Analysis of the General Program of the Chinese COmmunist Party COnstitution as a basis for theorizing the fundamental principles of Chinese political and legal theory
1. A Constitutional Theory for China:
From the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party to the
Basic Law of the Chinese Party-State
Larry Catá Backer
W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law and International Affairs,
Pennsylvania State University
Presentation for the 10th Annual Conference of the European China Law Studies
Association, Cologne, Germany, September 26, 2015
2. Context
• Is there a constitutional theory at
the foundation of the Chinese
state Party system?
• If so might it give rise to a
contradiction; it cannot be true to
itself it is true to itself?
• The issue arises of course in the
context of the one state two
systems.
• If it is possible to conceive of one
country two systems then why
not one ideology two vanguard
parties, etc.?
• This is the challenge taken up
here:
• Is there a unifying ideology, a
unifying constitutional and
political theory beneath the
various strands of the Chinese
Communist Party’s line?
• In other words, is there a
legitimating and substantively
coherent theory that weaves
together the strands of the CCP’s
standards, policies and
implementation initiatives?
2
3. • Objectives
– Freehand analysis of the General
Program of the Communist Part
Constitution Constitution
– The object is to focus on the
locus of what ought to be the
basic law of the Chinese State
– And to see if in the process
contradictions can be resolved or
at least mediated within a
coherent framework
4. Thesis The General Program suggests the
structures of Chinese Constitutional
Theory
• It is organized from fundamental
principles, to policies derives from
principles, to standards for applying
that policy (including “working
style”) to objectives based
application of policy.
• Suggest the ways that the logic of
this theoretical approach explains
what for some Westerners is the
“unexplainable”
– Democracy; Human rights; Rule of
law; One country two systems,
internationalism, authoritarianism,
democratic legitimacy, etc.
5. Roadmap
• Fundamental Principles
(¶¶ 1-9)
• From Principles to
Policy: The Basic Line of
the CCP (¶¶ 10-13)
• From Policy to
Implementation: The
Leadership Role of the
CCP (¶¶ 14-19)
• The Outward Relations
of the CCP (the Unities;
¶¶ 20-22)
• Party Building (¶¶ 23-
28).
5
6. 6
Fundamental
Principles (¶¶ 1-9)
• --Part 3: The CCP and Its Vanguard Role (¶ 1 General
Program).
--Part 4: The CCP's Guidebook (¶ 2 General Program).
--Part 5: Marxism-Leninism With Chinese
Characteristics (¶ 3 General Program).
--Part 6 Mao Zedong Thought (¶ 4 General Program).
--Part 7 Deng Xiaoping Theory (¶ 5 General Program).
--Part 8 Important Thought of Three Represents (¶ 6
General Program).
--Part 9 Scientific Outlook on Development (¶ 7 General
Program).
• --Part 10 Cage of Principle-Cage of Policy (¶ 8 General
Program).
--Part 11 Socialist Modernization and Class Struggle (¶ 9
General Program).
7. 7
From Principles to
Policy: The Basic
Line of the CCP (¶¶
10-13)
• --Part 12 The Basic Line of the CCP (¶ 10
General Program).
--Part 13 The CCP Basic Line-Economic
Development (¶ 11 General Program).
--Part 14 The CCP Basic Line-The Four
Cardinal Principles (¶ 12 General Program).
--Part 15 The CCP Basic Line-Reform and
Opening Up (¶ 13 General Program).
8. 8
From Policy to
Implementation: The
Leadership Role of the
CCP (¶¶ 14-19)
• --Part 16 CCP Leadership-The Socialist
Marker Economy (¶ 14 General Program).
--Part 17 CCP Leadership-Socialist
Democracy (¶ 15 General Program).
--Part 18 CCP Leadership-Socialist Culture (¶
16 General Program).
• --Part 19 CCP Leadership-Harmonious
Socialist Society (¶ 17 General Program).
--Part 20 CCP Leadership-Socialist Ecological
Progress (¶ 18 General Program).
• --Part 21 CCP Leadership-People's Liberation
Army (¶ 19 General Program).
9. 9
Outward Relations of
the CCP (the Unities;
¶¶ 20-22)
• --Part 22 Socialist Ethnic Relations (¶
20 General Program).
• --Part 23 Political and Territorial
Unity (¶ 21 General Program).
• --Part 24 Foreign Relations and
Communist internationalism (¶ 22
General Program).
10. 10
Party Building
(¶¶ 23-28)
• --Part 25 Framework for Party
Building (¶ 23 General Program).
--Part 26 Party Building Framework:
The CCP Line (¶ 24 General
Program).
--Part 27 Party Building Framework:
The Ideological Line (¶ 25 General
Program).
• --Part 28 Party Building Framework:
The Relationship to the People (¶ 26
General Program).
--Part 29 Party Building Framework:
Democratic Centralism (¶ 27 General
Program).
--Part 30 Party Building Framework:
Leadership (¶ 28 General Program).
11. 11
Conclusions First: The General Program presents the
fully matured and self-constituting
theoretical system that constitutes the basis
of the legal and political system of China
with respect both to substantive and
process principles.
Second: These principles inform the
State Constitution, providing the basic
sources for application of its provisions
Third: The Chinese political system is not
authoritarian in the Western sense, precisely
because its governance techniques are not
self serving for the vanguard party.
Fourth: The General Program presents a
system the objectives of which may be
compatible with those of the West but the
methods and techniques of which are
incompatible: including notions of rule
of law, human rights, religious freedom,
etc .