Fall 2015 Research Paper

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1
A Comparative Analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Kristin M. Bethel
University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Abstract
This paper seeks to identify and compare six different aspects of three terrorist organizations—
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb—to include leadership, financial networks, recruiting support, operating environment,
strategies and vulnerabilities. Effective counterterrorism policy is significantly more potent when
the threat is fully understood, recognized and comprehended. How do we successfully cripple
organizations? A key aspect of successfully implementing counterterrorism strategies precedes
any written policy or guidelines. Governments must take the time to learn all components of a
terrorist organization starting with those in leadership to the strategies and vulnerabilities of this
group. The more comprehensive intelligence on a known organization, the better agencies are
able to construct an effective counterterrorism policy. Christopher Faulkner and David Gray
write that, “It is obvious with hindsight that the international community has failed in a number
of situations to be proactive in defeating terrorist threats. In large part however, this failure has
come from incorrectly assessing the threat posed by terrorist groups (knowing the enemy)—a
theme the US has seen continue to repeat itself over the last decade” (p. 2). Along with fully
understanding the capabilities and makeup of a terrorist organization comes the more important
aspect of knowing what drives and motivates these groups.

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the United States of America (USA) as well as countries
all over the world, have vowed to avenge terrorism and all actors involved. Since then, we have
seen numerous terrorist attacks across the country, most recently, in Paris and Beirut as well as
Kenya and Lebanon. After every attack, countries vow revenge on those held responsible.
Nations are crippled and families are destroyed. Those responsible send video messages vowing
more attacks and are seen rejoicing and praising the successful attacks. Counterterrorism
strategies are changed and modified to allow intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies
virtually free reign to do what it takes to find these senseless perpetrators. Governments act
quickly so as not to seem weak and unable to stand strong in a time where all hope seems to be
lost. In a politically motivated time of existence, terrorism seeks to cause feelings of despair and
defeat. Terrorists want victims and those effected to feel crushed and lose faith in government.
Terrorists want their actions to cause change or demands to be met. They seek revenge on
everyone who has impeded or blocked their politically motivated agenda. Chaos and confusion
drive terrorists to repeat and plan more attacks until they are satisfied, but will they ever be
satisfied? Counterterrorism policies seek to provide systematic guidelines in disseminating
intelligence, information sharing and pinpointing locations and heads of leadership. Drone
attacks seek to destroy those in leadership as well as infrastructures critical to terrorist networks,
sometimes taking innocent victims along with them. Radical extremists effected by counter
attacks are then driven to attack for revenge once again. This cycle continues until an
organization is dismantled, those in leadership are killed, or finances decrease causing attacks to
cease.
Religious violence, for example, is motivated by justification for one’s actions due to
eternal life or in the case of the Islamic State (IS), establishing a religious caliphate. The Islamic

State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), alongside organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) seek to most importantly rid their
prospective countries of Western influence.
Leadership
ISIS, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or IS, recently re-
emerged as a strong force in 2013 amongst Syria and Iraq. After its original leader, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006, ISIS was hit with a series of attacks by “US-funded anti-al-Qaeda
militias known as the Sahwa or “Awakening” Groups (p. W. Andrew Terrill, p. 15). They only
recently emerged stronger than ever after rebuilding itself in Syria. However, their ties with
groups like Al-Qaeda were quickly severed as ISIS’ agenda became much more of a violent
contender. Organizations such as al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria,
who have been challenged due to the many different successes of ISIS, have denounced their
allegiance with ISIS due to their extreme violent agenda. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-
Qaeda since the death of Osama bin Laden, more recently repeated his severed ties with ISIL
after repeated conflicts between ISIS and al-Nusra. W. Andrew Terrill, wrote that “On February
2, 2014, the problems, between al-Qaeda and ISIL reached a crisis point when Zawahiri released
a statement disassociating his organization from ISIL, thus expelling the organization from al-
Qaeda” (p. 15-16). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been the leader since 2010 and under his reign,
changed the name from ISIL to IS and according to Terrill, “asserted that IS was now the only
legitimate authority in the Muslim world and its authority superseded and replaced the leadership
of each Muslim country” (p. 17). Under the leadership of Baghdadi, IS has achieved success in
holding territory in Iraq and Syria, and has also gained the allegiance of multiple militant
Islamist groups across the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Most significantly, it has begun

to expand into Egypt (the Sinai peninsula), Libya, and Yemen” (Ezzeldeen Khalil, 2015). With
an increasing global network and strong recruiting base, under its current leadership, IS will
continue to emerge as the prime, global Islamic jihadist organization.
While scholars have argued that al-Qaeda is no longer a threat to America’s
homeland, the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliate groups such as AQAP and AQIM have countered
these arguments tremendously. According to Faulkner and Gray, AQAP is “the result of a
merger between two separate al Qaeda operations—Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (AQSA) and Al
Qaeda in Yemen (AQIY)” (p. 2).
The emergence of AQSA stemmed from two different leaders, with two different
agendas. Yusuf Al-Uyayri emerged in 1998 after his release from prison with an agenda of
“establishing an Islamic Jihadist group that would threaten the Saudi regime and began
recruitment efforts shortly after his release” (Faulkner, p.2). He wanted to advance al-Qaeda’s
strategic goal by organizing five cells in Saudi Arabia in order to “ensure the continuation of
strategic goals should one cell be compromised” (p.3). Although very seemingly thought out and
quite promising, it would take time and effort to achieve this. The main al-Qaeda group based
out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as Al Qaeda Core (AQC) wanted an agenda that was
ready to be carried out immediately. On the other hand, was Abd Al-Rahman Al-Nashiri, who
upon returning to Saudi Arabia, had developed an immediate that would include attacks “against
the Saudi regime, government targets, and security forces in order to demonstrate Al Qaeda’s
intent to not be fazed by the war in Afghanistan (Faulkner, p. 3)”. This plot was much more
appealing to AQC, resulting in financial support of Nashiri. After the death of Nashiri, and with
AQC in need of a new al-Qaeda representation in Saudi Arabia, it was al-Uyayri’s time to prove
himself capable. He did momentarily with a single attack in 2003, killing 34 and wounded 200.

However, in the midst of a powerful counter-strategy against AQSA, the organization was
crippled with the capture of a number of operatives as well as the killings of many others, most
notably, Al-Uyayri himself. Once again, AQSA appeared to be weak and unable of withstanding
counterterrorism campaigns against them. Surprisingly, however, they were able to continue
their existence due to their utilization of a strong media campaign thereby bolstering recruitment
numbers. As AQSA continued to grow and thrive, so did the Al-Qaeda presence in Yemen. After
a major attack in Yemen on a US naval warship, the USS Cole, the international community took
a renewed attention to the threat of Al-Qaeda. From a leadership standpoint, it was not until 2006
that major leadership over Al-Qaeda was assumed. Two important individuals, —Nasser Al-
Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi—escaped from prison and assumed leadership in Yemen and the
Arabian Peninsula. These two groups merged together in 2009 and became AQAP, the current
threat we face today. As of the recent June 2015 death of Wahayshi, Qasim al-Raymi now
assumes current leadership over AQAP.
Another al-Qaeda affiliate group, AQIM or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is an
Algerian based terrorist group renamed after the original Groupe Salafiste de Predication et du
Djihad, or GSPC. This group was created in 1998 by Hassan Hattab, who sought a jihad against
an Algerian regime. What is interesting about this group however, was their apparent fight
against only Algeria, as opposed to other countries. After 9/11, two individuals who would later
become the eventual leaders of AQIM—Nabil Sahraoui and Abdelmalek Droukdel—ousted
Hattab, whose agenda was strictly set in Algeria, and Droukdel became the eventual leader after
Sahraoui’s death in 2004. AQIM has furthered its operational reach outside of Algeria and into
the Sahel, or the “belt connecting North Africa and West Africa and straddling ancient trade and
migration routes” (J. Peter Pham, p. 18). This group has seen many of its leaders surrendering to

Algerian forces in the last six to seven years, thereby weakening its status as an effective terrorist
group in North Africa. The Algerian counterterrorism campaign has been highly effective in this
region.
Financial Support
Parallel with strong leadership amongst an organization, comes the crucial need for
financial resources and support. Without financial means, terrorist groups are unable to carry out
attacks, train operatives in specific skill set areas, educate operatives, and even limits travel to
certain areas or targets of attack. Finances are a crucial hinge that keeps terrorist organizations
intact and they gain financial support through successful attacks and even through state-
sponsored operations. Terrorist organizations fund their operations through ties with organized
crime groups, state sponsors as well as self-financing. David Axe writes that “one self-financing
tactic is for extremist groups to recruit new fighters on the Internet, and require them to pay a fee
to join up” (2015). Another means of avoiding detection is operating in a cash only
environment. By operating in a cost-effective manner, they are able to avoid a financial trail
capable of being tracked, as well as limit their expenses.
ISIS has emerged as a strong organization due to their successful attacks, which in
turn is attributed to their large funding base. Matthew Levitt and Ryan Youkilis attribute much of
ISIS’ financing to “territorial based revenues, such as extortion, crime, "taxing" of the local
populations, and, of course, the sale of oil and antiquities” (2015). Their most recent conquest of
the city of Mosul allowed the terrorist organization to “freely loot banks, tax trade, and extort
residents” (Levitt & Youkilis, 2015). Financial and trade sanctions have not stopped ISIS
funding and the group continues to thrive in spite of such sanctions. Janine di Giovanni, Leah
Goodman and Damien Sharkov mention that “highly localized and multiple revenue streams feed

the terrorist organization’s coffers—generating up to $6 million a day, according to Masrour
Barzani, head of Kurdish Intelligence and the Kurdistan Regional Security Council” (p. 28).
They go on to mention that “ISIS has accepted funding from government or private sources in
the oil-rich nations of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait—and a large network of private donors,
including Persian Gulf royalty, businessmen and wealthy families” (p. 29). ISIS has also
instituted the use of “fake” humanitarian aid which is used as a means of funneling money and
using it to fund terrorist operations. Cellphone applications such as WhatsApp and Kik allow
GPS mapping to be utilized in order to coordinate where to send money amongst terrorist
members. As mentioned earlier, ISIS also utilizes cash methods in an effort to evade detection
and largely in part due to the lack of adequate security in Middle Eastern airports. Furthermore,
the lack of border control allows money to be freely moved across borders such as Turkey and
Syria with little to no impediments. Other forms of financial support comes from ISIS' selling of
ancient artifacts from looted archaeological sites as well as kidnapping for ransom.
Although not as financially stable as ISIS, AQAP also receives money from different
sources. It is no secret that states are known for sponsoring terrorism and David Cohen--the
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence for the U.S. Treasury Department--in
his speech at the Center for a New American Security said that groups such like AQAP and
AQIM also receive money from terrorist financiers(U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2014). He
goes on to note that "Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani is a Yemen-based fundraiser who used his
status in the charitable community as a cover for funneling financial support to AQAP" (Cohen,
2014). Cohen goes on to note that "apart from state sponsorship, KFR [kidnapping for ransom] is
today’s greatest source of terrorist funding and the most challenging terrorist financing threat.
Groups such as AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab continue to collect tens of millions of dollars

from ransoms" (2014). In order to keep terrorist organizations from gaining revenue and
finances, it is important for governments and citizens to ensure their safety as well as refuse
negotiations with terrorists. The U.S. government has made clear that it will not negotiate with
terrorists and give in to their demands.
AQIM conducts large numbers of ransoms of both Europeans as well as Algerians. These
ransoms have garnered millions of dollars to this group as a result. Richard Nessel writes that
“AQIM acquired 12 million euros from European hostage situations from 2009-2010” (p. 35).
Recruiting Networks
In the age of advanced technology, terrorist organizations are using it as a strategic
platform to spread propaganda and messages to a global audience. Members are utilizing social
media, forums even YouTube in order to profess their anti-Western ideologies, plans and threats.
They have broadcasted beheadings and public murders of citizens from around the world. More
importantly, however, is their usage of technology as a means of reaching out and recruiting new
members to join in their fight, which poses a significant risk. Social media utilizations of sites
such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed organizations to essentially mask themselves behind
a computer and effectively propagate ideologies and false promises in return for joining the fight
against targeted Western countries. These groups are targeting citizens of all countries, ages and
ethnicities, and even women. Due to the—in this case—thousands of ISIS supported Twitter
accounts, it is very difficult to track, manage and even shut down these accounts allowing
members to speak freely and openly to potential recruits. They have garnered support from all
over the world at virtually no cost to anyone. Through these sites, organizations are able to
employ professionally scripted videos and learned to navigate through impediments seeking to
block their means of a voice.

ISIS, in particular is known for broadcasting attacks as well as threats across the
globe. As it relates to recruitment, Heather Vitale and James Keague write that "arguably, ISIS
makes the largest impact on Twitter. It holds about a dozen accounts from central leadership, all
focused on different aspects: official messages from leaders, recruitment, networking,
intimidation, or religious themes" (p. 7). Using social media also has a personal effect to it.
Instead of just reading ideologies or pamphlets as a means of recruitment, terrorists who actually
are a part of the fight are able to reach out to troubled youth or individuals who are looking for a
sense of self-worth and purpose. Vitale and Keague add that "it enables the recruitment to be
more sincere and the message to be richer as it comes from mujahedeen on the battlefield instead
of an isolated leader" (p. 7). There is little to no monitoring of these sites except for when
extremely grotesque or offensive images are posted. Along with Twitter, ISIS is infamous for
using Instagram as a platform for visually disseminating photos of a wonderful life as a jihadist
that comes with promising benefits such as money, women and recognition. ISIS has even gone
so far as to construct professional videos depicting the need for Western recruits as well as
images and video of buildings being destroyed and people being killed. Vitale and Keague add
on to this aspect in noting that "these repeated images do nothing but glorify ISIS’s brutal acts,
helping to make the group more appealing to younger people through the shine of editing and
production" (p. 9). These means of recruitment being utilized by ISIS are attracting individuals
from all over and serve as a continual grave threat to our country. Lone wolf attacks are rising all
over the world and they are by far the biggest threat to America.
AQAP although not as big as ISIS, still has a strong foreign fighter base in Yemen and
Saudi Arabia. They are a much more localized group with grievances both inside their country as
well as towards Western culture and influence. Additionally, due to their high poverty rates,

Yemen serves as a hotspot for terrorist organizations to operate and thrive in. It is important to
identify the grievances related to that area so as to understand the broader spectrum of what
attracts individuals in those areas to join AQAP. According to Alistair Harris, "Muslims are
suffering at the hands of a CrusaderZionist alliance that props up illegitimate and corrupt local
regimes that have failed to provide for their citizens. AQAP’s diagnostic framework skillfully
weaves local grievances into this wider narrative of persecution, marginalization, and threat" (p.
6). AQAP's demographic consists of mainly young males who want to promote violence against
the West. Like ISIS, AQAP's main focus "remains on ridding the Arabian Peninsula of all non-
Muslims, the establishment of a local emirate, and the liberation of Palestine en route to the
establishment of a global caliphate" (Harris, 2010). AQAP has used the already known
grievances amongst its poverty stricken people in order to ignite the need to wage war against all
non-Muslims. Because of the socioeconomic grievances as well as the risk of civilian casualties
in a small area, it is important that counterterrorism efforts are aimed at preventing civilian
casualties so as not to allow these extremists to use civilian casualties as a grievance against the
Western military and law enforcement entities. Due to the small dynamics of AQAP and their
geographical location, they—unlike ISIS—are not as technological savvy as other terrorist
organizations. Being able to reach out to potential recruits by understanding what AQAP's
message is, is likely to have a reverse effect on those who may want to join. Unlike ISIS, AQIM
stemmed from jihadi fights against Algerian government.
AQIM presently serves as the most active terrorist group in North Africa. They are
involved heavily in the illicit crime environment and therefore attract members with criminal
records in crimes such as drug trafficking and petty theft. Richard Nessel writes that "an
inordinate number of AQIM’s suicide bombers had served previous prison terms for crimes

unrelated to AQIM or the jihad (drugs and petty crime)" (p. 34). Their organizations is made up
of mostly local Yemenis and Saudi Arabians as well as individuals in the Sahara-Sahel region,
consisting of the countries of Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.
Operating Environment
ISIS operates mainly out of Iraq and Syria. ISIS has gone on a spree of city takeovers
amongst heavy retaliation from different countries around the world, most notably Russia and the
U.S. Jessica McFate writes that "the Islamic State’s summer and early autumn 2015 campaign in
Iraq and Syria demonstrated that the group can pursue its objectives conservatively, surviving
under pressure and holding its own while balancing against its losses" (2015). In 2015 alone, the
Islamic State has held off defensive forces in the cities of Aleppo as well as Mosul and Ramadi.
They have also targeted Baiji for its oil as well as Fallujah. McFate notes that "the group still
boasts strong defenses in northern Aleppo, in the vicinity of Deir ez Zour, in outer Anbar, and in
the Zaab triangle north of Hawija" (2015). ISIS has also targeted cities in Syria in their continual
efforts to establish an Islamic caliphate amongst all Muslims.
AQAP operates mainly in Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the Middle East.
Socioeconomic conditions that incorporate weak states and dismantled government give this
terrorist organization the opportunity to thrive and operate without much interference. During
and after the collapse of the Saleh presidency, formerly known as the Arab Spring, AQAP used
this discord to become a thriving terrorist group. They have targeted military officials, police
officials as well as senior security officials. W. Andrew Terrill writes that "AQAP functioned
primarily as a terrorist organization prior to 2010, but it later expanded its operations to include
efforts to capture, hold, and rule territory in areas where the Yemeni government had only a
limited ability to maintain security" (p. 35). Their main operations are directed towards those in

Yemen and AQAP utilizes suicide bombings and assassinations as a major means of attack.
Yemeni security forces have made increasing efforts to thwart and defeat AQAP, however, there
is much more to be done.
As mentioned in the leadership section of this paper, the leader of AQIM is
Abdelmalek Droukdel. His command is supported by the People of Authority council which is
divided into two councils known as the Council of Notable and a Shura Council. (Nassel, p. 25).
The leadership is comprised of predominantly Algerian individuals. According to Nassel,
"AQIM conducts operations with centralized command and decentralized execution. The
centralized command structure of the headquarters element (Supreme Commander, Council of
Notables and Shura Council) task or approve targets and campaign plans for the zone
commanders" (p. 30-31). AQIM has a very loose reign on the commanders in its surrounding
regions as it relates to operations and plans. If an attack is possible, then it is up to the "zone
commander" to plan, execute, finance and carry it out. The central command regime tasks its
commanders in the surrounding areas with financing and equipping their recruits, thereby
regulating and conserving finances. AQIM's main operations are based in Algeria with a number
of footholds in the Sahel region consisting of Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. From a geographical
standpoint, the Sahelian region of Africa provides a great breeding ground for jihadist
organizations. Their weak states, relaxed border control and economic conditions allow
opportunities for drug and weapons smuggling as well. AQIM has thrived in this area due to
these regional conditions and continues to make alliances with other groups in the region. The
Algerian government must take swift action in order to prevent further turmoil in North Africa.
Unlike ISIS, AQIM is more of a regional threat as opposed to global. However all strategies
remain similar with an Islamic caliphate being the end goal.

Strategies
ISIS's strategy is one that is global, spanning across countries with multiple goals. Their
main strategy or goal is to establish and expand their caliphate across the world. In order to do
this, Harleen Gambhir makes a very detailed description of three rings that are dear to ISIS's
campaign. They are the Interior ring (Iraq and Syria), the Near Abroad ring (Jordan, Lebanon
and Israel-Palestine) and the Far Abroad ring (Europe, U.S., Asia) (July, 2015). For each ring,
Gambhir gives a mission. For the interior ring, the mission is "aggressive defense" (July 2015, p.
10). For the Near Abroad ring, the mission is "expansion through the creation of regional
affiliates" (p.11). Lastly, the mission of the Far Abroad ring is "disruption and preparation of the
battlefield" (p. 12). In countries like Iraq, ISIS seeks to wreak havoc amongst a failed state all
while spreading their radical propaganda. In neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon,
ISIS seeks to boost recruits and encourage membership into ISIS, all while going up against
ideological enemies, Al-Qaeda and the al-Nusra front. In countries such as Europe and the
Americas, ISIS seeks to maintain an existing presence in these countries as well as ignite cells to
launch terrorist attacks in their home countries. ISIS is very strategic in their methods and,
according to Gambhir, “ISIS’s global operations allow it to place stress on multiple states and
international alliances at once" (July, 2015). Cohesively, ISIS is "conducting simultaneous
campaigns to defend its existing territory within Iraq and Syria, to foster affiliates in the Middle
East and North Africa region, and to launch polarizing attacks in the rest of the world" (Gambhir,
May 2015, p. 2). ISIS has emerged from having a regional strategy to a global strategy that is
aimed at destroying Western culture and presence in order to establish a completely Muslim
caliphate.
Unlike ISIS, much of AQAP's strategy lies within appealing to the local Yemeni

population. AQAP has a much bigger focus on the Arabian Peninsula and disrupting the political
agenda of the area. In 2009, in AQAP's magazine, Sada al-Malahim, voiced their main goal as
"to unseat the regime in Saudi Arabia, noting that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s grasp
on power was weakening: 'We concentrate on Saudi Arabia because the government of Ali
Abdullah Saleh is on the verge of collapse [and he is about to] flee the land of Yemen' "(p. 3).
Due to its weak condition as a state, it gives AQAP full opportunity to achieve this goal as well
as push out anything or anyone preventing them from doing so. By using their strategy of
appealing to the people, AQAP is able to muster up recruits who want to fight for a cause.
Additionally, AQAP has, according to Nicholas Hedberg "worked carefully to cultivate ties to
the local population" (p. 33). By doing this, AQAP is able to achieve two goals: 1) recruit locals
and 2) to gain support of the locals. The organization has even married into the local tribes to
become more intertwined and involved with the Yemeni local tribes. By using outlets such as
merging with the local tribes as well as offering support and efforts to a very poor community,
they can potentially garner support as well as turn Yemenis away from the government. Their
messages of government neglect and abandonment can potentially resonate with the local
population causing them to want to revolt against the government. Nicholas Hedberg writes that
"through their shared experiences, marrying into the tribes, and political and ideological
messages resonating with Yemeni tribes, AQAP is creating a sphere of influence where the
Yemeni government has no control" (p. 35). As this exploitation of the Yemeni citizens as well
as the local tribes continue, it will continue to provide free roaming operational territory and
continue to pose a threat to the region as well as to the Western countries as their goal, like ISIS,
is to repel "foreigners from Muslim lands and establishing an Islamic Caliphate" (p. 32).
Counterterrorism strategy must continue to see AQAP as a potential threat so as not to continue

to let Yemen serve as a potential safe haven for Al-Qaeda leaders.
AQIM has a history of operating strictly within the Algerian borders but after an
operational transformation, they have broadened their borders to the North African region known
as the Sahelian region. Their growing operational capacity has allowed to conduct numerous
kidnapping-for-ransom attacks as well as the increased use of suicide bombings. Their targets
have remained tourists and military members along with attempted assassination attempts. Their
strategy consist of occupying and taking advantage of regions with little to no control.
Additionally, similar to AQAP, AQIM has "utilized local community integration in order to
gradually deepen its roots, grow its resource base, and develop its operational strength" (Modibo
Goita, p. 3). AQIM has exploited government response that resulted in loss of civilian life in
order to, according to Goita, “further drive a wedge between local Sahelian communities and
their national government" (p. 5). Due to the location and lack of economic resources in the
Sahelian region, as well as the close-knit makeup of AQIM, a large, comprehensive military
response will not be as successful as a centralized, remote attack that will avoid large loss of life.
It is absolutely imperative and necessary that counterterrorism seek out and exploit the
vulnerabilities of these organizations so that they are able to construct effective counterterrorism
policy against these terror groups.
Vulnerabilities
ISIS has proven itself to be a high-profile, successful terrorist organization, not only in
Iraq and Syria, but also in Europe and the United States. With the recent attacks in Paris in
January by lone wolf actors, as well as the subsequent attacks in Paris in November—all being
linked to ISIS affiliates—,it is very clear that ISIS has no plan to back down or give in.
Counterterrorism policies should be geared towards capitalizing on the vulnerabilities amongst

ISIS and using them to our advantage. Because ISIS is a very visible threat as well as very
violent and unreasonably in their operations, it causes some local Iraqis and Syrians to want
nothing to do with them. While they are trying to establish an Islamic caliphate as well as
overthrow the current government, they have no regard for human life as well as innocent
civilians. By using their high visibility and presence to our advantage, governments can pinpoint
destinations, training facilities as well as storage holds and destroy them. Anthony Celso
explains that "IS’ apocalyptic ideology and its fixation on fighting Western troops in a
predestined battle of Dabiq makes it vulnerable to open confrontation” (p. 9). In other words,
luring ISIS fighters out into open battle instead of just focusing on targeted air strikes will place
them in a weak spot and no match for our military weapons. However, with President Obama’s
refusal to place ground troops in Syria, that strategy will be hard to enforce. Celso also pinpoints
the local Sunni tribes as being the Islamic State’s “Achilles heel” (p. 9). Additionally, ISIS has
made many jihadi extremist enemies as a result of their radical ways to include local tribes
allowing this to serve as a major vulnerability as these tribes and other radical groups could
potentially increase their counterattack against ISIS and successfully weaken them. Unlike
AQAP and AQIM, targeting ISIS vulnerabilities will be a much more challenging feat as they
are greater in size, they cross different country borders and have the interest of thousands of
individuals around the world. The important aspect of weakening ISIS is to decrease recruit
numbers, social media propaganda and then work to effectively target local command centers
and other support structures in the Middle East.
AQAP has grievances both internally in Yemen as well as against Western states.
Because of that, they have an advantage over the government due to the government’s lack of
economic and financial assistance to its own people. AQAP is using these such grievances to

turn Yemenis as well as local Yemeni tribes against the government and it has been successful
thus far. If Yemen is able to prevent itself from turning in to a failed state and being further
thrust into the hands of AQAP, it will cause recruiting numbers to decrease and people to return
their faith in the local government. Secondly, by strengthening local Yemeni security forces,
AQAP will have to strengthen their efforts to fight back. If Yemeni forces are able to combat
them successfully, it will cause the organization to weaken. By targeting leadership first and
foremost, and taking out decision makers, AQAP will continue to spiral into discord and chaos,
confusion and possible departure from the organization by members.
Targeting AQIM’s vulnerabilities involves targeting internal conflicts amongst the
group. Common counterterrorism knowledge teaches that targeting a terrorist group’s core
leadership is an effective means of weakening an organization. AQIM has a history of internal
conflict amongst its group, most recently the conflict between him and Mohktar Belmokhtar as
well as with the inner Shura Council, a core cadre of religious leaders. Belmohktar, according to
Richard Nessel, “a popular AQIM sub-commander in the southern region of the GSPC, who
voiced his displeasure with Droukdel’s climb to power and subsequent expansion of operations
into the Sahel” (p. 43). This has caused a rift between the two as Droukdel is very power hungry
and willing to do whatever it takes to bolster his organization as successful. The other internal
rift is between Droukdel and the Shura Council of religious leaders. This conflict stems from
conflating statements made by the Council as well as Droukdel, which in turn “seemed to
corroborate the claim that Droukdel had begun deferring to AQ-Central for its guidance,
minimizing the role of AQIM’s own Shura Council” (p. 44). Droukdel is a very important figure
and his death would be a major blow to AQIM and open the door for increased internal conflict
in selecting a new leader. Because this organization is so hierarchy based with a centralized

leadership, it stands as their biggest vulnerability.
The most imperative aspect of a successful counterterrorism strategy is to know all
about your organization. Knowing strengths, operations, leadership, vulnerabilities, as well as
what keeps these organizations running are crucial aspects that can be used to a government’s
advantage. For example, the Islamic State operates on a considerably higher platform than
AQAP and AQIM. This is in part due to their location, their tactical successes in Western
countries as well as their very successful social media propaganda platform. Weak states such as
Yemen and Algeria located in remote parts of the world are susceptible to local conflicts as well
as socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, their members stem from these areas and are more
likely to be uneducated and illiterate. ISIS has the financial means to educate, train and send its
fighters all over the world. ISIS has unified thousands of fighters and taught them from a very
young age that the West is bad and jihad is good. Their ideologies are being mentally nailed into
the minds of recruits causing them to only know fighting. Intelligence agencies must continue to
gain information and study these groups in order to stay abreast of changes in leadership, track
financial funding as well as target and destroy critical command centers of these groups. As a
result, counterterrorism policies will allow governments to target these groups more precisely
and decrease and mitigate the threat of attacks against respective countries.

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