Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC

A Change of Policy 1
Running head: A CHANGE OF POLICY
A Change of Policy:
An Investigation into How American Foreign Policy Has Changed in the Past Two
Centuries
Student: Joseph Alexander Barnes
Mentor: Dr. David Weischadle
Thomas Edison State College, NJ
Course Title: Liberal Arts Capstone, LIB495 OL010
Date: 12/13/12

Abstract
This paper is a research into American foreign policy, in particular military interventions,
and how its objectives and strategies have changed from those of a small republic to
those of a global power. The research focuses on American policy during two periods: an
early period from 1788 to 1816 and a later period from 1947 to 2012. Three military
interventions were studied in the first period: the Quasi-War, the Barbary War, and the
War of 1812. For the later period, the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
were analyzed. The analysis for each conflict includes a look into the fiscal management
involved with wartime spending, loss of human life, causes, and outcomes. The analyses
help demonstrate the contrasts between the two periods. Several graphs and tables are
used in this paper to better demonstrate the outcomes of decision-making in the
government. The sources for the data include literature, letters, articles, public
documents, and statistical spreadsheets.

Table of Contents
Contents Page
List of Tables and Figures………………………………………………….. 4
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………….. 5
Chapter 2: Literature Review……………………………………………..... 8
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology…………………………….. 12
Chapter 4: Results of the Study…………………………………………….. 16
Chapter 5: Summary and Discussion……………………………………….. 25
References…………………………………………………………………... 66

List of Tables and Figures
Contents Page
Graph 1 – Total Revenue and Expenditure from 1796 to 1820 17
Graph 2 – Public Debt in the Period of 1796 to 1820 18
Graph 3 – Defense Spending during the Years of 1940 to 2010 19
Graph 4 – National Defense Spending as a Percentage of Total Spending 20
during Major Conflicts
Graph 5 – Total Federal Debt during the Years of 1940 to 2010 21
Graph 6 – Shares in Total Military Expenditures and World Population in 2011 22
Table 1 – U.S. Casualties during Major Conflicts in the Periods of 1796 23
to 1820 and of 1940 to 2012
Figure 1 – The Presence of the U.S. Military in Countries across the World 24

Chapter 1: Introduction
Changes in American foreign policy over the past two centuries are the topic of
this paper. The fact that differences exist between the policies of today and those of two
hundred years ago is undeniable, what is uncertain, however, is how contrasted and
significant these differences are. This dissertation then, in order to understand these
differences, runs a case study into the important policy decisions regarding military
intervention during the early administrations, in the late 18th
and early 19th
centuries, and
compares them with the decisions of military use taken in the past sixty years. The
contrasts provided by the comparisons will then illuminate the discrepancy in foreign
policy between the two periods.
Background of the Topic
One of the key responsibilities of the U.S. federal government is the creation and
management of foreign policy. Foreign policy determines a country’s standing within the
international community and its disposition towards other nations as well as their
dispositions towards it. These dispositions and relationships between countries,
depending on what they are, will either help ensure the survival of a nation or undermine
it. Given the importance of this topic, numerous works of literature, which seek to
understand the history and status of a nation, address it thoroughly. The literature cited by
this paper includes the works by Benjamin B. Carson, Larry Schweikart and Michael
Allen, Robert Leckie, and Stanley Karnow (Carson, 1987a, 1987b; Karnow, 1997;
Leckie, 1962; Schweikart & Allen, 2007).
Problem Statement

As already stated above, the fact that changes have taken place in American
decision-making is indisputable, the question that remains is to what degree these
changes have been and how intrinsic they are. The principle question is this:
How does American foreign policy over the past 60 years compare to the policy
during the early administrations over 200 years ago?
- What were America’s first policies regarding foreign intervention?
- How were these policies regarded by their contemporaries?
- What are the current American foreign policies and how do they fair?
- How are they different from the earlier ones?
Professional Significance of my Work
As a responsible citizen of a country, it is one’s duty to inform himself of the
proper responsibilities of the government, its proper management, and its suitable
outlooks and goals, in order that he or she may prudently vote for people who will
guarantee the upholding of a government that will justly rule his or her nation. One of the
key factors in the success of any government is the success in its foreign policy in
meeting the nation’s needs. Given foreign policy’s importance, one can read this research
paper in order that he may understand better the significance of our current foreign
policies, especially regarding military interventions in the Middle-East and elsewhere.
Also, given a better understanding of our ancestors’ policies compared to our own, one
could argue more skillfully in favor or disfavor of a change of policy.
Overview of Methodology
This work will consist of a case study, principally using qualitative data supported
by quantitative data. The focus of the research falls on conflicts with foreign powers, in

specific, the Quasi-War, the First Barbary War, the War of 1812, the Korean War, the
War in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, and the various modern-day operations such as
the Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The inquiries looked into various
aspects regarding these conflicts, including causes, financial gains or costs, casualties,
expectations, and outcomes. Information was gathered from literature as well as from
statistical spreadsheets provided by the government and international organizations.
Historical documents analyzed include speech transcripts, official documents, and
personal letters. When necessary, the quantitative data was summed up in tables or
graphs in order to better illustrate the trends or patterns across a certain time period.
Delimitations
The focus is on the major international conflicts involving America; other minor
interventions or conflicts, such as in South America or elsewhere, due to lack of space,
will be mostly overlooked. Other aspects of foreign policy besides military intervention,
such as trade, will also not be addressed. Domestic issues will only be briefly studied and
only when they play a key role in America’s foreign policy decisions.
Summary
This dissertation follows a case study into American foreign policy, comparing
how it stands today with how it stood over two-hundred years ago, with regard to military
intervention. This paper cites various works of literature which address the topic of
foreign policy and also it gathers raw, quantitative data from viable sources in order to
help construct clear pictures for the conclusions. The significance of this work is that it
will help responsible citizens understand better the history of early American foreign

policy as well as the changes that have taken place, in order that they will be better
informed to make the right decisions concerning present and future policies.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Prior to World War II, American foreign policy operated within a limited sphere
of influence; neighboring countries did not consider America as a key player in the world
of international politics. Although the World War I briefly interrupted her neutrality, after
the peace settlement she quickly disarmed and returned to her main craft of trading and
doing business. Overall she considered herself a neutral power, unwilling to interfere in
major conflicts. This all changed when America entered WWII. Within a few years she
became one of the strongest nations on earth, threatened only by Soviet Russia. While
WWII was a catalyst in spurring U.S. foreign policy to extend its sphere of influence
across the globe, the Cold War that followed between the U.S. and Soviet Russia
continually provided the fuel and impetus for expanding American influence and control.
Eventually the Russian superpower fell, however, leaving only America standing as the
last great power. But she did not dismantle her military nor did she choose to place
herself as an equal to the other nations. U.S. foreign policy has changed considerably,
driving the nation away from her earlier beginnings as a neutral power and causing her to
take on the role of an empire and to bear all the responsibilities and dangers that
accompany it.
Intervention in the Middle East
In the first decade of the 21st
century, the U.S. government’s foreign policy
culminated in two major military interventions, costing thousands of American lives,

trillions of taxpayer dollars, and the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in New York City, the
United States of America entered into a major conflict in Afghanistan and later Iraq. The
war in Afghanistan opened with an invasion by the U.S. and a coalition of her allies in
October, 2001. The U.S. and NATO occupation in Afghanistan still remains in place.
Over 2,100 American soldiers have been killed there, with over 17,500 wounded
(Chesser, 2012). The war in Iraq commenced with the U.S. invasion in March, 2003. U.S.
armed forces occupied the country for over 8 years, with the occupation ending in
December, 2011 when the last U.S. troops left the country. During the conflict nearly
4,500 soldiers lost their lives and nearly 32,000 others were seriously wounded (Casualty
status, 2012). According to the ‘Cost of War’ project in Brown University (Baum, 2011),
the total cost to taxpayers for these two wars combined has amounted to between 3.2 and
4 trillion dollars; civilian deaths in both wars are around 137,000 or more. With over
6,600 American lives lost, together with nearly 50,000 wounded and expenses reaching
$4 trillion, these foreign policy decisions have placed a heavy burden on the American
society and economy, one not to be easily remedied in the short term.
Similarities with the Old Empires
In addition to the two major interventions in the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy
has directed the extension of the U.S. military in proportions equivalent to the former
British Empire. 2010 estimates for defense spending, including veterans’ benefits, are
near $800 billion, with increases predicted in the immediate future (US, OMB, 2010).
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011), U.S. defense
spending alone represented 41% of all the military spending in world, while the

American population covers less than 5% of the world population (PRB, 2012). Even the
British Empire, at its peak in 1913 before WWI, had an aggregate real military
expenditure at less than 600 million pounds, an amount which has a purchasing power of
less than $64 billion today, a very small fraction of our current military spending
(Eloranta, 2010). The number of U.S. bases abroad has been officially reported at 662,
located within 38 foreign countries (US, DOD, 2010). Although the bases vary from
small and negligible outposts to massive and vital wartime command centers, and U.S.
personnel in some of the countries are in small numbers, the fact remains that the
American armed forces have extended across a vast area with enough strength to engage
in military interventions at a moment’s notice. America’s high defense spending and
sphere of influence over an enormous area have attained proportions which resemble and
even exceed the large empires of the past.
An Empire by Default
Given that the U.S. military is controlling events over a vast extension of territory,
it can then be asserted that U.S. foreign policy has placed the country in a status of
empire. A dictionary definition for the word control is “power or authority to guide or
manage” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989, p. 285). In the same
dictionary, the term empire can be defined as “something held to resemble a political
empire; esp : an extensive territory or enterprise under single domination or control”
(WNNCD, 1989, p. 408). The U.S. armed forces occupied Iraq for eight years and still
occupy Afghanistan. They have also installed numerous bases elsewhere, placing
American influence and ability to control over an “extensive territory”. U.S. foreign
policy, through the presence of the military, has directed the management and guided the

course of events in the countries of Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle
East, such as Libya. Moreover, the current administration continues to threaten the use of
military intervention to take control of affairs in other countries, such as Syria and Iran.
President Obama, in his speech to the UN general assembly (2012), stated “we again
declare that the regime of Bashar al-Assad must come to an end…” and that “the United
States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” These
actions and statements speak out of a “power and authority to guide or manage” the
affairs within these foreign countries. Although explicitly U.S. foreign policy will deny
any relation with imperial design of controlling the future of other nations, implicitly it
has led the American nation in becoming an empire by default.
Future Risks
U.S. entanglement in the Middle East is leading to further endangerment of
American lives, abroad and at home. If America enters into a war with Iran, the cost in
American lives and in U.S. dollars could be much more exacting than what was lost in
Afghanistan and Iraq (Cunnings, M. & Cunnings, E., 2012). Iran’s size is larger than that
of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. The country has observed our actions in the two wars
and has studied our strengths and faults and furthermore, it boasts technologies and
advantages not held by our usual adversaries. All this warns us that at best a conflict with
Iran will mean losses equivalent to those sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Summary
America’s foreign policy decisions in the last decade have exacted a heavy cost
from the American economy and led to the loss of thousands of American lives. Her
current intentions are to stay on a path of entanglement in the affairs of the Middle East,

with the possibility of another war with Syria or Iran or both. U.S. foreign policy
persistently relies on the use of military intervention and on the upholding of an
enormous defense budget and vast armed forces, a burden which falls entirely on the
American taxpayers. Facts and experience can thus indicate that the direction of
American foreign policy runs parallel to that of an empire and away from that of the
neutral republic that had once been the United States of America.
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
This paper’s research perspective is primarily qualitative, with some quantitative data
used in order to reinforce the conclusions. The research type for this project is a case
study, with a historical sub-type. The case study is used to generate a new theory
regarding American foreign policy, to understand how this policy, in relation to foreign
conflicts over the last six decades, stands in comparison to the policy adopted during the
earliest years of nation’s existence. The sub-questions provided are:
The investigations in this case study include observations of past and current events.
Documents were retrieved from print and online sources and were carefully analyzed to
provide accurate records. Material derived from literature, both contemporary as well as
historical, provided narrative and access to the opinions of important figures, while
historical records, such as letters, and quantitative data, gathered from statistical

spreadsheets, provided raw empirical facts that substantiated the claims cited or made
here. The observation guidelines require that all documents used in providing quantitative
data must be derived from valid sources, such as from government departments and other
sources that are trustworthy for providing valid and accurate data.
Methodology for Each Sub-Question
What Were America’s First Policies Regarding Foreign Intervention?
The first policies are regarded as those implemented during America’s early
period, while she was under the management of men who were responsible for the initial
construction, adoption, and implementation of the United States Constitution of 1787.
This period covers inclusively the presidencies of George Washington, John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Three events which involved military actions
taken against foreign belligerents were investigated: the Quasi-War, the First Barbary
War, and the War of 1812. The focus was on the civilian management on the highest
echelon in the government administration. The study involved historical narrative
provided by literature, and primary sources such as letters and statistical data. The
literature consisted of books, articles, and lectures available on print and online. Primary
sources, such as letters, treaties, and speech transcripts, are available on online archives,
including the Avalon Project organized by the Yale University. Necessary government
statistics for that early period were gathered from the bicentennial report on government
statistics by the Bureau of the Census, available on PDF form (US, BOC, 1976).
How Were These Policies Regarded by Their Contemporaries?
In order to further understand the disposition of the early American government, the
researcher studied the writings of significant players who managed the government.

These key persons included the four presidents of this time. The historical documents
analyzed included George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality and some letters
between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams (Jefferson, 1905; Washington, 1793).
What Are the Current American Foreign Policies and How Do They Fair?
The answer to the third sub-question was divided into two parts. The first part focuses
on American foreign interventions during the Cold War (between the years of 1947 and
1991), in particular the Korean War of 1950-53 and the Conflict in Vietnam of 1964-73.
The second part investigated foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. This period includes the Gulf War and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For each
intervention, the focus of research lay on the causes and justifications as well as the style
in civilian management. The outcomes for each episode were studied, in particular the
costs, by analyzing the statistics of military spending, deficit spending and public debt.
Also studied were published government statements available on the internet, in order to
understand the explicit doctrines of American foreign policy during each period.
Literature and quantitative data, available online, were used in order to understand the
implicit patterns during these periods.
How Are They Different from the Earlier Ones?
The fourth sub-question is answered by comparing the answers to the previous three
questions. The answers to the first and second questions provided the criteria by which
the early government defined competent foreign policy as well as the criteria which
defined unsuccessful policy. These answers in turn provided an understanding of the
government’s attitudes toward war, its dispositions towards belligerents and allies, its
justifications for intervention in foreign affairs, and what it regarded as necessary for

effective administration. The answers to the third question supplied an overview of the
recent and current policy and dispositions in the government. Therefore, the first two
questions provide the original data available for comparison while the third question
provides the new material with which to be compared.
Summary
The research perspective is primarily qualitative. The research type is a case study
using a historical and current setting. The research context involves major military
conflicts during two periods in American history: the period between the years 1788 and
1816 and that between 1947 and 2012. The principle tools include literature, in print and
online, published government reports, historical documents, such as letters and speech
manuscripts, and statistical spreadsheets from the government and other trustworthy
organizations. The principle method is narrative text accompanied by charts and graphs
that are drawn using quantitative data gathered from government spreadsheets. The
research is chronological, beginning with the first period, then the second, and ending
with a comparison of both.
Chapter 4: Results of the Study
As already mentioned, this research paper has focused on the differences between the
foreign policy of the early U.S. government and the policies of the recent and current
administrations. The major question is this: how does American foreign policy in the past
60 years compare to that of the early government 200 years ago? The sub-questions are
as follow:

Quantitative data has been collected from various sources. The data has been
summarized in the following graphs and tables. Each of these figures is preceded by a
brief introduction and followed with a list of its source(s). The figures are grouped
according to the sub-question(s) to which they are directly related.

What Were America’s First Policies Regarding Foreign Intervention? / How Were They
Regarded by Their Contemporaries?
Total Revenue and Expenditure from 1796 to 1820 – Graph 1
During the period of 1796 to 1820, the U.S. government strived to maintain a
balanced budget, with revenues exceeding expenditures for the majority of the time,
providing a surplus. Total receipts (revenue) peaked at $47,678,000 in 1816; total outlays
(expenditures) peaked at $34,721,000 in 1814. During this period, the major portion of
the outlays was designated for the military, veterans’ benefits and for payment of the
interest from public debt. Generally the army received more finances than the navy,
except for the period of Jefferson’s two terms as president, wherein the navy was the
principle recipient of government military spending.
Total Receipts and Outlays for the Years between
1796 and 1820
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
1796
1798
1800
1802
1804
1806
1808
1810
1812
1814
1816
1818
1820
Years
(inthousands)
Total Receipts
Total Outlays
Source: Series Y 335-338: Summary of Federal Government Finances---
Administrative Budget: 1789 to 1939 (US, BOC, 1976, pp. 1104).

Public Debt in the Period of 1796 to 1820 – Graph 2
During the period of 1796 to 1820, the consecutive administrations paid attention
to reducing public debt or at least to limiting it. The debt had been incurred from the costs
of the war with Great Britain in 1775 to 1783. The substantial rise in public debt marks
the period of the second war with Great Britain, known as the War of 1812. During this
whole period the public debt reached a minimum of $45,210,000 in 1811. The highest
peak was at $127,335,000 in 1815.
Total Public Debt for the Years between 1796 and
1820
$0
$20,000
$40,000
$60,000
$80,000
$100,000
$120,000
$140,000
1796179818001802180418061808181018121814181618181820
Years
(inthousands)
Total Public Debt
Source: Series Y 335-338: Summary of Federal Government Finances---
Administrative Budget: 1789 to 1939 (US, BOC, 1976, pp. 1104).

What Are the Current American Foreign Policies and How Do They Fair?
Defense Spending during the Years of 1940 to 2010 – Graph 3
For the first year of this period, the government defense outlay was at $2.3 billion.
The total defense outlay for 2010, at the end of this period, was at $802 billion. The totals
for defense spending include outlays for national defense as well as benefits and services
for veterans for the reason that both expenditures are directly linked to foreign and
military policies.
Government Defense Spending: 1940 to 2010
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
$800,000
$900,000
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Years
(inmillions)
National Defense Veterans Benefits and Services
Source: Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 to 2016 (US,
OMB, 2010, pp. 47 – 55)

National Defense Spending as a Percentage of Total Spending during Major
Conflicts – Graph 4
Each column marks national defense spending as a percentage of total spending
for a given year. Each column is one year ahead of that column that is immediately left of
it. The columns colored in cyan represent the years from 1940 to 1945; America was not
at war in 1940, but defense spending had been on the rise before America’s official
entrance into WWII in 1941. The highest column reaches 89.5% in the year 1945; the
lowest column marks 17.3% in the year 2001.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Percentages
National Defense Spending as Percentage of Total
Spending
Percentages from 2001 to 2010 Percentages during the War in Vietnam
Percentages during the Korean War Percentages during WWII
Source: Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 to 2016 (US,
OMB, 2010, pp 47 – 55)

Total Federal Debt during the Years of 1940 to 2010 – Graph 5
The lowest gross federal debt during this period was $50.7 billion in 1940; the
gross federal debt for the last year of this period was $13.5 trillion.
Gross Federal Debt 1940 to 2010
$0
$2,000,000
$4,000,000
$6,000,000
$8,000,000
$10,000,000
$12,000,000
$14,000,000
$16,000,000
1940
1947
1954
1961
1968
1975
1982
1989
1996
2003
2010
Years
(inmillions)
Gross Federal Debt
Source: Table 7.1 – Federal Debt at the End of Year: 1940 – 2016 (US, OMB,
2010, pp. 139-140).

How Are They Different from the Earlier Ones?
Shares in Total Military Expenditures and World Population in 2011 – Graph 6
The chief contributor to total military expenditures in the world is the United
States, with a share of 41%; U.S. population is the 3rd
largest in the world, with a share of
4.4%
1 – United States of America 5 – France
2 – China 6 – India
3 – Russia 7 – Japan
4 – United Kingdom 8 – Other
41
4.4
8.2
19.1
4.1
2
3.6
0.9
3.6
0.9
3.4
17.9
2.81.8
33.3
53
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Percentages
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Shares in Total Military Contributions Compared
to Shares in Total World Population in 2011
Shares in Total Military Contributions Shares in Total World Population
Source: Table 4.2 – The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in
2011 (SIPRI, 2011) and from 2012 World Population Data Sheet (PRB, 2012).

U.S. Casualties during Major Conflicts in the periods of 1796 to 1820 and of 1940 to
2012 – Table 1
The table below lists the estimates for total deaths and wounded during major
conflicts. War casualties are defined as the total of dead, wounded, and missing. The
estimates for missing are not provided here, however, they are usually small and
negligible. The period from 1796 to 1820 had two other international conflicts besides the
War of 1812, however, they were not regarded as wars or major conflicts by most
historians; the conflicts were decided by the navy and estimated casualties were very
light and negligible.
Conflicts Total Deaths Wounded Total Casualties
For period 1796 to 1820:
War of 1812 (1812-14) 2,260 4,505 6,765
For period 1940 to 2012:
World War II (1941-45) 405,399 670,846 1,076,245
Korean War (1950-53) 36,574 103,284 139,858
Vietnam Conflict (1964-73) 58,220 153,303* 211,523
Persian Gulf War (1990-91) 383 467 850
Operation Enduring 2,106 17,519 19,625
Freedom
(Began 2001 and still
continues)
Operation Iraqi Freedom 4,422 31,925 36,347
(2003-12)
Source: data for the War of 1812 to the Persian Gulf War were gathered from the
CRS Report for Congress RL32492 (Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010); for Operation
Enduring Freedom from CRS Report to Congress R41084 (Chesser, 2012); for Operation
Iraq Freedom from the Department of Defense (Casualty status, 2012)
*The wounded counted here include only those who were hospitalized due to wounds
received on the battlefield.

The Presence of the U.S. Military in Countries across the World – Figure 1
Areas shaded in light blue represent the countries in which the U.S. armed forces have
bases located. These bases house active elements of the U.S. armed forces. The number of bases
and their sizes vary for each country, with some having only three small sites with a single
American naval unit, such as Australia, while others have various bases with various units from
the army, navy and air force, such as South Korea.
Source: the data used to create this figure was gathered from the United States
Department of Defense (US, DOD, 2010, pp. 79-95).

Summary
Quantitative data gathered for this paper has been summarized here in various
figures and tables. The data has been collected from reports issued by the government of
the United States as well as from reports by international organizations (e.g. SIPRI and
the Population Reference Bureau). In the following chapters, the data will be subject to
interpretations and discussions and coupled with qualitative information in order to
provide answers to the listed sub-questions.
Chapter 5: Summary and Discussion
The following dissertation focuses on the foreign policy of the government of the
United States with regard to international conflicts. In the past twenty years, the U.S.
government has involved itself in various military expeditions against foreign countries,
including Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia, Somalia, and Libya. Congress made no declaration
of war for any of these missions and two of them resulted in an occupation that lasted
years. The occupation of Afghanistan, which began in fall of 2001, still holds today,
having cost more than 2,100 American lives along with over 17,500 wounded (Chesser,
2012). The occupation of Iraq lasted from 2003 to 2011 and had a much heavier toll on
life, with over 4,500 dead and 32,000 wounded (Casualty status, 2012). The summed cost
for both expeditions ranges between 3 and 4 trillion dollars, while the incessant warfare
within the two countries has claimed the lives of over 137,000 civilians (Baum, 2011).
Currently the U.S. government spends nearly $800 billion on military expenses, claiming
41% of total military spending in the world (SIPRI, 2011). The U.S. upholds a military
establishment that supersedes in firepower and manpower the British and German

Empires at their peaks before 1914 and which extends across the world with over 600
bases in 38 countries (US, DOD, 2010). These facts and more present an image of an
empire that runs contrary to the principles and intentions of our founding fathers. In order
to help demonstrate this, the following research contrasts the foreign policy of the
government during its first years with that of the recent and current administrations.
Statement of Problem
The major question is this: how does American foreign policy during the past 60
years contrast with that of over 200 years ago?
Review of Methodology
The case study chiefly relied on gathering data, both qualitative and quantitative,
from viable sources on print, available at hand or on the internet. The quantitative data
has been collected from statistical tables provided by the government and international
organizations and made available on the internet. Qualitative information was gathered
from literature as well as from historical documents, both public (e.g. treaties and speech
manuscripts) and personal (e.g. letters and interviews).
Summary of Results
o What were America’s first policies regarding foreign intervention? / How
were they regarded by our ancestors?

Decisions to enter into foreign conflicts were largely influenced by the
American economy and the government fiscal policy. The Jeffersonian
Republicans, who were in power in the years between 1800 and 1820, focused on
keeping a budget surplus in order to reduce the public debt. Rather than raise
taxes however, they instead reduced spending as best as possible, cutting the
military to its bare minimum. Deficit spending was generally avoided accept for a
brief time during the War of 1812. This deficit however was quickly closed up
and a large surplus followed to restore public debt to its earlier amounts.
o What are America’s current policies and how do they fair?
The U.S. Government over the past six decades has been steadily increasing
its defense spending, with current spending at nearly eight times that during
WWII. Military expenditures have been sustained with deficit spending,
contributing to a rising public debt that is approaching $14 trillion. While defense
spending has been increasing, military expenditures as a portion of total
expenditures have been decreasing over the decades. Military spending is
contributing to an ever-growing burden on the U.S. economy while at the same
time it is becoming less impactful on government decision-making.
o How are they different from the earlier ones?
The United States has become the world’s strongest power in terms of military
strength and spending. She currently represents 41% of total military expenditures
in the world, nearly twice as much as the next six leading military spenders,
including China and Russia, combined. Meanwhile the U.S. population is about
one-eight the size of the populations of the same six countries combined. The

American military has bases in countries across the world, each with active units
from the U.S. armed forces. Over 101,000 Americans have died on foreign soil in
five major conflicts following WWII. These conflicts have been styled as wars by
the majority of Americans, although no declaration of war has ever been
requested by the President and issued by Congress since WWII.
Relationship of Research to the Field
Research into historical documents gave insight into the minds of key players in
the field of foreign affairs, providing explanations for their actions. These documents
included letters between Jefferson and John Adams (Jefferson, 1905), and the transcript
of an interview by Matt Lauer with Secretary of State Albright on NBC-TV, released by
the Department of State (Albright, 1998). Other documents provided an overview of
administration policy regarding certain conflicts, describing the objectives as well as the
principles behind these conflicts. These sources included speeches and proclamations
made by presidents (Bush, 2001; Bush, 2002; Washington, 1793) and acts and resolutions
passed by Congress. In addition to historical documents, printed literature provided the
narrative which described events related to the above documents, giving them context
and background (Carson, 1987; Leckie, 1962; Schweikart & Allen, 2007; Stephen, 1999).
A wealthy amount of quantitative data directly related to foreign policy was collected
primarily from the government (Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010; US, BOC, 1976; US,
OMB, 2010), but also from international organizations (PRB, 2012; SIPRI, 2011). This
data enriched the research into the field of foreign policy by delineating the results of
government actions with regard to budget management, financial stability, and cost of
human life.

Conclusions
The Three Key Concerns of the Early Administrations
Washington and the Proclamation of Neutrality
By the end of 18th
century, America was a small federal republic whose concerns
were limited to a few key principles, namely the upholding of American neutrality and of
a strong overseas commerce. President Washington was the first who made this clear in
his Proclamation of Neutrality (Washington, 1793). In this executive mandate, the
president asserted that America would remain neutral in the face of the general war that
was engulfing Europe at the time and warned against Americans aiding any of the
belligerents. France had been soliciting the Americans for aid in her war against Britain
and her allies. At this time, there was strong sympathy towards France in the U.S.,
understandably since she was America’s ally and had been the strongest help during the
War for Independence. Meanwhile Britain had been adding fresh pain to old wounds by
intercepting American shipping with the French Indies, seizing more than 200 ships and
selling some as prizes (Carson, 1987a). But Washington and most of his administration
understood well that war was impractical, too costly, and, most importantly, not
necessary. Britain was America’s principle trading partner, attacking her would mean
fighting one of the strongest powers of the time while simultaneously cutting off the
primary source of commercial revenue (Schweikart & Allen, 2007). And although the
U.S. was allied to France, the treaty of Alliance between the two countries did not compel
either to fight the enemies of the other, following the peace made with Britain in 1783
(Treaty of Alliance, 1778). Even though Britain did not respect America’s freedom of the

seas, war with her was not an option. Instead, the administration agreed to the Jay Treaty,
which ended the British interceptions by diminishing American trade with the French.
Washington and the Federalists forwent their principle of defending American honor for
the sake of defending what to them was more important, peace in realm and security of
feature wealth.
The Quasi-War
Washington’s administration set the standard for future American policy
regarding foreign belligerents, and John Adams, who succeeded him as president, would
continue to follow this policy, rebuffing provocations to enter into general war and
improving the means by which America could secure her neutrality. France regarded the
Jay Treaty as a breach of her alliance with the U.S.; for her, closer association with
Britain was provocation enough for action against America. The French responded by
intercepting American ships and seizing their cargo, as the British had been doing before.
In the years of 1796 to 1797, the U.S. government reported that the French had seized
more than 300 American vessels (Carson, 1987a). The earlier sympathy towards the
French was now overwhelmed by a fresh outcry against the violations of America’s
freedom of seas. Pro-British and anti-French sentiment was particular strong in Adams’
cabinet. However, Adams first recourse was to a peaceful solution. The French,
nevertheless, were more arrogant and disrespectful towards the Americans than the
British; they were unwilling to compromise and wanted the Americans to pay an
enormous bribe before they would accept negotiations. It was at this point then, when
peaceful measures were exhausted, that Adams increased the armed forces and convinced
Congress to establish a Department of the Navy in 1798. In the years of 1798 to 1800,

during what has come to be called the Quasi-War, America’s young navy proved itself
more than capable of defeating the French at sea, humbling France and bringing her back
to the bargaining table without recourse to bribes. There had been no declaration of war
by either side, and all the action was on the high seas. The conflict was resolved with a
trade agreement known as the Convention of 1800, wherein the French recognized
America’s neutrality and freedom of the seas (Carson, 1987a). President Adams abided
by the principles set forth by Washington, but he went further than that. He oversaw the
creation of a navy, not as a tool to interfere with European quarrels, but as a means of
protecting American neutrality and commerce. He put a small yet stinging bite to the
American bark, making sure that others knew to think twice before venturing too closely.
The following administration of Jefferson would add more teeth and strength to the dog’s
maul, improving further the means to uphold Washington’s original principles.
The First Barbary War
Following Adams, Jefferson would also uphold the standards of neutrality and a
secure overseas commerce, but he added a third element, that of a frugal fiscal policy
focused on minimizing the budget and eliminating the public debt. He cut the government
budget while at the same time fighting a war. During his early administration, relations
with France and England were going relatively well; however, a new threat to American
commerce arose in the Mediterranean. Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, known as the
Barbary States, were North African principalities which largely subsisted on plundering
European merchant vessels and coastal towns. The European powers, too distracted with
their own squabbles, paid tribute to these states in order that they leave their shipping
alone. America was no exception. Before the Constitution of 1787 and after, the U.S.

government paid tribute to keep their merchants safe from harm. Even Adams, writing to
Jefferson in 1786 while he was ambassador at large, believed that if paying tribute was
less costly than waging war and maintaining an armed force, then it was better to swallow
one’s pride and accept the more practical option. Jefferson, however, disagreed; he was in
a favor of a strong navy. He argued that a navy would not only protect America’s honor
and pride, but it was in fact cheaper than paying tribute (Jefferson, 1905). When Jefferson
became President, he had the opportunity to follow through with what he had said earlier.
In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli declared war against the U.S., after Jefferson failed to
deliver the regular tribute on time. Let it be noted that Jefferson had dispatched a fleet to
deliver gifts and assurances to the pasha that the tribute would come, but when the fleet
failed to arrive on time and the pasha went to war, Jefferson, rather than seek a truce,
chose to fight instead in order to force the pasha to his own terms. Congress did not
declare war, but it authorized Jefferson through a series of resolutions to take action
against the Barbary States (Schweikart & Allen, 2007). The conflict lasted from 1801 to
1805, and it concluded with the subjugation of Tripoli. The U.S. navy successfully
maintained a solid blockade against Tripoli, with a fleet compromised of several warships
ranging from large frigates to small gunboats. A successful land expedition, consisting of
a few hundred Arab and Greek mercenaries led by William Eaton, who was a U.S.
ambassador, and a small band of U.S. marines, marched from Egypt across the desert for
five-hundred miles towards Derna, a neighbor city of Tripoli. The small force captured
Derna after a brief yet intense battle; the conquest of Derna opened the way for a land
attack against Tripoli from the east and marked American’s first foreign military
expedition as a successful one. The pasha, feeling unable to resist the Americans any

longer, was forced to sign a treaty in the summer of 1805, in which he agreed not to
attack American shipping and to accept no more tribute from the U.S.. What is
particularly interesting of this conflict was that Jefferson was able to fit out a navy
capable of overpowering the Barbary States while at the same time maintaining a budget
surplus and thus reducing public debt. He minimized defense spending and yet gave out
just enough to win a war. It can be seen on graphs 1 and 2, on pages 17 and 18, how the
revenue stays above expenses and the public debt drops. The debt dropped continually,
and by 1811, nearly 50% had been paid off. Jefferson was able to protect American
overseas commerce and to defeat a belligerent while at the same time reduce public debt
substantially. His administration was the pinnacle demonstration of a unique and
successful combination of firm resolve, willingness to fight, and frugality.
War of 1812: Declared War in the Early 19th
Century
Although the U.S. government had successfully defended American interests
while lowering public debt, it had done so while facing a weak opponent. When a more
formidable opponent encroached on American rights, without heed to compromise, the
U.S. government then, and only then, resorted to the only recourse available: war. By
1806 the fighting in Europe again began to intrude upon American neutrality, as the
British resumed their interception of American shipping towards France and her domains.
British antagonism, however, went beyond interception and seizure of cargo, but included
impressments of American sailors, who were branded as deserters from the royal navy,
and encouragement of the Indians on the Northwestern Territory to attack American
settlers (Schweikart & Allen, 2007). Jefferson was unable to compromise with the British
through peaceful means and Madison was just as unsuccessful. The British were

determined to maintain their supposed rights of searching vessels and forcefully seizing
goods and sailors. Despite these nuisances and violations of their rights, the Americans
were generally opposed to war, especially in New England, where there had always been
a strong bond with Great Britain. The shift towards war came when new representatives
were elected to Congress; these men, mainly from the western and southern regions of
the country, were in favor of going to war in order to stop the British infringements on
American rights. These “War Hawks”, as later historians would call them, successfully
dominated in Congress, and provided Madison with the support necessary for declaring
war. On June 1, 1812, Madison petitioned Congress for a declaration of war, which it
gave the same month. The war lasted for two years, and concluded with the Treaty of
Ghent in 1814. Overall, the conflict ended in a stalemate. During the war the U.S. army
had invaded Canada three times, with each invasion being unsuccessful; the British in
turn invaded the U.S. twice, once at Maryland and again at Louisiana, and in both
instances the British were thwarted, with especially disastrous results at the Battle of New
Orleans. The concluding peace restored the status quo ante bellum: conquered territory
was restored, prisoners exchanged, and American freedom of the seas and right of
neutrality were not addressed (Carson, 1987a). However, since the war in Europe had
ended, the British did not resume their interception of American ships. This conflict had
been the largest America had faced since its earlier war against Britain. Graphs 1 and 2
will show how, unlike with the Barbary War, spending went into a deficit and the public
debt rose substantially. Total casualties were little less than 7,000 (Leland & Oboroceanu,
2010). Given then, that there were no clear gains made by this war while at the same time

there were considerable losses, debates have risen as to why there had been a war in the
first place, what had been the reason for it.
Although there are many different opinions, one popular viewpoint places the
blame of the war at the feet of the War Hawks. According to this viewpoint, the war was
part of a scheme by the War Hawks, who consisted of westerners and southerners, to
provide an opportunity to conquer more territory from the British and Spanish, in
particular Canada and Florida, which they coveted. In addition to other facts, such as
various invasions of Canada and the aggressive rhetoric by the War Hawks, these
historians point to the fact that the strongest opposition to the war came from New
England, the same region which suffered the most from the British aggressive maritime
policies. If the reason for the war had been for protecting American overseas commerce
against British infractions, then why was New England, the principle region involved the
most in overseas commerce, the main opponent to the war? Thus it seems that the War
Hawks forced the New Englanders and the rest of America to fight a war, for the sake of
their own regional interests rather than those of America as a whole. It is very true that
New England was strongly opposed to the war; in fact, in 1814, the opposition was so
strong that representatives from the region held a secret convention in Hartford,
Connecticut, where they proposed such ideas as secession from the Union and making a
separate peace with Great Britain (Schweikart & Allen, 2007). But the following truths
must be noted as well. First, regardless of the motives of the War Hawks, the official
reasons for war were valid and honest: the British were violating America’s liberty of the
seas and neutrality and providing aid to Indians who attacked Americas. If today a
foreign country intercepted our trading vessels, confiscated some of their cargo and

carried away some their crew, or incited terrorists to attack our civilians, would our
government refrain from military action? Second, New England was dependent on its
trade with Britain; war with Britain hurt the New Englanders the most. Although it may
have been in the regional interests of the War Hawks to encourage war, it was likewise in
the regional interests of the New Englanders to avoid war, even if it meant hurting
national interests. Third, the War Hawks were Jeffersonian Republicans and those
opposed to war were Federalists, thus their fierce opposition to one another was not just
over the war, but was deeply involved in political factionalism. Fourth and last, although
the land campaigns principally targeted Canada, it must be remember that there were no
other targets available; Canada was the only British province within reach of the U.S.
army. It would not have made sense if the U.S. did not invade Canada, considering the
objective of the war was to attack and defeat the British and force them to terms.
Regardless, however, of the true reasons of the war, the official causes given in
the declaration of war were real ones that needed to be addressed. Great Britain, in spite
of her justifications, was mistreating the United States and it was within her right to fight
back. Furthermore, despite New England’s opposition, the war was a popular war, in the
sense that it was Congress, and not the President, that pushed for war. It was a declaration
of war, passed by the majority of Congress, which initiated the fight and it was a peace
treaty ratified by Congress that ended it. Moreover, the objectives were clear and concise:
Madison listed the grievances against the U.S. as the forceful seizure of American sailors,
violation of neutrals at sea, blockade of U.S. ports, Britain’s resolve not to desist in her
provocative actions, and her aid and encouragement to the Indians to fight Americans.
This list makes it clear that America was in the right with regard to her justifications of

war. It can at least be said then, that the War of 1812 was a clear cut war between two
powers, each fighting for the protection of its own interests. Following the end of the
conflict, both powers again became amicable towards one another; they ratified
commercial treaties between each other and deferred further disputes to committees
(Carson, 1987a; Schweikart & Allen, 2007).
Aftermath
Following the end of the War of 1812, the government resumed its normal course
as before, abiding by the three principles of defense of American rights, neutrality, and
frugality. Graphs 1 and 2 demonstrate how after the end of the war, the deficit was
quickly closed and a high surplus was provided to address the debt, which again
decreased over the years. The decline in public debt would continue until 1836, when it
reached a mere $38,000 (US, BOC, 1976). Although the Treaty of Ghent did not address
the issue of American freedom of the seas or right of neutrality, the British nevertheless
refrained from reemploying their declared rights of interception and seizure of goods and
sailors. When, in 1815, the Dey of Algiers, in violation of a treaty of 1795 that provided
him tribute, resumed to raid American shipping, the U.S. government promptly
responded by declaring war and sending a naval fleet to deal with him. Instead of a
protracted conflict of four years like the First Barbary War, this second action against the
Barbary States was over in weeks. A peace treaty was signed in June, 1815, in which the
Algerians desisted from attacking American ships and paid indemnities for damages done
(Stephens, 1999). Thus, by 1815, the U.S. government had grown strong enough to cast
away the practice of paying tribute; its navy was formidable enough to defend against
both the French and British navies and to easily subdue petty powers that preyed against

weaker nations. America’s neutrality and defense of her overseas commerce and interests
were now firmly protected.
In conclusion, the U.S. government had in its first decades demonstrated a general
tendency to follow the three principles championed by its founding fathers: neutrality,
defense of American rights and commerce, and frugality. There was a healthy balance
between these three rules. Occasionally one would predominate for a while when needed,
but it would soon restore itself to a balance with the other two. Always the objective and
purpose of each was to benefit and preserve the other two; it was a synergistic
relationship, with one serving and improving the others. The following sections will
discuss the course of events regarding foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th
century
over 100 years after the events discussed so far.
The Second Half of the 20th
century and the Undeclared War against the
Communist Powers
The first half of the 20th
century had witnessed a United States that still loosely
followed the three policies discussed above: neutrality, preoccupation with commerce
and trade, and minimal defense spending. Prior to WWII, America did break from its
neutrality to fight wars wherein she had been provoked by enemy attacks against her
citizens. These noticeably included the Spanish-American War of 1898, wherein the
Spanish were accused of sinking the U.S. warship Maine, and WWI, wherein the
Germans had attacked and sunk civilian ships, several of which had Americans on board
who died from the attacks. In each of these wars, the enemy was thus seen as an
aggressor and a threat to American lives, allowing Congress to declare a justifiable war.
Furthermore, following the conflicts’ conclusions, the U.S. government would return to

business as normal: the army would be reduced again, the country’s status as a neutral
restored, and the deficit abandoned. At first glance, WWII had been no different:
America was attacked and thousands of Americans killed, leaving Congress no choice
but to declare war, a legitimate war. The Axis powers that included the governments of
Germany, Italy, Japan, and their lesser allies were our declared enemies. For nearly four
years we fought them and finally forced them to surrender unconditionally. But the
conclusion of the war by 1945 was not the same as with the other conflicts; while before
an end to a war brought peace, the end of WWII however was not followed by peace but
by a renewed conflict.
The lack of a general peace following WWII was due to the nature of the alliance
that had defeated the Axis powers. The war had begun with the aggressions by Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia. The Germans and Russians partitioned Poland between
themselves in 1939 and then while the Germans conquered France, Denmark, the Low
Countries, and Norway, the Russians incorporated Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, and
invaded Finland. The aggressors however quickly turned on each other and by the
summer of 1941, Germany was invading Russia. Rather than let the two evils destroy one
another however, Britain and the U.S. instead regarded Russia as a victim, a friend in
need. Communist Russia’s earlier aggressions against her own people and her neighbors
were quickly forgotten, and she was made an ally to be defended at all costs. Together
Britain, the U.S. and Soviet Russia composed an alliance that was to overwhelm and
defeat Nazi Germany. Stalin of course had no intention of simply liberating Europe; as
before he wanted to dominate and so he did his best to undermine the effort by Britain
and the U.S. to reach Eastern Europe before the fall of Nazi Germany. At the conference

at Teheran in 1943, Stalin got what he wanted. Stalin insisted that his allies open a third
front against Germany by invading France, and President Roosevelt, eager to placate the
Russians, likewise urged that France be invaded. He disregarded all other plans,
including an invasion of the Balkans considered by Churchill (Carson, 1987b). Eastern
Europe was left open to Russian “liberation”. Therefore, following the end of WWII, the
British and the Americans faced a new enemy, or rather the same enemy without its
sheep’s clothing, in control of half of Europe. The fall of Eastern Europe to Communism
was already felt by 1946, when Churchill, in his famed speech at Fulton, Missouri, said
that “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent” (Churchill, 1946). Soviet dominance extended across Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and Rumania by 1946 and Czechoslovakia by 1948. Conflict
between the U.S. and Soviet Russia had begun as early as 1947, when the U.S., acting
outside of the UN, provided military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in order to
prevent these countries from falling under Communist control (Carson, 1987b). While
Communism was spreading in Europe, it was making even better headway in Asia, where
by 1949, China had fallen to Communism. Thus by 1949, within four short years after the
end of WWII, Eastern Europe and China, which the Americans had defended against
fascist totalitarianism, had fallen under Communist totalitarianism. Only afterwards did
the U.S. realize that at the beginning of WWII, the western world was facing two
enemies, but only one had been seen for the threat that it was while the other was made a
friend. Now freed from the containment by Fascist Germany and Imperial Japan,
Communist Russia and China filled their places as the new antagonists of western
civilization and democracy.

The Changes in the U.S. Government during the Cold War: End to Neutrality and the
Undeclared Wars
The conflict between the Communist powers and the U.S. generated in America a
fundamental break from her earlier policies and a shift towards new and heretofore un-
American ones: permanent alliances and preoccupation with events in foreign countries
and the use of undeclared and limited wars.
New Obligations and Responsibilities
The first break regarded permanent alliances and entanglement with the affairs of
Europe and elsewhere. The U.S., along with 50 other nations, oversaw the creation of the
United Nations Organization in June, 1945. At first, this pact was not necessarily an
alliance, but rather a commitment to avoid war and to settle international disputes through
peaceful discourse and negotiations. Overtime however, the obligations imposed by the
UN became more numerous and far-reaching and by 1950, UN resolutions were passed
calling for its member states to go to war in Korea. These resolutions could not at the
time, however, be forced upon uncommitted members; those countries who answered the
call to fight in Korea were friends of the U.S., and served more as auxiliaries with the
U.S. armed forces rather than as equally formidable forces carrying an equal load. The
conflict in Korea was very much an American fight with UN backing versus the other
way around. The UN then was at best a loose association between numerous countries,
many of which were belligerents towards each other, such as the U.S. and Soviet Russia.
The U.S. did however form a more legitimate alliance with its ratification of the North
Atlantic Treaty in 1949. The NATO alliance, between the U.S. and several other
countries including Britain and France, marked a more profound breach of America’s

neutrality; the U.S. now was obliged to help in the defense of any of the treaty’s members
and thus her neutrality was undermined by her commitment towards her allies, whether or
not that commitment was linked with America’s interests and safety. Forming the UN
and especially NATO, signified that America was abandoning her principle of neutrality
and replacing it with a disposition to fight for other countries for interests not directly
linked to her own. The U.S. was declaring that Europe, Asia, and regions elsewhere in the
world had to be defended by American armed forces. For the U.S., neutrality was thus
impossible since these very same regions were at the time in constant threat of invasions
and conflict; in order to defend them successfully, the U.S. had to be disposed to fight at
a moment’s notice. In other words, the U.S. no longer was in control of picking a fight,
this was now left to circumstances and events far out of her control. Fighting and winning
inevitable wars now became the dominant topic in Washington D.C.; America could not
think again of staying out of a fight, all she did now was think of how she could win in
the conflicts that were to come. The first of these inevitable clashes came in the
undeclared war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, which was followed by a second undeclared
war in Vietnam from 1964 to 1973.
The Undeclared Wars in Korea and Vietnam
Towards the end of WWII, Korea was still occupied by the Japanese army. Russia
and America both had agreed to enter Korea to accept the surrender of the Japanese
troops there, with the Russians occupying northern Korea above 38th
parallel and the
Americans southern Korea below that parallel. The Soviet Russians, however, were intent
on establishing a Communist regime in Korea, with the Communist Korean Kim Il Sung
at the head. The Americans on the other hand proclaimed Syngman Rhee, a descendant of

the Yi dynasty that had ruled Korea before the Japanese conquest in 1910, as the lawful
head of government. Thus the territory the Russians occupied came under control of Kim
Il’s government while the land under American occupation was governed by Rhee’s
government. The 38th
parallel, from being a line marking off where the American and
Russian armies should meet, changed into a boundary between two nations: the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea, under Kim Il Sung, and the
Republic of Korea, or South Korea, under Syngman Rhee. Both sides claimed that the
other was illegitimate, declaring that the whole of Korea was under their respective
governments. In the following years, North Korea’s army, backed by Russia, became
more disciplined and better equipped with tanks and weapons. The Americans backed the
South Koreans with financial aid but not with the kind of military training and supplies
that the Russians gave to North Korea. On June 25, 1950, after both the Russians and the
Americans had left, the inevitable clash erupted with the invasion of South Korea by the
North Koreans. The aggressor, with his superior army, pushed the defenders aside and
made headway in a rapid conquest of South Korea. At this crucial moment, the United
States entered the fight, building a successful line of defense and driving the enemy back,
across the 38th
parallel and into his own country. The U.S. armed forces were so
successful that they nearly conquered all of North Korea by October, 1950, but at that
moment China entered the struggle with a massive invasion across the Yalu River into
North Korea. The Americans and South Koreans were driven back again into defensive
positions in South Korea. By the spring of 1951, however, the U.S. renewed her offensive
into North Korea, driving the Communists back and taking some territory. But rather than
press the attack and take the whole of North Korea, the American armies stopped and

built a defensive line. Thus from 1951 to when the armistice was signed in 1953, both
forces generally remained static across the new battlefront that lay a short distance above
the 38th
parallel; this front now marks the present boundary between the modern countries
of North and South Korea. The conflict in Korea was the first major bloody clash
between the U.S. and the Communist powers; followed by a pause lasting little more than
a decade the conflict flared again, with the fighting renewed on a new battlefield in
Vietnam. The fighting in Vietnam that involved Americans lasted 9 years and was both
different and yet similar to the war in Korea. As in Korea, Vietnam was split, with the
Communists, backed by the Chinese and the Russians, holding the northern half and the
non-Communists, backed by the Americans, holding the southern end. North Vietnam,
with a superior government and army, threatened to overwhelm the south, but was only
prevented from doing so by American intervention starting in 1964. A main difference
was that there was no battlefront. The North Vietnamese, rather than invade outright
South Vietnam, instead supported the southern Communist rebels known as the Vietcong.
South Vietnam was thus engulfed in a guerilla war between the government and the
rebels, armed and supplied by the North Vietnamese. Eventually, however, the Vietcong
had sustained appalling casualties and their ranks, thinned and depleted, were replenished
by North Vietnamese and by the end, after the Americans had left in 1973, the North
Vietnamese invaded and overwhelmed South Vietnam in 1975. The conquest of South
Vietnam marked the second major difference between Korea and Vietnam; while in
Korea, America was able at least to prevent a Communist takeover, in Vietnam it was a
complete defeat with the Communists taking all of Vietnam.
The Differences between the Undeclared Wars of One Period and Those of Another

Now undeclared wars were not something new for the 20th
century. In 1754, war
essentially broke out in North America, with the British and their American subjects on
one side and the French and their Indian allies on the other. For two years the fighting
went on before Britain and France formerly declared war on each other in 1756. As
mentioned already above, from 1798 to 1800 America fought an undeclared war against
France, and again, from 1801 to 1805, against the Barbary States. However, the conflicts
that broke out following WWII were far different from those mentioned above for
various reasons.
Scale of fighting. The first regarded the difference in the scale of fighting. The
Quasi-War and the First Barbary War were almost exclusively limited to the sea. The
Quasi-War involved various small-scale engagements between warships that crossed
each others paths; there were no large fleets assembled and sent out on complicated
maneuvers to hunt down and destroy enemy ships. The war against the Barbary States
escalated slightly, as it did involve the assembling of a fleet large enough to protect
American commerce on the Mediterranean, to blockade Tripoli, and to intimidate the
other Barbary States from causing too much trouble. But the fighting was still on a very
small-scale: the Barbary corsairs had no chance against the American frigates on the open
sea and so the heaviest fighting took place at the blockade against Tripoli, where the
Americans had attempted several times to capture the harbor city by force. The land
expedition that captured Derna consisted principally of mercenaries led by fewer than ten
Americans. The fighting involved in Korea and Vietnam, on the other hand, presented a
huge contrast. A total of 5,720,000 Americans served in the U.S. armed forces during the
Korean War (Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010). The UN resolutions passed against North

Korea and China brought the aid of another 15 countries which sent a combined total of
about 160,000 combat troops to Korea (The 60th
anniversary of the Korean War
commemoration committee, 2010). The Republic of Korea itself supplied over a million
combat troops during the war. In addition to the army and marines, the U.S. deployed its
Far East naval and air forces as well as the U.S. 7th
fleet; America’s allies also provided
naval vessels, including aircraft carriers from Britain and Australia (The 60th
anniversary
of the Korean War commemoration committee, 2010). The Chinese and the North
Koreans each fielded armies of more than million men, and the Russians also provided
air supported in the form of their famous Mig jetfighters (Leckie, 1962). In Vietnam,
although there was no UN participation, the Americans fielded an even larger army,
bringing the fight to an even larger scale than in Korea. Over 8,700,000 U.S. personal
served during the Vietnam conflict, with U.S. troop strength in Vietnam reaching its peak
of 540,000 soldiers in 1968 (Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010; Karnow, 1997) The South
Vietnamese likewise fielded large armies and the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
deployed millions of soldiers during the conflict as well. During World War I, about a
total 4,735,000 Americans served in the armed forces, fewer than in Korea and only
slightly more than half the total in Vietnam. For the exception of nuclear warheads, both
sides in Korea employed the latest and most destructive weapons of war, ranging from
tanks, heavy artillery, rocket launchers, fighters, heavy bombers, aircraft carriers, and
battleships. The tactics included massive offenses involving hundreds of thousands of
troops and even amphibious assaults that paralleled those launched against the Japanese
in the Pacific theater during WWII. In Vietnam, although there was no battlefront as there
had been in Korea, this nevertheless did not prevent large scale warfare. Again the

Americans employed all her available weaponry from all branches of the armed forces;
besides the traditional tanks and bombers, the latest weaponry was also used, including
napalm and helicopters. The massiveness of the war effort in Vietnam can be attested by
the fact that by 1973 the “United States had dropped on North Vietnam, an area the size
of Texas, triple the bomb tonnage dropped on Europe, Asia, and Africa during World
War II” (Karnow, 1997, pp. 431). Therefore, while the struggles against France and the
Barbary States involved small-scale fighting, with no more than a few thousands
combatants on either side, America’s intervention in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam
reached the levels of full-scale warfare, surpassing by far even her involvement in World
War I.
Costs of war. The second difference between the conflicts before WWII and those
which followed lies in the cost. The small-scale fighting that accompanied the undeclared
wars against France and the Barbary States were matched by equally small costs. In fact,
as had been mentioned above and as can be seen in graphs 1 and 2 on pages 17 and 18,
Jefferson had minimized the defense budget to such an extreme that he was able to
maintain a surplus and reduce the public debt by nearly 50%. Although the researcher
was unable to find any casualty lists regarding these two confrontations, it can
nevertheless be inferred that the casualties were very light considering the limited
fighting that had taken place. For instance, during the War of 1812, which had witnessed
a much more vigorous war effort, including numerous land campaigns and naval
engagements, the U.S. armed forces suffered a total of only 6,765 casualties (Leland &
Oboroceanu, 2010). The costs of Korea and Vietnam on the other hand were very heavy.
Table 1 on page 23, lists the casualties, the totals of dead and wounded for each conflict.

The total of casualties for both wars was around 351,400, with the total of dead near
100,000. As can be seen on graph 3 on page 19, government defense spending during the
Korean War reached over $50 billion and during the Vietnam Conflict it reached nearly
$100 billion, roughly the same as when during WWII. Furthermore, these high costs were
sustained by a deficit spending, contributing to a rising public debt. Therefore, while the
costs of war during the conflicts two-hundred years ago were negligible, the costs that
resulted from Korea and Vietnam were grievous ones, surpassing all of America’s
previous declared wars for the exception of the Civil War and WWI & II.
Causes that led to war. The third difference to be mentioned regards the causes
and the goals of the conflicts. The quarrels with France and the Barbary States resulted
from direct aggressions against American lives and property. France was intercepting
American shipping and seizing cargo as part of her war effort against Britain and the
Barbary corsairs were essentially pirates, attacking and plundering ships and holding their
crews for ransom or enslaving them. When the U.S. government fought against these
aggressors, it was acting on that ancient right upheld by all other governments, that of
protecting the lives and property of their citizens. Given her justified actions, America’s
aims and goals were clear: simply to do what it takes to force the aggressors to stop
attacking Americans. The struggles in Korea and Vietnam however were not only
unrelated to the protection of American lives and interests, but they were frankly unclear
and imprecise. Now the principle motives indicated for American intervention at Korea
and Vietnam were the same, that of containment or the objective of halting the expansion
of Communism. However, the fact remains that the government failed to prove that the
aggressors’ actions were a direct, or even indirect, threat to American lives or property.

With Korea, according to others’ interpretations, American intervention was required in
order to secure the line of defense against Communism in the Far East. Secretary of State
Acheson, however, in a speech delivered in January, 1950, excluded both Korea and
Formosa (Taiwan) as necessary for the defense line in the Far East, going as far as to say
that to guarantee the defense of these regions was “hardly sensible or necessary within
the realm of practical relationship” (as cited in Leckie, 1962, pp. 37). This seemed a
reasonable assessment, considering that the conquest of South Korea or Formosa
wouldn’t have given a considerable gain to either North Korea or China. Neither of these
regions provided crucial ground or resources that would have tipped the balance in favor
of the Communist powers, giving them a better chance of conquering the whole of the
Far East. The general consensus in the U.S. government was that Japan was the crucial
ground to hold, and in 1950 or in the years that followed, none of the Communist powers
had sufficient naval or air power to defeat America’s navy and air force in order to reach
Japan, regardless of whether or not Korea stood or fell. It just could not be reasonably
shown that Korea or Formosa was important enough to defend at all costs. The
intervention in Vietnam was even more loosely linked to American interests than that of
Korea. American intervention in Vietnam was principally based on the domino theory,
which claimed that if Vietnam fell to Communism, then all of Indochina would also fall,
one country at a time like a line of domino bricks. Now there may have been some merit
to this argument, as Laos and Cambodia fell to Communism after South Vietnam did in
1975. However, two considerations have been overlooked. For one, the rise of
Communism always followed a collapse of the previous leadership due to internal rather
than external forces. South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were all plagued by inefficient

and corrupt governments and each had to deal with rebels from their own respective
countries. Corruption, powers struggles, coups and rebellions were the factors that
nourished a Communist victory, and all these factors were fully present in those
Indochina countries that fell to Communism. In Thailand, the spread of Communism
stopped because it, on the other hand, was not destabilized by these ailments. Thus the
domino theory was incorrect, in that the countries fell not because of some external force
pushing against it, but because of internal ones that caused an implosion; in clearer
words, the falling of dominoes ending at that piece which could stand on its own strength,
bolstered by the fact that it lacked those destabilizing elements present in the other
pieces. The second consideration regards the fact that several countries falling to
Communism did not present a deep threat to American lives and liberty. While in Europe
there was a Communist hegemony led by Soviet Russia, in Asia the picture was quite
different. There were numerous cultural and ethnical differences that precluded any kind
of coherent unity between the Communist countries. This can be more easily
demonstrated by the following facts. In 1975, while South Vietnam was being overrun by
the northern Communists, Cambodia also fell to the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian
Communist faction led by Pol Pot. Under Pol Pot’s leadership, the Khmer Rouge
attempted to establish some Marxist agricultural utopia, killing an estimated 2 million
Cambodians in the process. The destabilization in Cambodia, coupled with armed forays
by the Cambodians into Vietnam, prompted the Vietnamese to invade Cambodia in 1978.
The Chinese had sided with the Khmer Rouge and responded to the Vietnamese
aggression by invading Vietnam the following year in 1979; they were repulsed however,
but they still continued to support the Khmer Rouge guerilla fighters who resisted the

Vietnamese occupation. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, supported Vietnam, and it was
principally through her aid and backing that the Vietnamese were able to maintain an
occupation in Cambodia until 1989. This is only one example of how at times the
Communists could be at each other throats, undermining any cooperated effort to expand
Communism, such as by invading Thailand or Indonesia, and certainly frustrating any
real threat towards America.
Conflicts’ outcomes. A fourth and final contrast between the two periods of
conflicts was in the results. As had already been mentioned, both Adams’ and Jefferson’s
administrations were successful in attaining their goals of defending American shipping
from French and later Barbary aggressions. With Korea and Vietnam however, the
outcomes ranged from partially victorious to completely disastrous. In Korea, the U.S.
and her allies failed to defeat the original aggressor, namely North Korea. Instead, the
North Korean government remained intact, with its armies and fortifications still existing,
and today it continues to present a constant danger to South Korea, threatening to
reinvade that country as it did in 1950. However, there was still at least some partial
victory in that South Korea was successfully defended and saved from conquest for the
time being. Unfortunately the same could not be said of Vietnam. After nine years of
hard effort and fighting, the Americans left and two years later, in 1975, South Vietnam
was overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese invasion. All of Vietnam was then lost,
meaning that on the grand scale of things U.S. intervention achieved nothing except give
the Chinese and the Russians a reason to supply and arm the North Vietnamese. Let it be
noted however, that on the military side of things, the U.S. was in no terms defeated.
During the Korean War, the U.S. defense department estimated the Chinese casualties at

around 900,000 and those of the North Koreans at 520,000, thus total enemy casualties
were at 1,420,000, which is considerably more than the 140,000 suffered by the
Americans (Leckie, 1962; Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010). Vietnam also witnessed a very
disparate kill ratio. American casualties were a little over 210,000, of which 58,000 died,
while the Vietcong and North Vietnamese suffered appalling losses during their fight
against the French and then the Americans, with some estimates placing the death toll at
nearly a million, with hundreds of thousands more wounded. These kill ratios are only
one testimony showing that America stood undefeated on the battlefield. The true cause
of defeat was not in the superiority of the enemy, but rather in the strategy employed by
the U.S. leadership, the strategy of limited warfare. By 1951, the U.S. army was in the
position to drive back the Chinese and the North Koreans further from where it had stop
and even perhaps occupy all of North Korea. But Truman disallowed any further
advance; he was afraid of drawing the Russians in and turning the conflict into a general
war. North Korea was by this time essentially defeated and her only hope was in further
aid from China or Russia. The U.S. military wanted to bomb Manchuria, the Chinese
province which harbored the airports and bases that supplied the North Koreans, but
Truman would have none of it; he disallowed the U.S. air force from attacking north of
Yalu River, thus permitting the flow of weapons and supplies into North Korea. Thus by
1953 North Korea was heavily fortified and any future hope of a rapid victory was gone.
It was the same in Vietnam. For fear of drawing in China or Russia, Presidents Johnson
and Nixon refused to invade North Vietnam, which in turn provided the Vietcong with a
life-line of supplies and reinforcements. The concept of limited war proved to be absurd.
Has there ever been a victory where the enemy was permitted to have bases to which he

could retreat and replenish his supplies and ranks in order to strike out again? The life-
line of any war effort is logistics; poor logistics spells doom for any army, no matter how
strong, and conversely, strong and secure logistics can keep a small force on its feet no
matter how many blows it receives. The Americans could not have defeated the North
Koreans unless they were willing to fight and drive the Chinese back into Manchuria and
destroy their bases there. The Vietcong could never have been defeated unless North
Vietnam was occupied and its forces dispersed. If fighting China and North Vietnam, and
perhaps Russia, were unacceptable consequences, then the U.S. should have never
entered into war in the first place. If one is unable to do what it takes to win, than the only
other option is some insecure peace or outright defeat, both of which should be
unacceptable outcomes for any government foreign policy.
Summary
Thus in conclusion, following WWII the U.S. government abandoned its
neutrality and allowed itself to be entangled in foreign wars that were not related to
American interests. Furthermore, the means by which America addressed these conflicts
were inefficient to attain victory. Rather than declare war and make the proper efforts to
subdue the enemy or avoid war altogether, she instead resorted to making undeclared
war, limiting the efforts to be taken against the enemy and thus at best preventing any
clear victory and at worst ensuring only defeat.
America and Global Security
The end of the Cold War by 1989 marked an end to a period in American history.
With the end of Communism in Europe and Russia and with the diminished aggression
on the part of China, America no longer faced a threat of global war. It seemed that the

time had arrived for America to restore her neutrality and reduce her armies and defense
spending. But neither neutrality nor disarmament followed. Instead America emerged
herself in new conflicts that required her to stay heavily armed, with troops stationed
across the world and on the ready to intervene in foreign conflicts.
New Cause and New Enemies
America’s new cause came in the form of global security, of defending
democracy and human rights across the world. The American leadership came to see
itself as the leadership, not only of one nation, but of the world, with new responsibilities
extending beyond the simple protecting and upholding of American interests. Former
Secretary of State Albright, in an interview with Matt Lauer on The Today Show, said
that “if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable
nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see
the danger here to all of us” (Albright, 1998). On October 7, 2002, President Bush, in a
speech he delivered in Cincinnati on the government’s resolve to interfere in Iraq, on the
grounds that it allegedly held weapons of mass destruction, said that “we will meet the
responsibility of defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our
resolve, we will give strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And
by our actions, we will secure peace and lead the world to a better place” (Bush, 2002).
These quotes from the most important of the government’s leaders are indicators of the
new path the country had taken. They mark another large step further away from
America’s original policies. The earlier presidents were dedicated to protecting the
republic by remaining neutral and by choosing war only as a last resort and as a means of
protecting America’s neutrality and rights. As already mentioned, the Cold War changed

this, as America became involved with alliances and engrossed itself in foreign disputes,
allowing herself to fall into costly and avoidable wars. However, the whole purpose for it,
as the government had asserted, was to defend America from a real and tangible enemy,
that is, from Soviet Russia and her Communist satellites, which powers did not shy away
from threatening nuclear war against the U.S. and which had the means and will to carry
through with their threats. It was still believed that once the threat was gone and a general
peace restored, America would go back to her old status as a neutral. But following the
end to the Cold War, there was no stepping back and reconsidering one’s position. Rather
than face a single enemy, it made a new lists of enemies, one extending beyond
America’s capability of addressing.
Given that her new mission is defending vulnerable countries from entities
proscribed by the U.S. as aggressors against democracy and human rights, potential
targets for American military intervention have expanded significantly. In just the past
two decades, American forces entered various countries including Somalia, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Libya. Besides its past expeditions, the American
government continually threatens military intervention against countries which do not
comply with its demands. The current administration under President Obama has not
refrained from threatening intervention in Syria, on the grounds that Bashar al-Assad, the
head of the government, is a ruthless dictator supposedly causing the death of thousands
of his people. Threats have also extended towards Iran, on the grounds that the country is
attempting to arm itself with nuclear weapons, and thus potentially threatening its
neighbors with aggression. In addition to acting against sovereign countries, the U.S. has
proscribed various groups defined as terrorist organizations, in part of its so-called war on

terror. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks by the Al-Qaida, President Bush delivered a
speech in Congress on September 20, in which he declared that “Our war on terror begins
with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (Bush, 2001). This statement
declared a very broad and diverse group of organizations as enemies of America, not
necessarily for any actions that they may have committed against American citizens or
property, but because of their methods. Now many of these organizations have indeed
attacked and killed Americans, the Al Qaida being the most prominent of these.
However, by declaring a war on terror, America goes beyond simple retaliation and takes
on the task of eliminating a method of fighting that has been among humans since the
dawn of civilization. The Assyrian civilization and empire, which was at its peak by the
mid-7th
century B.C., is remembered the most for its acts and methods of terrorism, of
how the Assyrian armies destroyed whole cities, brutally killed their inhabitants,
mutilated captives, and committed other atrocities. Assyrian kings took pride in their
brutality and methods of terrorism used against their opponents; the fear and terror of the
Assyrian armies were used as a means of expanding the empire and discouraging
insurrections. Of course the use of terrorism did not start with the Assyrians nor did it end
with them. For the millennia that followed that ancient civilization, other civilizations
have used terrorism as a tool in gaining and keeping power. Even in 20th
century, in
countries that were considered civilized and socially evolved, such as Germany and
Russia, where barbarism had supposedly been vanquished, the use of terrorism would
reemerged and lead to the killing of millions of people, without consideration for sex,
age, or condition. Terror can be used even without realizing it. When the U.S.

government threatens its enemies with a nuclear warhead, is it not threatening to rain
terror down upon its enemies? Does it not hope that its enemies would be so terrified of
the consequences of a nuclear strike on their homeland, that they then would be too afraid
to attack America? How then can we now declare war on something that is as part of
humanity as violence itself? Is it reasonable to exhaust oneself in fighting the symptom
rather than the cause? Terror is the manifestation of anger, of hate, or even of
desperation; it is a tool by which people attack their enemies and overpower them, a tool
used by everyone. A war on terror, fought with physical weapons and military strategy, is
as impractical, unreal and self-defeating as a war on espionage, or a war on intimidation,
or a war on violence.
Where the New Struggle Has Led America
The Persian Gulf War. As mentioned already, the new cause of global security
has led America into a series of military interventions. The first of these was in Iraq in
what was called the Persian Gulf War. Iraq, fresh from its war with Iran, invaded Kuwait
in the fall of 1990. The UN promptly condemned Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, as
an aggressor and gave him an ultimatum, demanding that he leave Kuwait by January 15,
1991, or else force would be used against him. Iraq refused to comply; her armies were
attacked in Kuwait and driven away from the country. The forces brought up against Iraq
consisted of coalition of several countries, but like in Korea, it was the U.S. which took
the lead. President Bush had been a strong advocate in condemning Iraq and in
organizing a strong force with which to attack her. America brought the most to bear
against the enemy, and thus again, like Korea, the other UN allies served more as
auxiliaries while the U.S. led the main charge. The Persian Gulf War, however, was a

minor action. The conflict began in January and ended in April of that same year. The
Iraqi armies and air force were thoroughly dispersed and eliminated as potential threats.
The success in this enterprise was best felt by the fact that the American casualties were
very light, with a total of 850, of which only 383 died (Leland & Oboroceanu, 2010).
This first action, which had been fought in the name of restoring international peace and
insuring global security, had then been rather successful, with light casualties and a small
duration. In the following years there would be at least two more military interventions,
one in Somalia and another in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These however, were on a smaller
scale than in Kuwait and Iraq, and, due to insufficient information, will not be addressed
here.
The conflict in Afghanistan and the second war in Iraq. America’s resolve
towards global security intensified following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These attacks
directly led to the intervention in Afghanistan and indirectly to the second conflict in
Iraq. The Al-Qaida was the terrorist group which was responsible for the attacks in New
York, and their principle bases were in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Taliban regime that
governed Afghanistan aided and supported these terrorists. By attacking and killing
American citizens, the Al-Qaida essentially declared war on the U.S., and the U.S. in turn
had the right to respond with like force against the Al-Qaida and their allies, the Taliban.
The U.S. government gave an ultimatum, demanding that the Taliban, among other
things, close down the terrorist camps and surrender their leaders to the U.S., or else they
would “share in their [Al Qaida’s] fate” (Bush, 2001). The Taliban failed to comply, and
in October, 2001, the U.S. and NATO invaded Afghanistan. The action against the Al-
Qaida and the Taliban was thus a justified one, in the sense that it was founded on that

ancient right of self-defense, were the aggressor fired the first shot and thus made himself
a target for retaliation. But following the initial invasion and defeat and dispersion of the
Taliban and Al-Qaida, the U.S. government did not pull back, as it had previously done
in Iraq, and instead it established an occupation of Afghanistan and still occupies it to this
day. Although sufficient information regarding the initial causes for occupation could not
be gathered, it can, however, be shown that the U.S. occupation was ultimately linked to
the establishment of a new government and system of law in that country. Thus, what
started as a strike back operation, converted into a nation-building enterprise. The second
war in Iraq had a different beginning but the same end. With Iraq, the U.S. government
believed that Saddam Hussein, who still controlled the government in Iraq, was harboring
weapons of mass-destruction. The justification behind American intervention was along
the same lines as those behind the Persian Gulf War in 1991: to stop the aggression of
Saddam Hussein, who, now allegedly armed with deadly weapons, was posed to cause
even more trouble than before. Thus, in 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq and quickly defeated
and deposed Hussein. But as in Afghanistan, what began as a swift stroke that quickly
defeated an opponent, turned into a protracted occupation lasting years, with a focus
changed towards the creation of a new government and new laws in a foreign country.
The occupation lasted until the end of 2011, when the last American troops left the
country. In conclusion, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government
expanded her endeavors for global security, launching Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom, which operations went beyond retaliation for those attacks against
Americans, but instead involved the establishing, by military force, of new governments
and leaderships in the countries of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Intervention elsewhere. Military intervention for the sake of global security and of
installing new governments in other countries has not ended with Iraq and Afghanistan.
In 2011, President Obama provided limited air support to the rebels in Libya, who had
risen against Muammar Gaddafi and his regime. American intervention thus directly
contributed to the downfall of Gaddafi and his government in Libya, providing the means
for a new leadership to take control of the country. As mentioned already, the U.S.
administration has threatened military force against the Syrian government under Bashar
al-Assad; the same administration has also threatened military action against Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the leader of Iran, for his alleged attempts of developing nuclear warheads.
Undoubtedly then, military intervention, with the purpose of removing a government that
does not cooperate with American interference in its own affairs, is a current policy that
may involve more wars in the Middle-East in the months or years to come.
Consequences
The broadness of America’s objectives has led her to take on more and more
global responsibilities that are taking an increasingly heavy toll on the American public.
The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost already more than $3 trillion and the
occupation of Afghanistan is still in place and will continue to cost billions of dollars
(Baum, 2011). Causalities for both operations have reached nearly 56,000, of which
6,528 are dead (Casualty status, 2012; Chesser, 2012). Graph 3 depicts how defense
spending has been on the steady rise, reaching as far as $800 billion by 2010, over eight
times the military budget during WWII. The dangers in high defense spending are evident
in the increasingly high gross federal debt demonstrated in graph 5, where the debt has
nearly reached $14 trillion by 2010. This enormous debt is projected to rise even higher,

Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC

Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC

Recomendados

Recomendados

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Mais procurados (20)

Destaque

Destaque (13)

Semelhante a Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC

Semelhante a Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC (9)

Liberal Arts Capstone 2013 TESC