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The pattern of violent incidents attributed to Salafist groups in Libya from March 2012 to September 2012 indicate that
security across the country, and particularly in Benghazi, had deteriorated prior to the attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi.

Salafist attacks over the last six months were concentrated in the eastern city of Benghazi. An important inflection point
marking an increase in attacks was a demonstration held in Benghazi on June 7, 2012, in which heavily armed Salafist
groups from across the country called for the establishment of Sharia law in Libya.

During this time, militant Salafists targeted U.S. and other Western diplomatic and humanitarian entities, such as the U.N.
and U.K. missions in Libya and the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), before the attack on
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. Violence against Western targets increased dramatically during
the month of June 2012, as illustrated by the timeline on the following slide. Salafist groups claimed credit for several
attacks.

Attacks against Western interests during this time targeted not only physical structures such as Consulates and office
buildings, but also softer mobile targets such as diplomatic vehicles, sometimes in broad daylight. Attackers employed
weapon systems ranging from grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

An IED attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in early June 2012 caused a significant breach in the facility’s perimeter.
This event in particular demonstrated a vulnerability that justified the establishment of a heightened threat level at the U.S.
Consulate in Benghazi and should have corresponded with increased physical security and increased intelligence
gathering.

In the weeks prior to the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, members of the Consulate’s local guard force,
comprised of contracted members of a local militia, heard rumors of a pending militant attack on the facility. This reflection,
if reported prior to the attack, could have triggered a warning and a heightened state of alert. Instead, physical security at
the U.S. Consulate on September 11, 2012 remained at a minimal posture that proved insufficient to withstand 2 direct a
attack.
Title
Attacks leading up to the assault on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi demonstrated an imminent threat and justified a heightened state of alert.




                                                                                                                           Warning Indicator
                                                                                                                                        3
                                                                                                                           Other violent events
Title
  The U.S. Consulate in Benghazi sustained a deliberate, coordinated, and complex attack. Physical security was insufficient to withstand the attack.




  On September 11, 2012, the                                                                                              Personnel retreated to a
    main building of the U.S.                                                                                          secondary compound located
   Consulate in Benghazi was                                                                                             .5 miles to the south of the
  attacked by militants armed                                                                                          main building, identified as the
   with RPGs, truck mounted                                                                                             “annex.” Upon arriving at the
    artillery, and small arms.                                                                                             annex, personnel were
    Attackers penetrated the                                                                                           assaulted by mortar and small
 compound via the main gate.                                                                                             arms fire. It was during this
 U.S. security forces attempted                                                                                        attack that Tyrone Woods and
  to retake the compound, but                                                                                          Glen Doherty were killed, and
    they were unsuccessful.                                                                                              several security personnel
   Ambassador Stevens and                                                                                                 were critically wounded.
 Sean Smith were killed at the
           main building.


                            Alan McLean, Sergio Pecanha, Archie Tse, and Lisa Waananen | “The Attack on the American
                            Mission in Benghazi, Libya” | New York Times | 1 October 2012


The U.S. Consulate facility was neither purpose-built nor hardened to match the threat, specifically to withstand penetration and attacks by
grenade, RPG, or explosive devices. The facility was gated, equipped with a safe room, and guarded by layered security.
The layered security posture was insufficient to match the threat:
•    Marine Embassy Guards were not present at the U.S. Consulate at Benghazi.
•    Five State Department Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) personnel were on hand. The DSS posture was insufficient to withstand the assault.
•    External security was provided by members of a local militia, the “17th of February Martyrs Brigade,” paid at a rate of $30/day, contracted
     through the Blue Mountain Group. Three members were located at the U.S. Consulate at the time of the attack.
•    A Quick Reaction Force was located at the “annex.” The QRF and Libyan security forces secured both compounds after six hours. 4
Title
 Information gained from international media sources about Libyan Salafist groups, al-Qaeda in Libya, and the escalating pattern of attacks across Libya justified an increased threat level.

                                           This map illustrates the geographic concentrations of attacks in Libya, March 2012 – September 2012.

                                                 Tripoli
                                                              Zultan                                                                             Derna
                                                                   Misrata
                                                                                                                        Benghazi
  Katiba al-Ahrar Libya                                                                                                                                       Ansar al-Shariah Brigade
          Serte                                                                                                                                                       Benghazi




                                                                                                                                                               Ansar al-Shariah Brigade
     Katiba Dir’ Libya                                                                                                                                                  Derna
          Kufra

  ** The al-Qaeda standard above
   was flown during the Ansar al-
 Sharia demonstration in Benghazi
      on June 7, 2012. It is not                                                                                                                            Brigades of the Imprisoned
  assessed to represent Katiba al-                                                                                                                          Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman
      Ahrar Libya or Dir’ Libya                               Sabha
            specifically.

At least three known Libyan Salafist groups, based out of Benghazi and Derna, present a threat to U.S. interests in Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Brigade
in Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Derna, and the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman.

While the network affiliations of these groups remain unclear, their existence aligns with reported al-Qaeda objectives to establish a presence in
Libya. Several key AQ figures, to include Abd-al-Basit Azuz, Abu Anas al Libi, and Wisam Ben Hamid, are assessed to be active in Libya and
cultivating additional networks. Additional networks mentioned in reporting include Katiba al- Ahrar Libya in Serte and Dir’ Libya in Kufra.

Before the attack on September 11, 2012, information from international media sources about these Libyan Salafist groups and al-Qaeda’s
                                                                                                                                         5
objectives in Libya, viewed in light of the spread of attacks across Libya as well as the concentration in Benghazi, justified an increased threat
assessment to U.S. interests there. An increased threat level could have generated an overall increase in the security posture of U.S. diplomatic
missions in Libya.
Title
•   “Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, August 2012.
•   “Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi strength on display,” YouTube video, 14:54, published by Thiyyawarrior, September 19, 2012. Available online at
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBmfUpOdSF4.
•   “Armed men rally for Islamic law in Libya’s Benghazi,” Agence France-Presse, June 7, 2012.
•   “Assailants attack UN convoy in Libya, no one hurt,” Associated Press, April 10, 2012.
•   “Attack During Carjacking,” Embassy of the United States Tripoli, Libya, August 6, 2012.
•   “Benghazi jail break thwarted,” Libya Herald, April 26, 2012.
•   “Benghazi Security ‘Inappropriately Low’ says Former Regional Security Officer, Eric Nordstrom,” The Guardian Express Newspaper, October 18, 2012.
•   Benotman, Noman and Emad Naseraldin. “Rising Jihadism in Libya: the Abdul Rahman Brigade’s Goal in Attacking Western Targets,” Quilliam, June 13,
    2012.
•   “Bomb explodes outside Tunisian consulate in Tripoli,” Reuters, June 26, 2012.
•   “Brief on militant Islamist factions currently active in Libya,” SITE Intelligence Group, September 12, 2012.
•   “Blast and jailbreak rock Libya’s Benghazi,” Al-Jazeera, August 1, 2012.
•   “Blast rocks military intelligence building,” Associated Press, August 1, 2012.
•   Coker, Margaret. “Militant suspected in attack in Libya remains at large,” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2012.
•   Cousins, Michael. “Benghazi High Court bombed,” Libya Herald, April 27, 2012.
•   Cruickshank, Paul et al. “Pro al Qaeda group seen behind deadly Benghazi attack that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens,” CNN, September 12, 2012.
•   Ellawati, Maha. “Clashes over Sufi shrine kill 3 in Libya,” Saudi Gazette, September 9, 2012.
•   “Explosion in Benghazi mystifies locals,” Libya Herald, August 1, 2012.
•   Fitzgerald, Mary. “It wasn’t us,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2012.
•   “Fury over attack on British war graves in Benghazi,” BBC News, March 4, 2012.
•   Grant, George. “‘Salafists target women’s beauty parlor in Benghazi,” Libya Herald, June 13, 2012.
•   Grant, George and Hadi Fornaji. “Abushagur vows to do ‘whatever it takes’ to put a stop to Ansar Al-Sharia ‘inferno’ threat,” Libya Herald, September 19,
    2012.
•   “Iran Red Crescent team ‘kidnapped’ in Libya,” Al-Jazeera, July 31, 2012.
•   Joscelyn, Thomas. “Al Qaeda’s plan for Libya highlighted in congressional report,” Long War Journal, September 21, 2012.
•   Kelly, Mike. “Libya security cut while Vienna embassy gained Chevy Volts,” The Washington Times, October 10, 2012.
•   Kirkpatrick, David D. “Libya Singles Out Islamist as a Commander in Consulate Attack, Libyans Say,” The New York Times, October 17, 2012.
•   Letter from Rep. Darrell E. Issa and Rep. Jason Chaffetz to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, October 2, 2012. Available online at
    http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/10.2.12-Issa-Chaffetz-to-Clinton.pdf.
•   “Libya: Hundreds of Heavily Armed Salafi-Jihadist in Benghazi Demoand Sharia Law 9/June/2012,” YouTube video, 2:42, published by VexZeez, Septembe
    17, 2012. Available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHCFqdDFrqM.
•   “Libya: Salafis Storm Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi and Remove National Flag,” Tunis Afrique Presse, June 19, 2012.
•   “Libya unrest: UK envoy’s convoy attacked in Benghazi,” BBC News, June 11, 2012.
                                                                                                                                                 6
Title
•   “Libyan Jihadist Group Claims Bombing US Consulate in Benghazi,” SITE, June 11, 2012.
•   “Libyan jihadis claims US consulate attack: SITE,” AFP, June 11, 2012.
•   “Libyans storm Ansar Al-Shariah compound in backlash after attack on US Consulate,” Associated Press, September 21, 2012.
•   “Man Injured in Attack on Red Cross Office in Misurata,” The Tripoli Post, June 12, 2012.
•   Marine Corps Embassy Security Group official website, accessed October 18, 2012. Available online at http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/.
•   McLean, Alan et al. “The Attack on the American Mission in Benghazi, Libya,” The New York Times, October 1, 2012.
•   Nordstrom, Eric Allan. Prepared Statement at the request of Chairman Issa, and the Committee On Oversight & Government Reform, in support of
    Hearing on Security Failures in Benghazi, Tripoli on September 11, 2012, delivered October 10, 2012. Available online at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
    content/uploads/2012/10/2012-10-09-NORDSTROM-Written-Statement-Final1.pdf.
•   O’Bagy, Elizabeth. “Middle East Security Report 6: Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2012.
•   Pack, Jason. “Armed Salafist Protest in Benghazi,” Libya Analysis, June 7, 2012.
•   “Red Cross says one wounded in attack on office in Libya,” AFP, June 12, 2012.
•   Robertson, Nic, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister. “Growing concern over jihadist ‘safe haven’ in eastern Libya,” CNN, May 15, 2012.
•   Robertson, Nic, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister. “Pro-al-Qeada group seen behind deadly Benghazi attack,” CNN, September 13, 2012.
•   “Rocket-Propelled Grenade Hits Benghazi’s ICRC Offices,” The Tripoli Post, May 23, 2012.
•   Russell, Al. “Tripoli’s Al-Sha’ab shrine demolished,” Libya Herald, August 25, 2012. al-Shalchi, Hadeel.
•   “Salafists target historic madrassa in central Tripoli,” Libya Herald, August 29, 2012.
•   “Securing Our Embassies Overseas,” U.S. Department of State official website, accessed October 18, 2012. Available online at
    http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9004.htm.
•   “Sufi shrines attacked ‘by Islamist hardliners’ in Libya,” Malta Today, August 26, 2012.
•   al-Tommy, Mohammed and Hadeel Al-Shalchi. “Gunmen attack Tunisian consulate in Benghazi,” Reuters, June 18, 2012.
•   al-Tommy, Mohammed and Hadeel Al-Shalchi. “U.N. convoy targeted in explosion in east Libya: spokeswoman,” Reuters, April 10, 2012.
•   Travel Advisory for Libya, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October 5, 2012.
•    “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961,” United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95., 2005.
•   Wehrey, Frederic. “Libya’s Salafists in search of relevance,” The Daily Star, September 14, 2012.
•   Windrem, Robert. “Benghazi emerges as key recruiting ground for al-Qaeda, US intel analysts say,” NBC News, September 17, 2012.
•   “U.S. official says superiors worked against effort to boost Benghazi security,” CNN, October 11, 2012.
•   Zelin, Aaron Y. “Khow your Ansar al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012.




                                                                                                                                                   7

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Warning in Libya: The Rise of an Imminent Threat

  • 1. Title 1
  • 2. Title The pattern of violent incidents attributed to Salafist groups in Libya from March 2012 to September 2012 indicate that security across the country, and particularly in Benghazi, had deteriorated prior to the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Salafist attacks over the last six months were concentrated in the eastern city of Benghazi. An important inflection point marking an increase in attacks was a demonstration held in Benghazi on June 7, 2012, in which heavily armed Salafist groups from across the country called for the establishment of Sharia law in Libya. During this time, militant Salafists targeted U.S. and other Western diplomatic and humanitarian entities, such as the U.N. and U.K. missions in Libya and the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), before the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. Violence against Western targets increased dramatically during the month of June 2012, as illustrated by the timeline on the following slide. Salafist groups claimed credit for several attacks. Attacks against Western interests during this time targeted not only physical structures such as Consulates and office buildings, but also softer mobile targets such as diplomatic vehicles, sometimes in broad daylight. Attackers employed weapon systems ranging from grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). An IED attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in early June 2012 caused a significant breach in the facility’s perimeter. This event in particular demonstrated a vulnerability that justified the establishment of a heightened threat level at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi and should have corresponded with increased physical security and increased intelligence gathering. In the weeks prior to the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, members of the Consulate’s local guard force, comprised of contracted members of a local militia, heard rumors of a pending militant attack on the facility. This reflection, if reported prior to the attack, could have triggered a warning and a heightened state of alert. Instead, physical security at the U.S. Consulate on September 11, 2012 remained at a minimal posture that proved insufficient to withstand 2 direct a attack.
  • 3. Title Attacks leading up to the assault on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi demonstrated an imminent threat and justified a heightened state of alert. Warning Indicator 3 Other violent events
  • 4. Title The U.S. Consulate in Benghazi sustained a deliberate, coordinated, and complex attack. Physical security was insufficient to withstand the attack. On September 11, 2012, the Personnel retreated to a main building of the U.S. secondary compound located Consulate in Benghazi was .5 miles to the south of the attacked by militants armed main building, identified as the with RPGs, truck mounted “annex.” Upon arriving at the artillery, and small arms. annex, personnel were Attackers penetrated the assaulted by mortar and small compound via the main gate. arms fire. It was during this U.S. security forces attempted attack that Tyrone Woods and to retake the compound, but Glen Doherty were killed, and they were unsuccessful. several security personnel Ambassador Stevens and were critically wounded. Sean Smith were killed at the main building. Alan McLean, Sergio Pecanha, Archie Tse, and Lisa Waananen | “The Attack on the American Mission in Benghazi, Libya” | New York Times | 1 October 2012 The U.S. Consulate facility was neither purpose-built nor hardened to match the threat, specifically to withstand penetration and attacks by grenade, RPG, or explosive devices. The facility was gated, equipped with a safe room, and guarded by layered security. The layered security posture was insufficient to match the threat: • Marine Embassy Guards were not present at the U.S. Consulate at Benghazi. • Five State Department Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) personnel were on hand. The DSS posture was insufficient to withstand the assault. • External security was provided by members of a local militia, the “17th of February Martyrs Brigade,” paid at a rate of $30/day, contracted through the Blue Mountain Group. Three members were located at the U.S. Consulate at the time of the attack. • A Quick Reaction Force was located at the “annex.” The QRF and Libyan security forces secured both compounds after six hours. 4
  • 5. Title Information gained from international media sources about Libyan Salafist groups, al-Qaeda in Libya, and the escalating pattern of attacks across Libya justified an increased threat level. This map illustrates the geographic concentrations of attacks in Libya, March 2012 – September 2012. Tripoli Zultan Derna Misrata Benghazi Katiba al-Ahrar Libya Ansar al-Shariah Brigade Serte Benghazi Ansar al-Shariah Brigade Katiba Dir’ Libya Derna Kufra ** The al-Qaeda standard above was flown during the Ansar al- Sharia demonstration in Benghazi on June 7, 2012. It is not Brigades of the Imprisoned assessed to represent Katiba al- Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman Ahrar Libya or Dir’ Libya Sabha specifically. At least three known Libyan Salafist groups, based out of Benghazi and Derna, present a threat to U.S. interests in Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Derna, and the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. While the network affiliations of these groups remain unclear, their existence aligns with reported al-Qaeda objectives to establish a presence in Libya. Several key AQ figures, to include Abd-al-Basit Azuz, Abu Anas al Libi, and Wisam Ben Hamid, are assessed to be active in Libya and cultivating additional networks. Additional networks mentioned in reporting include Katiba al- Ahrar Libya in Serte and Dir’ Libya in Kufra. Before the attack on September 11, 2012, information from international media sources about these Libyan Salafist groups and al-Qaeda’s 5 objectives in Libya, viewed in light of the spread of attacks across Libya as well as the concentration in Benghazi, justified an increased threat assessment to U.S. interests there. An increased threat level could have generated an overall increase in the security posture of U.S. diplomatic missions in Libya.
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  • 7. Title • “Libyan Jihadist Group Claims Bombing US Consulate in Benghazi,” SITE, June 11, 2012. • “Libyan jihadis claims US consulate attack: SITE,” AFP, June 11, 2012. • “Libyans storm Ansar Al-Shariah compound in backlash after attack on US Consulate,” Associated Press, September 21, 2012. • “Man Injured in Attack on Red Cross Office in Misurata,” The Tripoli Post, June 12, 2012. • Marine Corps Embassy Security Group official website, accessed October 18, 2012. Available online at http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/. • McLean, Alan et al. “The Attack on the American Mission in Benghazi, Libya,” The New York Times, October 1, 2012. • Nordstrom, Eric Allan. Prepared Statement at the request of Chairman Issa, and the Committee On Oversight & Government Reform, in support of Hearing on Security Failures in Benghazi, Tripoli on September 11, 2012, delivered October 10, 2012. Available online at http://oversight.house.gov/wp- content/uploads/2012/10/2012-10-09-NORDSTROM-Written-Statement-Final1.pdf. • O’Bagy, Elizabeth. “Middle East Security Report 6: Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2012. • Pack, Jason. “Armed Salafist Protest in Benghazi,” Libya Analysis, June 7, 2012. • “Red Cross says one wounded in attack on office in Libya,” AFP, June 12, 2012. • Robertson, Nic, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister. “Growing concern over jihadist ‘safe haven’ in eastern Libya,” CNN, May 15, 2012. • Robertson, Nic, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister. “Pro-al-Qeada group seen behind deadly Benghazi attack,” CNN, September 13, 2012. • “Rocket-Propelled Grenade Hits Benghazi’s ICRC Offices,” The Tripoli Post, May 23, 2012. • Russell, Al. “Tripoli’s Al-Sha’ab shrine demolished,” Libya Herald, August 25, 2012. al-Shalchi, Hadeel. • “Salafists target historic madrassa in central Tripoli,” Libya Herald, August 29, 2012. • “Securing Our Embassies Overseas,” U.S. Department of State official website, accessed October 18, 2012. Available online at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9004.htm. • “Sufi shrines attacked ‘by Islamist hardliners’ in Libya,” Malta Today, August 26, 2012. • al-Tommy, Mohammed and Hadeel Al-Shalchi. “Gunmen attack Tunisian consulate in Benghazi,” Reuters, June 18, 2012. • al-Tommy, Mohammed and Hadeel Al-Shalchi. “U.N. convoy targeted in explosion in east Libya: spokeswoman,” Reuters, April 10, 2012. • Travel Advisory for Libya, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October 5, 2012. • “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961,” United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95., 2005. • Wehrey, Frederic. “Libya’s Salafists in search of relevance,” The Daily Star, September 14, 2012. • Windrem, Robert. “Benghazi emerges as key recruiting ground for al-Qaeda, US intel analysts say,” NBC News, September 17, 2012. • “U.S. official says superiors worked against effort to boost Benghazi security,” CNN, October 11, 2012. • Zelin, Aaron Y. “Khow your Ansar al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012. 7