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Agenda
OSS Security Resources https://aka.ms/OSSsecurity
Development Realities
bashHOLE?
Shell Shock.. meh
Not just named vulnerabilities…
Cathedral and the Bazaar
1999: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow.”
2003: Michael Howard & David LeBlanc
assert most don’t know what to look for
2006: Coverity & others release reports of
selectively scanned Open & Closed source
projects, claiming proof Linus’ Law works
2014: Heartbleed, Shellshock, Poodle, etc
2017: …
https://www.flickr.com/photos/hades2k/7001927337
More audience participation!
How many vulnerabilities do you
think there have been in OpenSSL
since Heartbleed?
Average
CVSS 5.36
Trending Now: compromise OSS integrity
http://blog.npmjs.org/post/163723642530/crossenv-malware-on-the-npm-registry
http://www.nbu.gov.sk/skcsirt-sa-20170909-pypi/index.html
https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/09/display-widgets-malware/
Show Me The Data
OSS Component Vuln Data Slides
1 1 1
4
8
3 4 5 4
2
12 12
4
16
4
24
34 34
8
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3
0 0
5
1
3
10 10
6
1
16
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CVE Counts by Year
OpenSSL Apache Struts
OSS Component Vuln Data Slides
0
10
20
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Freetype FFMPEG Chromium Electron
Data from public sources is limited
FFMPEG
NVD: 253
CVE Details: 253
High value data isn’t free
FFMPEG
NVD: 253
CVE Details: 253
VulnDB: 1,200+
Efficiency At What Cost?
A single application
◦ may have hundreds of different
third party libraries implemented
◦ may have multiple copies of the
same component or library
implemented
Debate!
What should you measure library quality on?
◦ Count of vulnerabilities
◦ Frequency of update releases
◦ Average severity of vulns (CVSS or other)
◦ Existence of POC or Exploit
OSS Vulnerability Lifecycle and SDL
Cost to Fix Vulnerabilities
The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) estimates that code
fixes performed after release can result
in 25+ times the cost of fixes performed
during the design phase.
tl;dr: Pay me now or pay me later… with
interest.
Secure Development Lifecycle
Vulnerability Management Process
Identify
Issue1
Assess
Impact2
Dev & Test
Fix3
Deploy
Fix4
Post
Release5
OSS Vulnerability Lifecycle
Identify
Issue
Assess
Impact
Dev &
Test Fix
Public
Release
w/ CVE
Post
Release
Identify
Issue
Assess
Impact
Dev &
Test Fix
Public
Release
Post
Release
Identify
Issue
Assess
Impact
Dev &
Test Fix
Public
Release
Post
Release
Identify
Issue
Assess
Impact
Dev &
Test Fix
Public
Release
Post
Release
When to Point Fix
Cloud Architecture and OSS (Generic)
Data Center
Facility Security
HVAC
Power
Shared HW
Network
Storage
Compute
ILO / Serial
BIOS / Firmware
VM OS - IaaS/PaaS/Other
Linux BSD Windows
Start Operationally Secure
Vendor Build
and Publish
• Guidance
• Attestation
• Validation
Marketplace
• Start secure
by default
• Image health
• Better trust
decisions
Deployment
• Secure
templates
• Hardening
guides
Running
• Stay secure
• Baselines
• Monitoring
Agents
Zooming in on the Cloud – “Scanning”
100x
• Source Code
• Intellectual property
• Vulnerability
• Binary in builds
10x
• VM / Infra / OS
• Packages
• Configuration
• Authenticated (Internal)
1x
• Edge / Port
• Un-Authenticated
• Authenticated (web app)
Automate and Integrate
Automate what can be automated
◦ Source Code Scanning
◦ Binary Scanning
◦ Both for IP, Security, and freshness
Integrate
◦ The solutions and tools *MUST* be integrated Into your developers workflow and build
systems
Get It Done
• Automate everything you can:
◦ Detection and inventorying of OSS implemented in source code, cloud tenants, etc
◦ Notifications of out of date and vulnerable OSS that needs updating
◦ Updating packages - Greenkeeper
• Complete a Security Assessment of OSS components prior to use
• Routinely update OSS components to current version
• Microsoft employee? Go further down the OSS Risk Rabbit Hole
and stream the STRIKE presentation. Find it at aka.ms/osssec
www.motleyzoo.org
BlueHat v17 || Down the Open Source Software Rabbit Hole

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BlueHat v17 || Down the Open Source Software Rabbit Hole

  • 1.
  • 3. OSS Security Resources https://aka.ms/OSSsecurity
  • 4.
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  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17. Not just named vulnerabilities…
  • 18. Cathedral and the Bazaar 1999: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” 2003: Michael Howard & David LeBlanc assert most don’t know what to look for 2006: Coverity & others release reports of selectively scanned Open & Closed source projects, claiming proof Linus’ Law works 2014: Heartbleed, Shellshock, Poodle, etc 2017: … https://www.flickr.com/photos/hades2k/7001927337
  • 19.
  • 20. More audience participation! How many vulnerabilities do you think there have been in OpenSSL since Heartbleed?
  • 22. Trending Now: compromise OSS integrity http://blog.npmjs.org/post/163723642530/crossenv-malware-on-the-npm-registry http://www.nbu.gov.sk/skcsirt-sa-20170909-pypi/index.html https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/09/display-widgets-malware/
  • 23. Show Me The Data
  • 24. OSS Component Vuln Data Slides 1 1 1 4 8 3 4 5 4 2 12 12 4 16 4 24 34 34 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 5 1 3 10 10 6 1 16 13 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 CVE Counts by Year OpenSSL Apache Struts
  • 25. OSS Component Vuln Data Slides 0 10 20 30 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Freetype FFMPEG Chromium Electron
  • 26.
  • 27. Data from public sources is limited FFMPEG NVD: 253 CVE Details: 253
  • 28. High value data isn’t free FFMPEG NVD: 253 CVE Details: 253 VulnDB: 1,200+
  • 29. Efficiency At What Cost? A single application ◦ may have hundreds of different third party libraries implemented ◦ may have multiple copies of the same component or library implemented
  • 30. Debate! What should you measure library quality on? ◦ Count of vulnerabilities ◦ Frequency of update releases ◦ Average severity of vulns (CVSS or other) ◦ Existence of POC or Exploit
  • 32.
  • 33.
  • 34. Cost to Fix Vulnerabilities The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimates that code fixes performed after release can result in 25+ times the cost of fixes performed during the design phase. tl;dr: Pay me now or pay me later… with interest.
  • 37. OSS Vulnerability Lifecycle Identify Issue Assess Impact Dev & Test Fix Public Release w/ CVE Post Release Identify Issue Assess Impact Dev & Test Fix Public Release Post Release Identify Issue Assess Impact Dev & Test Fix Public Release Post Release Identify Issue Assess Impact Dev & Test Fix Public Release Post Release
  • 39.
  • 40. Cloud Architecture and OSS (Generic) Data Center Facility Security HVAC Power Shared HW Network Storage Compute ILO / Serial BIOS / Firmware VM OS - IaaS/PaaS/Other Linux BSD Windows
  • 41.
  • 42. Start Operationally Secure Vendor Build and Publish • Guidance • Attestation • Validation Marketplace • Start secure by default • Image health • Better trust decisions Deployment • Secure templates • Hardening guides Running • Stay secure • Baselines • Monitoring Agents
  • 43. Zooming in on the Cloud – “Scanning” 100x • Source Code • Intellectual property • Vulnerability • Binary in builds 10x • VM / Infra / OS • Packages • Configuration • Authenticated (Internal) 1x • Edge / Port • Un-Authenticated • Authenticated (web app)
  • 44. Automate and Integrate Automate what can be automated ◦ Source Code Scanning ◦ Binary Scanning ◦ Both for IP, Security, and freshness Integrate ◦ The solutions and tools *MUST* be integrated Into your developers workflow and build systems
  • 45.
  • 46. Get It Done • Automate everything you can: ◦ Detection and inventorying of OSS implemented in source code, cloud tenants, etc ◦ Notifications of out of date and vulnerable OSS that needs updating ◦ Updating packages - Greenkeeper • Complete a Security Assessment of OSS components prior to use • Routinely update OSS components to current version • Microsoft employee? Go further down the OSS Risk Rabbit Hole and stream the STRIKE presentation. Find it at aka.ms/osssec