit Analysis Table: Excerpt of the branch window of the ROP payload. FROM TO —- 0x7c346c0a 0x7c346c0b 0x7c37a140 0x7c37a141 —- Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 53. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Does the solution handle ROP attacks? Exploit Analysis 1 7 c346c08 : f2 0 f 58 c3 addsd %xmm3,%xmm0 2 7 c346c0c : 66 0 f 13 44 24 04 movlpd %xmm0,0 x4(%esp ) 1 0x1000 ( s i z e =1) pop rax 2 0x1001 ( s i z e =1) r e t Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 54. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the solution easy to implement? Lines of Code comparison 100 1000 10000 100000 1×106 Ether:Comp Ether:Xen Ether:Patches Ether:Patch Ether:Ctl MAVMM:Comp MAVMM:Rep Bit:Comp Our:Comp Our:Cli Our:Drv Our:Scr Lines of Code by solution Solution Figure: Lines of Code by solution. Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 55. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the solution portable? Talking about Linux 1 s t a t i c i n i t i n t b t s i n i t ( void ) 2 bts pmu . c a p a b i l i t i e s = PERF PMU CAP AUX NO SG | PERF PMU CAP ITRACE 3 bts pmu . t a s k c t x n r = p e r f s w c o n t e x t ; 4 bts pmu . e v e n t i n i t = b t s e v e n t i n i t ; 5 bts pmu . add = b t s e v e n t a d d ; 6 bts pmu . d e l = b t s e v e n t d e l ; 7 bts pmu . s t a r t = b t s e v e n t s t a r t ; 8 bts pmu . stop = b t s e v e n t s t o p ; 9 bts pmu . read = b t s e v e n t r e a d ; 10 r e t u r n p e r f p m u r e g i s t e r (&bts pmu , 11 ” i n t e l b t s ”,−1) Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 56. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is the solution portable? Talking about Linux 1 p e r f i n i t (&pe , MMAP PAGES) ; 2 f c n t l ( g b l s t a t u s . fd evt , F SETOWN, get pid () ) ; 3 monitor loop ( p i d c h i l d , s o u t f i l e ) ; Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen
  • 57. Introduction Software-Based Solutions Evasion Techniques Hardware-Assisted Solutions Attacks Conclusions Extra Is solution’s overhead acceptable? Could the solution run in real-time? Task Base value System monitoring Penalty Benchmark monitoring Penalty Floating-point operations (op/s) 101530464 99221196 2.27% 97295048 4.17% Integer operations (op/s) 285649964 221666796 22.40% 219928736 23.01% MD5 Hashes (hash/s) 777633 568486 26.90% 568435 26.90% RAM transfer (MB/s) 7633 6628 13.17% 6224 18.46% HDD transfer (MB/s) 90 80 11.11% 75 16.67% Overall (benchm. pt) 518 470 9.27% 439 15.25% Monitoring Systems & Binaries FAU @ Erlangen