1. UK Missile Defence
Centre
Defence against airborne threats
Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) themed competition
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Overview
 The UK Missile Defence Centre (UK MDC) is seeking innovative
solutions to defending against attacks from:
 ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; hypersonic munitions
 3 challenges:
1. defence without interceptor missiles
2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences
3. improve the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing defences
 Consider innovation across the whole system and its elements
 Closing date for proof-of-concept submissions 3 July 2014 at 5pm
 up to £420k to support these
 Possible wider exposure to UK MDC or Ministry of Defence (MOD)
funding
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3. UK Missile Defence
Centre
Content
 What is the UK Missile Defence Centre?
 Defeating the threat
 Defensive terminology
 Military perspective
 CDE competition challenges
 The ‘small print’
 Summary
 Questions
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
The UK Missile Defence Centre
Ballistic missile
threat reduction
lethality
Scenario
simulation
& wargaming
Maritime
theatre ballistic
missile defence studies
Systems engineering
Threat characterisation
Novel technologies
UK Missile Defence Centre
Support to policy (MOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Cabinet
Office)
Science and technology support to future capability development
International collaboration and support to NATO
Industrial opportunities
Support to WMD disablement
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
 UK MDC established July 2003
 Joint MOD/industry construct
 Provides timely scientific and technical advice on ballistic missile
defence to Ministers and MOD Head Office
 Supports UK industry in sustaining strategic capabilities
UK MDC:
understanding missile defence & sustaining strategic
capabilities
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Defeating the threat
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Ballistic missiles
 Similar to a space launch vehicle, but designed to re-enter the
atmosphere immediately and at extreme speed.
 the fastest means of hitting any point more than 300km away
 Powered and guided for first few minutes; generally purely ballistic
thereafter
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SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile Short-range ballistic missile launch

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Ballistic missiles
 Shorter range ballistic missiles (<600km) remain as single entity
 >600km only the re-entry vehicle that delivers payload onto target
 Recent uses in Libya and Syria
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SCUD missile on launcher
Various intermediate- and medium-range ballistic
missiles

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
The US perception of the ballistic missile threat
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Ballistic missile times-of-flight challenge defences
5500km ground range
3500km
2000km
`1000km
300km
`600km
Further reading: NASIC ‘2013 ballistic missile and cruise missile threat’
AFD-130710-054.pdf from http://www.mda.mil
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Cruise missiles
 Essentially expendable unmanned aircraft
 Cost-effective deep target attack
 vastly reduced risk versus aircraft carrying direct attack
munitions
 Can achieve <10m accuracy
 Will fly a range of trajectories to avoid air defences
 Key component of modern warfare
 more than 200 used in Libya
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Various cruise missiles

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Hypersonic munitions
 >Mach 5 and within the (upper)
atmosphere
 Not currently deployed
 Technology being examined by
US, Russia, China, France and
India
 Very high speeds & significant
manoeuvre potential likely to
defeat ‘conventional’ defensive
solutions
 Target size likely to be bigger
than ballistic missile re-entry
vehicle
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) concepts
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Integrated air and missile defence
 In reality, current defensive systems can engage some, but not all
of the threats
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
Command
Authority
Integrating
Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
W
arning
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
Command
Authority
Integrating
Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
W
arning
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
Command
Authority
Integrating
Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
W
arning
W
arning
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 They are layered to
provide:
 efficiency
 redundancy
 shared understanding

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Military considerations
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Theatre ballistic missiles (TBM) and anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBM)
 TBM pose a significant threat to deployed operations
 TBM are a threat to static formations, ports, airfields, bases and key
infrastructure
 ASBM able to strike maritime platforms at any point within effective
area (Anti Access Area Denial – A2AD)
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 Limited engagement windows
for defensive systems
 Ability of UK forces to defeat
this threat?
 surveillance systems – some
capability
 effectors – little capability
‘Duncan passing Clydebank leaving for first sea trials’ by Mark Harkin is licensed under CC Attribution
2.0 Generic license. Source : http://www.flickr.com/photos/markyharky/7899777334/

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Subsonic and supersonic land attack cruise
missiles
 Threat missiles avoid detection using terrain masking and route to
avoid defensive systems
 Key infrastructure would be defended by ground-based air defence
systems
 surface-to-air missiles
 anti-aircraft guns
 UK has point defence and local area defence systems
 How are defensive systems cued?
 early warning available from airborne sensors
 ground-based sensors will provide short reaction time
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“BrahMos missile. MAKS-2009” by Allocer is licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
Unported license. Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BrahMos_MAKS2009.jpg

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Subsonic and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles
 ‘Cat and mouse’ - advancement in offensive missile development
requires improvement of defensive systems
 Iran/China introducing new/novel capabilities and technologies almost
annually
 responsive insertion of technology difficult to achieve
 Increased situational awareness (SA) important to maintain
reaction time against difficult air targets for maritime platforms
 challenging flight profiles
 height / speed / low observability
 Desire for integrated hard/soft kill capability of defending against
current and emerging difficult air targets
 looking for increased probability of escaping hit
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Hypersonic
 May not be tracked by current surveillance systems
 Reduced reaction time
 Challenging target for an interceptor missile
 Need improvements in:
 cueing
 decoys
 amount of decision time available – human factors?
 automation
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Defensive terminology
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Defensive measures of interest in CDE
submissions
 Active defence - soft kill
 interaction, including physical contact, but without an
immediate response from the threat system being observable.
Includes techniques covering deception, spoofing, masking,
jamming etc but excludes classic passive defence solutions
such as hardening and camouflage
 Active defence - hard kill
 interaction with the threat system and, in particular, payload
delivery mechanism following which a catastrophic observable
event takes place
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Defensive measures of interest in CDE
submissions
 Counterforce
 pre-emptive attack of the origin of the threat weapon against persons
and/or equipment essential for the initiation of the threat’s mission
 Defence also encompasses other measures (not considered here)
 deterrence
 diplomacy
 passive defence
 etc
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
CDE competition challenges
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
The US missile defence solution to countering ballistic missiles
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
CDE competition challenges
1. Defence without interceptor missiles
2. Kill assessment for non-destructive defences
3. Improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing
defences
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Competition guidelines
 Proposals should address at least 1 of the challenges, could
address more than 1 challenge, but do not have to address all
challenges
 We will favour solutions capable of dealing with the most
challenging threats ie ballistic and hypersonic missiles
 The proposed solutions do not necessarily need to be mounted on
or controlled by the defended asset
 many current air and missile defence solutions are entirely separate
military units to the assets they defend
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Challenge 1: defence without interceptor missiles
 Consider entirely new methods for providing defence at range
 How can we effectively defend against complex weapon threats
without using interceptor missiles, such that the threat does not
successfully damage its target?
 ideally at ranges greater than circa 10km
 Examples
 hard-kill techniques such as lasers and other directed energy systems
 soft-kill applications such as sensor burnout due to energy
concentration
 novel methods of employing counterforce techniques
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YAL-1A airborne laser

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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Challenge 2: kill assessment for non-destructive
defences
 Soft-kill defences generally interfere with the internal electronics of
the complex weapon, so the external appearance of the weapon
might remain largely unchanged
 This is a particular issue for ballistic missile defence, since these
threats will continue to follow a ballistic trajectory even if completely
electronically disabled
 How do we assess whether or not a damaged threat weapon still
poses a threat to us given that its trajectory is largely unchanged?
 Solutions should be usable from a stand-off range, in a timely
manner and produce information high in confidence
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Challenge 3: improving the efficiency and/or cost
effectiveness of existing defences
 Apply innovation to existing methods for hard-kill active defence (eg
interceptor missiles and guns) such that the efficiency is increased
 Consider innovation at the whole-system level, as well as the sub-
system level. Consider intra-system interactions
 Proposals will be expected to explain how the concept might
improve a performance metric such as cost effectiveness, volume,
probability of hit or fly-out time
 an order of magnitude in improvement is required to be considered
effective
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
The ‘small print’
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
What we want
 Proof-of-concept research proposals not previously used:
 novel technologies (up to the concept-definition stage)
 developed technologies elsewhere
 Proposals applicable to a wider range of threats are more likely to
be funded
 Solutions to defence against ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or an
order of magnitude improvement against less-stretching threats
 Identify the consequences of intercepting (or failing to intercept) the
threat
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
What we want
 Solutions are not limited to a particular theatre of operation, threat
nation or level of conflict intensity
 Priority will be given to proposals demonstrating or de-risking a
concept
 Clarify the possible limitations of the proposed solution eg:
 environmental issues
 physical characteristics
 target characteristics
 operational considerations
 economic considerations
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
What we don’t want
 Proposals that pose an excessive risk of friendly fire or collateral
damage (eg interceptors with nuclear warheads)
 The same proposal that is already being funded as part of another
MOD research programme
 Solutions with political sensitivities are highly unlikely to be
considered
 We will not fund any proposals that:
 fall outside the remit given here
 provide only marginal improvements to current solutions
 require significant government-provided equipment or infrastructure
 but you should identify alternative, non-government-provided sources
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Exploitation
 Phase 1 is this CDE themed competition
 MOD/Dstl will assess proposals
 MOD will ensure bidders intellectual property is protected
 On successful completion of phase 1, up to £500k is available from
UK MDC for phase 2
 Subsequent phases are likely to be the subject of long-term
exploitation in partnership with
 If a successful bid does not fit comfortably within our strategy, with
bidders permission UK MDC will expose the project to other
funding sources within MOD via an appropriate contracting route
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Summary
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UK Missile Defence
Centre
Summary
 Proposals must be submitted to the CDE portal by 5pm on 3 July
2014
 Challenges:
1. defence without interceptor missiles
2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences
3. improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing
defences
 Innovation is vital as defence against airborne threats has been studied
from many perspectives over the years
 There are opportunities for further exploitation of successful proposals
 For challenge/technical queries contact: MDCNovelTech@dstl.gov.uk
 For submission/process queries contact: cde@dstl.gov.uk
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