1. Centre
Defence
Enterprise
for
Enduring Challenge Competition

2. Enduring competition
Perpetual
Radical
£3M per year

3. Enduring competition
Challenges
Enduring
9 framework

4. Framework
Protection
Lethality
Human performance
Mobility
Lower cost of ownership

5. Framework
Situational awareness
Communication
Data
Power

6. Enduring challenge
Conventional Weapons
Active Integrated Protection
Systems (AIPS)

7. Enduring Challenge
Competition
Centre for Defence Enterprise
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

8. Conventional Weapons
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

9. Programme vision
Research and Development will have supported UK
Weapons Freedom of Action and Operational
Advantage by maturing technologies and evidence
to enable a future complex weapons, novel weapons
and general munitions portfolio underpinned by the
principals of Commonality, Modularity and Re-use.
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

10. B
C
D
© Crown Copyright Dstl 2013
TechnologySystem
Time
Technology
development in absence
of systems thinking (pet
projects)
System thinking in
absence of technology
maturation (concepting)
A
A: Technology driven activity with focused
system analysis e.g. Future Local Area Air
Defence System (FLAADS)
B: System driven activity with focused
technology maturation e.g. Selective
Precision Engagement At Range
(SPEAR)
C: Technology push into application with
future refinements e.g. Brimstone 2
D: Stretching requirement tempered by
available technology e.g. Future Anti
Surface Guided Weapon (FASGW)
Innovation and Exploitation
Therefore we will need to
introduce Systems Expertise to
follow technology development in
the Centre for Defence
Enterprise through the Weapons
Science and Technology Centre
(WSTC).
Visualisation courtesy of MBDA via MCM ITP

11. Programme drivers (1)
• Conventional Weapons
– Complex Weapons (Guided Munitions)
– General Munitions (excluding small arms)
• Operational advantage
– “…we often need superior technology and other forms of battle-
winning edge.”
• Freedom of Action
– “…we must be able to operate, maintain, and refresh certain
capabilities effectively, without being dependent on others.”
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
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12. Programme drivers (2)
• Policy / doctrine trends
– Through Life Cost – Complex Weapons are very expensive
• Commonality
– The use of a single weapons system across multiple roles
• Modularity
– The use of a single sub-system in multiple weapons system
• Re-use
– Developing an existing sub-system or system for a new application
– Accuracy
• Reduced risk of Collateral Damage
• Comparable Effect with smaller or fewer weapons
– Lifespan
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

13. Programme Themes
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27 May 2014

14. CDE enduring challenges
• lethality (weapons – conventional, novel, directed
energy, defence, less-than-lethal)
• lower cost of ownership (platforms, equipment,
facilities)
• Protection (personnel, platforms, facilities, digital
systems, materials)
• New capabilities (challenging current convention,
disruptive)
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

15. Points of contact
• PDD@dstl.gov.uk
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

16. Active Integrated Protection System
(AIPS) - Enduring Challenge
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17. Contents
• AIPS Research Scope
• Threats
• Active Protection Description
• Why Active Protection
• Active Protection Issues and Challenges
• What we want
• What we don’t want
© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

18. Active Integrated Protection System (AIPS)
Research Scope
• Mass efficient vehicle protection by the
application of Hard Kill and/or Soft Kill
technologies
• Hard Kill measures aim to physically interact
with incoming threats to prevent or reduce
impact - “Don’t be Hit”
• Soft Kill measures aim to disrupt the threat
engagement chain “Don’t be acquired / Hit”
• Goal: An affordable Fully Integrated System
with inherent Threat Detection and
Situational Awareness
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

19. The Threats
• Non-complex shoulder launched
anti-tank (AT) systems
• Complex anti-tank guided
munitions (ATGM)
• Tank fired large calibre munitions
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

20. What Constitutes a typical AIPS?
• Active and passive sensors for threat launch and/or track
• Control & processing hub
• Hard kill effectors
• Soft kill effectors
• Host platform supporting architecture
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

21. Why Active Protection?
• Proliferation capable anti armour systems is a major risk
• Vehicle passive and reactive protection measures may no longer provide
complete protection for some threat systems
• Passive protection systems only deal with the
“Do not be Penetrated” layer of the onion
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014

22. Active Protection – The Issues
• Active protection is not the panacea of platform protection and
should be considered as only part of the survivability toolkit.
• Common issues:
– Diverse and evolving range of threats
– Coverage and dealing with multiple threats
– Physical integration (Size, Weight, Power)
– Potential collateral effects
• Use in complex environments
– Safety
– Security
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
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23. The Active Protection Challenge
Developing a low risk, mass efficient, affordable and
flexible protection capability that can provide increased
survivability to a range of land platforms.
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
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24. What We Want
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014
• Innovation
– New combat vehicle APS concepts with lower
integration and operational risk:
• Novel concepts and technologies to detect, classify
and track a threat
• Novel methods of physically interacting with the
threat (Hard Kill)
• Novel methods of disrupting the engagement chain
(Soft Kill)
• Novel adaption of technologies
• Consideration of the issues, performance trades and risk
mitigation

25. What We Don’t Want
OFFICIAL© Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
27 May 2014
• Novel solutions that don’t attempt to deal with the real threat
scenario – i.e. “Don’t be there”
• Solutions that don’t address the key issues
– Solutions that are not feasible in the real world of safety, size,
weight and power constraints
• Technology studies of existing commercially available APS
systems