1. Hall 1
Kyler Hall
Mexico De Afuera through the Great Depression: Anti-Mexican Hysteria,
Revolutionary Rhetoric, and the Ugly Truth
At the age of ten, Raymond Rodriguez, an instrumental founder of Chicano History,
witnessed his father walk out of their Long Beach farmhouse for the last time in 1936, “never to
see his wife and children again.”1 While thousands of Mexicans were unjustly deported, the
majority of roughly 263,000 Mexican repatriates left “voluntarily” due to increasingly malicious
forms of anti-Mexican hysteria.2 Rodriguez considered his father one of the many repatriates
hoping to find themselves in more amicable social environments, claiming, “[My father must
have] figured: 'If they don't want me, I'm going back.’ While Rodriguez’s father had the option
to stay in the United States with his family and a functioning agribusiness, anti-Mexican
legislation and community paranoia ultimately convinced him, like hundreds of thousands of
other repatriates, to return to Mexico.
Beginning in late 1930, the Federal, State, and Los Angeles municipal governments
created an atmosphere of terror through police-state deportations, raids, destruction of
documentation, and false promises of protection. While the United States government cultivated
an atmosphere of community hysteria through deportation raids in homes and public plazas, the
Mexican government employed nationalist, Revolutionary rhetoric backed by promises of ejido
land, supplies, and financial support. Unfortunately, the Mexican government’s repatriate
policies included scare-tactics which implied that compatriots living abroad would lose their
Mexican citizenship without proper documentation. Yet while working feverishly to establish
1 Elaine Woo,“Raymond Rodriguez Dies at 87”, Los Angeles Times, July, 06, 2003.
2 The Mexican community in the United States before the Great Depression was estimated at roughly 640,000. By
1940, the population was estimated to have dropped to 377,000. Tamar Wilson, “The culture of Mexican
migration,” Critique of Anthropology 30, no. 4 (2010): 408, sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

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nationalist Mexican allegiance beyond its border, the Mexican government failed to gain
widespread support from a critical, demanding Mexican community with identity and knowledge
firmly rooted on both sides of the border.3 Accordingly, The Revolutionary Mexican
government found itself trapped by its ambitious promises, its desires to consolidate followers
amongst “impressionable” repatriates, and La Opinión’s news coverage of the disastrous
economic depression in La Madre.4 Despite lacking funds and massive foreign debt, the
Mexican government attempted to cater to repatriates with promises of rural ejido
reorganization, transportation, and legal protection. Most importantly, La Opinión reported the
shortcomings of uniform repatriate policy from the Mexican government and provided an avenue
for local community members to express their discontent with empty Revolutionary promises
and the betrayal of the U.S. government. With the aid of La Opinión, the majority of the
Mexican community in Los Angeles intuitively ignored hollow Revolutionary promises,
discovered the ugly truth, challenged their disenfranchisement, and devised grassroots methods
of communal survival in the United States.
The historical writing of the Mexican experience in the United States began in the 1920’s
as economic progress attracted a new wave of Mexican Immigration. Sociologists Manuel
Gamio, Emory Bogardus, and others studied the growing Mexican community through
sociological categories that future immigration historians used to develop their studies. Through
extended oral interviews, Manuel Gamio underscores the Mexican immigrant experience as a
result of economic and social exploitation. Further, the extremely seasonal nature of Mexican
employment created “mobility [which] prevents the organization of a [formal] immigrant social
3 George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity,Culture,and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900 –
1945 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 205 – 210.
4 Dennis Nodín Valdés, “Mexican Revolutionary Nationalism and Repatriation during the Great Depression”
Mexican Studies4, no. 1, (Winter, 1988): 2

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order.”5 And while Gamio outlines the presence of informal social safety networks, he
acknowledges an underlying rift between Mexican immigrants and their increasingly
Americanized Mexican youth. For example, Anastacio Torres, a poor, unskilled agrarian
worker, argued, “for they [pochos] are of our own blood because their parents were Mexicans,
[yet] they pretend that they are Americans.”6 Emory Bogardus similarly identifies tensions
between Mexican American offspring and their more conservative elders, from the perspective
of an elder, “It is because they can run around so much and be so free, that our Mexican girls do
not know how to act.”7 While Bogardus and Gamio primarily concerned themselves with the
social effects of socioeconomic oppression, they incidentally recorded the development of lasting
ties between American culture and the Mexican community living in the United States.
In the 1950’s, Oscar Handlin advanced a historical discourse of the Mexican immigrant
which inevitably began a debate over the retention of traditional values in the face of American
culture. In The Uprooted, Handlin argues that the Mexican immigrant community experienced a
universal immigrant social phenomenon based on the “separation from known surroundings . . .
becoming a foreigner, and ceasing to belong.”8 With specific sociological categories in mind
such as peasant, village, Mexican immigrant, he successfully reveals the typical Mexican
immigrant’s experience from rural villages in Mexico to slums in the United States. While he
implies that traditional cultural values are ultimately cherished through his imagery of
immigrants as transplanted trees in a foreign climate, he argues that Mexican immigrants will
follow a universal process of inevitable conformity. In a similar vein, Abraham Hoffman further
5 Manuel Gamio, The Mexican Immigrant: His Life-Story (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 69.
6 Gamio, The Mexican Immigrant, 58.
7 Emory Bogardus, The Mexican in the United States (Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1934),
28.
8 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (Boston, Little, Brown, 1973) 4.

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supports the notion for a universal experience by constantly comparing Mexican repatriation in
the 1930’s with the historical subjugation of other ethnic immigrant minorities.
While Handlin and other immigration historians provided the historical groundwork for a
social history of the Mexican immigrant community in the United States, The Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960’s inspired debates on ethnicity, ethnic studies, and rebellion against
mainstream hegemony. Revisionist scholars like John Bodnar concerned themselves with
nationalist ethnicity and its lasting influence despite western assimilation. Bodnar disagrees with
Handlin’s universal immigrant experience by slightly altering the metaphor of Mexicans as
transplanted trees in a foreign land. Naming his book, Transplanted, he suggests that Mexican
immigrants never lose their distinct cultural ethnicity in the face of mainstream U.S. cultural
hegemony.9
With the momentum of the Civil Rights Movement, ethnic studies, and the growth of a
distinct, intellectual Mexican American community, early Chicano historians strayed away from
debates on cultural syncretism. Accordingly, “racial and class oppression” within mainstream,
white hegemony became the focus, while “culture was simply a reflection of socio-economic
conditions.”10 In Francisco E. Balderrama’s, In Defense of La Raza, which utilizes Mexican
consulate records, he illustrates racial and class oppression from heightened U.S. anti-Mexican
hysteria through the lens of U.S. government officials and Mexican consulate officials. Not only
did early Chicano historiography acknowledge the oppressive nature of mainstream white
hegemony, it also supported the foundations for an inherently syncretic, multicultural Chicano
community. Certain Chicano scholars like Francisco Balderrama, Douglas Monroy, George
9 John Bodnar, The Transplanted:A History of Immigrants in Urban America (Indiana University Press, 1987)
10 Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American, 7.

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Sanchez and others pinpoint the synthesis of a well-established cultural transaction resulting in
the Mexican American identity in the first half of the 20th century. “Becoming Mexican
American”, for example, inaugurates Sanchez’s intentions of inseparably merging both cultures.
Utilizing newspapers, personal interviews, and archival data, Sanchez illustrates an acculturated
yet alienated portrait of the Chicano community which only becomes more complicated with the
passage of time.
My study will focus specifically on Mexico de Afuera and its responses to discriminatory
anti-Mexican legislation and Revolutionary Mexican policy interpreted through articles printed
by La Opinión from 1930 to 1932. For the purpose of my study, I will borrow a commonly used
phrase during the period, Mexico de Afuera, to refer specifically to the Mexican community in
Los Angeles.11 While scholars have typically used Mexico de Afuera to refer to the entire
Mexican population living in the United States, the term has special resonance within Los
Angeles considering the community’s size and proximity to Mexico. Due to the enormous size
of the Los Angeles Mexican community, the largest Mexican community in the United States, it
received constant pressure from both the United States and Mexican governments.12 On one
hand, the United States focused on creating discriminatory legislation based on racial
preconceptions, while on the other hand, the Mexican government utilized La Opinión to inform
Mexicanos de Afuera of repatriate policies and deliver a nationalist Mexican rhetoric campaign.
Through a comparative analysis of news articles, editorials, and telegrams printed in La
Opinión, it is possible to uncover the experience of Mexico de Afuera as it waded through U.S.
11 Douglas Monroy, Rebirth: Mexican Los Angeles from the Great Migration to the Great Depression (Los Angeles,
University of California Press; 1999) 4
12 The Los Angeles Mexican Consulate’s conservative estimates pinned Mexico de Afuera’s population just under
200,000 large. Considering the addition of highly mobile and evasive undocumented immigrants, there is no telling
the actual size of the community.

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social exclusion through deportation policy and Revolutionary Mexican discourse. With respect
to repatriation during the ‘1930’s and the relevance of the Mexican experience in the United
States, two questions arise: how did Mexico de Afuera react to irreconcilable social situations of
U.S. anti-Mexican policies and attitudes? And how did Mexico de Afuera respond to
Revolutionary rhetoric and empty promises? First of all, it is necessary to illustrate the
increasingly hostile anti-Mexican sentiments encouraging Mexican repatriation back to La
Madre Patria and provide an opening for the Mexican government to institute nationalist
Revolutionary discourse.13 My study will focus on a handful of raids and deportations that
directly affected a relatively minute number of people but indirectly affected the entire L.A.
community. Among many forms of rising anti-Mexican culture, La Opinión reported on the
proposal of progressively stringent immigration quotas, extra funding for immigration officers,
special taxes for foreigners, and registration lists proposed by federal, state, and local
government agencies. In addition, La Opinión articles with interviews of local Mexicanos
exaggerate the power and presence of deportation authorities and illustrate immigration officers
in vicious, folkloric fashion exacting supreme power over the Mexican community. Immigration
officers like “Mr. Carr”, “Joe Sepulveda,” and others were depicted as ruthless monsters with no
regard for laws or documentation. Mexicanos de Afuera could no longer feel safe in their own
homes as paranoia engulfed the entire community. Finally, articles covering horrific deportation
raids, like La Placita and San Fernando, complete the body of newspaper articles which pushed
Mexico de Afuera’s sense of self-belonging to a precarious tipping point.
13 A commonly used term to refer to mother Mexico. I use La Madre Patria with specific reference to repatriates
returning to a Mexico created by the Revolutionary Mexican government or the “Revolutionary family.” Richard
Griswold Del Castillo, La Familia (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). Richard Griswold Del
Castillo observes through the 1930 Census that roughly 44 percent of Mexico de Afuera was native-born to the
United States. For many Mexicans living in the United States, Mexico was becoming an increasingly distant
concept.

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On the other side of the border, the Mexican government exploited this distinct window
of heated anti-Mexican legislation by employing citizenship scare tactics against Mexico de
Afuera. Through articles transmitted to La Opinión by the Los Angeles Mexican consulate, it is
clear that the Mexican government contrived an expiring Mexican citizenship for those living in
the United States in order to scare potential repatriates into going home or registering with the
Mexican consulate. Furthermore, speeches, conferences, and manifestos from the national
government in Mexico City aimed to capitalize on the increasing numbers of incoming nationals
by underscoring social repatriation policies like a reinvigorated Mexican identity, the idealization
of rural ejidos, and a sacrificial duty to La Madre Patria. From the period of 1930 to 1932, La
Opinión received an abundance of telegrams from the Mexican government stressing nationalist
Mexican cooperation and the necessity of returning to work on ejido projects in La Madre. At
the same time, articles transmitted to La Opinión from Mexico City highlight the Mexican
government’s attempt to prioritize the assistance of repatriates with promises of transportation,
employment, and legal protection. For many Mexicanos de Afuera, the temptation of returning
to the homeland with financial security became increasingly alluring as anti-Mexican
immigration policy became more violent from 1930 to 1932. Convinced that they would receive
assistance from the Mexican government in some form or another, thousands of Mexicans
jumped at the opportunity to escape their fears of deportation, anxiety, and alienation from U.S.
society. Yet while roughly one third of Mexicanos de Afuera was either deported or left
“voluntarily” from 1930 to 1940, the majority decided to resist their exclusion, create grass-roots
assistance networks, and express their discontent through La Opinión. On this note, La Opinión
published articles which informed readers how to join grassroots assistance networks and where
to go to receive collectively funded legal advice. Furthermore, La Opinión informed Mexico de

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Afuera on the status quo on the other side of the border in La Madre Patria: telegrams and
special correspondence from Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Mexico City reported repeated
suspension of public works projects, unemployment over fifty percent, and rampant starvation.
Most importantly, editorials from Ignacio E. Lozano, founder and chief of staff, staff writers, and
local community members used La Opinión to advance the most critical viewpoint of their
irreconcilable social struggle between Revolutionary Mexican ideology and inhospitable U.S.
immigration policy. Further, editorials educated Mexico de Afuera over the lack of policy
implementation and the starving, struggling northern border regions of Mexico with opinion
pieces discussing the horrendous state of affairs.
The turn of the 20th century marked a critical, watershed moment for Mexican
immigration to the United States and the subsequent development of a considerable Mexican
community in Los Angeles. Following the Reclamation Act of 1902, which provided federal
funding for southwest commercial agribusiness, mining, and railroad infrastructure, U.S.
industrial magnates actively recruited and exploited the massive source of cheap, unskilled labor
to the south. Yet with the turn of the 1930’s and the failure of the global economy, a new era of
illegal deportation raids and anti-Mexican witch hunts became the focus of United States
immigration policy. A look at government publications found in La Opinión reveals that the
Mexican government manipulated and played upon the fears generated by the U.S. public and
government. Further, while Chicano historians like George Sanchez concerned themselves by
the 1980’s with the social destruction of the post-depression Mexico de Afuera, I am interested in
discovering how the Mexican Government advanced Revolutionary Mexican nationalism as a
method for rhetoric, instead of coherent repatriate policy.

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The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with the goal of overthrowing the dictatorship of
Porfirio Diaz, providing social and civil liberties, nationalizing the means of production, and
equalizing the inequality gap between Mexico’s rich and poor.14 More specifically, the Mexican
Revolution called for agrarian ejido redistribution and the destruction of foreign investments in
Mexican industry. Marking an unofficial end to the militaristic phase of the Revolution in 1917,
the Constitution of 1917, most specifically Article 27, nationalized the means of production,
allowing the expropriation of privately-held foreign investments.15 While the Constitution of
1917 laid the groundwork for Revolutionary policy, Revolutionary presidents including Pascual
Ortiz Rubio (1930 – 1932,) failed to implement coherent land expropriation and reorganization
programs. Unfortunately the Revolution was plagued by political factionalism, corruption, and
infighting which often times led to erratic, incoherent policy with a heavy reliance on
Revolutionary rhetoric. Beginning in the 1920’s, the Mexican government consistently espoused
Revolutionary ideals in order to consolidate state power. In La Revolución: Mexico’s great
revolution as memory, myth, and history, Thomas Benjamin argues that the country “was unified
by a ‘revolutionary family’” while the government silenced Revolutionary opposition.16
Despite or rather because of the fact that many of these Mexican repatriates had never been to La
Madre Patria, the Mexican government constantly reinforced sacrificial duty to La Madre and
the need for Revolutionary ejido collectives. The Mexican government erroneously viewed
Mexico de Afuera as a Revolutionary tabula rasa that could be indoctrinated with the ideals of
the Revolution.
14 The Plan of San Luis Potosi, drafted by Francisco Madero, outlined the qualms Mexicans had with the current
dictatorship followed by a belated call to arms.
15 John Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute (London: Duke University Press, 2008) 19
16 Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución,68.

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Anti-Mexican U.S. Policyand Community Paranoia
Beginning in late 1929, the U.S. government conducted deportation raids that initiated a
tangible atmosphere of overwhelming community paranoia for Mexico de Afuera. And while
these raids deported a minuscule portion of the Mexican community, it augmented the entire
community’s “fear of persecution” through La Opinión news coverage and community gossip.
Acknowledging the faltering economy and inhospitable social environment in the United States,
many Mexicans “voluntarily” returned to La Madre Patria. In an article published on November
30, 1930, titled, “Compatriotas Denunciados,” an overwhelming sense of community paranoia is
illustrated through exaggerated representations of immigration officers. The article narrates an
incident where an untrustworthy immigration officer allegedly tricked Mexicans into deportation
despite valid identification paperwork and legal status. Further, “the workers talk in the Street
about how Pedro or Juan were apprehended from their homes.”17 Although the likelihood of
being apprehended in your home or being sent back to Mexico with the proper documentation
was minimal, it developed into a self-destructive process of paranoia that encouraged the
“voluntary” repatriation of roughly 40,000 to 50,000 Mexicans in the Los Angeles region alone.
In early February of 1931, La Opinión journalists interviewed several community
members near Sonora Town, the social and economic epicenter of the Mexican community in
L.A, in regards to rising community paranoia. On this note, Sonora Town Mexicans “have
noticed a significant increase in the number of deportation officers” which has led to several
unlawful deportations like in the cases of I.C. Machado and Angel Asturias.18 Although
Machado had legally immigrated to the United States, he was detained, refused proper legal
17 “Compatriotas Denunciados,” La Opinión, Correspondence from Brawley, CA., November 30, 1930
18 “Comienza La Deportacion…,” La Opinión, February 7, 1931

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protection, and deported to Tijuana. Before deportation, a La Opinión journalist asked him
where he was being sent, to which he responded, “no one in the deportation truck knows where
we are going for certain . . . but it seems like they are going to take us to Tijuana.”19 Although
Machado was a documented immigrant, he was not allowed to stay in the country, communicate
with his family, nor take any material belongings outside of a suitcase. Similarly, Angel Asturias
was unjustly deported without the opportunity for legal protection or consultations. Asturias
managed to send his brother Roberto a letter published by La Opinión on February 7th, 1931.
Asturias pleads, “Roberto: send me a shirt and go to the Mexican consulate and tell Rafael
Colina: ‘they have detained me illegally although I am clearly documented.”20 In this
circumstance, Asturias was not given the opportunity for luggage, nor mention the ability to seek
legal protection. Machado and Asturias, like many others, illustrated the extremely precarious
sense of safety which U.S. deportation policies upheld.
Los Angeles county officials and immigration officers targeted gathering places like La
Placita and Sonora Town which acted as “the physical and spiritual center of . . . Mexican Los
Angeles.”21 In response to encroaching forms of paranoia invading communal security and
driving away customers, the business leaders of Sonora Town initiated a collective legal fund
which intended to provide protection for any compatriots “who are detained in Sonora Town or
any other region in Los Angeles.”22 As Francisco Balderrama points out in “In Defense of La
Raza,” the team of lawyers had a strong case against Federal immigration agents in clear
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, which should apply “regardless of whether
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Douglas Monroy, Rebirth,14
22 “Medidas En Contra De La Deportacion,” La Opinión, Feb. 20, 1931.

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those arrested were U.S. citizens.”23 In order to stem the tide of community paranoia and
subsequent lack of business, “three lawyers are contracted for [Mexican community members]
who are captured, incarcerated, or in the process of deportation.”24 In the absence of legal
protection provided by the Mexican government, the local community members funded the
service themselves asking for communal donations.
The increasing number of deportation raids in early 1931 forced Mexican business
leaders to provide a façade of security through legal protection against unjustifiable raids against
the community. La Asociación de comerciantes, the organization who spearheaded the legal
retainer, made sure to utilize La Opinión’s enormous following to constantly advertise Mexico de
Afuera’s legal resources. On Feb. 28th, 1931, just two days after the infamous La Placita Raid,
La Opinión published, “Abogados Para Los Mexicanos” which announced the addition of
Nathan Freedman to fight illegal detainment and deportation. The Sonora Town Merchants and
handfuls of other grassroots sociedades performed crucial social services to ensure survival in
the United States and challenge disenfranchisement from mainstream society by the United
States government.25 Furthermore, George Sanchez highlights the assistance provided by “The
Cooperative Society of Unemployed Mexican Ladies” through the eyes of Maria Olazábal, one
of hundreds of unemployed Mexican women dedicated to the well-being of the Mexican
community. Olazábal provided an at-cost tamale program which catered to her local
neighborhood in the absence of public service or food stamp programs. Accordingly, the
23 Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 17.
24 “Si Hay ‘Leva’ Dicen En La Calle Main: Los Comerciantes se reunieron ayer y nombraron abogados,” La
Opinión,Feb. 19th, 1931
25 David G. Gutierrez, “Migration, Emergent Ethnicity, and the ‘Third Space’: The Shifting Politics of Nationalism
in Greater Mexico,” The Journal of American History 86 (1999) 487 – 488.

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Cooperative Society, like the Asociación, successfully provided essential services that
“cushioned the deprivation” felt by deportation, unemployment, and community paranoia.26
While social safety networks like the Asociación de comerciantes and the Cooperative
Society of Unemployed women provided safe guards against wholesale community destruction,
Mexico de Afuera could not prevent communal fear from deportation “campaigns [designed] to
rid southern California of Mexicans.”27 On February 15, 1931, “Pide $500,000 Para Nombrar
Mas Agentes” was published on the front page under the massive headline, “Más Mexicanos
Arrestados.”28 Sent from the Washington D.C. “United Press”, this article reports on the
proposal of a $500,000 budget increase to hire an extra 245 Immigration officers targeting
Mexicans living in the United States. The Los Angeles Department of Immigration played an
insurmountable role encouraging the Mexican community to “voluntarily” repatriate to La
Madre. According to conservative estimates by the Los Angeles Consulate, there were 170,000
persons, or 16.4 percent of the entire Mexican population in the United States, living in the
greater Southern California area.29 Between 1930 and 1935, the Los Angeles Mexican
community lost upwards of 60,000 or roughly 30 percent of its inhabitants.30 However, the most
intrusive deportation raids, conducted by the Immigration Bureau from February to March in
1931, only apprehended and deported a total of 269 undocumented Mexican workers.31 The
interrogation and detainment of hundreds of suspects naturally led to a communal fear
encouraging repatriation to a welcoming Revolutionary Mexican regime.
26 George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American, 209 - 210
27 Ibid. 209.
28 La Opinión front page, February 15th, 1931.
29 Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 5.
30 Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American, 213.
31 Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza, 18 – 19.

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Appealing to the Congress, President Hoover’s director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Clawson Roop, declared, “the president supports the campaign to accelerate the
deportation of immigrants living here illegally.”32 Despite the fact that the director of the U.S.
Food Administration, Herbert Hoover had rigorously enlisted roughly 80,000 Mexican farm,
mine, and industrial workers to fill wartime demands during World War I, he endorsed nation-
wide deportation raids as the president of the United States in 1930, claiming, “[Mexicans] took
jobs away from American citizens.”33 This anti-Mexican Federal legislation joined an array of
California State and Los Angeles municipal laws which prohibited undocumented Mexican
immigrants from obtaining employment and maintaining livelihoods. In August of 1931, the
California State legislature passed into law the discriminatory Alien Labor Act which prevented
Mexicans from obtaining employment in public works projects like, “construction sites,
highways, schools, government office buildings, and other[s].”34 Exclusively referring to Los
Angeles, the law officially excluded 900 Mexicans from work immediately, not to mention those
unregistered Mexicans without paperwork.35
The Department of Immigration’s statements to the Mexican community reflect the
virulent paranoia driven by U.S. deportation raids. On February 18th, 1931 La Opinión published
a statement from the Bureau of Immigration which assured the Mexican community that
deportation raids were conducted with utmost legality. On this note, “all of [our] inspectors
operate prudently and only conduct deportations according to the law.”36 But La Opinión
32 “Pide $500,000 para Nombrar Mas Agentes,” La Opinión, February 15th, 1931.
33 Tamar Wilson, “The culture of Mexican migration,”407 – 408. Wilson underscores the government’s trend of
utilizing Mexican labor in times of need and then repatriating them in times of economic depression. Sanchez,
Becoming Mexican American, 213. Hoover quote.
34 Ibid. pg. 211.
35 Robin Fitzgerald Scott, The Mexican-American in the Los Angeles Area, 1920 – 1950:From Acquiescence to
Activity (Los Angeles,University of Southern California, 1971) 116 – 117.
36, “Declara El Departamento De Migración,” La Opinión,February 18th, 1931.

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reveals these statements as false as they mention “los amigos de Manuel Rivera” who were
illegally deported after their documents were destroyed by immigration officers. Like I.C.
Machado and Angel Asturias, Manuel Rivera represented the Mexican community’s non-existent
sense of security in the face of bloodthirsty immigration officers. On February 18th, 1931,
Walter E. Carr had a meeting with Rafael de la Colina, representative of the L.A. Mexican
consulate, in which the Mexican community presented incriminating evidence pointing to illegal
deportations by the Bureau of Immigration. On the February 19th, 1931, the front page headline
reads in enormous bold type, “No Hay Razzia De Mexicanos, Declara El Inspector Carr.”37 In a
hopeless attempt to relieve the legal Mexican community of their safety, Walter E. Carr, head of
the L.A. Immigration department, assures, “all of [our] deportations have been in strict
accordance with the law and an investigation is being launched with respect to protest from the
Mexican community.”38
The U.S. Federal Government and State legislatures further solidified Mexican exclusion
from U.S. citizenship through the proposed implementation of increasingly stringent immigration
quotas and threatened immigrant registries. Published on January 21, 1931, “Lo Presenta Al
Congreso Un Diputado” reports the status of a curtailing immigration bill illustrating one facet of
the U.S. government’s plan to establish an atmosphere of paranoia. In effect, the bill proposed to
reduce the national immigration total by 10%, limiting legal Mexican immigration to a total of
1180 entrants per year.39 While repatriation efforts were initially utilized to target illegal
immigrants living within the borders, it quickly developed into a catch-all policy reducing the
37 La Opinión,Feb. 19th, 1931 front page headline. Razzia is a term meant to describe deportation raids against
documented Mexican residents and Mexican American citizens. The L.A. department of Immigration neurotically
reassured legally documented Mexican residents that there was no need to fear deportation.
38, “El Consul Y Mr. Carr En Una Platica,” La Opinión,February 19th, 1931.
39 “Lo Presenta Al Congreso Un Diputado,” Telegram from Washington D.C., La Opinión,January 21, 1931.

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number of potential legal immigrants by 90%. Further, “El Registro de Extranjeros: [Un]
Proposicion Contraria A Los Ideales Y Tradiciones De Estados Unidos” emphasizes the lack of
control that the Mexican community felt in respect to protecting themselves from subjugation or
deportation. Although inarguably impossible, both then and now, the bill proposed by the New
York State Legislature recommended “an obligatory registry with digital impressions of all
resident immigrants in this country.” 40 Considering the drastic effects of deportation raids, a
supposed registry of the Mexican community would only diminish the sapped sense of Mexican
belonging in the United States. Despite the obvious impracticality of the program, it
nevertheless suggested the increased facilitation of deportations unto the Mexican community
living in the United States.
Revolutionary MexicanRhetoric, Promises, andthe Ugly Truth
While on one side of the border U.S. officials desperately clamored to oust the Mexican
community, on the other, the Mexican Government gladly absorbed potential supporter formerly
living in the United States and less-aware of Revolutionary failures. Understanding the
uninviting atmosphere north of the border, the Mexican Government consciously attempted to
implement a traditional, nationalist Mexican identity unto all those repatriates returning home. .
For example, on February 15th, 1931, the Mexican government published a Revolutionary
manifesto titled, “La Obra De La Revolución No Morirá, Porque Las Ideas Han Penetrado En
Las Conciencias.” In this manifesto, Felix Palavicini, eminent Revolutionary journalist,
tediously educates Mexico De Afuera over the course of events from 1910 – 1931. But more
importantly, he touts the imminent success of Mexico’s Revolutionary social program.
40 Read Lewis, “El Registro De Extranjeros,” La Opinión, January, 24, 1931.

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Accordingly, “the Mexican social Revolution will consolidate its conquests. . . despite its
excesses, its accidents, and its crimes.”41 Although the Mexican government tacitly admits its
flaws, they made sure to infuse Mexico de Afuera with a sense of Revolutionary optimism.
Further, Mexico de Afuera was encouraged to leave the repressive social atmosphere of
the United States and join a Mexico enacting Revolutionary social policy. The Mexican
government urged educated Mexican youth to avoid higher education in America and realize the
excellence of Revolutionary universities. The article titled “Pide Que No Se Eduquen Aquí,”
from the director of National University in Mexico City, Ignacio Garcia Téllez, underscores the
insidious effects of U.S. education against Mexican identity and nationalism. Accordingly,
Téllez argues that Mexican students educated in the United States, “lose [important] notions of
nationality and country.” Furthermore, “Mexico . . . has campuses which are equal to, if not
better than, universities of higher education in the United States.”42 From the perspective of the
Mexican government, they could no longer afford their young, bright intellectuals moving to the
United States and ultimately forgetting about the country and the principles of the Revolution.
“Nada Sin Cooperacion”, an editorial from a representative of Ortiz Rubio, president of
the Republic of Mexico from 1930 to 1932 projects the necessity for Mexico to “join hands” in
order to overcome economic depression and political factionalism. The article reassures that the
policy of Ortiz Rubio has finally created a Mexico for all Mexicans while successfully routing
out political radicals. Yet while Rubio expresses his inherently contradictory view, the article
concludes “the country is now convinced that without cooperation, nothing can be achieved.”43
41 “La Obra De La Revolución No Morirá, Porque Las Ideas Han Penetrado En Las Conciencias ,” La Opinión,
February, 15, 1931.
42 “Pide Que No Se Eduquen Aquí: En México hay tan buenas escuelas como las de E.U. dice Garcia Tellez, United
Press, Mexico City, La Opinión,February 9th, 1931.
43 “Nada Sin Cooperacion” editorial, La Opinión,January 22, 1931.

18. Hall 18
Or, in other words, the country has finally been trained (by the Federal Government) to work
towards a common goal set out by the Revolution. For Mexican repatriates coming into this
system, ideal cooperation meant working for a reorganized rural ejido. The Mexican
Government explicitly outlined the need for L.A. Mexican repatriates to return to ejidos. From a
special correspondence for La Opinión published on January 25, 1931, the “Conferencia De Soto
y Gama Sobre Ejidos” explicitly embodied the Mexican government’s intended goal of
emphasizing a nationalist sense of Revolutionary Mexican identity committed to rural agrarian
reorganization. Here, Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, representative of the Rubio regime, urges in
the name of Emiliano Zapata, “the ejido must be sacred for all Mexicans, in the ejido we must
witness the bastion of la raza.”44 Accordingly, México De Afuera should not only remember the
Revolutionary sacrifice made by their compatriots, but also remember their obligations to fulfill
the revolution and return to ejido colonization projects. Due to the fact that the majority of
Mexico’s relatively small population of 15 million inhabitants was concentrated in urban areas,
the government hoped to create rural colonization projects in the northern and southernmost
regions. 45
Taking into consideration the volatile atmosphere north of the border, the Mexican
Government successfully capitalized on the anti-Mexican atmosphere in order to reconsolidate
and utilize their incoming citizens. “En 3 Grupos Los Divide El Gobierno”, published on
January 21st, 1931, covers the three categories used by the Mexican government in order to
catalogue citizens as usable resources.46 Even though unemployment was already high, the
44 “Conferencia De Soto Y Gama Sobre Ejidos”, special correspondence,México City, La Opinión, January 25,
1931.
45 Dennis Valdes, “Mexican Revolutionary Nationalism and Repatriation during the Great Depression,” 9 – 10
46 “En Tres Grupos Los Divide El Gobierno,” La Opinión,January 21st, 1931.

19. Hall 19
Mexican government believed repatriates “contribute[d] immensely to the nation’s well-being.”47
The first and most coveted group were repatriates that had returned to Mexico with U.S. capital,
tools, and other resources to support themselves. Ideally, these repatriates would volunteer, after
a free parcel of land, to lead agricultural communities and educate less advanced Mexicans. The
Mexican Government consistently stressed the necessity of the first group within Mexico’s post-
Revolutionary society, while the second and third groups (those returning to family or those in
need of assistance) were generally ignored in practice. According to estimates by Dennis
Valdés, roughly three fourths of the almost 300,000 repatriates returned to their home town or
village, ten to fifteen percent moved to urban regions, and just five percent returned to
colonization ejido projects. While the Mexican government successfully provided land for
several ejido projects, they often times stranded hundreds of families by failing to provide
essential supplies.48
At times the Mexican government’s repatriation policy digressed into scare tactics
neglecting Mexico de Afuera’s insurance of an inviolable Mexican Citizenship. The Mexican
Government warned Mexico de Afuera that unless they register themselves as Mexicans living
abroad in the United States, they forfeit their Mexican Citizenship and their ability to legally
cross back into Mexico.49 In effect, the Mexican government instilled fear in order to force the
entire Mexican community to register their citizenship under the Revolutionary regime. As a
result, the Mexican consulate and the government could more efficiently control the movements
and activities of recorded Mexican Repatriates, ideally utilizing them as cogs in the redistributed
47 Francisco E. Balderrama & Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930’s
(Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1995) 138.
48 Valdes highlights several case studies of colonization projects ultimately failing due to inconsistent government
assistance. Dennis Valdes, “Mexican Revolutionary Nationalism and Repatriation during the Great Depression 16 –
24. .
49, “No Pierden Su Ciudadanía Los Mexicanos Aquí,” Prensa Unida de México, La Opinión,Nov. 28, 1930.

20. Hall 20
rural ejido agrarian program. Similarly, “Certificados Que Son Nulos”, published on January 22,
1931, fortifies the false notion that Mexican repatriates could theoretically lose the opportunity to
return home.50 Although the Mexican Government only refused citizenship to certain political
dissidents, they consciously supported the use of widespread fear in order to instill ideology and
allegiance.
As Mexican nationalist sentiment grew during the ‘20’s and ‘30’s, the Revolutionary
government developed an increasingly sympathetic stance towards repatriates.51 From the
Mexican government’s perspective, Mexico de Afuera was an entity that needed to embody the
Revolutionary ideals of the Republic. In order to convince incoming repatriates to occupy
sparsely-populated rural regions, the Mexican government promised transportation, legal
protection, food, and ejido parcels.52 Despite the fact that the Mexican government failed to
implement effective repatriation policy for hundreds of thousands of incoming repatriates, it
constantly promised Mexico de Afuera legal protection against exploitation. “La Ofrece El
Gobierno De Nuestro Pais,” transmitted for La Opinión via radio on January 22, 1931,
guarantees “a legal service intended to exclusively address controversial issues related to the
protection of our nationals abroad.”53 This new legal team was supposed to work very closely
with the Secretary of Relations to assist repatriates in the United States. Unfortunately, this
pledge for legal protection failed to provide protection for repatriates who were subject to
exploitation from transportation coyotes and forced to sell their life belongings for survival. On
50, “Certificados Que Son Nulos,” La Opinión,January 22, 1931
51 Dennis Valdés, “Mexican Nationalism During the Great Depression,” 10
52 The Mexican government would often times promise farmland, financial support,livestock, etc. yet fail to
consistently deliver, leaving rural communities stranded. Francisco E. Balderrama & Raymond Rodriguez, Decade
of Betrayal,158.
53, “La Ofrece El Gobierno De Nuestro Pais: Al efecto ha creado en Relaciones un Departamento jurídico” via radio
from Mexico City, La Opinión, January 22, 1931.

21. Hall 21
February 10, 1931, for example, Chihuahua State officials called attention to repatriate
vulnerability and pledged legal protection against coyotes.54 Although the federal Mexican
government promised repatriate nationals legal protection and ejido parcels, the state of
Chihuahua was forced to step in and assimilate repatriates. In the absence of a cohesive
repatriation program and empty promises from government officials, repatriates were exploited
on both sides of the border. According to reports received by the Department of Migration,
repatriates were often times forced to sell their life’s possessions for little to nothing in order to
avoid starvation or keep traveling.”55 As Francisco Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez argue
in Decade of Betrayal, some officials successfully implemented small-scale repatriation
programs but the vast majority were forced to fend for themselves.56
The Mexican Press frequently ignored the social, economic and political turmoil in order
to protect “revolutionary nationalism” and the revolutionary family.57 On November 27, 1930,
La Opinión published an article titled, “Gran Parte De Ellos Residía Al Sur De E.U.” in which
the Mexican Government proudly displays the success of repatriate-ejidos. On this note, “the
government has transported a large percentage of repatriates to the interior and made sure many
were set up in irrigated farm regions.”58 Not only does the Mexican government exaggerate the
amount of assistance given and success had, they illustrate Revolutionary agrarian living as a
picturesque ideal of Mexican identity. On Feb. 12th, 1931, for example, La Opinión announced
that the State of Querétaro “has been denying ejido applications.” And “for that reason, the
54, “La Ofrece El Administrador De La Aduana Para Evitar Que Se Les Siga Explotando,” special telegram, Juarez
City, Chihuahua, La Opinión,February 10, 1931.
55 “Lo Informan Al Departamento De Migración: Les compran a precios irrisorios autos y camiones se asegura,”
United Press of Mexico, Mexico City, La Opinión, February 6, 1931.
56 Francisco E. Balderrama & Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal,135 - 142
57 Ibid. 134
58, “Gran Parte De Ellos Residía Al Sur De E.U.”, La Opinión, November 27th, 1930.

22. Hall 22
agrarian issue must be terminated.”59 The Mexican government flaunted their policy victories
yet refused to acknowledge a failed rural reorganization program that would not begin to solve
itself until the Cardenas regime in the late ‘30’s.60 From 1920 to 1934, the Mexican federal
government gave peasants lands on a small-scale in order to satiate political unrest but did not try
to address the socioeconomic inequalities that spurred the Revolution in the first place.61
Meanwhile, the Mexican community in L.A. read articles from the northern regions of
Mexico reporting the devastating effects repatriates were having on a struggling northern border
economy. While the Mexican Press was often times forced to uphold the successful image of the
Revolution, there was no possible way of masking the unemployment, starvation, and lack of
government assistance. On March 2, 1931, representative to the Revolutionary government in
Mexico City, Jose M Davila informs Mexico de Afuera that there are over ten thousand
campesino families starving in the northern border regions of Mexico. A region hit particularly
hard was the northern region of Baja California near Tijuana where newly-elected governor
Carlos Lerdo y Tejada was forced to request for emergency supplies. Accordingly, “Se Hace Un
Pedido De Alimentos” published by La Opinión on February 26, 1931, exhibits Lerdo y Tejada
vowing to redistribute land and provide beans and corn to the unemployed.62 On that same day,
he also published “El Manifesto de Lerdo Y Tejada” blaming the drastic state of affairs on
previous “authorities that did not know how to govern.”63 Just days later on March, 1, 1931,
Trejo y Lerda was forced to publish a defensive plea to the community. “Pide Que Todos
Cooperan Con Trejo Y Lerdo” reveals the desperate situation burgeoning in Baja California.
59 “Se Niega La Ampliación De Los Repartos,” La Opinión,February 12, 1931.
60 John Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 3 – 20
61 Ibid. 20
62 “Se Hace Un Pedido De Alimentos: Frijol y maíz serán repartidos entre los que no tienen trabajo: Varias empresas
ofrecen sembrar 72,800 acres de terreno,” Mexicali, B.C., La Opinión, February, 26, 1931.
63 “El Manifesto de Lerdo y Tejada,” editorial, February 26, 1931.

23. Hall 23
Due to painfully slow deliveries on much-needed promises, desperate repatriates and local
community members demanded a change in government.64
Although the Trejo y Lerda regime accurately reminds community members that change
does not happen overnight, the quick call for a reelection exhibits a repatriate – saturated
populace alienated by empty promises and lacking government follow-through. Ciudad Juarez
was another community that could not absorb the influx of repatriates to the region. “En
Automoviles Y A Pie,” published on December 2, 1930, warns Mexico de Afuera that even
though repatriates receive social acceptance, they do not receive economic assistance. On this
note, the poorest Mexican repatriates who could not afford subsidized train fare were forced to
make the journey back to La Madre on foot.65 According to the Mexican Delegation of
Migration in the region, the city received “complete families bringing only blankets and cloth
luggage.” 66 Furthermore, children often times went without a second change of clothing out of
necessity. The vast majority of these passengers were mothers and children who were reuniting
with deported loved ones on the other side of the border. Not only did these families have to
find each other completely on their own, they had to do so without any breadwinner to fund the
journey. La Opinión editorials warned repatriates of the dire unemployment, displacement, and
starvation plaguing the northern regions of Mexico during the early 1930’s. As a result, it is no
surprise that the Mexican government failed to debunk Mexico de Afuera’s widely shared
attitude of ambivalence towards the Revolutionary state.67
64, “Pide Que Todos Cooperen con Trejo y Lerdo”, La Opinión, March, 1, 1931.
65 “En Automoviles Y A Pie, A Diario Se Les Ve Por Los Caminos De La Frontera,” Special Correspondence, La
Opinión,September 8, 1930.
66 “Es Lamentable La Situación En Que Llegan: Familias completas, que en su mayoría son niños y mujeres ,”
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, La Opinión, February 19, 1931.
67 George Sanchez, “Becoming Mexican American,” 109.

24. Hall 24
Considering Mexico de Afuera’s disenfranchisement from American society and the
absence of a sustained solution from the Mexican government, La Opinión became a dynamic
arena to challenge societal marginalization and hollow Revolutionary rhetoric. The Mexican
Chamber of Congress was one of the first organizations to demand accountability and provide
assistance to struggling repatriates.68 Publicizing a meeting of over a hundred community
members, La Opinión advertised the demands of the Congress and promises from the Los
Angeles Mexican consulate to address illegal deportation raids. On February 16, 1931, La
Opinión opened its editorial section with a public debate titled, “Como se Hará la Repatriación,”
which addressed the glaring need for uniform repatriation policy. La Opinión editorial writers
suggested several relatively simple yet effective methods to generate a repatriation fund. First of
all, “an additional tax of 1 cent on each piece of mail would be effective.” To put this into
perspective, the Mexican community sent $14 million dollars in postal money order alone.69
Significant funds could have easily been generated by small taxes and fees on postal interaction
between the two countries. Additionally, a La Opinión editorialist suggests a five percent tax on
the lottery, a ten percent tax on public events, or the creation of special stamps which would
effectively raise enough funds to transport and relocate overflowing numbers of repatriates. 70
La Opinión also published grassroots policy demands from both sides of the border
expressing mounting frustrations with the Mexican government. Succinctly expressing the
issues plaguing Mexico de Afuera, local community member Gregorio Marquez directly
questioned the Ortiz regime’s inability to implement a universal method to process repatriates.
For those repatriating after the winter of 1929, repatriation was usually a “volunteer” action
68 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: repatriation pressures 1929 – 1939
(University of Arizona Press, 1974) 30 – 35.
69 Ibid. 34 – 35.
70 “Como se Hará la Repatriación,” editorial, La Opinión, February 16, 1931.

25. Hall 25
made in the absence of male bread winners or public assistance. On this note, although “the
Revolutionary government was guiding the country to progress and social justice,” they did not
have the money or manpower to follow up on its promises to repatriates. Giving a piece of
advice to the Mexican government, he assures that if Mexico de Afuera could be “convinced that
we do not have a future” in the United States. Marquez continues to point out the extremely high
unemployment rate and blatant need for government assistance.71
On the other side of the border, Mexican citizens questioned the disconnect between
Revolutionary rhetoric and Revolutionary policy. For example, in an open letter to governor
Trejo, Mexicali citizens rejected open-ended proposals in favor of clear-cut relief strategies. In
their own words, [Trejo’s] declarations, speaking to the necessity of cooperation to solve the
problems of unemployed Mexicans, have been reduced to simply words and a lack of action.”72
Mexicans living on both sides of the border had come to expect Revolutionary ideology without
the promises of the Revolution. Similarly, Juan Rotaclanca expressed his frustrations with the
Revolutionary government in a letter addressed to Ortiz Rubio sent to La Opinión and El
Universal. Affiliated with the Federation of United Workers in Tijuana, Rotaclanca petitions the
government to institute nationalist labor laws in order to protect employment for nationals. With
certain corrupt corporations in mind, Rotaclanca reveals that worker registries are often forged to
hide the number of foreigners working in Mexico. On this note, urban and rural laborers
demanded that they receive employment, higher wages, and benefits promised to obreros during
the Revolution. Offering legislative suggestions, Rotaclanca recommends adequate worker
registries employing 95 % Mexican nationals and taxes to raise funds for repatriates.73 Although
71, “Proyecto Para La Repatriación De Los Mexicanos,” Special Telegram, La Opinión,February 14, 1931.
72, “Duros Ataques De Los Obreros Sin Ocupación Al Gobernar Del D. Norte De B. California,” Special telegram,
Mexicali, B.C., La Opinión,February, 19, 1931.
73 Juan Rotaclanca “La Voz del Público”, editorial, La Opinión,February 21, 1931.

26. Hall 26
these policies were never put into effect, they offered Mexican community members the
opportunity to express their ideas in an open forum.
La Opinión advanced a discouraging yet realistic illustration of La Madre’s inability to
enact Revolutionary policy for repatriates and unskilled Mexican workers. Although roughly
one third of Mexico de Afuera voluntarily made their way back to La Madre Patria in the 1930’s,
the majority remained to occupy their disenfranchised “Third Space” between the United States
and Mexico.74 La Opinión revealed the ugly truth to Mexico de Afuera: staying in the United
States is the lesser of two evils considering the drastic state of affairs and failure of
Revolutionary policy. Although Lazaro Cardenas would effectively implement foreign
expropriations and ejido redistributions on a wide-scale in the late 1930’s, Mexico de Afuera’s
distrust of the Mexican government lasted throughout the decade. La Opinión informed Mexico
de Afuera over the unemployment, high death rates, and suffering which ultimately convinced
the majority of inhabitants to remain. Furthermore, La Opinión played a crucial role in
publicizing grass root social networks that proved essential to the survival of the community.
74 David G. Gutierrez, “Migration, Ethnicity, and the ‘Third Space,’” 487 – 488.

27. Hall 27
Bibliography
1. Francisco Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza Francisco E. Balderrama & Raymond
Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s(Albuquerque,
University of New Mexico Press, 1995)
2. Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s great revolution as memory, myth, and
history (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000)
3. John Bodnar, The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America (Indiana
University Press, 1987).
4. Emory Bogardus, The Mexican in the United States (Los Angeles, University of Southern
California Press, 1934).
5. John Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute (London: Duke University Press, 2008)
6. Manuel Gamio, The Mexican Immigrant: His Life-Story (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1931).
7. Richard Griswold Del Castillo, La Familia (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1984).
8. David G. Gutierrez, “Migration, Emergent Ethnicity, and the ‘Third Space’: The Shifting
Politics of Nationalism in Greater Mexico,” The Journal of American History 86 (1999)
9. Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (Boston, Little, Brown, 1973.)
10.Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: repatriation
pressures 1929 – 1939 (University of Arizona Press, 1974)
11.Douglas Monroy, Rebirth: Mexican Los Angeles from the Great Migration to the Great
Depression (Los Angeles, University of California Press; 1999.)
12.George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in
Chicano Los Angeles, 1900 – 1945 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.)
13.Robin Fitzgerald Scott, The Mexican-American in the Los Angeles Area, 1920 – 1950:
From Acquiescence to Activity (Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1971.)
14.Dennis Nodín Valdés, “Mexican Revolutionary Nationalism and Repatriation during the
Great Depression” Mexican Studies 4, no. 1, (Winter, 1988.)
15.Tamar Wilson, “The culture of Mexican migration,” Critique of Anthropology 30, no. 4
(2010): 408, sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
16.La Opinión
17.Los Angeles Times

28. Hall 28
Notes
1. All of the direct quotes from La Opinión have been translated to English by me for the
purpose of this study. Here I provide the direct quotes to all of my interpretations.
2. F.N. #19: los trabajadores platican en las calles diciendo que Pedro o Juan fue
aprehendido en su casa.
3. F.N. # 20: “se [han] notado un marcado aumento de Inspectores”
4. F.N. # 21: “Nadie de los que vamos en el camino lo sabemos de cierto . . . Parece que se
nos lleva a Tijuana.”
5. F.N. # 22: “Roberto: Hazme el favor de mandarme la camisa y vas con el señor Cónsul y
le dices me haga favor . . . Me han detenido injustamente: [aunque] yo pasé la línea
debidamente.”
6. F.N. # 24: “que sean detenidos en el Sonora Town o en cualquiera otro lugar de Los
Ángeles.”
7. F.N. # 26: “tres abogados . . . sean contratados por los capturados, encarcelados y se
intente deportarlos.”
8. F.N. # 34: “el Presidente secunda la campana para acelerar la deportación de extranjeros
que viven [aquí] ilegalmente.”
9. F.N. # 38: “Todos los inspectores obran con la mayor cordura y solamente se deporta de
acuerdo con la Ley.”
10. F.N. # 40: “todas las deportaciones han estado estrictamente ajustadas a la Ley y que se
va a practicar una investigación respecto a la protesta.”
11. F.N. # 42: “[un] registro obligatorio y la toma de impresiones digitales de todos los
extranjeros residentes de este pais.”
12. F.N. # 43: “La revolución social de México consolidará sus conquistas, no por sus
excesos, ni por sus atropellos, ni por sus delitos; sino a pesar de sus excesos, sus
atropellos, y sus delitos.”
13. F.N. # 44: (1) “pierden las nociones de nacionalidad y patria.” (2) “México . . . cuenta
con planteles, si no mejores, al menos iguales a los que existen en los Estados Unidos.”
14. F.N. # 45: (1) “llegar a las manos” (2) “porque ya el pais está convencido de que sin
cooperación, nada se logra.”
15. F.N. # 46: “El ejido debe ser sagrado para todos los Mexicanos, declaro, en el ejido
debemos ver el baluarte de la raza.”
16. F.N. # 54: “un servicio de abogados para que se entienda exclusivamente con los asuntos
contenciosos relacionados con la protección de nuestros nacionales.”
17. F.N. # 59: “A un gran porcentaje de estos Mexicanos el gobierno se ha visto precisado a
transportarlos gratuitamente al interior del pais . . . y a muchos de ellos se les ha
establecido ya en zonas irrigadas.
18. F.N. # 61: (1) “se han venido negando a ampliar los repartos de ejidos.” (2) “por esa
razón se considera como prácticamente terminado el problema.”
19. F.N. # 65: “autoridades [que] no han sabido gobernar.”
20. F.N. # 68: “familias completas . . . [que solo] traen cobijas y pequeñas maletas de tela.”

29. Hall 29
21. F.N. # 71: “el impuesto de un timbre adicional de un centavo por cada pieza postal podría
ser efectivo.”
22. F.N. # 73: (1) “el Gobierno Revolucionario esta[ba] encauzando la patria por el sendero
del progreso y de la justicia social” (2) “convencidos de que no tenemos ni garantías de
un futuro mejor.”
23. F.N. # 74: “[Trejo’s] declaraciones en el sentido de cooperar para solucionar la crisis de
los sin trabajo, se han reducido a puras palabras y a nada de acción.”