This presentation was given at the Eurotek 2012 technical diving conference and tries to highlight the challenges in changing and developing a safety culture within the sport of recreational and technical diving.
Culture. Isn’t just something that grows in the lab (or kitchen)...
1. Culture. Isn’t just something
that grows in the lab (or kitchen)...
Improving Diving Safety Through Improved
Reporting and a Just Culture
Gareth Lock
E: gareth.lock@cognitas.org.uk M: 07966 483832
2. Scope
• Risk
• Cultures
• What is an Incident?
• Reporting, why should I?
• Case Studies
• Reporting Opportunities
• DISMS
• Conclusions
3. Introduction
• Full time RAF Officer
(ex C-130 aircrew)
• Adv Trimix Diver
• Studying for PhD
Cranfield
• Cognitas in 2010
• DISMS launched Apr 2012
13. Risk, What is It?
• Diving is risky
• Baselines are required
• What is risk?
14. Risk, What is It?
• Diving is risky
• Baselines are required
• Understand the risks
• What is risk?
15. Risk, What is It?
• Diving is risky
• Baselines are required
• Understand the risks
• Educate but don’t scare
• What is risk?
16. Risk, What is It?
• Diving is risky
• Baselines are required
• Understand the risks
• Educate but don’t scare
• Mitigate and reduce them
• What is risk?
17. Risk, What is It?
• Diving is risky
• Baselines are required
• Understand the risks
• Educate but don’t scare
• Mitigate and reduce them
• To improve safety, not primarily
reduce litigation
• What is risk?
19. Risk, What is It?
zIncident
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Safety Margin
20. Risk, What is It?
zIncident
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
21. Risk, What is It?
z
Resources
Incident
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
22. Risk, What is It?
z
Resources
Incident
Bad Luck!
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
23. Risk, What is It?
z
Resources
Incident
Bad Luck!
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
Training
24. Risk, What is It?
z
Resources
Incident
Bad Luck!
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
Training
Feedback
25. Risk, What is It?
z
Resources
Incident
Bad Luck!
Safe Limit for
Recreational
Diving
Safe Limit for
Technical!
Diving
Human Error!
(Active/Latent)
Training
Reporting
Feedback
28. Cultures
• What are they?
Culture can be described as ‘‘the shared values and
beliefs within an organization which create
behavioural norms’’ (Shaw and Blewitt, 1996)
38. Reporting Culture Survey
• Percentage of Divers Had
Incidents?
• Types of Incidents
• Knowledge of the BSAC
system
• Reasons for not reporting
• DCI Occur vs Report
48. Reporting Culture
• Improvements are
needed
• Guidelines on what is an
Incident
• Independence may
improve uptake
• Easy to submit report
• Useful outputs
• Promotion of Reporting
49. Reporting Culture
• Improvements are
needed
Govaarts C. EAM 2/GUI 6 - Establishment of ‘Just
Culture’ Principles in ATM Safety Data Reporting
and Assessment. Safety Regulation Unit,
EUROCONTROL; 2006.
• Guidelines on what is an
Incident
• Independence may
improve uptake
• Easy to submit report
• Useful outputs
• Promotion of Reporting
53. Just Culture
• Not ‘no blame’
• The environment to talk about or
report an incident without fear of
retribution (professional/peer)
• Consoling the human error
• Coaching the at-risk behaviour
• Punishing the reckless behaviour
• Not ‘no blame’
54. Just Culture
• Not ‘no blame’
• The environment to talk about or
report an incident without fear of
retribution (professional/peer)
• Consoling the human error
• Coaching the at-risk behaviour
• Punishing the reckless behaviour
• Who draws the line...?
• Not ‘no blame’
56. What is an Incident?
“National Research Council defines a safety
“incident” as an event that, under slightly different
circumstances, could have been an accident.”
National Research Council, Assembly of Engineering, Committee on Flight Airworthiness
Certification Procedures. Improving aircraft safety: FAA certification of commercial
passenger aircraft. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1980.
57. What is an Incident?
“National Research Council defines a safety
“incident” as an event that, under slightly different
circumstances, could have been an accident.”
National Research Council, Assembly of Engineering, Committee on Flight Airworthiness
Certification Procedures. Improving aircraft safety: FAA certification of commercial
passenger aircraft. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1980.
“We defined a near miss as any event that could
have had adverse consequences but did not and was
indistinguishable from fully fledged adverse events
in all but outcome.”
Barach P, Small SD. Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: Lessons from non-medical
near miss reporting systems. BMJ 2000, Mar 18;320(7237):759-63.
59. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
60. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
61. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
62. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
63. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
64. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
• CCR failure at end of BT, bailout ascent
65. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
• CCR failure at end of BT, bailout ascent
• OxTox
66. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
• CCR failure at end of BT, bailout ascent
• OxTox
• CO2 hit
67. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
• CCR failure at end of BT, bailout ascent
• OxTox
• CO2 hit
• DCI end in paralysis
68. What is an Incident?
• Unplanned separation at depth, solo ascent
• OOG back gas just before end of BT
• Twin indies, end dive 20bar/210bar
• Major (N2 or CO2) Narcosis Event
• DCI, no lasting effects once on O2 on boat
• CCR failure at end of BT, bailout ascent
• OxTox
• CO2 hit
• DCI end in paralysis
• Fatality
70. What is an Incident?
• 10% Lack of Clarity
• More guidance required
71. What is an Incident?
• 10% Lack of Clarity
• More guidance required
• 34% Trivial/Not Serious/Not
Contribute to Learning
• ‘Why do we still make same
mistakes?’
• ‘Not perceived as relevant to
my deep gas diving.’ -
referring to BSAC AIR
73. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Experienced Trimix
Instructor, Relatively New
CCR Diver
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
74. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Experienced Trimix
Instructor, Relatively New
CCR Diver
• Forgetting O2 shutdown post
dive
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
75. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Experienced Trimix
Instructor, Relatively New
CCR Diver
• Forgetting O2 shutdown post
dive
• Shutdown O2 progressed from
dekitting to ‘on lift’
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
76. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Experienced Trimix
Instructor, Relatively New
CCR Diver
• Forgetting O2 shutdown post
dive
• Shutdown O2 progressed from
dekitting to ‘on lift’
• Shutdown in water waiting for
previous diver/lift
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
77. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Experienced Trimix
Instructor, Relatively New
CCR Diver
• Forgetting O2 shutdown post
dive
• Shutdown O2 progressed from
dekitting to ‘on lift’
• Shutdown in water waiting for
previous diver/lift
• PPO2 0.07 on lift Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
79. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Reported: Diver
shutdown O2 in water.
Broke ‘rules’.
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
80. Case Study One
MCCR Shutdown
• Reported: Diver
shutdown O2 in water.
Broke ‘rules’.
• Not one reason for
incident, back story
possible to understand
WHY
Image from www.kissrebreathers.com
83. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Experienced MOD 3 level
CCR Diver
• Stressful previous days
84. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Experienced MOD 3 level
CCR Diver
• Stressful previous days
• Issues on descent, carried
on despite ascending to clear
85. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Experienced MOD 3 level
CCR Diver
• Stressful previous days
• Issues on descent, carried
on despite ascending to clear
• CO2/N2 Narcosis and bailed
out, then problems started!
86. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Experienced MOD 3 level
CCR Diver
• Stressful previous days
• Issues on descent, carried
on despite ascending to clear
• CO2/N2 Narcosis and bailed
out, then problems started!
• Fortunately resolved at 21m
on OC bailout after 20mins
88. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Likely Reported:
Potential narcosis
leading to bailout
89. Case Study Two
CCR Narcosis
• Likely Reported:
Potential narcosis
leading to bailout
• Not one reason. Many
opportunities to stop
incident developing.
Full story required to
understand WHY
93. Reporting, Why Should I?
• What is the Risk?
• How Big Is the Problem?
• Where is the Problem?
94. Reporting, Why Should I?
• What is the Risk?
• How Big Is the Problem?
• Where is the Problem?
• Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model
• Organisational Influence
• Unsafe Supervision
• Pre-Condition for Unsafe Acts
• Unsafe Acts
95. Reporting, Why Should I?
• What is the Risk?
• How Big Is the Problem?
• Where is the Problem?
• Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model
• Organisational Influence
• Unsafe Supervision
• Pre-Condition for Unsafe Acts
• Unsafe Acts
•How To Stop It Happening Again?
104. Reporting, Why Should I?
• Data Provision
• Safety conferences, lack of data
• Insurance and financial implication
105. Reporting, Why Should I?
• Data Provision
• Safety conferences, lack of data
• Insurance and financial implication
• Lessons Learned
106. Reporting, Why Should I?
• Data Provision
• Safety conferences, lack of data
• Insurance and financial implication
• Lessons Learned
• Needed to support Just and Reporting
Cultures - Feedback loop
107. Reporting, Why Should I?
• Data Provision
• Safety conferences, lack of data
• Insurance and financial implication
• Lessons Learned
• Needed to support Just and Reporting
Cultures - Feedback loop
“Consistently similar problems or errors, likely to be an
organisational or supervisory problem” - Reason
128. Areas for Improvement
• More Analysis Needed in Reports
• Increase number of filter options
• Improve drop down options esp CCR
129. Areas for Improvement
• More Analysis Needed in Reports
• Increase number of filter options
• Improve drop down options esp CCR
• Greater uptake from the user
community
132. Summary
• More opportunity for ‘Lessons Learned’
• Easier to address than total stats
capture, probably greater impact too
133. Summary
• More opportunity for ‘Lessons Learned’
• Easier to address than total stats
capture, probably greater impact too
• Needs stronger Reporting Culture
134. Summary
• More opportunity for ‘Lessons Learned’
• Easier to address than total stats
capture, probably greater impact too
• Needs stronger Reporting Culture
• But ‘Just Culture’ essential to improve
reporting
135. Summary
• More opportunity for ‘Lessons Learned’
• Easier to address than total stats
capture, probably greater impact too
• Needs stronger Reporting Culture
• But ‘Just Culture’ essential to improve
reporting
• DISMS provides open, confidential and
independent reporting system
136. Questions?
“From a safety perspective, it is not
criminal to make an error, but it is
inexcusable if you don’t learn from it” -
Wiegmann/Shappell 2003
www.cognitas.org.uk http://www.divingincidents.org