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Impact on the Australian market of the US sub-
prime mortgage meltdown



Leo Tyndall, Tyndall Capital         May 2012
Overview
   Why did it happen
   When did it happen
   What happened
   Knock on effect to Australia
   Government response
   Market response
   Long term effects
   Euro crisis and its effect on Australia
   Additional reading material
                                              2
Why did it happen

 Subprime market                Capital markets
  suffer difficulties             – Term mismatch
   –   Reset shock                – Complex instruments
   –   Poor risk assessment       – Pass-through
   –   Declining underwriting       strategies – “no skin
   –   Declining house              in the game”
       prices                     – Rating agency
                                    reliance




                                                            3
When did it happen



 Early signs of              Bear Sterns bought    Lehmans
  deteriorating portfolios     by JP Morgan at        bankrupty
 Falling US house prices      10ct a share          TARP implemented
 Arrears on home loans       Banks cut lending     Goldmans Sachs,
  rising                      CP conduit funding     Morgan Stanley
 Liquidity squeeze by mid     slowed or halted       become banks
  year                        SLN(RMBS              Merrill Lynch
                               extendible CP)         merge with BOA
                               halted                Wells and
                                                      Wachovia Bank
                                                      merged
                                                                    4
What happened

 Liquidity squeeze
  – Interbank lending stopped
  – Investors returned to cash
  – Retail customers lost faith in banking sector
    to the extent certain banks suffer significant
    withdrawals
  – SIVs collapsed
  – Bond spreads widen ten fold or more

                                                     5
Knock on effect to Australia




                               6
Knock on effect to Australia

 Non bank institutions relying on offshore funding collapsed or
  retreated:
   – Basis capital, Allco, Elderslie
   – RHG
 Securitisation market halted
   – 2008 – 1 deal issued without AOFM assistance
   – Australia CP market halted, resulting in banks being called on
      their liquidity facilities
   – Term issuance margins increased signficantly and resulted in
      some issuers cancelling transactions
   – Foreign banks retreated from the Australia market



                                                                      7
Knock on effect to Australia
Australia is not an island in the capital markets




      Knock on effect to Australia
      Source:RBA, UBS, S&P




                                                    8
Government response

   1st stimulus package - October 2008, the Rudd government announced
    that it would guarantee bank deposits
   An economic stimulus package worth $10.4 billion was announced
   AOFM to purchase RMBS
   RBA repo eligibility to include ABS
   Regulatory changes – major changes
     – National Consumer Credit Code
     – Personal Property Securities Act
     – Rating agency regulation
     – APS 120 – align to Basle 2 and consequently Basle 3
     – Amendment to Banking Act – Covered Bonds allowed
   2nd economic stimulus package - February 2009, $47 billion was
    allocated to help boost the economy


                                                                         9
Market response

 Pros
  – Securitisation market showed a signs of
    recovery




                                              10
Market response

 Pros
  – Other investors supported securitisation
    along side the AOFM participation




                                               11
Market response

 Cons
  – RMBS Securitisation remains at significant low levels due to
    the inability to offer bullet structures and minimal offshore
    participation




                                                                    12
Market response

 Cons
  – Credit enhancements level set by the rating agencies increased causing
    inefficient pricing;
  – Funds suffered significant redemptions and do not want to participate in any
    asset purchase where liquidity in secondary market is slow;
  – Foreign banks retreated from the markets;
  – Major domestic banks hold more than 90% of the market share in mortgages
  – Conduit funding is no longer an economical solution for banks and funders
  – Covered bonds only helped the major banks due to the inability to offer a
    support solution for the lower rated banks
  – Investment banking model is not considered an attractive solution for most
    banks. Accordingly innovation and competition is close to non existent in the
    Australian market
  – Issuers need mezzanine funding but pricing is high due to few participants in
    the market


                                                                                    13
Long term effects

 Subdued home lending
 Increase in securitisation of asset backed
  securities




                                               14
Long term effects

 Slowing in the retail credit market
  consequently slowing economy
  – Pharmacy industry suffering reductions in
    credit facilities
  – Residential lending criteria tightening
    resulting in a slowdown in housing industry
  – SME suffering credit crunch due to an
    reluctance by the major banks to lend in the
    sector
  – Less competitions due to foreign banks
    withdrawing from the market
                                                   15
Solutions

 Call support
 Covered bond support
 Mezzanine funding solutions
 Require super funds invest in fixed instruments
  up ?%
 Support competitors in the market to the majors
 Regulate them with APRA – e.g. Housing
  Coops.

                                                    16
Euro Crisis – its effect to Australia

 Foreign banks retracting from the market
   – Syndicated loan market slowed
   – Commercial property market slowed
   – Project finance slowed
   – Unemployment increased – out of work bankers, property
     professionals, project finance professionals
 Inability for the majors to handle the increase in demand
   – Majors become selective
   – Pricing increases
   – Smaller player squeezed out due to funding constraints
   – Reduced competition


                                                              17
Additional reading material

   http://www.securitisation.com.au/marketsnapshot

   http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2008/sp-ag-160508.html (RBA paper,

    2008, address to the Sub-prime Mortgage Meltdown Symposium)

   http://www.canstar.com.au/global-financial-crisis/

   http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2010/jun/8.html

   http

    ://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1396/PDF/04_Sub-prime_paper.pdf


                                                                           18

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Knockon Effects Of The Us Subprime Meltdown On Australia

  • 1. Impact on the Australian market of the US sub- prime mortgage meltdown Leo Tyndall, Tyndall Capital May 2012
  • 2. Overview  Why did it happen  When did it happen  What happened  Knock on effect to Australia  Government response  Market response  Long term effects  Euro crisis and its effect on Australia  Additional reading material 2
  • 3. Why did it happen  Subprime market  Capital markets suffer difficulties – Term mismatch – Reset shock – Complex instruments – Poor risk assessment – Pass-through – Declining underwriting strategies – “no skin – Declining house in the game” prices – Rating agency reliance 3
  • 4. When did it happen  Early signs of  Bear Sterns bought  Lehmans deteriorating portfolios by JP Morgan at bankrupty  Falling US house prices 10ct a share  TARP implemented  Arrears on home loans  Banks cut lending  Goldmans Sachs, rising  CP conduit funding Morgan Stanley  Liquidity squeeze by mid slowed or halted become banks year  SLN(RMBS  Merrill Lynch extendible CP) merge with BOA halted  Wells and Wachovia Bank merged 4
  • 5. What happened  Liquidity squeeze – Interbank lending stopped – Investors returned to cash – Retail customers lost faith in banking sector to the extent certain banks suffer significant withdrawals – SIVs collapsed – Bond spreads widen ten fold or more 5
  • 6. Knock on effect to Australia 6
  • 7. Knock on effect to Australia  Non bank institutions relying on offshore funding collapsed or retreated: – Basis capital, Allco, Elderslie – RHG  Securitisation market halted – 2008 – 1 deal issued without AOFM assistance – Australia CP market halted, resulting in banks being called on their liquidity facilities – Term issuance margins increased signficantly and resulted in some issuers cancelling transactions – Foreign banks retreated from the Australia market 7
  • 8. Knock on effect to Australia Australia is not an island in the capital markets Knock on effect to Australia Source:RBA, UBS, S&P 8
  • 9. Government response  1st stimulus package - October 2008, the Rudd government announced that it would guarantee bank deposits  An economic stimulus package worth $10.4 billion was announced  AOFM to purchase RMBS  RBA repo eligibility to include ABS  Regulatory changes – major changes – National Consumer Credit Code – Personal Property Securities Act – Rating agency regulation – APS 120 – align to Basle 2 and consequently Basle 3 – Amendment to Banking Act – Covered Bonds allowed  2nd economic stimulus package - February 2009, $47 billion was allocated to help boost the economy 9
  • 10. Market response  Pros – Securitisation market showed a signs of recovery 10
  • 11. Market response  Pros – Other investors supported securitisation along side the AOFM participation 11
  • 12. Market response  Cons – RMBS Securitisation remains at significant low levels due to the inability to offer bullet structures and minimal offshore participation 12
  • 13. Market response  Cons – Credit enhancements level set by the rating agencies increased causing inefficient pricing; – Funds suffered significant redemptions and do not want to participate in any asset purchase where liquidity in secondary market is slow; – Foreign banks retreated from the markets; – Major domestic banks hold more than 90% of the market share in mortgages – Conduit funding is no longer an economical solution for banks and funders – Covered bonds only helped the major banks due to the inability to offer a support solution for the lower rated banks – Investment banking model is not considered an attractive solution for most banks. Accordingly innovation and competition is close to non existent in the Australian market – Issuers need mezzanine funding but pricing is high due to few participants in the market 13
  • 14. Long term effects  Subdued home lending  Increase in securitisation of asset backed securities 14
  • 15. Long term effects  Slowing in the retail credit market consequently slowing economy – Pharmacy industry suffering reductions in credit facilities – Residential lending criteria tightening resulting in a slowdown in housing industry – SME suffering credit crunch due to an reluctance by the major banks to lend in the sector – Less competitions due to foreign banks withdrawing from the market 15
  • 16. Solutions  Call support  Covered bond support  Mezzanine funding solutions  Require super funds invest in fixed instruments up ?%  Support competitors in the market to the majors  Regulate them with APRA – e.g. Housing Coops. 16
  • 17. Euro Crisis – its effect to Australia  Foreign banks retracting from the market – Syndicated loan market slowed – Commercial property market slowed – Project finance slowed – Unemployment increased – out of work bankers, property professionals, project finance professionals  Inability for the majors to handle the increase in demand – Majors become selective – Pricing increases – Smaller player squeezed out due to funding constraints – Reduced competition 17
  • 18. Additional reading material  http://www.securitisation.com.au/marketsnapshot  http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2008/sp-ag-160508.html (RBA paper, 2008, address to the Sub-prime Mortgage Meltdown Symposium)  http://www.canstar.com.au/global-financial-crisis/  http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2010/jun/8.html  http ://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1396/PDF/04_Sub-prime_paper.pdf 18