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Bypassing patchguard on Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 
Mark Ermolov, Artem Shishkin 
Positive Technologies
What is patchguard? 
―“Please don’t patch our kernels” call from MS 
―Even if your kernel patch is correct, you’ll catch a BSOD 
•0x109 CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION 
―Protected structures 
•System images: ntoskrnl.exe, win32k.sys, hal.dll etc. 
•System structures: IDT, GDT, Syscalltables etc. 
―Periodic checksums validation for protected stuff 
―Doesn’t work on Windows 9
What if we really need to? 
―Go for it! 
―But… 
•Patchguard developers are prepared for reverse engineers 
•Hyper-inlinedobfuscation © Alex Ionescu 
•Anti-debugging tricks 
•Several ways of checks invocation
Code obfuscation 
―Symbol stripping
Code obfuscation 
―Misleading names
Code obfuscation 
―Code junk generation 
•Loop unrolling 
•Dead code insertion 
•Indirect calls and variable accesses
Anti-debugging 
―Works only on free builds without kernel debugger!
Anti-debugging 
―Randomly inserted checks for debugger presence
Anti-debugging 
―If you use breakpoints, they will be included to a patchguard checksum, leading to a 0x109 bugcheck 
―If you use hardware breakpoints, well…
Non-linear code flow 
―Active usage of Vectored Exception Handling
Reverse-engineering 
―For dynamic analysis with KD (with windbgf.e.) 
•Remove all kdpresence checks manually 
—Look them up with IDA scripting 
—Apply patches in KD with pykd 
—Do it before “Phase1InitializationDiscard“ 
―For static analysis with IDA 
•Try not to give up waiting for patchguard initialization function decompilation 
―Use something else, like hypervisor-based debugger ;)
Reverse-engineering 
―Since patchguard is developed incrementally, the key functions in reversing it are 
•KiFilterFiberContext–chooses the way for invoking patchguard checks 
•Unnamed sub inside KiFilterFiberContext–creates a structure aka patchguard context and schedules it’s verification 
•Other functions (like context checkers) can be misleadingly named, but you can look them up around KiFilterFiberContextsince they are located in a single compilation unit
Bypassing patchguard 
―There are different approaches 
•patch kernel image so that patchguard will just not start 
•hook KeBugCheckExand restore the state of a system 
•modify checkers so that they would be always valid 
•de-schedule contexts verification 
—This is what we’ve implemented
Contexts verification scheduling 
―Context verification might be launched with 
•KeSetCoalescableTimer 
—A timer that periodically launches context verification 
•Prcb.AcpiReserved 
—A certain ACPI event (f.e. Idle transition) 
•Prcb.HalReserved 
—A haltimer clock 
•PsCreateSystemThread 
—A queued system thread that sleeps a random amount of time 
•KeInsertQueueApc 
—A queued regular kernel APC 
•KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc 
—A periodic event which happens every "KiBalanceSetManagerPeriod" ticks
Contexts verification descheduling 
―So we’ve got to deschedulecontext verification once and for all 
•KeSetCoalescableTimer 
—Timer? Disable! 
•Prcb.AcpiReserved 
—Zero out this field 
•Prcb.HalReserved 
—Same here 
•PsCreateSystemThread 
—Scan sleeping worker threads and set wait time to infinite for suitable 
•KeInsertQueueApc 
—Same here 
•KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc 
—Revert to KiBalanceSetManagerDeferredRoutine
•research [at] ptsecurity[dot] com 
•www.ptsecurity.com 
•blog.ptsecurity.com 
Thank you!

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Bypassing patchguard on Windows 8.1 and Windows 10

  • 1. Bypassing patchguard on Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 Mark Ermolov, Artem Shishkin Positive Technologies
  • 2. What is patchguard? ―“Please don’t patch our kernels” call from MS ―Even if your kernel patch is correct, you’ll catch a BSOD •0x109 CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION ―Protected structures •System images: ntoskrnl.exe, win32k.sys, hal.dll etc. •System structures: IDT, GDT, Syscalltables etc. ―Periodic checksums validation for protected stuff ―Doesn’t work on Windows 9
  • 3. What if we really need to? ―Go for it! ―But… •Patchguard developers are prepared for reverse engineers •Hyper-inlinedobfuscation © Alex Ionescu •Anti-debugging tricks •Several ways of checks invocation
  • 6. Code obfuscation ―Code junk generation •Loop unrolling •Dead code insertion •Indirect calls and variable accesses
  • 7. Anti-debugging ―Works only on free builds without kernel debugger!
  • 8. Anti-debugging ―Randomly inserted checks for debugger presence
  • 9. Anti-debugging ―If you use breakpoints, they will be included to a patchguard checksum, leading to a 0x109 bugcheck ―If you use hardware breakpoints, well…
  • 10. Non-linear code flow ―Active usage of Vectored Exception Handling
  • 11. Reverse-engineering ―For dynamic analysis with KD (with windbgf.e.) •Remove all kdpresence checks manually —Look them up with IDA scripting —Apply patches in KD with pykd —Do it before “Phase1InitializationDiscard“ ―For static analysis with IDA •Try not to give up waiting for patchguard initialization function decompilation ―Use something else, like hypervisor-based debugger ;)
  • 12. Reverse-engineering ―Since patchguard is developed incrementally, the key functions in reversing it are •KiFilterFiberContext–chooses the way for invoking patchguard checks •Unnamed sub inside KiFilterFiberContext–creates a structure aka patchguard context and schedules it’s verification •Other functions (like context checkers) can be misleadingly named, but you can look them up around KiFilterFiberContextsince they are located in a single compilation unit
  • 13. Bypassing patchguard ―There are different approaches •patch kernel image so that patchguard will just not start •hook KeBugCheckExand restore the state of a system •modify checkers so that they would be always valid •de-schedule contexts verification —This is what we’ve implemented
  • 14. Contexts verification scheduling ―Context verification might be launched with •KeSetCoalescableTimer —A timer that periodically launches context verification •Prcb.AcpiReserved —A certain ACPI event (f.e. Idle transition) •Prcb.HalReserved —A haltimer clock •PsCreateSystemThread —A queued system thread that sleeps a random amount of time •KeInsertQueueApc —A queued regular kernel APC •KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc —A periodic event which happens every "KiBalanceSetManagerPeriod" ticks
  • 15. Contexts verification descheduling ―So we’ve got to deschedulecontext verification once and for all •KeSetCoalescableTimer —Timer? Disable! •Prcb.AcpiReserved —Zero out this field •Prcb.HalReserved —Same here •PsCreateSystemThread —Scan sleeping worker threads and set wait time to infinite for suitable •KeInsertQueueApc —Same here •KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc —Revert to KiBalanceSetManagerDeferredRoutine
  • 16. •research [at] ptsecurity[dot] com •www.ptsecurity.com •blog.ptsecurity.com Thank you!