Book Reviews from the "Georgia Guardsman" magazine

Professional Development Bookshelf:
Reviews of books that teach us about our craft

By Maj. John H. Alderman IV
Public Affairs Office
Georgia Department of Defense
W
hat can Guardsmen learn from a business
executive’s handbook written half a century
ago? Lots, actually.
First published in 1967, The Effective Executive
is business guru Peter F. Drucker’s close look at how
executives operate and how they can improve themselves
in order to improve their organizations. Rather than a
focus on managing people, it’s really about managing
one’s self.
Executives, Drucker writes, mainly contribute by
affecting their organization’s ability to perform and obtain
results. By “executive” he generally means business
executives. But his working definition – people who are
expected to get the right things done – sounds a lot like
the basic definition of a “leader.”
While it is more obvious that this book would be
great for battalion commanders and chiefs of staff, I
found its lessons very useful – decisive even – as a
Troop Commander, and figure the lessons would apply to
thoughtful leaders from squad level, up.
For example, Drucker has a healthy appreciation
for decentralized decision-making. Leaders must make
decisions, not just carry out orders. Executives must focus
their efforts and time on what other people need and can
use to make the organization successful. Meetings should
be held only for a purpose.
Essentially, executives do two things: provide a
vision and make decisions. And the key is making the
right decisions. If executives make decisions that others
can make, or that they can make unnecessary by issuing
policy, they are wrong, Drucker contends.
Perhaps the best-known example from this book
is Drucker’s observation that a well-run factory is a
quiet factory. If he visited a factory where everything
was dramatic, and people were rushing about excitedly
making things happen – it would be less well-run than
a quiet factory where good planning, solid policies and
thorough systems and procedures had made things…
quite regular.
“A recurrent crisis,” he writes, “should always
have been foreseen.” So the job of the leader, then, is
to anticipate problems and provide training, equipment,
systems or decisions to keep problems from developing.
A major takeaway is that, whatever his rank, a leader
acts like “top management” when she focuses on what
she can do to serve the needs of the entire organization –
from whatever position she’s in. And that is a lesson we
could all do well to keep in mind.
Throughout, the prose is lightened by illustrations
and observations from business and the military. After
all, military leaders make tough decisions all the time,
and the high stakes of our field means we have to get
things more right more often than most business leaders
– or we face more awful consequences.
It’s not the simplest manual on leadership, but it is
one of the very best. I first read this book when I was a
young lieutenant, and the ideas in it completely changed
the way I approach leadership. I wish I had read it sooner.
W
e can learn a lot from taking a little time to
analyze battles and asking ourselves what
decisions, or technology, or logistics, or
personalities were key to victory... or defeat. But military
history books that describe these battles share the
common challenge of reaching the right level of detail
for a quick study.
Too little detail and you get what amounts to a
dictionary entry of places and people; too much detail
and it’s hard to cover a lot of ground while drawing
broader conclusions.
100 Decisive Battles gets the mix just right. Each
battle gets a few pages, and Davis describes the historical
setting and results of each one in crisp, entertaining prose.
For every battle he includes a short, precise description
of why that battle is important, a description of the battle
itself, and then an explanation of the results and effects.
He then offers his references for further reading. Most
battles include maps, and some have illustrations.
Throughout, his analysis is spot on. More than once,
I found myself thinking of even familiar battles in a new
way because Davis had given them more, or different,
context than I had seen before. The results sections
extended my understanding of the battles and helped me
fit them together – making the book’s chronological order
even more useful.
There are some surprise inclusions and exclusions
of battles; but narrowing it down to 100 battles over the
course of 3,500 years of history had to be tough. More
important is that the battles span both time and place, and
each of the battles was decisive in its own way.
So, for example, Davis covers the battle of Crécy but
not the more famous battle of Agincourt – because Crécy
is more important strategically and Agincourt basically
repeats the tactics used at Crécy.
Overall, 100 Decisive Battles serves as both a
thorough grounding in the most important battles and
tactics of history – and as a great general reference on the
subject. It is broad enough to teach us how to think about
maneuver, logistics, and decision-making, yet specific
enough to give us useful examples.
I don’t think it’s too strong a statement to say that this
book should be on the bookshelf of every professional
military officer.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
100 Decisive Battles
from Ancient Times
to the Present
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
Reviews of books that
teach us about our craft
June 2010 | 18 July 2010 | 20

A
science fiction book? On the Professional
Development Bookshelf? You better believe
it! Right up there on the shelf next to Starship
Troopers.
Ender’s Game is the story of a young boy becoming
a leader under unique and trying circumstances. Set
in the relatively near future, the novel spins a fairly
straightforward tale. Earth has been attacked by aliens
twice, and now the planet is desperately trying to prepare
for the rematch they know is coming. So, they are
selecting and developing leaders at very early ages and
pouring everything into the hope that one of them will be,
essentially, perfect.
Like all good fiction, this storyline is about developing
character and solving problems. In this case, how does a
society select and develop leaders? What makes a good
combat leader, and how does a trainer pull that out of
a candidate for leadership? What does that candidate go
through as the transformation takes place?
That selection and development process forms
the core of the novel. Card takes us inside two minds:
one shaping a leader through direct counseling and by
indirect situational challenges; the other, Ender, growing
into that leader as he is poked and prodded along. Then,
as he becomes a leader and starts shaping teams, we see
it all over again from a different angle.
Ender’s Game really becomes an exploration of the
methods – a philosophy, really – of training junior leaders.
Ender is thrown into a real maelstrom of experiences
and people, and he encounters different attitudes toward
command, leadership, followership, and decision making.
He has to handle superiors less talented, and subordinates
more talented, than he is.
Most useful to us as readers are the lessons Ender
learns about how those without power can influence those
in power through example, or counsel, or even direct
challenge. The parallels to be drawn by a new lieutenant
– in charge but inexperienced – are clear. The same could
be said for junior NCOs.
A minor theme explores the power of rhetoric:
Methods to shape thoughts and action with words and
ideas. In fact, we come to see the ability to communicate
effectively as the leader’s best tool.
Card is a fantastic storyteller. His characters have an
edge to them, and project a peculiar kind of reality. So,
although the book is practically a manual on leadership,
it never feels like one. In fact, it is plenty enjoyable just to
read as a space yarn. But that would be to miss the point.
So, if you need a change of pace, or prefer to learn by
example and consideration, give this novel a shot. You
will probably immediately see why it has been on the
Marine Corps Reading List since its inception.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
T
he perennial trick to understanding a given
battle or campaign is matching the detail of
written description to the visualization of a map
illustration. The West Point Atlas of War series spans
centuries of warfare in a simple, effective manner that
supports both close reading and general browsing. First
published in the 50’s under the auspices of Gen. Esposito
at the Military Academy, many of the maps are available
online.
The books are harder to find, but if you’re lucky, you
can still pick up reprints at larger bookstores. The most
recent reprint included separate volumes on theAmerican
Civil War, World War I, and the European and Pacific
theaters of World War II. The latter is the one that most
opened my eyes.
Just as Paul Davis’s 100 Decisive Battles (featured
in this column this past June) perfectly balances scope
and detail, so too does The West Point Atlas. For each
battle or campaign, a map of the area of operations (and
sometimesareaofinterest)issetwithaconcisedescription
of the action. Sometimes, the two are perfectly matched;
sometimes, the maps may only illustrate the decisive part
of the action.
Throughout, the prose is lively and appropriately
detailed, a good read that balances analysis with reporting
in some pretty neat ways. So, for example, sometimes the
narrative is explicit in its condemnation or praise for a
commander’s decision.At other times, facts are presented
in such a way that a student of history can draw his or
her own conclusions about the action. Rather than feeling
uneven in its treatment, it keeps the atlas interesting and
makes it more a tool of instruction.
The maps are beautiful. Perfectly scaled and
illustrated, there is enough detail to give the reader some
terrain to analyze to help see how commanders’decisions
were shaped – similar to the utility provided by staff rides.
The maps are rarely unclear or cluttered, with a clear
and concise black-and-white color scheme. Another nice
detail is the inclusion of local place-names, which give
a feel for what the commanders may have seen on the
ground. Unremembered places like Catherine’s Furnace,
Barber’s Point, and Todd’s Tavern show up next to the
names we know well only because a battle took place a
little farther down the road.
The atlas maps and descriptions are probably best at
teaching an understanding of the higher-order decisions
that shape wars. The volume on the Pacific Theater, for
example, was the first book that really helped me fully
visualize and understand the division-level maneuver
that surrounded or supported some of the smaller-scale
(or seemingly unconnected) battles with which I had
previously been familiar.
Ultimately, a robust appetite for and understanding of
the various factors which have affected major battles and
campaigns in the past allows any commander to better
contextualize any challenges faced by his or her own
unit. The West Point Atlas of War series effectively puts
salient facts and mitigating factors into a visually and
intellectually compelling format that makes it easy for
commanders to make use of the lessons hard-learned in
battles past.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
August 2010 | 20 September 2010 | 20

T
his slim little volume on logistics is so brilliant that
it would be tempting to read the first short essay or
two, declare yourself Enlightened, promise never
to load your Troops down with extra gear again, and move
on.
Famed historian Col. S.L.A. Marshall’s basic premise
is: “No logistical system is sound unless its first principle
is enlightened conservation of the power of the individual
fighter.”
In other words, don’t weigh down your folks with
unnecessary stuff.
Marshall’s famous studies of the great mass of gear
we ask our troops to carry into combat have affected
generations of leaders. Staff gets much of the blame: To
mitigate their fears of every possible contingency, all sorts
of extra equipment is added to the basic combat load.
Because Marshall also believes that “In war, all effort,
all policy, should be directed toward speedier delivery of
a greater volume of a more efficient fire at the decisive
point,” this study of logistics is all about the intersection
of logistics and leadership. For him, strategic leadership
marshals resources effectively; tactical leadership
motivates and inspires subordinates by doing the same.
Some of Marshall’s ideas are challenging and
practically unthinkable. Send troops into combat with
little food or ammunition? Are you kidding? Yet, as
Marshall writes, “the Soldier with only five clips in his
pocket but spring in his gait is tenfold stronger than the
man who is foundered under the weight of ammunition he
will never use.”
And if you accept his basic premise, then you should
give careful consideration to this new equation of risk
assessment. What might we gain in mobility in exchange
for accepting the risk of having fewer reloads?
At its core, The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a
Nation is about the creation and preservation of combat
power so that it can be used at the decisive point. And that
proves a pretty good model for leadership in general.
Soldiers manage their fuel and ammunition to maintain
pressure on an enemy; pilots manage energy to maintain
superior position in a dogfight; managers balance the need
for information against the cost of distracting their people
from their daily tasks by holding too many meetings.
Marshall illustrates his points with vignettes from
various wars to keep things interesting. Along the way he
makes some pithy observations on decision making, the
psychology of combat, staff work, maneuver, and morale.
Another valuable inclusion in the book is
straightforward leadership philosophy that ties everything
together: “The ability to command the loyalties of your
men, to learn to think rapidly and resolutely in their behalf
while teaching them to do likewise, and to strive always
to avoid wasting their force and energy so that it may be
applied in strength at the vital time and place - that is
leadership of the highest possible caliber.”
Whatever their position or duty, leaders are responsible
for managing resources to accomplish missions. So,
Marshall’sapproachwillproveusefulinitsrelentlessfocus
on necessary things, of unencumbering subordinates, and
maximizing operational effects.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“Economy of forces operates in the sphere of supply
just as relentlessly as it does in its application to the striking forces.”
October 2010 | 20

A
nyone who has ever fenced, or wielded a close-
combatweapon,orstudiedmartialartsunderstands
how a weapon can serve as an extension of the
body. This understanding entails a comprehension of the
relationship between action and reaction, vulnerability
and the strike.
Knowledge of these things proves useful whether
employing a tank platoon, or a light infantry battalion,
or a fighter aircraft. But these are lessons which can be
learned more immediately (and perhaps easily) with a
close-combat weapon.
Probably, it is for this reason that Miyamoto Musashi’s
The Book of Five Rings – collected here with Yagyu
Munenori’s Family Traditions on the Art of War – has
survived through the ages as a key text of the martial arts.
The translator, Thomas Cleary, refers to these as “texts
on conflict and strategy,” meant to be useful in all walks of
life. Both authors, too, stress repeatedly that the “martial
arts” are meant to be applied in all situations.
This approach truly makes these works of conflict
philosophy more than strategic thought (or even business
method) alone. The end result Miyamoto and Munenori
would have us reach is more a state of mind – a way
of approaching problems, martial or otherwise – with
a proper balance of focus and openness, of passive and
aggressive physical and mental states.
Of course, this also means the book is not always easily
approachable. Much of it reads like a book of aphorisms;
some of it is repetitive and mystical, a little too Eastern
for many readers.
For these reasons, this is a book best savored. You’ll
want to have enough time to reflect on what you read – but
not so much time that you lose the threads of the major
themes running throughout the works. I recommend as
interactive an experience as you can manage: Discuss it
with others, or capture your thoughts and reflections in
the margins of your book as you read. Agree or disagree,
your reactions matter and, if captured, can help you better
understand and develop your own philosophy of conflict.
Some of the lessons will be more challenging.
“‘Mountain and sea’ means that it is bad to do the same
thing over and over again,” writes Musashi. Yet, on
reflection and in context, understanding the need to match
tactics to the situation at hand, and not repeat stale tactics
– these are things with which we can identify.
Other lessons will be clearer immediately. “When you
strike a blow, do not keep your mind on where you hit; after
striking, bring your mind back to observe your adversary’s
condition,” writes Munenori. Students of maneuver – and
many pilots – will recognize this admonition against
“tunnel vision” from early in their training.
The bottom line is that if one approaches this book
with an open mind, and a willingness to apply somewhat
abstract lessons to today’s situation, The Book of Five
Rings may help you reach “the next level” in your strategic
thinking.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“The performance of an expert seems relaxed but does not leave any gaps.
The actions of trained people do not seem rushed.”
January 2011 | 20

W
atching theA-Team as a kid, it never occurred to
me how odd it was that although Hannibal and
the boys traded hundreds of bullets with each
week’s bad guys, practically no one was ever hit. Sure,
tires were hit. Drums of gasoline were hit, and fireballed
into the air. Makeshift welded contraptions were hit. But
not people.
As ridiculous as this now seems, perhaps the show was
more realistic than we think. At least, that’s a conclusion
one might reach after reading On Killing, a psychological
tour de force by former Ranger and paratrooper Dave
Grossman.
Grossman’s book thoroughly explores the psychology
of humans killing other human beings: What it takes,
mentally, as well as the costs, psychologically. Reasons
why it is hard to kill, and the things we do to make it easier.
The reaction most people have to killing, and what can be
done to ease the difficulties that often later result.
Even in the Army we don’t seem too eager to talk about
it in such blunt terms – unless we are boasting, or talking
about blood making the grass grow. Both can be useful; but
neither is a particularly effective way to improve ourselves
professionally. And we should be honest: While Peace may
be our Profession, killing is our business. Army or Air,
and especially on today’s battlefield, any of us entering a
combat zone had best be prepared to kill.
Grossman builds off of previous studies (particularly
those of S.L.A. Marshall) which revealed that, historically,
the vast majority of Soldiers (and pilots) in combat either
never pull the trigger, or miss that target, even at pretty close
ranges. The historical examples aren’t perfect (certainly
there are exceptions!) but they’re there.
He demonstrates, in part, that humans and animals
alike have powerful urges not to kill members of their own
species. Grossman explores why, and the training that has
been implemented in the last century to help correct that
deficiency.
Grossman goes on to help us understand why and
how combatants do kill, a model based on the demands
of authority; group absolution; predisposition of the killer;
distance from the victim; and the attractiveness of killing
the victim.And he explores what happens later, the visceral
reaction most people have to killing, even if they are willing
to do it in the first place.
Finally, he turns his attention on society – on the TV
shows, movies, and video games that desensitize us to
killing and to death not at all unlike military training meant
to make us more comfortable with killing. Is that a good
idea for our society?
On Killing reminds us that this subject is worth
considering, and perhaps even discussing with our fellow
Guardsmen. Certainly these considerations can affect how
we prepare ourselves and our units for combat. It certainly
did both for me.
As for those of us who have never been to combat, and
perhaps never will – these days, many around us have.
Reading this book is also a great way to help us understand
them better.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“Our chants in basic training... were not just meant to make us disdainful of
the danger of our own deaths, but more willing to kill in combat, as well.”
N
o one need tell Soldiers that stress can affect
decisions. But what can we do about that?
Doctor Henry Thompson’s book, The Stress
Effect, sets out to help leaders make better decisions
despite (and perhaps even using) stress. “The trick,” he
writes, “is to keep stress as an ally, not an enemy.”
A veteran Ranger and paratrooper, Lt. Col. Thompson
has been into the sleep-deprived, ultra-high-stress combat
that pushes Soldiers to their limits even as it demands
superior-quality decisions with the highest of stakes. He
has subsequently applied and refined his experience and
education as an esteemed organizational psychologist and
leadership consultant in the corporate world. The result
is a book uniquely useful to us Guardsmen, who must be
successful in both arenas.
The Stress Effect examines the art and science of
decision making, including different models people use,
andtheimportantdifferencesbetweenintuitiveandrational
decision making. It then looks at types of intelligence; the
effects of emotions and stress on decision making; how to
manage stress; and how to build resilience.
There’s a fair amount of science here – the chemistry
of emotions, the anatomy of the brain – but this is well-
balanced by practical application and illustrated by real-
world examples, both civil and military. Not only does
Thompson clarify complex concepts, he also condenses
vast areas of research (with references for further study).
So this is a great resource for leaders trying to develop
themselves or their subordinates.
Thebookisespeciallywell-timedforArmyGuardsmen,
explaining concepts of Resilience that underlie training
implemented in the Army over the last year or so.
What I find most interesting about The Stress Effect is
that while the concepts in each chapter can stand alone,
they very effectively build upon one another. Explanations
of stress, plus explorations of emotion and intelligence
lead to the critical concept of Building Stress-Resilient
Emotional Intelligence.
Emotion is key. It seems like we spend a fair amount
of time urging young leaders to take the emotion out
of decisions. This can be vital; but it’s also a little
disingenuous.
Those emotions are markers and motivators. They
can be enormously useful in motivating people, or
understanding what motivates them – or in how they will
respond to a decision. Understanding our own emotions
can be vital in maintaining accurate situational awareness,
especially in stressful situations.
The Stress Effect concludes with seven best practices
to build stress resilience. Thompson’s ARSENAL system
of Awareness, Rest, Support, Exercise, Nutrition, Attitude,
and Learning provides a great roadmap to focusing our
efforts and maximizing our effect.
For the growing and professional leader, The Stress
Effect provides immediate effect on how we do business –
as well as a system of systems from which we can further
develop our own way of living.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“The trick is to keep stress as an ally, not an enemy.”
March 2011 | 20 April 2011 | 20

F
ighting a Counterinsurgency (COIN) with the
massive resources of the United States behind you
is daunting enough. But what if you had so many
constraints that you also had to manufacture your own
weapons, including bombs that used super-bounce balls
as shrapnel?
J.R.T. Wood’s Counter-Strike from the Sky is a
superbly detailed historical account of a relatively modern
counterinsurgency fought in the 1970s in the country of
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under just these constraints.
The resultant, curious mixture of old equipment, low
technology, innovation, and daring airborne maneuver
makes a thought-provoking solution to an age-old problem.
Wood’s book (some editions include a DVD as well)
chronicles their weapons, strategy, armament, and tactics
in a direct, matter-of-fact manner that seems characteristic
of the British military. The last few chapters, a detailed
historical account of the massive cross-border raid,
Operation Dingo, is practically a book by itself, and clearly
demonstrates the height of airmobile, deep-strike vertical
envelopment tactics as exercised by the Rhodesians.
As a result of a widening guerilla war in which the
insurgents were increasingly difficult to bring to battle, the
SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry, as well as associated
police and intelligence forces, developed a concept that
came to be known as “Fireforce.”
Its genesis probably was the Battle of Sinoia in 1966,
when their troops were first transported by helicopter into
combat. The battle was disappointing: Weapons were
ineffective; air and ground radios were incompatible;
common practices such as a standard left-hand orbit for
helicopters had not been worked out; coordination between
police and military forces was awful.
Over time, lessons from Sinoia led to new training,
equipping, and focus that transformed the force into a new
weapon.
Scouts and intelligence teams maintained Observation
Posts on likely or known areas of insurgent operations.
Once enemy elements were spotted, small teams of light
infantry (called “sticks”) were transported by helicopters
(the French “Alouette” light utility aircraft) to the target
area and dismounted onto blocking positions. Additional,
larger sticks would be dropped by World War II-era
Dakota aircraft in further blocking positions to box in the
insurgents.
Practically simultaneously, gunship versions of the
Alouette would circle overhead and begin destroying the
enemy. Additionally, the (somewhat aging) Rhodesian Air
Force would send in aircraft such as the Canberra, Hunter,
or Vampire to provide close air support. In coordination
with these fires, the sticks would sweep through and
destroy the remaining enemy troops.
This fast-moving, hard-hitting combined arms force
proved deadly. This Fireforce developed into an aerial
ballet of fixed and rotary attack and transport aircraft, with
intricate Command and Control necessary to maintain
situational awareness and unity of command.
Modern warriors of both the Army and Air Guard
have great lessons to learn here. The integration of air
and ground elements of combat power are clear, as are the
effects of unfettered innovation. The Fireforce is a great
reminder that the best solution need not be as dependent
on technology or the newest weapon system as on the
intelligent use of weapons available.
A final note: get the edition with the DVD. It’s low-
tech, but packed with personal accounts and video of the
countryside to help you visualize the battles.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
May 2011 | 20
M
obile Armor. Light, fast, maneuverable suits
with jump jets, guns, rockets, bombs, hand
flamers, radar, IR goggles, heads up display,
commo suites, and a prototype Blue Force Tracker. That’s
the hook for this book.
But there’s so much more going on.
New members of the military have a tough time. They
must find their own place in an organization infinitely
bigger than they are, even while learning skills, customs,
regulations, culture, and people, all at once. Most are
newly adult, too, further complicating things.
Finding one’s place in the organization is essentially
what this book is about. I think that’s why it remains
popular and is so often recommended to junior leaders.
The great science fiction makes it a fun read. The
“Mobile Infantry” – future versions of Marines, Rangers,
skirmishers, or Cavalry, depending on your taste – jump
onto alien planets, maraud, dispatch bad guys with bombs
and mini-nukes, get extracted, and head off to the next
system. Good. Times.
Wefollowtheprotagonistthroughalternatingmemories
of combat, Mobile Infantry enlistment, leadership training,
and even high school. Through these experiences, Heinlein
introduces and plays with all sorts of ideas. Why do we
fight? Who fights? What’s the division of labor in a small
unit? How do we train officers? What’s the model for NCO/
officer working relationships? What demeanor should a
junior officer project?
So Starship Troopers isn’t just a romp through space
– or a memoir of basic training. It’s more a series of
philosophical discussions between characters that provide
thoughts like this one to new officers:
“I gave you a talk on how rough it’s going to be. I
want you to worry about it, doing it in advance, planning
what steps you might take against any combination of bad
news that can come your way, keenly aware that your life
belongs to your men and is not yours to throw away in a
suicidal reach for glory…and that your life isn’t yours to
save, either, if the situation requires that you expend it.”
Anyone ever express that sentiment to you quite so
clearly?
Some of these philosophical points are what make some
people refer to this book as “controversial.” For example:
In a free society, who gets to vote? In the book’s future,
only Veterans – and not even current service members –
get to vote. Other folks are free, but they don’t determine
the course of government. His point, however, is one that
ties selflessness and service to governance and society.
In fact, this is a good example of why leaders can re-
read the book over time, finding new ideas in it that reward
further reflection (as with Gulliver’s Travels, for example).
Starship Troopers is a great work, not just because it is fun
– but because it is instructive and provocative.
Final note: If you have had the misfortune of seeing
the Verhoeven movie from the 90s which shamelessly uses
the name of this novel, I recommend you banish it from
your mind. In many cases it actually inverts Heinlein’s
philosophies and erases the leadership lessons offered. The
less said about it, and the sooner it is forgotten, the better.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“There are no dangerous weapons;
only dangerous men.”
June 2011 | 20

E
arly in this collection of excellent essays and articles,
German Capt.AdolfVon Schell points out that, while
in peace we learn about leading and maneuvering
forces, we are not instructed in the thoughts and fears that
run through the mind of the front-line Soldier. “We are not
told how we can help him in his mental battles.”
Von Schell wrote this betweenWorldWars I and II, while
a student at Fort Benning – and well before the Resiliency
programs we now have in place. Yet his approach to Battle
Leadership can inspire and inform our approach to training.
Topics covered include battlefield psychology,
“leavening” green troops with tested veterans, the
development of the German Army, and numerous
descriptions of battles and maneuvers in World War I.
These battles are wonderfully detailed, following
combatants at the company and platoon level in open
warfare against the British and Russians. Some sections
chronicle the leader’s thought process as well, giving
further insight.
Thefocusisalwaysonthementalstateoftroopsinvolved
– the feeling of constantly being under fire, the thoughts
going through a young leader’s mind in a changing situation,
the effect of darkness or retreat on march casualties, etc.
These small incidents, writes Von Schell, make up Troops’
experiences and should be considered ahead of time.
Another key characteristic of the battlefield is
uncertainty. Reports are exaggerated (and first reports
always wrong); information is slow in coming, or comes in
unrelated bits and pieces that somehow must be connected.
On a modern battlefield, the problem can actually be
exacerbated by the sheer amount of information coming in.
Yet, writes Von Schell, in our peacetime training, too
often we present perfect information to leaders and even
prompt them when to make a decision and even on what
needs to be decided.
“Our field exercises, our map problems, and our war
games should be conducted with as little information of the
enemy as possible,” he writes. Then they will prepare our
leaders for battle.
“Leaders must nearly always issue orders without exact
information. Our mission and our will are often the only
things untouched by obscurity. These will frequently form
our only basis for an order. If a leader awaits complete
information before issuing an order, he will never issue
one.”
For all this talk of battlefields, Von Schell’s observations
apply equally well to domestic emergency operations and,
to a lesser extent, in day-to-day office environments. In the
latter, there are stressors in Troops which leaders must take
into account regularly; in the former, a potential for disasters
that cause mass casualties and a corresponding deep effect
on Troops that probably cannot be fully calculated in
tranquil times.
Though it is especially useful for leaders in light
infantry, Battle Leadership contains lessons for leaders at
all levels and in most professions. It makes an excellent
companion to On Killing (review), which is more limited
in scope and to The Stress Effect (review), which explains
the science behind Von Schell’s anecdotes.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“In peace we should do everything
possible to prepare the minds of our
soldiers for the strain of battle.”
AAugust 2011 | 20
I
remember, several years ago, watching one of my
lieutenants maneuver his squads in an attack on the
MOUT complex at Camp Blanding. They were in close
contact with the OPFOR, moving through the point of
penetration into the streets beyond.
Tom was just behind his lead squad. But he wasn’t
looking at the enemy. Rather, he was sitting down on his
haunches, leaning against a wall, head tilted back, looking
up at the ceiling. He listened to reports come in, listened to
the sounds of the fight, and calmly gave his men orders. Tom
was visualizing the battlefield – a vital skill for leaders at all
levels, and a skill that John Macdonald’s Great Battlefields
of the World can help you develop.
Macdonald covers 30 battles from Cannae (between
Romans and Hannibal, 216 B.C.) to Dien Bien Phu
(between the French and the Viet Minh, 1953-4). The sense
of breadth is a little misleading, however, as Macdonald
skips 1200 years of military history between his first and
second battles, and fully two-thirds of the battles covered
involve the British.
That’s not necessarily a problem, however, as British
military history between Hastings and The Hook really is
the story of Western military history in the same period.
The book’s compact, engaging coverage of that history is
its greatest strength.
Each of the 30 battles is given a brief historical context,
detailed description of how the battle unfolded, depictions
of tactics and weapons used, a rudimentary 3D model of the
terrain, and an illustrative painting.
These many “entry points” to the battles’ stories make
Great Battlefields easy to skim. In fact, one could go through
the entire book just reading the sidebars on weapons and
get a pretty good brief history of Western armies’ weapons
development.
The real draw of the book, however, is the one or two
paintings provided for each battle. Macdonald chooses
a decisive point in the battle and provides a ballon’s-eye-
view of the action. These lively paintings of the pageantry,
sweeping movement, fallen horses, muzzle flashes, and
gallantry of the battlefields really brings the action to life –
and aids the student of history with visualizing the maneuver
and decisions that shaped history.
True, the computer graphics are a bit dated; and, having
visited a couple of these battlefields, I can confirm that
details of the terrain elevations are sometimes wanting.
But, the overall benefit of gaining a new perspective on
the battles proves useful both in understanding the battles
better, and in learning how better to visualize battlefields
based on reports and descriptions.
Great Battlefields is a perfect companion to 100 Decisive
Battles – not least because many of the books’ battles share
common weapons, tactics, uniforms, and even commanders.
This book also is exceptionally user-friendly, an
excellent introduction to Western warfare for junior leaders.
If you’re looking to get started – or want a book in your
library to make it easy to share lessons from – this is a great
first choice.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“Many of Morgan’s sharpshooters were sited high
up in the trees, from which vantage points they used
their powerful Pennsylvania rifles to deadly effect.”
July 2011 | 20

By Maj. John G. Lowe
J7 Joint Training & Doctrine
Georgia Army National Guard
N
o True Glory is an excellent account of the
20-month struggle for Fallujah, Iraq, in a series of
battles in 2003 and 2004. The reader gets a vivid
front-line account of the vicious fighting that occurred in
the streets, house-to-house, and hand-to-hand.
Bing West takes the reader through four phases:
counterinsurgency, siege, reversal and attack. The
reader rides along with American units as they apply
counterinsurgency doctrine to fighting insurgents.
Early in the counterinsurgency phase, Soldiers of the
3rd Infantry Division spent time constructing a soccer
field in downtown Fallujah. Once they had finished, a
mob gathered, ripped down the nets, removed the dirt, and
dumped garbage on the site. The enemy was determined to
prevent ordinary Iraqis from ever seeing that the American
invaders had improved their lives. This was an ominous
sign of what was to come.
The author further showcases how little cooperation,
and often how little civility, existed between the military
and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) planners
in Baghdad, partly due to having two separate chains of
command.
Mr. West also takes a look at how the U.S. lost the
information war to Al Jazeera and allowed them to shape
the story of Fallujah.
“Every night, images of civilian casualties were
transmitted worldwide via satellite and across the internet.
Western television networks pooled video from Fallujah,
including film from the Arab cameramen with the
insurgents. The pictures stressed destruction. Al Jazeera
was unrelenting in depicting the death of civilians.”
As Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, Commander of the 1st
MEF, put it, “Al Jazeera kicked our butts.”
The heart of the story, though, is about the brutal
fighting in close combat – the courage and bravery
displayed everyday by the men who fought the battle of
Fallujah. West’s accounts are detailed and riveting.
“Chandler kneed Sanchez in the buttocks to signal ‘Go!’
and they flooded the room. Sanchez ran straight across the
room. Chandler and Severtsgard broke right, aiming up at
the catwalk. Farmer was the last one to the door, where he
froze for a moment, trying to convince himself it wasn’t
fear. A second later, a grenade landed in the middle of
the room and exploded right where he would have been
standing. Farmer was blown off his feet back into the foyer.
Severtsgard and Chandler disappeared in a huge swirl of
dust and debris, as the deafening roar of AK’s filled the
main room. Chandler fell instantly with three bullets in his
leg and both his shoulder and leg shredded by the grenade
shrapnel. Severtsgard was also torn up, with shrapnel in
his leg and foot. With one hand he dragged Chandler from
the kill zone into the kitchen.”
This book has something for Soldiers of all ranks.
From leadership and decision making at the strategic level
and how it affects Soldiers on the ground in the thick of
the fight, to close quarters combat at the squad level, this
candid look at combat will help leaders understand what
they may one day face in person.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“Every night, images of civilian
casualties were transmitted worldwide
via satellite and across the internet.”
W
e’ve begun passing through the 150th
anniversaries of some of the most trying,
dramatic, dangerous, heroic, and bloody times
in our Nation’s history: those of our Civil War.
While many of us have studied particularly famous
military battles of the period (many of which can be read
about in the books we reviewed in the June 2010 or August
2011 editions of the Georgia Guardsman), and most folks
know something about the political history of the time,
The New York Times Complete Civil War offers a unique
reference for the time period, and a penetrating view into
the intersection of military and political events of the war.
Holzer and Symonds have reprinted no fewer than
650 articles published in the New York Times between
1850 and 1877. Complementing these articles are timely
and informative footnotes to explain vague allusions or
dated comparisons. Included are spot-on choices from
illustrations and engravings, and even a number of political
cartoons that capture the flavor of the time.
With the hardcover edition, they include a DVD-ROM
with (literally) every single article published by the paper
during the war. While this represents an incredible body of
text – and a searchable database – the text is unedited and
unformatted, making reading somewhat cumbersome.
But the real value of this book is to put the war into a
very different context than most of us have experienced
before. The articles are arranged chronologically as they
were published – and therefore in the order people were
made aware of events, rather than when they actually
occurred. In an age where even telegraphs were still rare,
it could take days – and from the Western theater, weeks
– for a story to reach New York. So the story of battles
or political events unfold and evolve much as they would
have for readers 150 years ago.
That’simportantbecauseitremindsus(whohavecertain
knowledge of the outcome of Gettysburg or Vicksburg) of
how wars unfold in the public understanding. Many of the
articles are not just late getting to New York – they are
wrong. Or, because the journalist had to dispatch an article
before the battle was over, they are incomplete.
So, understanding the military and historical events
of the day really took an extra effort to piece together
fragments of information – and sift through the rather pro-
Lincoln bias that the Times had – to get closer to the truth.
The reader also better understands that the War was not
a long string of battles, one after another. Rather, there were
long periods of inaction and indecision. Complex problems
and powerful sentiments meant pervasive uncertainty;And
it is within this context that we should place not just our
understanding of the Civil War, but of war and of warfare
in general.
What we do on or above the battlefields – or on the
scenes of a domestic response – of tomorrow will of course
have a profound effect on the Citizens we serve… and on
their support, which we require in order to succeed.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“A battle is not a prize-fight. Its object is not to test
either the pluck or endurance of the combatants, but to
secure possession of certain positions.”
September 2011 | 20 October 2011 | 20

A
few thousand years ago, a large group of veteran
Greek hoplites joined a Persian prince in a march
to capture the throne from his brother, the Persian
king. They made it almost to Babylon, where in a decisive
battle the Persians were defeated…but in the process the
Persian prince was killed and the victory made moot.
Those Ten Thousand then had to march a thousand miles
through hostile territory to Greece, or face death, maiming,
or slavery.
Anabasis is the famous story of that difficult journey
home.
This is a military classic, full of details of battles
and personalities of the time. But more than that, it is an
adventurous yarn with touches of epic storytelling that
enliven, rather than belabor it. The author was a mid-level
officer at the start of the journey, and later elected to a key
senior position and was instrumental in getting the force
back to Greece. Xenophon’s style is surprisingly engaging
and personal, simple and direct. For that reason, this is a
good choice if you’d like to learn more about warfare in
the ancient world.
Large and small battles punctuate the story. More than
mere troop descriptions, however, the reader gets a true
sense of the thought processes of the Greeks and their
leaders as the battles unfolded.
But can we really learn anything about the modern
battlefield from an ancient battle? Absolutely. As a
maneuver guy, I tend to think of forces as heavy or light;
fast or slow; and using close combat or ranged weapons.
In the old Maneuver paradigm, these are the old firepower-
speed-protection constraints. Anabasis shows that these
constraints were at work in the ancient world, as well: The
slower, (more) heavily armored, close combat hoplites had
to devise new tactics against faster, lighter missile troops.
What is especially useful to our professional
development, however, is Xenophon’s central focus on
leadership.
He characterizes leaders both good and bad; he explains
indetailthethoughtprocessnecessarywhenmakingseveral
difficult decisions; and throughout Anabasis models the
use of rhetoric and argument in making his points clear
to Soldiers, to other generals, and to potential friends and
enemies.
In modern times, we’re used to rejecting “mere
rhetoric” as trickery or a waste of time. But the real purpose
of rhetoric is to focus and sharpen the effect of argument –
a skill all leaders need.
He also describes and codifies an ancient, constant
thread in the philosophy of Western Warfare: Because we
are free and fight for freedom, we are innately superior to
armies of the east who are forced to fight. Whether this is
absolutely true or not, it’s worth considering as a source of
strength and pride…and a difference we need to allow for
when working with ally and enemy alike.
Overall, Anabasis is a great opportunity to get a
detailed look at how our business was conducted in the
ancient world – and to hear a lively, real-world adventure
along the way. A great read, too.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“The hoplites will run faster
and more cheerfully if I also
am on foot leading the way.”
November 2011 | 20
A
sk five people to define leadership, and you’re
likely to have 10 definitions when you finally
cut off discussion. Yet, most would agree that
leadership requires interaction between people. Leadership
therefore requires communication – and this slim little
volume is one of the most important and accessible works
on the subject.
Ofcourse,it’smostlyaboutwrittencommunication.The
book covers three main areas: Rules of usage, principles of
composition, and style. Strunk & White clarify common
usage errors, help us understand how to compose for
greater effect, and help us suit that composition both to
the rhetorical situation and to our own particular ways of
doing things.
I won’t be the first to argue that good writing and good
speaking are inescapably connected.And certainly, modern
leaders are required constantly to communicate up, down,
and sideways in the chain of command in both written and
oral formats.
Few things are as unnatural as reading. Consider what
our pets must think as we sit for hours (or minutes!) on
end, staring at blocky objects covered in squiggly lines. Yet
somehow, those scratches of letters on the paper convey
ideas and emotions across time and space. Small wonder
that writing, then, could be so tricky (especially with as
nutty and contradictory a language as ours).
We may not like it, and we may not want our audience
to care, but grammar and punctuation matter. Minor, non-
recurring errors matter less. Glaring or frequent errors are
indicators (conscious or not) that the writer does not know
what he is talking about.
Even grammatical errors affect credibility in sometimes
unpredictable ways --- and, I think, the fear of this keeps
someleadersfromcommunicatingasoftenorasconfidently
as they should.
The bulk of Elements of Style is about grammar and
usage, but it all drives toward higher-order questions of
composition. The goal is to get the basics down so we can
focus on actually shaping communication for better effect.
How many of us have ever been confused by an unclear
order? Or failed clearly to communicate our intentions? Or
had cause to present a complex situation simply? Clearer,
more vigorous communication is key to good leadership.
Consider this passage from Elements of Style:
“Vigorous writing is concise. A sentence should
contain no unnecessary words, a paragraph no unnecessary
sentences, for the same reason that a drawing should have
no unnecessary lines and a machine no unnecessary parts.
This requires not that the writer make all his sentences
short, or that he avoid all detail and treat his subjects only
in outline, but that every word tell.”
Sounds like great advice for orders and plans.
Communication is essential to leadership. If we are
going to get this right – if we are going to develop ourselves
in this profession, not just serve time in a mere occupation
– we must also develop ourselves as leaders. This book is
a great start in an important area – and a good companion
and reference throughout our careers.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“The act of composition disciplines the mind.”
December 2011 | 20

January 2012 | 20
By Lt. William Carraway
Media Relations Officer
W
hen I deployed toAfghanistan in 2009, a copy of
Ian Mitroff and Gus Anagnos’ book went with
me. I found that the observations of Mitroff and
Anagnos had equal utility in the crucible of combat and the
business world.
TheacademiclessonsIhadlearnedincrisismanagement
became immediately relevant to the task of mentoring
Afghan police and local government officials. At the same
time, the means of identifying and mitigating the effects of
crises before they erupted was critical to platoon leadership
in battle and in garrison. Effective principles of crisis
management may be applied whether the crisis is related
to economics, human endeavor, natural emergencies, or the
actions of enemy combatants.
The centerpiece of Mitroff and Anagnos’ book is a
best-practices model for crisis management as presented in
chapter three. Chapters one and two lead up to this model
by establishing the inevitability of crises and reviewing
previous examples of crisis management that achieved
various degrees of success.
Beginning with the Tylenol poisonings of 1982 (roundly
considered to be the birth of modern crisis management) and
moving forward, Mitroff and Anagnos offer case studies
of crisis management which illustrate how organizations
successfully mitigated crises or were consumed by them.
Johnson & Johnson was noted for using prompt media
engagement and swift action to address consumer fears
following the Tylenol poisonings.
By contrast, Intel Corporation’s handling of complaints
following its 1994 Pentium Chip release demonstrate how
an organization can completely misunderstand potential
second-order effects of its actions.
Having paved the way with past examples, the authors
introduce the best practices model, the components of which
are stakeholders, types and risks of crises, mechanisms,
scenarios, and systems. Particularly interesting is the
section on systems, which describes the factors that impact
corporate culture and how that corporate culture affects the
organization’s institutional defense mechanisms.
Having established the model, the authors’ succeeding
chapters delve into something of a running dialogue
on matters impacting crisis management. Mitroff and
Anagnos imagine how Machiavelli, Sigmund Freud,
Mahatma Ghandi and William James would counsel a crisis
manager. The manager is advised to avoid self-deception
and counseled to seize the initiative by telling the truth and
accepting responsibility.
In one of the wiser counsels, the authors suggest the
crisis manager (or leader) “respond to the emotional needs
of others as they perceive them not as (the leader) perceives
them” and to “never never assume the outside world will
see a situation exactly as you do.”
In Afghanistan, there was often a wide gulf in how
problems were viewed by mentors and the Afghan forces.
Being able to step back and analyze a crisis from different
perspectives allowed me to understand problems facing the
Afghan forces and apply outside-the-box solutions.
At just 154 pages, the book is not an exhaustive study,
but it does provide nuggets for further reflection. Where
the best-practices model is offered as a framework, the
model by itself is not a crisis management panacea. As a
tool, however, the model may be used as a starting point for
organizations to conduct a self-audit of crisis preparedness.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“never, never assume the outside world will see a
situation exactly as you do.”
By Lt. William Carraway
Media Relations Officer
A
book entitled The 60 Second Leader probably
doesn’t suggest in-depth analysis of the subtle
nuances of leadership; however, what the book
concedes in brevity it makes up for with bibliography.
Composed of 30 short chapters, the book offers brief
summaries of leadership lessons augmented by real-
world anecdotes. Rather than “just another management
cliff notes book,” this work whets the appetite for further
study. Each chapter provides sources for further reading.
Thus, the book offers the reader the opportunity to conduct
further study.
Don’t like a particular lesson? Forget it. All you’ve lost
is a minute. But find something you really appreciate and
the author invites you to read further from a laundry list of
tomes on leadership, economics, and behavioral science.
Of particular relevance was the lesson that recounted
Gen. Colin Powell’s observation of the effects of
leadership on gunnery practice. The Army was interested in
determining the optimal number of shells to fire to maintain
proficiency.
In a study, one tank battalion was given the maximum
amount of practice rounds while another received fewer
rounds and more time in the simulator. The units were
then tested on the firing range to determine which training
approach was more effective.
The surprising result: Neither training strategy was
more effective. The units that fired the best were the ones
with the best commanders. It was the commander who was
able to maximize the unit’s performance regardless of the
circumstances.
Powell concluded, “Leadership is the art of
accomplishing more than the science of management says
is possible.”
The book also shares the suggestion that all leadership
is autobiographical and that great leaders must do three
things: Tell a compelling story about themselves, tell a
compelling story about the organization and its mission,
and make people feel that they are part of that story.
At just 194 pages, the 60 Second Leader is a breeze to
read in short manageable sections. The book is available
free on the AKO Library.
The 60-second PhD in leadership:
1. Make a list of all things done to you that
you abhorred.
2. DON’T DO THEM TO OTHERS. EVER.
3. Make another list of things done to you
that you loved.
4. DO THEM TO OTHERS ALWAYS.
– Dee Hock
February 2012 | 20
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“Take care of Soldiers and
they will take care of you.”
-- Command Sgt. Maj. Phillip Stringfield

March 2012 | 20
By Maj. John Hazel Alderman IV
Public Affairs Officer
A
s a tanker by trade I’ve always been fascinated
by an old romantic notion of (to borrow a phrase)
“fighting a desperate battle against incredible
odds.” In modern military history, few events match this
description so well as Israel’s desperate defense against a
combined Egyptian and Syrian attack in October 1973.
Nowhere is this story better told than in Abraham
Rabinovich’s The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter
That Transformed the Middle East.Aformer writer for the
Jerusalem Post, Rabinovich’s work is both engaging and
vivid, and a must for any student of warfare in the Middle
East. He masterfully blends multiple aspects of modern
warfare - air and land battles, political considerations, and
civilian perspectives - into a comprehensive picture of war.
The Israelis faced truly incredible odds. On the Golan
Heights, a scant 177 Israeli tanks with 11 artillery batteries
were assaulted by 1,460 Syrian tanks with 115 artillery
batteries. Incredibly, they held the line until the reserve
could arrive and organize into a counterattack.
On the other side of the country, Egypt’s assault
crossing of the Suez Canal proved to be a masterpiece of
planning and an engineering marvel. Following low-level
air strikes against command posts, SAM batteries, and
airfields, more than 10,000 artillery shells fell on Israeli
positions in the first minute alone. This was followed by
a perfectly executed crossing operation that put 32,000
Egyptians across the canal in just three and a half hours.
An hour later, the first bridge was complete; two hours
later, the number of bridges had risen to 12.Meanwhile,
Israeli tanks defending the canal got their first taste of a
new weapon: Sagger anti-tank missiles, in their first major
encounter with armored forces. The crews had no idea
what the odd lights were “floating” toward them until tanks
started to explode around them.
Only six years earlier, the Israeli Air Force had reigned
supreme following a pre-emptive strike that virtually
destroyed the Egyptian Air Force. Now, however, two
Israeli Phantoms scrambled to meet the attack, only to find
themselves up against 26 MiGs. Other IAF planes attacking
the crossing sites ran into a sophisticated SAM umbrella
that rivalled what the Americans had faced in Vietnam;
early losses were appalling.
The story of how Israel recovered from these blows
not just to hold the line, but to mount counterattacks that
threatened both Cairo and Damascus, makes up the rest of
this great book. Rabinovich explores the inner workings of
both sides, as well as Israel’s initial, nearly fatal failure:
They expected to be fighting the same Arabs they had
faced in 1967. Yet, “Israel had not calculated the vital
psychological boost the Arabs would derive from having
seized the initiative.”
Maps and photographs throughout this book are
excellent. Rabinovich tells a complex story masterfully,
blending human detail with the epic sweep of battle to give
us a true sense of the war, and what it takes to overcome
such incredible odds.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
“The platoon commander had no idea what
they might be. The answer came over the
radio net.‘Missiles.’”
April 2012 | 20
By 1st Lt. William Carraway
Public Affairs Officer
T
he 48th IBCT deployed for Operation Enduring
Freedom in 2009. In May 2009, in the course
of 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry’s introductory
briefings in Kabul, we were introduced to Dr. Terry
Tucker, Operations Training and Management Mentor
for the Afghan National Army.
Dr. Tucker provided guidance on counter insurgency
(COIN) and methods for working with the Afghan
population, forces, and non-government organizations.
Dr. Tucker has collected many of his observations of
COIN techniques in his book Counterinsurgency
Methods & the Global War on Terror.
It is no exaggeration to say that this book, and Dr.
Tucker’s subsequent visits to Kunduz, helped shape
the success of our (Delta Company, 2-121) mission in
Afghanistan.
“We still have not made the most
important shift of all – the mental
shift from conventional operations to
counter insurgency.”
Dr. Terry Tucker served 24 years in the Infantry,
Armor, and Cavalry. Retiring as a Sergeant Major, he
served as an instructor and advisor to the U.S. Army,
Royal Saudi Land Forces, and theAfghan NationalArmy.
By the time 2-121 arrived in Kabul, Dr. Tucker was in
his fifth year of instructing at the Kabul-based Counter
Insurgency Academy.
His experience in the Army and his time on the
ground inAfghanistan informs the pages of his book with
a language and perspective that will be instantly familiar
to one who has participated in COIN.
For those unfamiliar with COIN doctrine, Dr. Tucker
breaks down the subject with understandable metaphors
and allusions to the business world.
One example is his treatment of the human terrain
element, which he compares to market share. Dr.
Tucker notes that there are multiple methods used by
companies to achieve market share, many of which occur
simultaneously. COIN and conventional operations must
also be synchronized.
Dr. Tucker notes that the Army is in a state of change
with regard to how best to execute COIN operations.
The Army’s transformation to meet the asymmetrical
post-9-11 threat has not been a smooth journey, nor is
that journey complete.
For one thing, Dr. Tucker notes that Army Doctrine
has been slow to process and implement the changes. To
examine the state of COIN doctrine, Dr. Tucker explores
the history of doctrine development from World War II
to present day. He also examines the role of decisive
operations in terms of mass vs. precision. Where
“Shock and Awe” was a means to achieve a decisive
end in the conventional battlefield, the challenge in
the COIN environment is to balance conventional with
psychological effects to achieve disproportionate effects.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
Reviews of books
that teach us about our craft

May2012 | 16
By Maj. William Cox
Georgia Army National Guard
B
eing an Army Aviator who flew the UH-1
in flight school, and who has flown combat
MEDEVAC missions, I was drawn to Robert
Mason’s Chickenhawk, a visceral account of his yearlong
deployment to Vietnam.
Mason’s story takes you with him and the rest of the
“Preachers” of B/229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st
Cavalry Division, to their musty, mildewed tents and
into his shot-up cockpit, while flying over Vietnam. He
nonchalantly weaves basic rotary wing tactics, techniques,
and procedures into the storyline, teaching readers while
captivating them with this very human experience.
The first chapter made me laugh as he recounted his
first few months at flight school. While it is uniquely his
story, it is also ubiquitous with every helicopter pilot’s
experience at flight school.
“A week before I was to graduate Anderson, my
instructor pilot cut the power as I cruised towards the
stage field. I bottomed the pitch immediately, turned into
the wind [everything that flies lands into the wind - it
reduces ground speed at touchdown] and glided down in
autorotation… I was concentrating on doing the maneuver
by the numbers. I noticed Anderson shaking his head
forlornly, out of the corner of my eye. My feeling of pride
and competence turned to stark terror. I saw the power
line. I turned abruptly away from them but I was now very
low, heading for a stand of trees. Anderson kept shaking
his head sadly [saying] ‘I’ve got it.’”
Mason then sails to Vietnam where his instruction
really begins with his mentors who had flown combat
missions in gliders during WWII, and had been fighters in
Korea. He learns that flight school taught him just enough
to be dangerous, and the Pilot-In-Command who sits next
to him is his primary instructor until he becomes a PIC
himself.
In addition to detailing his air-assault missions, the
story is intensely personal concerning his thoughts and
experiences in combat. Most Soldiers will find a sentence
which puts into words their own experience: “We stared
like tourists at the people we had come to save.” Soldiers
cannot help but be drawn into the conversations and absurd
situations Mason and his crew members experience both
in the air and on the ground in between missions.
Whether the “Preachers” are verbally abusing the
“Operation Twins” that never leave the compound on a
combat mission, or are talking about ladies, the reader
realizes that Mason’s crewmembers are archetypes that
somehow end up on every Soldier’s deployment.
While the book keeps you at the edge of your seat,
reliving his intensely personal and raw experiences, it does
not prepare you for his downward spiral of troubled dreams
and sleepless nights. While Mason does survive Vietnam,
he is not able to leave Vietnam behind. Back in the States,
he becomes an instructor pilot but is soon grounded. He
gets out of the Army, and his life continues to take tragic
turns until he finds himself in jail in 1983, just before this
book is published. The reader is left wishing Mason had
Mental Health services like the service has today, ready to
help Soldiers deal with the stress of combat.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
Reviews of books
that teach us
about our craft
June 2012 | 32
O
f the thousands of books and articles written
about leadership and management each year,
those produced by Harvard Business Review
stand out for the quality and expertise associated with
the brand. Each volume in this new series collects 10
such articles on a particular subject – Strategy, Change
Management, Managing Yourself – and in that sense
is the best of what HBR has to offer. This volume On
Leadership is excellent for military leaders looking to
consider new ideas and better understand old ones.
Selected from the last 20 years or so of HBR, writers
include Peter F. Drucker, author of The Effective
Executive and other enduring leaders in the field. The
articles range from analytical to practical to scholarly to
self-help in style; all benefit from HBR’s cogent editing
and their insistence on lucid prose.
The book’s layout aids accessibility as well as
retention. Articles include sidebar “Idea in Brief” and
“Idea in Practice” sections as well as short case studies.
The Idea in Brief summarizes main ideas and makes
it easy to prioritize reading. The Idea in Practice adds
depth and applies these basic ideas.
Each of the articles is just the right size. Coleman is
famous for his development of “emotional intelligence”
and while I find the idea attractive, I’m disinclined to
read hundreds of pages about it. So his article in On
Leadership explores the idea well enough for me and
allows me both to apply it and to decide if I want to read
more later.
Understanding this is actually pretty important to
personal development and the idea of an anthology in
the first place.
There are so many books on leadership published
because there are so many different situations, so many
maps to success. How can we hope to localize those
ideas and apply them in our lives? Immersion in a long
book steeps us in a relatively small number of ideas and
aids internalization. Conversely, an anthology like this
one broadens development and aids in experimentation
with new ideas.
For example, Rooke and Torbert posit seven “action
logic” models of leadership. What happens when you
try to put your co-workers into these models? Where
do you place yourself? Are any opportunities or threats
revealed?
Workingtheotherdirection,Kotterhelpedmecodify
past observations. I’ve been a fan of decentralization
sincemyCavalrydays,andalwaysthoughtthatsituation
builds good leaders. But why? Kotter observes that
good leaders tend to have had demanding jobs early in
their careers – and decentralized organizations tend to
create just this situation.
HBR’s 10 Must Reads: On Leadership contains
dozens of examples of leaders in action applying
these various leadership theories, yet there’s no
overabundance of prophetic declarations about
leadership or its requirements.
It proves an immediately approachable book full of
good sense by trusted authors who see leadership as a
mosaic of factors – making this anthology a mosaic of
mosaics, in a way. A great and informative read.
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
Reviews of books

July 2012 | 12
By SDF Warrant Officer 1 Seth G. Stuck
Georgia State Defense Force
A
s mentioned in last month’s article about family
emergency preparedness, sometimes it’s helpful
to consider how your family would or should
respond to a worst-case scenario. Well, I’m here to tell
you, it doesn’t get any worse than the zombie apocalypse.
Max Brook’s The Zombie Survival Guide forces you
to consider what you would do in the absence of a police
force, a transit system, household utilities and other
creature comforts while at the same time coping with
the presence of potential disease infection, violence, and
even hysteria. Brooks is particularly adept at making you
consider your potential recourse over different lengths of
time and space and varying degrees of danger.
What if you have to relocate? What if you have
to relocate through a hostile area? What if you have
to relocate through a hostile area while transporting
wounded?
“Americans are notorious for their
bad diet, lack of exercise, and relentless
fetish for labor-saving technology. As
recognizable as the term ‘couch potato’
is, a more accurate term would be ‘cattle’:
fat, lazy, listless, and ready to be eaten.”
Works of fiction like The Zombie Survival Guide
serveasexcellentthoughtexperiments.Thethreatofflesh-
eating zombies would be enough to give anyone pause,
which is exactly why this book serves as such a great
emergency preparedness resource. If you feel confident
in your ability to respond to a zombie apocalypse, there
isn’t much you couldn’t handle.
True, the odds of you having the beat back the
walking dead with a crowbar are slim, but the thought and
imagination Brooks puts into his emergency preparedness
outline serves as an example to us all.
In fact, many of the tactics he references come
from guidance offered in Army field manuals and even
emergency plans issued during the Cold War – an era
when worst-case scenario emergency preparedness was
less of a thought experiment and more commonplace. For
instance, if you have to hunker down for a long period of
time in a facility that’s likely to have its utilities cut off,
run to the bathtub and fill it up with fresh water.
From a thorough breakdown of weapons one might
want to have handy for home defense, to what household
items might suffice as substitutes in the absence of any
traditional weapons, to considerations about potential
refuges when all civic leadership and structure has
broken down, to transportation pros and cons, to terrain
considerations, Brooks takes you through every stage of
apocalyptic mayhem response planning. And his basic
point is the same as that of most any work on emergency
preparedness: if you wait until an emergency happens to
prepare, it’s too late.
As Brooks notes, “If you believe you can accomplish
everything by ‘cramming’ at the eleventh hour, by all
means, don’t lift a finger now. But you may think twice
about beginning to build your ark once it has already
started raining.”
Professional
Development
Bookshelf:
Reviews of books

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