1. ً‫مرحبا‬ً‫مرحبا‬
WelcomeWelcome

2. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management
Khaled A. AnterKhaled A. Anter

3. Let’s start with gettingLet’s start with getting
to know each otherto know each other

4. Ground rulesGround rules
 Start at 9:00Start at 9:00
 First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)
 Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include.Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include.
Prayer)Prayer)
 Finish at 2:00 pmFinish at 2:00 pm
 Cell. Phones silent/no calls during sessionCell. Phones silent/no calls during session
 Stop presenter & ask if you have a questionStop presenter & ask if you have a question
 Relax & have funRelax & have fun

5. Henry FordHenry Ford
(1863-1947(1863-1947((
““you can not build a reputationyou can not build a reputation
based on what you are going to dobased on what you are going to do””

6. What is a crisisWhat is a crisis??
A crisis (from the Greek κρίσις - krisis; plural:
"crises"; adjectival form: "critical") is any event
that is, or expected to lead to, an unstable and
dangerous situation affecting an individual, group,
community or whole society.
More loosely, it is a term meaning 'a testing time'
or an 'emergency event'.

7. Definition of a crisis
Crisis is the situation of a complex
system (family, economy, society) when the
system functions poorly, an immediate decision is
necessary, but the causes of the dysfunction are
not known.

8. What is a crisis managementWhat is a crisis management??
Crisis management is the process by which an
organization deals with a major event that
threatens to harm the organization, its
stakeholders, or the general public.

9. Three most common elements to
crises
(a) a threat to the organization,
(b) the element of surprise,
(c) a short decision time.

10. Venette definition
Argues that "crisis is a process of transformation
where the old system can no longer be
maintained.“
Therefore the fourth defining quality is the need
for change.
If change is not needed, the event could more
accurately be described as a failure or incident

11. Risk assessment Vs. Crisis managementRisk assessment Vs. Crisis management
Risk assessmentRisk assessment involves assessing potential
threats and finding the best ways to avoid those
threats, Crisis management involves dealing with
threats before, during, and after they have
occurred.

12. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management
It is a discipline within the broader context of
management consisting of skills and techniques
required to identify, assess, understand, and cope
with a serious situation, especially from the
moment it first occurs to the point that recovery
procedures start.

13. Management
misconduct
Deception
Skewed
Management
values
malevolence
Confrontation
Technological
Natural
Types
of
Crises

14. Phases of a CrisisPhases of a Crisis
 Signal detectionSignal detection
 Preparation and preventionPreparation and prevention
 Containment and damage controlContainment and damage control
 Business recoveryBusiness recovery
 LearningLearning

15. Models and theories associated withModels and theories associated with
crisis managementcrisis management
 Management Crisis PlanningManagement Crisis Planning
 Contingency planningContingency planning
 Business continuity planningBusiness continuity planning
 Structural-functional systems theoryStructural-functional systems theory
 Diffusion of innovation theoryDiffusion of innovation theory
 Role of apologies in crisis managementRole of apologies in crisis management
 Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership
 Unequal human capital theoryUnequal human capital theory

16. Case studiesCase studies
““1010casescases””

17. Case - ICase - I
TylenolTylenol®® (J&J) - 1982(J&J) - 1982

18. IncidentIncident
 Seven individuals diedSeven individuals died
inin metropolitan Chicagometropolitan Chicago
 65 milligrams of cyanide65 milligrams of cyanide

19. ApproachApproach
 Recalled and destroyed 31 million capsulesRecalled and destroyed 31 million capsules
 Cost of $100 millionCost of $100 million
 CEO, James Burke, appeared in television adsCEO, James Burke, appeared in television ads
 News conferences informing consumers of theNews conferences informing consumers of the
company's actionscompany's actions
 Tamper-resistant packaging was rapidlyTamper-resistant packaging was rapidly
introducedintroduced
 $100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson$100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson
on murdereron murderer’’s heads head

20. ConclusionConclusion
 Tylenol remains a top seller, controlling aboutTylenol remains a top seller, controlling about
35% of the pain killer market in North America35% of the pain killer market in North America

21. Case - IICase - II
Odwalla FoodsOdwalla Foods - 1996- 1996

22. IncidentIncident
 Apple juice causes anApple juice causes an
outbreak ofoutbreak of E. coliE. coli infectioninfection
 UnpasteurizedUnpasteurized
 Forty-nine cases wereForty-nine cases were
reportedreported
 Death of a small childDeath of a small child
 16 criminal counts of16 criminal counts of
distributing adulterated juicedistributing adulterated juice
 OdwallaOdwalla pled guiltypled guilty

23. ApproachApproach
 Within 24 hours,Within 24 hours, OdwallaOdwalla conferred with the FDA andconferred with the FDA and
Washington state health officialsWashington state health officials
 Schedule of daily press briefingsSchedule of daily press briefings
 Press releases which announced the recallPress releases which announced the recall
 Expressed remorse, concern and apologyExpressed remorse, concern and apology
 Detailed symptoms ofDetailed symptoms of E. coliE. coli poisoningpoisoning
 Developed effective thermal processesDeveloped effective thermal processes
 All of these steps were communicated through closeAll of these steps were communicated through close
relations with the media and through full-pagerelations with the media and through full-page
newspaper adsnewspaper ads

24. ConclusionConclusion
 Despite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked toDespite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked to
rehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising itsrehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising its
new safety proceduresnew safety procedures, Odwalla released its line of food, Odwalla released its line of food
bars (its first solid food product line) and entered thebars (its first solid food product line) and entered the
$900$900 million fruit bar market.million fruit bar market.
 Another new product was theAnother new product was the Future ShakeFuture Shake, a "liquid, a "liquid
lunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of theselunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of these
efforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end ofefforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end of
1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third
quarterquarter

25. Case - IIICase - III
Pepsi -Pepsi - 19931993

26. IncidentIncident
 Claims of syringes beingClaims of syringes being
found in cans of dietfound in cans of diet
PepsiPepsi
 Pepsi urged stores not toPepsi urged stores not to
remove the product fromremove the product from
shelvesshelves
 Situation investigatedSituation investigated
 led to an arrestled to an arrest

27. ApproachApproach
 Pepsi made public and then followed with their firstPepsi made public and then followed with their first
video news releasevideo news release
 First video showing the production process toFirst video showing the production process to
demonstrate that such tampering was impossible withindemonstrate that such tampering was impossible within
their factoriestheir factories
 A second video news release displayed the man arrestedA second video news release displayed the man arrested
 A third video news release showed surveillanceA third video news release showed surveillance where awhere a
woman was caught replicating the tampering incidentwoman was caught replicating the tampering incident

28. ApproachApproach
 The company simultaneously publicly worked with theThe company simultaneously publicly worked with the
FDA during the crisisFDA during the crisis
 The corporation was completely open with the publicThe corporation was completely open with the public
throughoutthroughout
 Every employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the detailsEvery employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the details
 After the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran aAfter the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran a
series of special campaigns designed to thank the publicseries of special campaigns designed to thank the public
for standing by the corporation, Coupons for furtherfor standing by the corporation, Coupons for further
compensationcompensation

29. ConclusionConclusion
 This case served as a model for how to handleThis case served as a model for how to handle
other crisis situationsother crisis situations

30. Case - IVCase - IV
BhopalBhopal disaster 1984disaster 1984

31. IncidentIncident
 One of the world'sOne of the world's
worstworst industrial catastrophesindustrial catastrophes
 A leak ofA leak of methylmethyl
isocyanateisocyanate gas and othergas and other
chemicals from the plantchemicals from the plant
 Exposure of hundreds ofExposure of hundreds of
thousands of peoplethousands of people
 Confirmed a total of 3,787Confirmed a total of 3,787
deathsdeaths
 leak caused 558,125 injuriesleak caused 558,125 injuries

32. ApproachApproach
 Illustrates the importance of incorporatingIllustrates the importance of incorporating cross-cross-
cultural communicationcultural communication in crisis management plansin crisis management plans
 Operating manuals printed only in English is anOperating manuals printed only in English is an
extreme example of mismanagementextreme example of mismanagement
 Indicative of systemic barriers to information diffusionIndicative of systemic barriers to information diffusion
 Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (UnionUnion
CarbideCarbide’’s upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in thes upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in the
relief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indianrelief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indian
governmentgovernment))

33. ConclusionConclusion
 Seven ex-employees, including the former UCILSeven ex-employees, including the former UCIL
chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causingchairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing
death by negligencedeath by negligence and sentenced toand sentenced to two yearstwo years
imprisonmentimprisonment and aand a fine of about $2,000fine of about $2,000 each,each,
the maximum punishment allowed by law. Anthe maximum punishment allowed by law. An
eighth former employee was also convicted, buteighth former employee was also convicted, but
died before judgment was passeddied before judgment was passed

34. Case - VCase - V
FordFord andand FirestoneFirestone Tire andTire and
Rubber CompanyRubber Company 20002000

35. IncidentIncident
 15-inch Wilderness AT,15-inch Wilderness AT,
radial ATX and ATX II tireradial ATX and ATX II tire
treads were separatingtreads were separating
from the tire corefrom the tire core
 leading to grisly,leading to grisly,
spectacular crashesspectacular crashes
 These tires were mostlyThese tires were mostly
used on the Ford Explorer,used on the Ford Explorer,
the world's top-sellingthe world's top-selling
(SUV)(SUV)

36. ApproachApproach
 First, they blamed consumers for not inflatingFirst, they blamed consumers for not inflating
their tires properlytheir tires properly
 Then they blamed each other for faulty tires andThen they blamed each other for faulty tires and
faulty vehicle designfaulty vehicle design
 Then they said very little about what they wereThen they said very little about what they were
doing to solve a problem that had caused moredoing to solve a problem that had caused more
than 100 deathsthan 100 deaths
 They got called to Washington to testify beforeThey got called to Washington to testify before
CongressCongress

37. ConclusionConclusion
 Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tiresBridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires
 Total cost = 1 Billion $Total cost = 1 Billion $

38. Case - VICase - VI
Exxon Valdez oil spillExxon Valdez oil spill
19891989

39. IncidentIncident
 Spilled millions ofSpilled millions of
gallons of crude oil intogallons of crude oil into
the waters off Valdezthe waters off Valdez ––
AlaskaAlaska
 The size of the spill isThe size of the spill is
estimated at 40,900 toestimated at 40,900 to
120,000 m3120,000 m3
 Hundreds of miles ofHundreds of miles of
coastline were pollutedcoastline were polluted
and salmon spawningand salmon spawning
runs disruptedruns disrupted

40. ApproachApproach
 Exxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing withExxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing with
the media and the publicthe media and the public
 The company had neither a communication plan nor aThe company had neither a communication plan nor a
communication team in place to handle the eventcommunication team in place to handle the event
 Exxon established its media center in Valdez, a locationExxon established its media center in Valdez, a location
too small and too remote to handle the onslaught oftoo small and too remote to handle the onslaught of
media attentionmedia attention
 The company actedThe company acted defensivelydefensively in its response to itsin its response to its
publicpublic
 Even laying blame, at times, on other groups such asEven laying blame, at times, on other groups such as
thethe Coast GuardCoast Guard

41. ConclusionConclusion
 Litigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigantsLitigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigants
 A jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million inA jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million in
compensatory damages and US$5 billion incompensatory damages and US$5 billion in
punitive damagespunitive damages
 As of 2010 there are approximately 98As of 2010 there are approximately 98 cubiccubic
metres (3,500metres (3,500 cucu ft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdezft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdez
crude oil still in Alaska's sand and soilcrude oil still in Alaska's sand and soil

42. Case - VIICase - VII
TheThe ChernobylChernobyl disasterdisaster
26 April 198626 April 1986

43. IncidentIncident
 Reactor four suffered aReactor four suffered a
catastrophic power increasecatastrophic power increase
leading to explosions in itsleading to explosions in its
corecore
 This dispersed largeThis dispersed large
quantities of radioactive fuelquantities of radioactive fuel
and core materials into theand core materials into the
atmosphereatmosphere
 The accident occurred duringThe accident occurred during
an experiment scheduled toan experiment scheduled to
test a potential safetytest a potential safety

44. ApproachApproach
 The reactor had not been encased by any kind ofThe reactor had not been encased by any kind of
hardhard containment vesselcontainment vessel
 Because of the inaccurate low readings, theBecause of the inaccurate low readings, the
reactor crew chiefreactor crew chief assumed that the reactor wasassumed that the reactor was
intactintact
 The readings of another dosimeter brought in byThe readings of another dosimeter brought in by
04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that
the new dosimeter must have been defectivethe new dosimeter must have been defective

45. ApproachApproach
 "We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had"We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had
told us.told us.““
LieutenantLieutenant Volodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 ofVolodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 of acuteacute
radiation sicknessradiation sickness

46. ConclusionConclusion
 TheThe distrustdistrust that many people (both within andthat many people (both within and
outside theoutside the USSR) had in theUSSR) had in the SovietSoviet authoritiesauthorities
 Over 30 years is estimated at US$235Over 30 years is estimated at US$235 billion (inbillion (in
2005 dollars)2005 dollars)
 5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine
still related to Chernobylstill related to Chernobyl

47. Case - VIIICase - VIII
FukushimaFukushima I nuclear accidentsI nuclear accidents
20112011

48. IncidentIncident
 Following the9.0Following the9.0
magnitudemagnitude TōhokuTōhoku
earthquake andearthquake and
tsunamitsunami on 11 Marchon 11 March
20112011
 Experts consider it to beExperts consider it to be
the second largestthe second largest
nuclear accident afternuclear accident after
thethe Chernobyl disasterChernobyl disaster
 More complex as allMore complex as all
reactors are involvedreactors are involved

49. ApproachApproach
 Tokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level forTokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level for
infantsinfants
 Prompting the government to distribute bottledPrompting the government to distribute bottled
water to families with infantswater to families with infants
 A nuclear emergency was declared by theA nuclear emergency was declared by the
Government at 19:03 on 11 MarchGovernment at 19:03 on 11 March
 Initially a 2Initially a 2 km, then 10km, then 10 kmkm evacuation zone wasevacuation zone was
orderedordered

50. ApproachApproach
 Later Prime MinisterLater Prime Minister issued instructions thatissued instructions that
people within a 20people within a 20 km (12 mile) zone around thekm (12 mile) zone around the
plant must leaveplant must leave
 Urged that those living between 20Urged that those living between 20 km andkm and
3030 km from the site to stay indoorskm from the site to stay indoors
 Six weeks after the crisis began, plans wereSix weeks after the crisis began, plans were
announced for a large-scale study of theannounced for a large-scale study of the
environmental and health effects of radioactiveenvironmental and health effects of radioactive
contamination from the nuclear plantcontamination from the nuclear plant

51. ConclusionConclusion
 A private report by journalists and academics as well as an
investigation by TEPCO.
 The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the
disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but
because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in
protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely.
 "The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that
events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur . .
. and were not aware that measures to avoid the worst situation
were actually full of holes," the government panel said in its final
report.

52. Case-IX
‫حادثة حريق قطار الصعيد‬
‫العياط – مصر‬
20‫ فبراير‬2002‫ م‬

53. ‫الدحداث‬‫الدحداث‬
‫كان القطار رقم‬832 ‫ المتوجه من القاهرة إلي أسوان‏, قد اندلعت‬
‫النيران في إحدي عرباته الساعة في الثانية من صباح يوم‬20
‫فبراير‬2002.‫ م‏, عقب مغادرته مدينة العياط عند قرية ميت القائد‬
 ,‫أكد الناجون أنهم شاهدوا ديخانا كثيفا ينبعث من العربة اليخيرة للقطار‏‬
,‫ثم اندلعت النيران بها وامتدت بسرعة إلي باقي العربات اليخيرة‏‬
‫والتي كانت مكدسة بالركاب المسافرين لقضاء عطلة عيد‬
.‫الحضحى في مراكزهم وقراهم في صعيد مصر‬
 ‫وقام بعض الركاب بكسر النوافذ الزجاجية‏, وألقوا بأنفسهم يخارج‬
.‫القطار‏, مما تسبب في مصرعهم أو غرقهم في ترعة البراهيمية‬
‫وقام قائد القطار بفصل العربات السبع المامية عن العربات‬
‫المحترقة‏, وأيخطر الجهات المعنية بالحادث‏, ثم واصل رحلته يخشية‬
.‫توقفه وحدوث كارثة جديدة‬

55. ‫التناول‬‫التناول‬
 ‫أكد الدكتور عاطف عبيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء ـ عقب زيارته‬
‫مستشفي العياط المركزي للطمئنان علي المصابين ـ أن الحريق‬
‫اشتعل بعربات القطار بسبب‬‫انفجار موقد بوتاجاز‬ ‫ في بوفيه إحدي‬
.‫العربات بالقطار‏, وامتدت النيران إلي باقي العربات‬
 ‫تعد حادثة قطار الصعيد التي راح حضحيتها أكثر من ثلثمائة ويخمسين‬
‫مسافرا السوأ من نوعها في تاريخ‬ ‫السكك الحديدية المصرية أي منذ‬
.‫أكثر من مئة ويخمسين عاما‬
 ‫بدأت في القاهرة يوم‬27 ‫ إبريل‬2002 ‫ محاكمة‬11 ‫ مسؤول بهيئة‬
‫السكك الحديدية في مصر إذ يواجهون اتهامات بالهمال في أسوأ‬
‫حادث قطار مصري أودى بحياة‬361. ‫ شخصا‬
.‫أدت الكارثة إلى استقالة وزير النقل المصري إبراهيم الدميري‬

56. Case - XCase - X
The Deepwater Horizon oil spillThe Deepwater Horizon oil spill ––
20102010
““The Macondo incidentThe Macondo incident””
Gulf of MexicoGulf of Mexico

57. IncidentIncident
 It is the largest accidental marine oilIt is the largest accidental marine oil
spill in the history of the petroleumspill in the history of the petroleum
industryindustry
 The spill stemmed from a sea-floorThe spill stemmed from a sea-floor oiloil
gushergusher that resulted from the April 20,that resulted from the April 20,
2010,2010, explosion ofexplosion of DeepwaterDeepwater
HorizonHorizon
 BPBP released a 193-page report on itsreleased a 193-page report on its
web site. The report saysweb site. The report says BPBP
employees and those ofemployees and those of TransoceanTransocean
did not correctly interpret a pressuredid not correctly interpret a pressure
test, and both companies neglectedtest, and both companies neglected
signs such as a pipe calledsigns such as a pipe called a risera riser losinglosing
fluid. It also says that while BP did notfluid. It also says that while BP did not
listen to recommendationslisten to recommendations
byby HalliburtonHalliburton for more centralizersfor more centralizers

58. ApproachApproach
Short-term efforts:Short-term efforts:
 Remotely operated underwaterRemotely operated underwater
vehicles to close the blowoutvehicles to close the blowout
preventerpreventer valves on the well headvalves on the well head
 Placing a 125-tonnePlacing a 125-tonne
(280,000(280,000 lb)lb) containmentcontainment
domedome (which had worked on leaks in(which had worked on leaks in
shallower water) over the largest leakshallower water) over the largest leak
and piping the oil to a storage vesseland piping the oil to a storage vessel
on the surfaceon the surface
 Positioning a riser insertion tube intoPositioning a riser insertion tube into
the wide burst pipethe wide burst pipe

59. ApproachApproach
 TransoceanTransocean's's Development Driller IIIDevelopment Driller III started drilling a firststarted drilling a first
relief well,relief well, GSF Development Driller IIGSF Development Driller II started drilling astarted drilling a
second reliefsecond relief
 Each relief well is expected to cost about $100Each relief well is expected to cost about $100 millionmillion
 BPBP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that partbegan pumping cement from the top, sealing that part
of the flow channel permanentlyof the flow channel permanently
 Two weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could beTwo weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could be
declared completely sealeddeclared completely sealed
 Even in properly sealed wells, the cementEven in properly sealed wells, the cement
plugs can fail over the decades and metalplugs can fail over the decades and metal
casings that line the wells can rustcasings that line the wells can rust

60. ConclusionConclusion
 At first,At first, BPBP files a 52files a 52 pagepage exploration andexploration and
environmental impact planenvironmental impact plan for thefor the MacondoMacondo well. Thewell. The
plan stated that it was "plan stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface orunlikely that an accidental surface or
subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activitiessubsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities””
 Mark E. HafleMark E. Hafle, a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns, a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns
that the metal casing for thethat the metal casing for the blowout preventerblowout preventer mightmight
collapse under high pressurecollapse under high pressure
 TheThe White HouseWhite House oil spill commission released a finaloil spill commission released a final
report detailing faults by the companies that led to thereport detailing faults by the companies that led to the
spillspill
 The panel found thatThe panel found that BPBP,, HalliburtonHalliburton, and, and
TransoceanTransocean had attempted to workhad attempted to work more cheaplymore cheaply andand
thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakagethus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage

61. ConclusionConclusion
 BPBP released a statement in response to this, saying,released a statement in response to this, saying, ""Even priorEven prior
to the conclusion of the commissionto the conclusion of the commission’’s investigation, BP instituteds investigation, BP instituted
significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risksignificant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk
management “management “
 TransoceanTransocean, however, blamed, however, blamed BPBP for making the decisionsfor making the decisions
before the actual explosion occurred and government officialsbefore the actual explosion occurred and government officials
for permitting those decisionsfor permitting those decisions
 HalliburtonHalliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders ofstated that it was acting only upon the orders of BPBP
when it injected the cement into the wall of the wellwhen it injected the cement into the wall of the well
 HalliburtonHalliburton also blamed the governmental officials andalso blamed the governmental officials and BPBP. It. It
criticizedcriticized BPBP for its failure to run afor its failure to run a cement bond logcement bond log testtest
 In the report,In the report, BPBP was accused of nine faultswas accused of nine faults

62. ““Better management of decision-making processesBetter management of decision-making processes
withinwithin BPBP and other companies, betterand other companies, better
communication within and betweencommunication within and between BPBP and itsand its
contractors and effective training of keycontractors and effective training of key
engineering and rig personnel would haveengineering and rig personnel would have
prevented theprevented the MacondoMacondo incidentincident””
TheThe White HouseWhite House oil spilloil spill
commission panel final reportcommission panel final report

63. Lessons learned inLessons learned in
Crisis ManagementCrisis Management

64. Lessons learned in CrisisLessons learned in Crisis
ManagementManagement
 A study identified organizations that recovered andA study identified organizations that recovered and
eveneven exceededexceeded pre-catastrophe stock pricepre-catastrophe stock price
 The average cumulative impact onThe average cumulative impact on shareholdershareholder
valuevalue for thefor the recoverersrecoverers waswas 5% plus5% plus on their originalon their original
stock valuestock value
 TheThe non-recoverersnon-recoverers remained more or less unchangedremained more or less unchanged
between days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, butbetween days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, but
suffered a net negative cumulative impact of almostsuffered a net negative cumulative impact of almost
15%15% on their stock price up toon their stock price up to one yearone year afterwards.afterwards.

65. ImportantImportant
““It is highly recommended to those whoIt is highly recommended to those who
wish to engage their senior management inwish to engage their senior management in
the value of crisis managementthe value of crisis management””

66. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity

67. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity
 Management must move from a mindset thatManagement must move from a mindset that manages
crisis to one thatto one that generates crisis leadership
 Most executives focus on communications andMost executives focus on communications and publicpublic
relationsrelations as aas a reactive strategyreactive strategy
 Potential damage to reputation can result from thePotential damage to reputation can result from the
actual management of the crisis issueactual management of the crisis issue
 Companies may stagnate as theirCompanies may stagnate as their riskrisk
managementmanagement group identifies whether a crisis isgroup identifies whether a crisis is
sufficientlysufficiently ““statistically significantstatistically significant””

68. Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership
””Immediately addresses both the damageImmediately addresses both the damage
and implications for the companyand implications for the company’’s presents present
and future conditions, as well asand future conditions, as well as
opportunities for improvementopportunities for improvement””

69. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management
 United StatesUnited States National GuardNational Guard at the federal levelat the federal level
 U.S.U.S. Federal Emergency ManagementFederal Emergency Management
AgencyAgency ((FEMAFEMA) within the) within the Department ofDepartment of
Homeland SecurityHomeland Security administers theadministers the NationalNational
Response PlanResponse Plan ((NRPNRP))
 This plan is intended toThis plan is intended to integrate public andintegrate public and
private responseprivate response by providing a commonby providing a common
language and outlininglanguage and outlining

70. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management
 TheThe NRPNRP is a companion to theis a companion to the NationalNational
Incidence Management SystemIncidence Management System
 FEMAFEMA offers free web-based training on theoffers free web-based training on the
National Response PlanNational Response Plan through the Emergencythrough the Emergency
Management InstituteManagement Institute
 Common Alerting ProtocolCommon Alerting Protocol ((CAPCAP) is a relatively) is a relatively
recent mechanism that facilitates crisisrecent mechanism that facilitates crisis
communication across different mediums andcommunication across different mediums and
systems “A consistent emergency alert format “

71. RememberRemember!!

75. The Crisis Management ToolboxThe Crisis Management Toolbox
I. Individual Preparedness Plan Checklist
II. Coordination Authority Public Checklist
III. Command Centers
IV. Incident Command System (Common Terminology)
V. Designating a Spokesperson, backup spokesperson
VI. Media Policies and Procedures (Practicing Tough
Questions/Prepared Statements)
VII. Drill, drill then drill !

76. Practice Model - IPractice Model - I

77. ‫اللهلية‬ ‫الغاز‬ ‫شركة‬‫اللهلية‬ ‫الغاز‬ ‫شركة‬
 ‫أنت رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة الغاز اللهلية )غاز – مصر‬‫أنت رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة الغاز اللهلية )غاز – مصر‬))
 ‫حضر إليك مسئول المان بالشركة يقترح عمل خطة مكافحة‬ ‫حضر إليك مسئول المان بالشركة يقترح عمل خطة مكافحة‬
‫أزمات لحالة تسريب غاز من شبكة توزيع الغاز الخاصة‬ ‫أزمات لحالة تسريب غاز من شبكة توزيع الغاز الخاصة‬
‫بشركتك‬‫بشركتك‬
 ‫ماذا تفعل لمواجهة إحتمال لهذة الزمة؟‬‫ماذا تفعل لمواجهة إحتمال لهذة الزمة؟‬

78. Practice Model - IIPractice Model - II

79. ‫الوطنية‬ ‫السيارات‬ ‫صناعة‬ ‫شركة‬‫الوطنية‬ ‫السيارات‬ ‫صناعة‬ ‫شركة‬
 ‫أنت مدير إدارة السلمة بشركة السيارات الوطنية )شاس‬‫أنت مدير إدارة السلمة بشركة السيارات الوطنية )شاس‬))
 ‫بعد قراءتك لتفاصيل ما حدث من أزمة دواسات الوقود‬ ‫بعد قراءتك لتفاصيل ما حدث من أزمة دواسات الوقود‬
‫المعيبة بشركة تويوتا العالمية قررت عمل خطة مواجهة‬ ‫المعيبة بشركة تويوتا العالمية قررت عمل خطة مواجهة‬
‫ازمات التى قد تواجه صناعتك‬‫ازمات التى قد تواجه صناعتك‬
 ‫ما لهى السيناريولهات التى سوف تفترضها و كيف تضع‬ ‫ما لهى السيناريولهات التى سوف تفترضها و كيف تضع‬
‫خططها ؟‬‫خططها ؟‬

80. Practice Model - IIIPractice Model - III

81. ‫الشيخ‬ ‫شرم‬ – ‫الفيروز‬ ‫منتجع‬‫الشيخ‬ ‫شرم‬ – ‫الفيروز‬ ‫منتجع‬
 ‫قمت بإفتتاح منتجع للسياحة بشرم الشيخ‬‫قمت بإفتتاح منتجع للسياحة بشرم الشيخ‬
 ‫الستثمارات الكلية التى قمت بوضعها به تكلفت‬ ‫الستثمارات الكلية التى قمت بوضعها به تكلفت‬3030 ‫ مليون‬ ‫ مليون‬
‫جنية مصرى من أموال القروض‬‫جنية مصرى من أموال القروض‬
 ‫تريد أن تحمى إستثمارك من المفاجآت‬‫تريد أن تحمى إستثمارك من المفاجآت‬
 ‫ماذا تفعل؟‬‫ماذا تفعل؟‬

82. Last wordsLast words

83. Thank youThank you
‫شكرا‬ ً‫شكرا‬ ً