Proper logging can catch breaches like retail PoS
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Malware Archaeology LOG-MD Proper logging would have caught breaches like the ones suffered by the Retail PoS events
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Proper logging can catch breaches like retail PoS
- 2. Logging for Hackers How Proper Logging Would Have Caught PoS Breaches 2
- 3. Who am I – Michael Gough » Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic » I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us Who, What, Where, When and hopefully How Creator of » Malware Management Framework » Several Windows Logging Cheat Sheets » Co-Creator of “Log-MD” – Log Malicious Discovery Tool • With @Boettcherpwned – Brakeing Down Security PodCast » @HackerHurricane and also my Blog
- 5. » We discovered this in May 2012 » Met with the Feds ;-) Why you should listen to me? MalwareArchaeology.com 2014 - We gave an infected VM to one of the Big IR Firms… They came back “Yup.. It’s clean” #Fail
- 6. Malware evolves » So must we » Darwin says • Evolve or die » Well… Evolve or get breached anyways » Getting breached means an RGE !!! • Resume Generating Event
- 7. A quick look at STATS MalwareArchaeology.com
- 8. DBIR 2016 » Why we are here… MalwareArchaeology.com 8 Time it takes hackers to compromise you Time it takes hackers to steal your data
- 9. DBIR 2016 MalwareArchaeology.com 9 Hackers time to Compromise is getting faster Than our ability to Discover them
- 10. DBIR 2016 MalwareArchaeology.com 10 • The dreaded 3rd party call and Law Enforcement notifications going up • Fraud and Internal detection going down
- 11. Chasing Hashes MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware hashes are no longer similar • Malware is morphing or created unique by design for each system OR on reboot
- 14. Sophos Says… » 70% of malware is unique to 1 company (APT) » 80% of malware is unique to 10 or less (APT) » That means… » 20% of malware is what the AV industry focuses on, but it is what most of you and everyone in this room sees and gets by: • Attachments in email • URL in email • Surfing the web - Ads - WordPress, Drupal, Joomla… MalwareArchaeology.com
- 15. A quick look at Advanced Malware Artifacts MalwareArchaeology.com
- 16. Winnti - Malware Infection Malware Launch Hiding malware in the Registry Modify Service
- 17. Escalate permissions obvious NOT your admin Check the Service used Modify Permissions Push out malware using CMD Shell & CScript
- 18. Using the Registry for storage Update Registry Change Registry Permissions Change permissions on files
- 19. Bad behavior becomes obvious Doing Recon Going after Terminal Services Query Users
- 20. You can even capture their Credentials Caught THEIR Credentials!
- 21. Persistence » Avoided leaving key files behind like they did before, well one anyways… the persistence piece
- 22. HKLMSoftwareClients » putfile » file » read 4D5A = MZ in HEX Key Size = 256k
- 23. Persistence » Infector… One for the DLL (infect.exe) and one for the Driver (InfectSys.exe) » Altered system management binaries • McAfeeFrameworkService • BESClientHelper • Attempted a few others, some failed
- 24. Persistence » BAM! Got ya – PROCMon on bootup
- 25. A quick look at Commodity Malware Artifacts MalwareArchaeology.com
- 26. Angler delivered Kovter » Unique way to hide the persistence » Inserted a null byte in the name of the Run key so that RegEdit and Reg Query fail to read and display the value » And a LARGE Reg Key (anything over 20k is large)
- 27. Dridex Artifacts
- 28. Dridex Persistence » New method towards the end of 2015, nothing in the Registry showing persistence while system was running » In memory only until system shutdown • On shutdown the Run key was created » On startup the malware loads and Run key deleted
- 29. Dridex is Baaack » 2016 variant
- 30. How to Detect Malicious Behavior MalwareArchaeology.com
- 32. Where to start » What am I suppose to set? “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet” “Malware Management Framework” » Find them all here: • MalwareArchaeology.com
- 33. PowerShell » It’s coming… in a BIG way - It’s already here » Ben Ten uses it (Not PowerShell) » Carlos uses it (MetaSploit) » Dave uses it (SET) » Kevin too (Pen Tester) » Dridex uses it » RansomWare uses it » And logging SUCKS for it
- 35. So what do we do about PowerShell? » The “Windows PowerShell Logging Cheat Sheet” » Designed to catch the folks I just mentioned, and others ;-) » Get it at: • MalwareArchaeology.com
- 37. How to catch this stuff Enable Command Line Logging !!!! » At the time of Winnti 2014 ONLY Win 8.1 and Win 2012 R2 had command line logging » Which we had, then we saw this in our alerts of suspicious commands (Cscript & cmd.exe & cacls & net & takeown & pushd & attrib) SIX Commands » Scripts too
- 38. And this query - Splunk » index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4688 NOT (Account_Name=*$) (arp.exe OR at.exe OR bcdedit.exe OR bcp.exe OR chcp.exe OR cmd.exe OR cscript.exe OR csvde OR dsquery.exe OR ipconfig.exe OR mimikatz.exe OR nbtstat.exe OR nc.exe OR netcat.exe OR netstat.exe OR nmap OR nslookup.exe OR netsh OR OSQL.exe OR ping.exe OR powershell.exe OR powercat.ps1 OR psexec.exe OR psexecsvc.exe OR psLoggedOn.exe OR procdump.exe OR qprocess.exe OR query.exe OR rar.exe OR reg.exe OR route.exe OR runas.exe OR rundll32 OR schtasks.exe OR sethc.exe OR sqlcmd.exe OR sc.exe OR ssh.exe OR sysprep.exe OR systeminfo.exe OR system32net.exe OR reg.exe OR tasklist.exe OR tracert.exe OR vssadmin.exe OR whoami.exe OR winrar.exe OR wscript.exe OR "winrm.*" OR "winrs.*" OR wmic.exe OR wsmprovhost.exe OR wusa.exe) | eval Message=split(Message,".") | eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) | table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message | stats count > 2
- 39. So how do you do this? » Malware Management allowed us to setup alerts on artifacts from other malware analysis • MalwareManagementFramework.org » Of course our own experience too » Malware Discovery allowed us to find odd file hashes, command line details, registry locations » Malware Analysis gave us the details
- 40. What we all need to look for » Logs of course, properly configured - Events • Command Line details • Admin tools misused – executions • New Services (retail PoS should know this) • Drivers used (.sys) » New Files dropped anywhere on disk – Hashes • Infected management binary (hash changed) » Delete on startup, write on shutdown – File & Reg Auditing » Scripts hidden in the registry – Registry Compare » Payload hidden in the registry – Large Reg Keys » Malware Communication – IP and WhoIS info » Expand PowerShell detection » VirusTotal Lookups
- 41. So what did we take away from all of this? MalwareArchaeology.com
- 42. You basically have 3 options » Do nothing – Eventually leading to an RGE » Log Management / SIEM • Cost $$$ and storage • But IS the best option, better than most security solutions if you want my opinion » What if I don’t have Log Management or SIEM?
- 43. It didn’t exist So we created it! So you can do it too! 43
- 45. » Log and Malicious Discovery tool » When you run the tool, it tells you what auditing and settings to configure that it requires. LOG-MD won’t harvest anything until you configure the system! » So answers How to check for the What to set I already told you about
- 46. Functions » Audit Report of log settings compared to: • The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” • Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks • Also USGCB and AU ACSC » White lists to filter out the known good • By IP Address • By Process Command Line and/or Process Name • By File and Registry locations (requires File and Registry auditing to be set) » Full File System hash baseline and compare » Full Registry baseline and compare » Report.csv - data from logs specific to security • 12 reports total
- 48. Purpose » Malware Analysis Lab – Why we initially developed it » Investigate a suspect system » Audit the Windows - Advanced Audit Policy settings » Help MOVE or PUSH security forward » Give the IR folks what they need and the Feds too » Take a full system (File and Reg) snapshot to compare to another system and report the differences » Discover tricky malware artifacts (Large Keys, Null Byte, AutoRuns) » Deploy with anything you want, SCCM, LanDesk, PSExec, PS, etc… » Replace several tools we use today with one easy to use utility that does much more » Replace several older tools and GUI tools » To answer the question: Is this system infected or clean? » And do it quickly - SPEED !
- 49. Free Edition » Audit your settings – Do you comply? » Harvest security relevant log data – 12 Reports » Whitelist log events by IP, Cmd Line, Process and File / Registry audit locations » Perform a full file hash baseline of a system » Compare a suspect system to a Baseline or Dir » Perform a full Registry snapshot of a system » Compare a suspect system to a Reg Baseline » Look for Large Registry Keys for hidden payloads
- 50. » Everything the Free Edition does and… » More reports, breakdown of things to look for » PowerShell report » Specify the Output directory » Harvest Sysmon logs » Harvest WLS Logs » Whitelist Hash compare results » Whitelist Registry compare results » Create a Master-Digest to exclude unique files » Free updates for 1 year, expect a new release every quarter » Manual – How to use LOG-MD Professional
- 51. Future Versions – In the works! » WhoIs lookups of IP Addresses called » VirusTotal lookups of discovered files » Find parent-less processes » Assess all processes and create a Whitelist » Assess all services and create a Whitelist » VirusTotal lookups of unknown or new processes and services » Other API calls to security vendors
- 53. Crypto Event » C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwixk.exe » C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwpir.exe » C:WINDOWSsystem32cmd.exe /c del C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwixk.exe >> NUL » C:WindowsSystem32vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /Quiet
- 55. Malicious Word Doc con’t More DRIDEX
- 56. Use the power of Excel » The reports are in .CSV format » Excel has sorting and filters » Filters are AWESOME to thin out your results » You might take filtered results and add them to your whitelist once vetted » Save to .XLS and format, color code and produce your report » For .TXT files use NotePad++
- 57. So what do we get? » WHAT Processes executed » WHERE it executed from » IP’s to enter into Log Management to see WHO else opened the malware » Details needed to remediate infection » Details to improve your Active Defense! » I did this in… 15 Minutes!
- 58. Resources » Websites • Log-MD.com The tool » The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” • MalwareArchaeology.com » Malware Analysis Report links too • To start your Malware Management program » This presentation is on SlideShare and website • Search for MalwareArchaeology or LOG-MD
- 59. Questions You can find us at: » Log-MD.com » @HackerHurricane » @Boettcherpwned » MalwareArchaeology.com » HackerHurricane.com (blog) » MalwareManagementFramework.Org » http://www.slideshare.net – LinkedIn now