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SatCom Protection
in
Mission Critical
Oil & Gas
Exploitation
21st Century SatCom Connectivity
Oil & Gas
Exploration
Production
Crude Pipelines
Shipping
Product Distribution
Product Pipelines
Trading
SatCom
Supporting the
Supply Chain
Refining
Storage Terminals
End-to-End SatCom Solution for the O&G Industry
VoIP1
E-mail2
Broadband Internet3
Corporate Training4
Secure Corporate Apps5
Remote Collaboration6
ATM/POS7
Monitoring & Surveillance8
Offshore GSM9
Tele-Medicine10
Maps & Weather11
Digital Video Content12
Needs
• Crew Welfare
• Reliability
• Security
• Performances
Constraints
• Bandwidth
• Costs
• Security
• Space
Global SatCom Network Architecture
Monics™ - RF Carrier System Monitoring1
satID™ - Interference Signal Geolocation2
SigX Protect™ - Signal Cancellation3
SpectralNet™ - RF over IP4
Types of Interference (1/2)
!
X
Y
!
!
Adjacent satellite
signal
Cross-Pol Interference – Accidental / very common
– Generally caused by: poorly aligned antennas in fixed or bursting networks;
and/or lack of training/experience of the uplink operators.
– Becoming more prevalent as installation margins are squeezed.
– Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID, training.
Adjacent Satellite Interference – Accidental / common
– Generally caused by: operator error, or poor inter-system coordination or
lack of installation expertise. Becoming more prevalent as two degree
spacing between satellites in the geostationary arc becomes more common.
– Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID,
Adjacent Carrier Interference – Accidental / minimum occurrence
– Generally caused by: operator error, or equipment failure (unlocked
equipment).
– Relatively infrequent
– Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID.
Types of Interference (2/2)
!
Unauthorized Access – Accidental & Deliberate
– Term given to a signal which is not resident as cross-pol or adjacent satellite
or carrier.
Deliberate: relatively rare
– Generally caused by: unauthorized use of bandwidth, piracy, and hostile
attempts to deny service. It’s becoming more prevalent though geopolitical
motivation.
– Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools. While hostile
jamming is generally easy to locate, it is almost impossible to remove
without political intervention, which can prove difficult.
Accidental: very common
– Generally caused by: equipment failure, human error, improper
commissioning, and terrestrial interference from other microwave systems.
– Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID, training.
Unfortunately terrestrial systems often have priority and so becomes dead
capacity.
Ways to Detect Interference
Passive
Wait for the affected carrier to
alarm or report from the field
Compare spectrum plot of the
transponder with the nominal
frequency plan
Check for unauthorized carriers,
spurious emissions
Active
Continually scan signals and
transponders of interest, generate
alarms for out-of-tolerance
conditions
Analog Spectrum Analyzer
Digital Spectrum Analyzer
Pro-active; problem can be cleared
before it is noticed by the affected
customer
Monics™ - RF Carrier Management
Network Distributed Architecture1
Multiple Access Points/Multiple Users2
Windows Authentication3
Advanced Space Segment Filtering4
Carrier-Under-Carrier Analysis5
TDMA/FDMA Display6
Most advanced monitoring systems are
based on DSP technology
satID™ - Interference Geolocation
Integrated with Monics
Shares Common Hardware
Performs Interference Characterization
With Carrier Under Carrier Detection
Scaled Implementation
Cost Effective Solutions
Meet Specific Requirements
NOC/Distributed Acquisition Design
Accuracy – Speed – Ease of Use1
Graphical user interface for unparalleled
operational awareness and ease-of-use2
Result Averaging and Satellite Position
Correction for greater accuracy3
Working in any frequency band and
across multiple beams/continents4
Geolocation TheoryPrimary
satID
Time and
Frequency
Correlation
?
Secondary
Target
Different path
lengths give
Differential Time
Offset (DTO)
Different satellite
velocities gives
Differential Frequency
Offset (DFO)
Frequency Overlap1
Geographical Overlap2
Bias CorrectionPrimary
satID
Secondary
Inaccuracies in Satellite
positions and velocities2
Reference Propogation Effects3
Monitoring Station
measurement effects4
Target
?
Uncertainties in Satellite
translation frequencies1
KRATOS Geolocation Case Studies
Equipment Failure
• Failed transmission components on
antennas operating on the same
spacecraft can generate spurious
emission affecting other users.
Human Error
• Lack of training and lack of
discipline generates all of the human
induced interferences.
Deliberate Jamming
• Deliberate denial of service attacks
have been carrier out on a regular
base. Middle East and more recently
Ukraine are the main targets.
Geolocation should be the last tool in the SatOps Toolbox
Proven troubleshooting procedures allow most SatOps to detect, identify and
eliminate an interference within minutes or hours from the start of the
anomaly.
SigX Protect™ - Signal Cancellation
What is it?
• Where you can characterize and
cancel a signal with no prior
knowledge of the signal
Why is it important?
• Enables new applications
What applications?
• Signal protection (from RFI)
• Bandwidth Reuse
What is New?
Blind Signal
Separation
Mass marketed technology for
more than 10 years
1
Already successfully used by
satellite industry
2
KRATOS Signal Cancellation Case Studies
Unintentional Interferences
• By independently eliminating interference through signal separation and
cancellation within the communication chain, 90% of interference can be
addressed
Hardware Faults
• Signals can be protected from sweeping interference across the band
High Powered Interferer
• Signals can be protected even when the interferer is at a higher power
SCPC over TDMA
• Signal cancellation allows the time varying signals to pass through the
system, cleaned up of interference from a interference
The added benefits of Signal Separation is Bandwidth Optimization
Through characterization and blind separation of signals, extra power
available in the bandwidth can be utilized to increase effectiveness and
efficiency of leased bandwidth
SpectralNet™ - Limitation of RF Transport
RF
Cable
Fiber
Optic
Distribution
RF signals captured at an antenna can
only be transmitted over a short
distances before the signal degrades
<50 km
<0.5 km
Impact
Constrains ground system design
by requiring processing equipment
to be co-located with antennas
10
11
-9
-7
13
6
…
What is Digital IF
Enables RF Spectrum to be captured, digitized and converted into IP packets
Sampled IF waveform
I/Q data from antenna /
downconverter
10
11
-9
-7
13
6
…
IP packets
ANSI/VITA 49.0Prefilter
VITA-49 Packets Converted
to RF Waveforms
IP packets
ANSI/VITA 49.0
10
11
-9
-7
13
6
…
10
11
-9
-7
13
6
…
Ability to Manage IP
Transport of VITA IP Packets1
Ability perform faithful RF
reconstruction after
transport
2
Interfacing to analog or
digital equipment3
Cost effective and deployable
technology4
Issues with Digital IF Adoption
Challenges of IP Transport
Router
Packets
Network Latency and Jitter Packet Loss
Bandwidth Costs
RF over IP Case Study
Today:
Equipment must located in close proximity to antennas due to IF signal attenuation
With RF over IP
The proximity constraints between antennas and processing equipment is eliminated
Direct A/D, D/A to IP packets
Central Site
SpectralNet
Appliance
SpectralNet
Appliance
Effectively Range limitation
1 km coax, 50 km RF fiber
Enabling:
WAN
Effectively NO Range limitation
Spectral Mon
Remote site
RF/IF IFL IF Switch
Modem Crypto
Gateway
Equipment Pooling
Reducing space and power
footprint
Centralized operations
Better use of personnel
1
3
2
4
SAT Corporation (SAT) has prepared this document for use by its personnel, licensees, and potential licensees.
SAT reserves the right to change any products described in this document as well as information included
herein without prior notice.
The information contained herein is presented for educational purposes only and the right to copy and use
this document is limited to that necessary to fulfill this function. The recipient agrees that they will not, nor
will they cause others to, copy or reproduce this information, either in whole or in part, or manufacture,
produce, sell or lease any product copied from or essentially based upon the information contained herein
without prior written approval of SAT.
Registered trademarks of KRATOS include, but are not limited to,
Monics, satID, SigX Protect and SpectralNet.
Copyright© 2014 SAT Corporation. All rights reserved.
Contact
guido.baraglia@kratosdefense.com

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SatCom Protection in Mission Critical Oil & Gas - Edited

  • 2. 21st Century SatCom Connectivity Oil & Gas Exploration Production Crude Pipelines Shipping Product Distribution Product Pipelines Trading SatCom Supporting the Supply Chain Refining Storage Terminals
  • 3. End-to-End SatCom Solution for the O&G Industry VoIP1 E-mail2 Broadband Internet3 Corporate Training4 Secure Corporate Apps5 Remote Collaboration6 ATM/POS7 Monitoring & Surveillance8 Offshore GSM9 Tele-Medicine10 Maps & Weather11 Digital Video Content12 Needs • Crew Welfare • Reliability • Security • Performances Constraints • Bandwidth • Costs • Security • Space
  • 4. Global SatCom Network Architecture Monics™ - RF Carrier System Monitoring1 satID™ - Interference Signal Geolocation2 SigX Protect™ - Signal Cancellation3 SpectralNet™ - RF over IP4
  • 5. Types of Interference (1/2) ! X Y ! ! Adjacent satellite signal Cross-Pol Interference – Accidental / very common – Generally caused by: poorly aligned antennas in fixed or bursting networks; and/or lack of training/experience of the uplink operators. – Becoming more prevalent as installation margins are squeezed. – Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID, training. Adjacent Satellite Interference – Accidental / common – Generally caused by: operator error, or poor inter-system coordination or lack of installation expertise. Becoming more prevalent as two degree spacing between satellites in the geostationary arc becomes more common. – Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID, Adjacent Carrier Interference – Accidental / minimum occurrence – Generally caused by: operator error, or equipment failure (unlocked equipment). – Relatively infrequent – Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID.
  • 6. Types of Interference (2/2) ! Unauthorized Access – Accidental & Deliberate – Term given to a signal which is not resident as cross-pol or adjacent satellite or carrier. Deliberate: relatively rare – Generally caused by: unauthorized use of bandwidth, piracy, and hostile attempts to deny service. It’s becoming more prevalent though geopolitical motivation. – Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools. While hostile jamming is generally easy to locate, it is almost impossible to remove without political intervention, which can prove difficult. Accidental: very common – Generally caused by: equipment failure, human error, improper commissioning, and terrestrial interference from other microwave systems. – Mitigation: monitoring, detection and geolocation tools, carrierID, training. Unfortunately terrestrial systems often have priority and so becomes dead capacity.
  • 7. Ways to Detect Interference Passive Wait for the affected carrier to alarm or report from the field Compare spectrum plot of the transponder with the nominal frequency plan Check for unauthorized carriers, spurious emissions Active Continually scan signals and transponders of interest, generate alarms for out-of-tolerance conditions Analog Spectrum Analyzer Digital Spectrum Analyzer Pro-active; problem can be cleared before it is noticed by the affected customer
  • 8. Monics™ - RF Carrier Management Network Distributed Architecture1 Multiple Access Points/Multiple Users2 Windows Authentication3 Advanced Space Segment Filtering4 Carrier-Under-Carrier Analysis5 TDMA/FDMA Display6 Most advanced monitoring systems are based on DSP technology
  • 9. satID™ - Interference Geolocation Integrated with Monics Shares Common Hardware Performs Interference Characterization With Carrier Under Carrier Detection Scaled Implementation Cost Effective Solutions Meet Specific Requirements NOC/Distributed Acquisition Design Accuracy – Speed – Ease of Use1 Graphical user interface for unparalleled operational awareness and ease-of-use2 Result Averaging and Satellite Position Correction for greater accuracy3 Working in any frequency band and across multiple beams/continents4
  • 10. Geolocation TheoryPrimary satID Time and Frequency Correlation ? Secondary Target Different path lengths give Differential Time Offset (DTO) Different satellite velocities gives Differential Frequency Offset (DFO) Frequency Overlap1 Geographical Overlap2
  • 11. Bias CorrectionPrimary satID Secondary Inaccuracies in Satellite positions and velocities2 Reference Propogation Effects3 Monitoring Station measurement effects4 Target ? Uncertainties in Satellite translation frequencies1
  • 12. KRATOS Geolocation Case Studies Equipment Failure • Failed transmission components on antennas operating on the same spacecraft can generate spurious emission affecting other users. Human Error • Lack of training and lack of discipline generates all of the human induced interferences. Deliberate Jamming • Deliberate denial of service attacks have been carrier out on a regular base. Middle East and more recently Ukraine are the main targets. Geolocation should be the last tool in the SatOps Toolbox Proven troubleshooting procedures allow most SatOps to detect, identify and eliminate an interference within minutes or hours from the start of the anomaly.
  • 13. SigX Protect™ - Signal Cancellation What is it? • Where you can characterize and cancel a signal with no prior knowledge of the signal Why is it important? • Enables new applications What applications? • Signal protection (from RFI) • Bandwidth Reuse What is New? Blind Signal Separation Mass marketed technology for more than 10 years 1 Already successfully used by satellite industry 2
  • 14. KRATOS Signal Cancellation Case Studies Unintentional Interferences • By independently eliminating interference through signal separation and cancellation within the communication chain, 90% of interference can be addressed Hardware Faults • Signals can be protected from sweeping interference across the band High Powered Interferer • Signals can be protected even when the interferer is at a higher power SCPC over TDMA • Signal cancellation allows the time varying signals to pass through the system, cleaned up of interference from a interference The added benefits of Signal Separation is Bandwidth Optimization Through characterization and blind separation of signals, extra power available in the bandwidth can be utilized to increase effectiveness and efficiency of leased bandwidth
  • 15. SpectralNet™ - Limitation of RF Transport RF Cable Fiber Optic Distribution RF signals captured at an antenna can only be transmitted over a short distances before the signal degrades <50 km <0.5 km Impact Constrains ground system design by requiring processing equipment to be co-located with antennas
  • 16. 10 11 -9 -7 13 6 … What is Digital IF Enables RF Spectrum to be captured, digitized and converted into IP packets Sampled IF waveform I/Q data from antenna / downconverter 10 11 -9 -7 13 6 … IP packets ANSI/VITA 49.0Prefilter VITA-49 Packets Converted to RF Waveforms IP packets ANSI/VITA 49.0 10 11 -9 -7 13 6 … 10 11 -9 -7 13 6 … Ability to Manage IP Transport of VITA IP Packets1 Ability perform faithful RF reconstruction after transport 2 Interfacing to analog or digital equipment3 Cost effective and deployable technology4 Issues with Digital IF Adoption
  • 17. Challenges of IP Transport Router Packets Network Latency and Jitter Packet Loss Bandwidth Costs
  • 18. RF over IP Case Study Today: Equipment must located in close proximity to antennas due to IF signal attenuation With RF over IP The proximity constraints between antennas and processing equipment is eliminated Direct A/D, D/A to IP packets Central Site SpectralNet Appliance SpectralNet Appliance Effectively Range limitation 1 km coax, 50 km RF fiber Enabling: WAN Effectively NO Range limitation Spectral Mon Remote site RF/IF IFL IF Switch Modem Crypto Gateway Equipment Pooling Reducing space and power footprint Centralized operations Better use of personnel 1 3 2 4
  • 19. SAT Corporation (SAT) has prepared this document for use by its personnel, licensees, and potential licensees. SAT reserves the right to change any products described in this document as well as information included herein without prior notice. The information contained herein is presented for educational purposes only and the right to copy and use this document is limited to that necessary to fulfill this function. The recipient agrees that they will not, nor will they cause others to, copy or reproduce this information, either in whole or in part, or manufacture, produce, sell or lease any product copied from or essentially based upon the information contained herein without prior written approval of SAT. Registered trademarks of KRATOS include, but are not limited to, Monics, satID, SigX Protect and SpectralNet. Copyright© 2014 SAT Corporation. All rights reserved. Contact guido.baraglia@kratosdefense.com