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Network Visibility through
NetFlow
Richard Laval
Stealthwatch SEM, Europe
rilaval@cisco.com
30-Mar-16
Changing
Business Models
Dynamic
Threat Landscape
Complexity
and Fragmentation
New Networks Mean New Security Challenges
Organizations lack visibility
into which and how many
devices are on their Network
Services are moving to the
Cloud at a faster rate than IT
can keep up
Over 50 billion connected
“smart objects” by 2020.
Acquisitions, joint ventures,
and partnerships are
increasing in regularity.
ENTERPRISE
MOBILITY
ACQUISITIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS
CLOUD INTERNET OF THINGS
It’s Not “IF” You Will Be Breached…It’s “WHEN.”
Expanded Enterprise Attack Surface
Partner Security Day @ Cisco Live Berlin
Lawrence Orans,
Gartner, Network and Gateway
Security Primer for 2016
January 22, 2016
“Network security architects should accept the reality
that, in 2016, it is unreasonable to expect that they can
build perimeter defenses that will block every attack
and prevent every
security breach.
Instead, they need to adopt new products and/or
services that will enable the network to be an integral
part of a strategy that focuses on detecting and
responding to security incidents.”
Cisco Confidential 5© 2013 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
You Can’t Protect What You Can’t See
The Network sees everything. Gives Deep and Broad Visibility
Answers Who, what, when, where, How did they come on network
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1011
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0100
1011
0101
0100
1011
0101
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1011
The Insider Threat
About this session
This session is about using network
analysis or the network (our obvious
things) to mitigate an attack.
“The world is full of obvious things which
nobody by any chance observes.”
Sherlock Holmes, The Hound of the Baskervilles
Managing the Insider Threat
Access Controls
• Control who and what is on the
network
Segmentation
• Define what they can do
SGT
You are who you say
you are and these are
the resources you are
allowed access to
based on your
credentials.
Managing the Insider Threat
Control movement of malicious
content through inspection points
Content Controls
• Deep contextual visibility at
inspection points
This is what you are
allowed to bring into the
secure zone/network.
Once the walls are built
monitor for security visibility
10
Now monitor the activity inside the
secure controlled zone.
Managing the Insider Threat
Introduction to NetFlow
• Developed by Cisco in 1996 as a packet forwarding mechanism
• Statistical Reporting became relevant to customers
• Reporting is based on Flow and not necessarily per-packet (Full Flow
vs. Sampled)
• Various versions exist version 1 through 9, with 5 being the most
popular and 9 being the most functional
• Traditional NetFlow (TNF) – fixed info to identify a flow
• Flexible Netflow (FNF) – user defines how to identify a flow
NetFlow
10.2.2.2
port 1024
10.1.1.1
port 80
eth0/1
eth0/2
Start Time Interface Src IP Src
Port
Dest IP Dest
Port
Proto Pkts
Sent
Bytes
Sent
SGT DGT TCP Flags
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010 SYN,ACK,PSH
10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 1010 100 SYN,ACK,FIN
Start Time Interface Src IP Src
Port
Dest IP Dest
Port
Proto Pkts
Sent
Bytes
Sent
SGT DGT TCP Flags
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010 SYN,ACK,PSH
NetFlow = Visibility
A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information
NetFlow Deployment Architecture
Management/Reporting Layer:
• Run queries on flow data
• Centralize management and reporting
Flow Collection Layer:
• Collection, storage and analysis of flow records
Flow Exporting Layer:
• Enables telemetry export
• As close to the traffic source as possible
NetFlow
Considerations: Flow Exporting Layer
1. NetFlow support
2. Which version of NetFlow to use
3. How to configure/what to measure
4. Where in the network to enable NetFlow export
Versions of NetFlow
Version Major Advantage Limits/Weaknesses
V5 Defines 18 exported fields
Simple and compact format
Most commonly used format
IPv4 only
Fixed fields, fixed length fields only
Single flow cache
V9 Template-based
IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets
MPLS and BGP nexthop supported
Defines 104 fields, including L2 fields
Reports flow direction
IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets
Fixed length fields only
Uses more memory
Slower performance
Single flow cache
Flexible NetFlow (FNF) Template-based flow format (built on V9
protocol)
Supports flow monitors (discrete caches)
Supports selectable key fields and IPv6
Supports NBAR data fields
Less common
Requires more sophisticated platform to produce
Requires more sophisticated system to consume
IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX) AKA NetFlow V10
Standardized – RFC 5101, 5102, 6313
Supports variable length fields, NBAR2
Can export flows via IPv4 and IPv6 packets
Even less common
Only supported on a few Cisco platforms
NSEL (ASA only) Built on NetFlow v9 protocol
State-based flow logging (context)
Pre and Post NAT reporting
Missing many standard fields
Limited support by collectors
NetFlow Deployment
Catalyst® 6500
Distribution
& Core
Catalyst® 4500
ASA
ISR
Edge
ASR
Each network layer offers unique NetFlow capabilities
Access
Catalyst®
3560/3750-X
Catalyst® 4500
Catalyst®
3650/3850
Where to collect NetFlow from?
Listed below are the typical use cases and the recommendations of where to collect the NetFlow from in the network:
1. Use case detection of security events –
a. Only need to account for the packet once.
b. Collect at the edge, if not 100% flow capable then distribution, if not 100% flow capable then core.
c. Enable flow on any exporter that will provide additional context like ASA FWs (provide NAT and FW actions), and
Proxy data (allow visibility into outbound traffic that has been translated)
2. Use case forensics or auditing –
a. You should be looking to account for all packets.
b. Deploy as close to the edges of the network as possible.
c. Enable flow on any exporter that will provide additional context like ASA FWs (provide NAT and FW actions), and
Proxy data (allow visibility into outbound traffic that has been translated).
3. Use case networking (performance) –
a. You need flow from everywhere to help with interface utilization, QoS monitoring, trending and capacity planning and
tracking issues back to the source of the problem which could be any interface.
NetFlow Terminology
Aside: Myths about NetFlow Generation
Myth #1: NetFlow impacts performance
• Hardware implemented NetFlow has no
performance impact
• Software implementation is typically
significantly <15% processing overhead
Myth #2: NetFlow has bandwidth overhead
• NetFlow is a summary protocol
• Traffic overhead is typically significantly <1% of total traffic per exporting device
NetFlow Collection: Flow Stitching
10.2.2.2
port 1024
10.1.1.1
port 80
eth0/1
eth0/2
Start Time Client
IP
Client
Port
Server IP Server
Port
Proto Client
Bytes
Client
Pkts
Server
Bytes
Server
Pkts
Client
SGT
Server
SGT
Interfaces
10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 100 1010 eth0/1
eth0/2
Uni-directional flow records
Bi-directional:
• Conversation flow record
• Allows easy visualization and analysis
Start Time Interface Src IP Src
Port
Dest IP Dest
Port
Proto Pkts
Sent
Bytes
Sent
SGT DGT
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010
10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 1010 100
NetFlow Collection: De-duplication
Start Time Client IP Client
Port
Server
IP
Server
Port
Proto Client
Bytes
Client
Pkts
Server
Bytes
Server
Pkts
App Client
SGT
Server
SGT
Exporter, Interface,
Direction, Action
10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 HTTP 100 1010 Sw1, eth0, in
Sw1, eth1, out
Sw2, eth0, in
Sw2, eth1, out
ASA, eth1, in
ASA, eth0, out, Permitted
ASA eth0, in, Permitted
ASA, eth1, out
Sw3, eth1, in
Sw3, eth0, out
Sw1, eth1, in
Sw1, eth0, out
10.2.2.2
port 1024 10.1.1.1
port 80
Sw1
Sw2
Sw3
ASA
Any unique information is added to the record.
Path of the packet for example is unique.
How The Conversational Flow Record Looks in SW
Where WhoWhat
When
How
Who
• Highly scalable (enterprise class) collection
• High compression => long term storage
• Months of data retention
More context
Host Groups: Applied Situational Awareness
Virtual container of multiple
IP Addresses/ranges that
have similar attributes
Best Practice: classify all
known IP Addresses in one
or more host groups
Lab servers
ISE as a Telemetry Source (adding context)
Monitor Mode
• Open Mode, Multi-Auth
• Unobstructed Access
• No impact on productivity
• Profiling, posture assessment
• Gain Visibility
Authenticated Session Table
Cisco ISE
• Maintain historical session table
• Correlate NetFlow to username
• Build User-centric reports
StealthWatch
Management
Console
syslog
Global Intelligence (adding more context)
• Known C&C Servers
• Tor Entrance and Exits
Conversational Flow Record with added context
ISE
Telemetry
NBAR
Applied situational
awareness
FlowSensor
Geo-IP mapping
Threat
feed
Flow Table – IPv6
StealthWatch can also display IPv6 flow records
“There is nothing like first hand evidence”
Sherlock Holmes, A Study in Scarlett
Now, lets analyse all that good NetFlow
data/evidence generated by the network.
NetFlow Analysis with StealthWatch can help:
Identify additional IOCs
• Policy & Segmentation
• Network Behaviour & Anomaly Detection (NBAD)
Better understand / respond to an IOC:
• Audit trail of all host-to-host communication
Discovery
• Identify business critical applications and services
across the network
Locate Assets
32
Find hosts communicating on the network
• Pivot based on transactional data
Host Groups – Targeted Reporting
Geo-IP-based Host Group
Summary chart of traffic
inbound and outbound from
this Host Group
Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts
Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses
Table of all individual hosts
Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts
Rogue Hosts
(IP addresses you don’t know about as they
have not been classified)
Concept: Indicator of Compromise
IDS/IPS Alert
Log analysis (SIEM)
Raw flow analysis
Outside notification
Behavioural analysis
Activity monitoring
IoC = is an artifact observed on a network or in an operating system that with high
confidence indicates a computer intrusion
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise
Anomaly detection
File hashes
IP Addresses
There are many IoCs from the network which we need to piece together to solve the crime.
Attack Lifecycle Model
Exploratory
Actions
Footprint
Expansion
Execution
Theft
Disruption
Staging
Initial
Compromise
Initial
Recon
Infiltration
(C&C)
Now we use our evidence from the IoCs
to build a map/model of and attack.
IoC’s from Traffic Analysis
Behavioural Analysis:
• Leverages knowledge of known bad behaviour
• Policy and segmentation
Anomaly Detection:
• Identify a change from “normal”
StealthWatch NBAD Model
Algorithm Security
Event
Alarm
Track and/or measure behaviour/activity
Suspicious behaviour observed or anomaly detected
Notification of security event generated
This how
StealthWatch
processes all the
IoCs to make
sense of them.
Alarm Categories
Each category accrues points.
Example Alarm Category: Concern Index
Concern Index: Track hosts that appear to compromising network integrity
Security events
StealthWatch: Alarms
Alarms
• Indicate significant behaviour changes and policy violations
• Known and unknown attacks generate alarms
• Activity that falls outside the baseline, acceptable behaviour
or established policies
Watching for Data Theft
Data Exfiltration
• Identify suspect movement from Inside Network to Outside
• Single or multiple destinations from a single source
• Policy and behavioral
Data Hoarding
Suspect Data Hoarding:
• Unusually large amount of data
inbound from other hosts
Target Data Hoarding:
• Unusually large amount of data outbound
from a host to multiple hosts
Suspect Data Hoarding
Data Hoarding
• Unusually large amount of data inbound to a host from other hosts
• Policy and behavioral
“The Science of Deduction.”
Chapter 1: The Sign of the Four
Now we are going to use the evidence
generated by the network to solve our mystery.
Investigating a Host
IOC: IDS Alert from FirePower provides an IP address that
StealthWatch can use to investigate.
Host report for 10.201.3.59
Behavior alarms
Quick view of host
group communication
Summary
information
Investigating: Host Drilldown
User
information
Applications
Investigating: Applications
A lot of applications.
Some suspicious!
Investigating: Behaviour Alarms
Significant network activity
It Could Start with a User …
Alarms
Devices and
Sessions
Active Directory
Details
Username
View Flows
Links and Recommended Reading
More about StealthWatch and the Cisco Cyber Threat Defense Solution:
http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense
http://www.lancope.com
Recommended Reading
Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns1015/ns1238/cyber_threat_defense_design_guide.pdf
Cyber Threat Defense for the Data Center Cisco Validated Design Guide:
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise/design-zone-security/ctd-first-look-design-guide.pdf
Securing Cisco Networks with Threat Detection and Analysis (SCYBER)
https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/security/cybersecurity/scyber_exam
Key Takeaways
Insider threats are operating on the
network interior
Threat detection and response requires
visibility and context into network traffic
NetFlow and the StealthWatch System provide actionable security intelligence
Q & A
“The game is afoot!”
Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the The Abbey Grange
Thank you
57

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Network Security and Visibility through NetFlow

  • 1. Network Visibility through NetFlow Richard Laval Stealthwatch SEM, Europe rilaval@cisco.com 30-Mar-16
  • 2. Changing Business Models Dynamic Threat Landscape Complexity and Fragmentation New Networks Mean New Security Challenges Organizations lack visibility into which and how many devices are on their Network Services are moving to the Cloud at a faster rate than IT can keep up Over 50 billion connected “smart objects” by 2020. Acquisitions, joint ventures, and partnerships are increasing in regularity. ENTERPRISE MOBILITY ACQUISITIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS CLOUD INTERNET OF THINGS It’s Not “IF” You Will Be Breached…It’s “WHEN.” Expanded Enterprise Attack Surface
  • 3. Partner Security Day @ Cisco Live Berlin Lawrence Orans, Gartner, Network and Gateway Security Primer for 2016 January 22, 2016 “Network security architects should accept the reality that, in 2016, it is unreasonable to expect that they can build perimeter defenses that will block every attack and prevent every security breach. Instead, they need to adopt new products and/or services that will enable the network to be an integral part of a strategy that focuses on detecting and responding to security incidents.”
  • 4. Cisco Confidential 5© 2013 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. You Can’t Protect What You Can’t See The Network sees everything. Gives Deep and Broad Visibility Answers Who, what, when, where, How did they come on network 0101 0100 1011 0101 0100 1011 0101 0100 1011 0101 0100 1011
  • 6. This session is about using network analysis or the network (our obvious things) to mitigate an attack. “The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance observes.” Sherlock Holmes, The Hound of the Baskervilles
  • 7. Managing the Insider Threat Access Controls • Control who and what is on the network Segmentation • Define what they can do SGT You are who you say you are and these are the resources you are allowed access to based on your credentials.
  • 8. Managing the Insider Threat Control movement of malicious content through inspection points Content Controls • Deep contextual visibility at inspection points This is what you are allowed to bring into the secure zone/network.
  • 9. Once the walls are built monitor for security visibility 10 Now monitor the activity inside the secure controlled zone. Managing the Insider Threat
  • 10. Introduction to NetFlow • Developed by Cisco in 1996 as a packet forwarding mechanism • Statistical Reporting became relevant to customers • Reporting is based on Flow and not necessarily per-packet (Full Flow vs. Sampled) • Various versions exist version 1 through 9, with 5 being the most popular and 9 being the most functional • Traditional NetFlow (TNF) – fixed info to identify a flow • Flexible Netflow (FNF) – user defines how to identify a flow
  • 11. NetFlow 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 eth0/1 eth0/2 Start Time Interface Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent SGT DGT TCP Flags 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010 SYN,ACK,PSH 10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 1010 100 SYN,ACK,FIN Start Time Interface Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent SGT DGT TCP Flags 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010 SYN,ACK,PSH
  • 12. NetFlow = Visibility A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information
  • 13. NetFlow Deployment Architecture Management/Reporting Layer: • Run queries on flow data • Centralize management and reporting Flow Collection Layer: • Collection, storage and analysis of flow records Flow Exporting Layer: • Enables telemetry export • As close to the traffic source as possible NetFlow
  • 14. Considerations: Flow Exporting Layer 1. NetFlow support 2. Which version of NetFlow to use 3. How to configure/what to measure 4. Where in the network to enable NetFlow export
  • 15. Versions of NetFlow Version Major Advantage Limits/Weaknesses V5 Defines 18 exported fields Simple and compact format Most commonly used format IPv4 only Fixed fields, fixed length fields only Single flow cache V9 Template-based IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets MPLS and BGP nexthop supported Defines 104 fields, including L2 fields Reports flow direction IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets Fixed length fields only Uses more memory Slower performance Single flow cache Flexible NetFlow (FNF) Template-based flow format (built on V9 protocol) Supports flow monitors (discrete caches) Supports selectable key fields and IPv6 Supports NBAR data fields Less common Requires more sophisticated platform to produce Requires more sophisticated system to consume IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) AKA NetFlow V10 Standardized – RFC 5101, 5102, 6313 Supports variable length fields, NBAR2 Can export flows via IPv4 and IPv6 packets Even less common Only supported on a few Cisco platforms NSEL (ASA only) Built on NetFlow v9 protocol State-based flow logging (context) Pre and Post NAT reporting Missing many standard fields Limited support by collectors
  • 16. NetFlow Deployment Catalyst® 6500 Distribution & Core Catalyst® 4500 ASA ISR Edge ASR Each network layer offers unique NetFlow capabilities Access Catalyst® 3560/3750-X Catalyst® 4500 Catalyst® 3650/3850
  • 17. Where to collect NetFlow from? Listed below are the typical use cases and the recommendations of where to collect the NetFlow from in the network: 1. Use case detection of security events – a. Only need to account for the packet once. b. Collect at the edge, if not 100% flow capable then distribution, if not 100% flow capable then core. c. Enable flow on any exporter that will provide additional context like ASA FWs (provide NAT and FW actions), and Proxy data (allow visibility into outbound traffic that has been translated) 2. Use case forensics or auditing – a. You should be looking to account for all packets. b. Deploy as close to the edges of the network as possible. c. Enable flow on any exporter that will provide additional context like ASA FWs (provide NAT and FW actions), and Proxy data (allow visibility into outbound traffic that has been translated). 3. Use case networking (performance) – a. You need flow from everywhere to help with interface utilization, QoS monitoring, trending and capacity planning and tracking issues back to the source of the problem which could be any interface.
  • 19. Aside: Myths about NetFlow Generation Myth #1: NetFlow impacts performance • Hardware implemented NetFlow has no performance impact • Software implementation is typically significantly <15% processing overhead Myth #2: NetFlow has bandwidth overhead • NetFlow is a summary protocol • Traffic overhead is typically significantly <1% of total traffic per exporting device
  • 20. NetFlow Collection: Flow Stitching 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 eth0/1 eth0/2 Start Time Client IP Client Port Server IP Server Port Proto Client Bytes Client Pkts Server Bytes Server Pkts Client SGT Server SGT Interfaces 10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 100 1010 eth0/1 eth0/2 Uni-directional flow records Bi-directional: • Conversation flow record • Allows easy visualization and analysis Start Time Interface Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent SGT DGT 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 100 1010 10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 1010 100
  • 21. NetFlow Collection: De-duplication Start Time Client IP Client Port Server IP Server Port Proto Client Bytes Client Pkts Server Bytes Server Pkts App Client SGT Server SGT Exporter, Interface, Direction, Action 10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 HTTP 100 1010 Sw1, eth0, in Sw1, eth1, out Sw2, eth0, in Sw2, eth1, out ASA, eth1, in ASA, eth0, out, Permitted ASA eth0, in, Permitted ASA, eth1, out Sw3, eth1, in Sw3, eth0, out Sw1, eth1, in Sw1, eth0, out 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 Sw1 Sw2 Sw3 ASA Any unique information is added to the record. Path of the packet for example is unique.
  • 22. How The Conversational Flow Record Looks in SW Where WhoWhat When How Who • Highly scalable (enterprise class) collection • High compression => long term storage • Months of data retention More context
  • 23. Host Groups: Applied Situational Awareness Virtual container of multiple IP Addresses/ranges that have similar attributes Best Practice: classify all known IP Addresses in one or more host groups Lab servers
  • 24. ISE as a Telemetry Source (adding context) Monitor Mode • Open Mode, Multi-Auth • Unobstructed Access • No impact on productivity • Profiling, posture assessment • Gain Visibility Authenticated Session Table Cisco ISE • Maintain historical session table • Correlate NetFlow to username • Build User-centric reports StealthWatch Management Console syslog
  • 25. Global Intelligence (adding more context) • Known C&C Servers • Tor Entrance and Exits
  • 26. Conversational Flow Record with added context ISE Telemetry NBAR Applied situational awareness FlowSensor Geo-IP mapping Threat feed
  • 27. Flow Table – IPv6 StealthWatch can also display IPv6 flow records
  • 28. “There is nothing like first hand evidence” Sherlock Holmes, A Study in Scarlett Now, lets analyse all that good NetFlow data/evidence generated by the network.
  • 29. NetFlow Analysis with StealthWatch can help: Identify additional IOCs • Policy & Segmentation • Network Behaviour & Anomaly Detection (NBAD) Better understand / respond to an IOC: • Audit trail of all host-to-host communication Discovery • Identify business critical applications and services across the network
  • 30. Locate Assets 32 Find hosts communicating on the network • Pivot based on transactional data
  • 31. Host Groups – Targeted Reporting Geo-IP-based Host Group Summary chart of traffic inbound and outbound from this Host Group
  • 32. Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses Table of all individual hosts
  • 33. Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts Rogue Hosts (IP addresses you don’t know about as they have not been classified)
  • 34. Concept: Indicator of Compromise IDS/IPS Alert Log analysis (SIEM) Raw flow analysis Outside notification Behavioural analysis Activity monitoring IoC = is an artifact observed on a network or in an operating system that with high confidence indicates a computer intrusion • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise Anomaly detection File hashes IP Addresses There are many IoCs from the network which we need to piece together to solve the crime.
  • 36. IoC’s from Traffic Analysis Behavioural Analysis: • Leverages knowledge of known bad behaviour • Policy and segmentation Anomaly Detection: • Identify a change from “normal”
  • 37. StealthWatch NBAD Model Algorithm Security Event Alarm Track and/or measure behaviour/activity Suspicious behaviour observed or anomaly detected Notification of security event generated This how StealthWatch processes all the IoCs to make sense of them.
  • 39. Example Alarm Category: Concern Index Concern Index: Track hosts that appear to compromising network integrity Security events
  • 40. StealthWatch: Alarms Alarms • Indicate significant behaviour changes and policy violations • Known and unknown attacks generate alarms • Activity that falls outside the baseline, acceptable behaviour or established policies
  • 41. Watching for Data Theft Data Exfiltration • Identify suspect movement from Inside Network to Outside • Single or multiple destinations from a single source • Policy and behavioral
  • 42. Data Hoarding Suspect Data Hoarding: • Unusually large amount of data inbound from other hosts Target Data Hoarding: • Unusually large amount of data outbound from a host to multiple hosts
  • 43. Suspect Data Hoarding Data Hoarding • Unusually large amount of data inbound to a host from other hosts • Policy and behavioral
  • 44. “The Science of Deduction.” Chapter 1: The Sign of the Four Now we are going to use the evidence generated by the network to solve our mystery.
  • 45. Investigating a Host IOC: IDS Alert from FirePower provides an IP address that StealthWatch can use to investigate. Host report for 10.201.3.59 Behavior alarms Quick view of host group communication Summary information
  • 47. Investigating: Applications A lot of applications. Some suspicious!
  • 49. It Could Start with a User … Alarms Devices and Sessions Active Directory Details Username View Flows
  • 50. Links and Recommended Reading More about StealthWatch and the Cisco Cyber Threat Defense Solution: http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense http://www.lancope.com Recommended Reading Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns1015/ns1238/cyber_threat_defense_design_guide.pdf Cyber Threat Defense for the Data Center Cisco Validated Design Guide: http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise/design-zone-security/ctd-first-look-design-guide.pdf Securing Cisco Networks with Threat Detection and Analysis (SCYBER) https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/security/cybersecurity/scyber_exam
  • 51. Key Takeaways Insider threats are operating on the network interior Threat detection and response requires visibility and context into network traffic NetFlow and the StealthWatch System provide actionable security intelligence
  • 52. Q & A
  • 53. “The game is afoot!” Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the The Abbey Grange
  • 55. 57