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SSL/TLSSSL/TLS
MM
TT
Exception in thread "main" javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun
at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1506)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:979)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:914)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387)
at sun.net. .protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559)
at sun.net. .protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185)
at sun.net. .protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1512)
at sun.net. .protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1440)
at sun.net. .protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getInputStream(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:254)
at com.infosupport.maartenm.Demo.main(Demo.java:13)
Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderExcepti
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292)
at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1488)
13 more
Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:146)
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:131)
at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382)
WW
Using SSL/TLS correctly is often hard to achieve
...and understand!
Crucial for secure connection between systems
Globally deployed (intra-)cloud applications
7 L OSI M7 L OSI M
data unit layers
Data
Data
Data
Segments
Packets
Frames
Bits
Application 
Network Process to Application
Presentation 
Data Representation 
and Encryption
Session 
Interhost Communication
Transport 
End­to­End Connections 
and Reliability
Network 
Path Determination and 
Logical Addressing (IP)
Data Link 
Physical Addressing 
(MAC and LLC)
Physical 
Media, Signal and 
Binary Transmission
Host LayersMedia Layers
H SSL TLSH SSL TLS
SSL 1.0 never released
SSL 2.0 1995 - 2011 (POODLE)
SSL 3.0 1996 - 2014 (POODLE)
TLS 1.0 1999 - 2011 (BEAST)
TLS 1.1 2006
TLS 1.2 2008
TLS 1.3 2018
DD
What's the issue?!
HH
1. public/private key encryption
2. signed certificates
3. certificate authorities
1 P P1 P P
K EK E
MM
1. Select two prime numbers:
2. Calculate modulo:
3. Select random number < modulo:
4. Find d, so that
a.
b.
c.
Note that varies with : when
p = 11, q = 17
p ∗ q = 187
e = 3
(d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0
320 mod 160 = 0
(321 − 1) mod (10 ∗ 16) = 0
(107 ∗ 3) = 321 ⇒d = 107
d e e = 75, ⇒ d = 183
N , P QN , P Q
1.
2. Find d, so that
Pretty hard without knowing and !
As soon as we know , calculating is trivial
(again).
p ∗ q = 299, e = 5
(d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0
p q
p = 13, q = 23 d = 317
For big enough and , finding those factors will cost an
eternity!
So we can distribute and even !
p q
p ∗ q e
LL GG
p ∗ q = 187, e = 3, G ⇒ 7
= = 3437
e
7
3
343 mod 187 = 156
LL 156156
Since we know and , we can calculatep q d = 107
= ≈ 4.6 ∗156
d
156
107
10
234
mod 187 = 7156
107
7 ⇒ G
NN
Client Server
1 ClientHello →
2 ← ServerHello
3 ← Certificate
4 ← ServerKeyExchange
5 ← ServerHelloDone
6 ClientKeyExchange →
7 ChangeCipherSpec →
8 Finished →
9 ← ChangeCipherSpec
10 ← Finished
DD
No-one is eavesdropping!
2 S2 S
CC
A certificate contains:
Serial Number
Subject
Validity
Usage
Public Key
Fingerprint Algorithm
Fingerprint
But wait... anyone could create a certificate!
So we also need
Signature Algorithm
Signature
Issuer
... and a way to sign certificates.
A signature is a mathematical relationship between a message
, a private key and a public key .
It consists of two functions:
1. signing function
2. verifying function
So, given and and knowing , we can tell if is indeed
signed by .
x sk pk
t = f (sk, x)
[accept, reject] = g(pk, t, x)
x t pk x
sk
3 C3 C
AA
An entity that issues digital certificates,
certifying the ownership of a public key
by the subject of the certificate.
“I can trust you, because I trust John, and
John trusts Alice, and Alice trusts you.
So, who is John, anyway?
Many John's in todays browsers and operating systems!
Top-notch security procedures, including "key ceremonies"
And yet...
“Once upon a time, a Dutch certificate
authority named DigiNotar was living
happily and carefree in the town of
Beverwijk.
“An attacker compromised a webserver of
DigiNotar due to a vulnerability that is
present within the DotNetNuke software.
DotNetNuke version 4.8.2.0 is installed on
host winsrv119. This version is affected by a
file upload vulnerability.
“Due to the weak security of Windows
passwords it must be assumed that the
attacker was able to compromise the
passwords [...] of the accounts found on the
system. On the system, [...] the domain
administrator account [...] is present.
“The attacker was able to traverse the
infrastructure and obtain access to at least
two CA's that were used to generate
certificates.
/** intentionally left blank */
WW
Google blacklists 247 certificates in Chromium
Microsoft removes the DigiNotar root certificate from all
supported Windows-releases *
Mozilla revokes trust in the DigiNotar root certificate in all
supported versions
Apple issued Security Update 2011-005
Update Certificate Revocation Lists (although these are self-
signed)
DD
Trust (for what it's worth)
T , T TT , T T
Simple HTTP client with TLS support:
curl -v -k <address>
Troubleshoot trust issues and see certificates being used:
openssl s_client -showcerts -servername <address> -
connect <address>:443
Troubleshoot supported protocols, ciphers, ...:
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 <address>
JVM SJVM S
-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<file>
Denotes where a truststore can be found: a file that contains
trusted certs.
-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=changeit
is the password to that file.
JVM SJVM S
-Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=<file>
Denotes where a keystore can be found: a file that contains
public and/or private keys.
-Djavax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword=changeit
is the password to that file.
JVM SJVM S
-Djavax.net.debug=ssl:[flag]
Include debug logging for TLS handshake and connections.
Additional flags:
record session sessioncache pluggability plaintext
handshake defaultctx keymanager data packet
keygen sslctx trustmanager verbose
PP
II
Public Key Krüpto by , , and ( )
Puss In Boots by
Beverwijk by @
“So long and thanks for all the fish!
Sándor P. Fekete Sebastian Morr Sebastian Stiller @ideainstruction
kisspng
Gerard Hogervorst Wikimedia Commons
Maarten Mulders (@mthmulders)#tlsformortals

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SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaZone)

  • 2. TT Exception in thread "main" javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1506) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:979) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:914) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387) at sun.net. .protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559) at sun.net. .protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185) at sun.net. .protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1512) at sun.net. .protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1440) at sun.net. .protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getInputStream(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:254) at com.infosupport.maartenm.Demo.main(Demo.java:13) Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderExcepti at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387) at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292) at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1488) 13 more Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:146) at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:131) at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280) at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382)
  • 3. WW Using SSL/TLS correctly is often hard to achieve ...and understand! Crucial for secure connection between systems Globally deployed (intra-)cloud applications
  • 4. 7 L OSI M7 L OSI M data unit layers Data Data Data Segments Packets Frames Bits Application  Network Process to Application Presentation  Data Representation  and Encryption Session  Interhost Communication Transport  End­to­End Connections  and Reliability Network  Path Determination and  Logical Addressing (IP) Data Link  Physical Addressing  (MAC and LLC) Physical  Media, Signal and  Binary Transmission Host LayersMedia Layers
  • 5. H SSL TLSH SSL TLS SSL 1.0 never released SSL 2.0 1995 - 2011 (POODLE) SSL 3.0 1996 - 2014 (POODLE) TLS 1.0 1999 - 2011 (BEAST) TLS 1.1 2006 TLS 1.2 2008 TLS 1.3 2018
  • 7. HH 1. public/private key encryption 2. signed certificates 3. certificate authorities
  • 8. 1 P P1 P P K EK E
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11. MM 1. Select two prime numbers: 2. Calculate modulo: 3. Select random number < modulo: 4. Find d, so that a. b. c. Note that varies with : when p = 11, q = 17 p ∗ q = 187 e = 3 (d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0 320 mod 160 = 0 (321 − 1) mod (10 ∗ 16) = 0 (107 ∗ 3) = 321 ⇒d = 107 d e e = 75, ⇒ d = 183
  • 12. N , P QN , P Q 1. 2. Find d, so that Pretty hard without knowing and ! As soon as we know , calculating is trivial (again). p ∗ q = 299, e = 5 (d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0 p q p = 13, q = 23 d = 317
  • 13. For big enough and , finding those factors will cost an eternity! So we can distribute and even ! p q p ∗ q e
  • 14. LL GG p ∗ q = 187, e = 3, G ⇒ 7 = = 3437 e 7 3 343 mod 187 = 156
  • 15. LL 156156 Since we know and , we can calculatep q d = 107 = ≈ 4.6 ∗156 d 156 107 10 234 mod 187 = 7156 107 7 ⇒ G
  • 16.
  • 17. NN Client Server 1 ClientHello → 2 ← ServerHello 3 ← Certificate 4 ← ServerKeyExchange 5 ← ServerHelloDone 6 ClientKeyExchange → 7 ChangeCipherSpec → 8 Finished → 9 ← ChangeCipherSpec 10 ← Finished
  • 20. A certificate contains: Serial Number Subject Validity Usage Public Key Fingerprint Algorithm Fingerprint
  • 21. But wait... anyone could create a certificate! So we also need Signature Algorithm Signature Issuer ... and a way to sign certificates.
  • 22.
  • 23. A signature is a mathematical relationship between a message , a private key and a public key . It consists of two functions: 1. signing function 2. verifying function So, given and and knowing , we can tell if is indeed signed by . x sk pk t = f (sk, x) [accept, reject] = g(pk, t, x) x t pk x sk
  • 25. An entity that issues digital certificates, certifying the ownership of a public key by the subject of the certificate.
  • 26. “I can trust you, because I trust John, and John trusts Alice, and Alice trusts you.
  • 27. So, who is John, anyway? Many John's in todays browsers and operating systems!
  • 28. Top-notch security procedures, including "key ceremonies" And yet...
  • 29. “Once upon a time, a Dutch certificate authority named DigiNotar was living happily and carefree in the town of Beverwijk.
  • 30. “An attacker compromised a webserver of DigiNotar due to a vulnerability that is present within the DotNetNuke software. DotNetNuke version 4.8.2.0 is installed on host winsrv119. This version is affected by a file upload vulnerability.
  • 31. “Due to the weak security of Windows passwords it must be assumed that the attacker was able to compromise the passwords [...] of the accounts found on the system. On the system, [...] the domain administrator account [...] is present.
  • 32. “The attacker was able to traverse the infrastructure and obtain access to at least two CA's that were used to generate certificates.
  • 34. WW Google blacklists 247 certificates in Chromium Microsoft removes the DigiNotar root certificate from all supported Windows-releases * Mozilla revokes trust in the DigiNotar root certificate in all supported versions Apple issued Security Update 2011-005 Update Certificate Revocation Lists (although these are self- signed)
  • 35. DD Trust (for what it's worth)
  • 36. T , T TT , T T
  • 37. Simple HTTP client with TLS support: curl -v -k <address> Troubleshoot trust issues and see certificates being used: openssl s_client -showcerts -servername <address> - connect <address>:443 Troubleshoot supported protocols, ciphers, ...: nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 <address>
  • 38. JVM SJVM S -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<file> Denotes where a truststore can be found: a file that contains trusted certs. -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=changeit is the password to that file.
  • 39. JVM SJVM S -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=<file> Denotes where a keystore can be found: a file that contains public and/or private keys. -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword=changeit is the password to that file.
  • 40. JVM SJVM S -Djavax.net.debug=ssl:[flag] Include debug logging for TLS handshake and connections. Additional flags: record session sessioncache pluggability plaintext handshake defaultctx keymanager data packet keygen sslctx trustmanager verbose
  • 41. PP
  • 42. II Public Key Krüpto by , , and ( ) Puss In Boots by Beverwijk by @ “So long and thanks for all the fish! Sándor P. Fekete Sebastian Morr Sebastian Stiller @ideainstruction kisspng Gerard Hogervorst Wikimedia Commons Maarten Mulders (@mthmulders)#tlsformortals