As the Retail Distribution Review took effect in the UK in 2013, many expected distributors of investment products to win the haggle with product providers. This didn't happen. But the aftermath leaves as many questions unanswered by the industry. This presentation paints some scenarios and explores the implications for action

1. RDR and preferential terms for distributors
The aftermath of the share class haggle
May 2014

2. Share class proliferation could have been
a nightmare
• the UK Retail Distribution Review decreed that distributors
should be paid by customers, not providers
• in 2013 distributors spent a lot of time pressing asset
managers for preferential terms ….
• not least because the business models of former fund
supermarkets were under pressure from loss of cash
rebates from fund managers
• everyone expected preferential terms to be implemented
by creation of unique share classes for each distributor
• this potential proliferation of share classes would have
adverse consequences for all industry participants

3. If share classes had proliferated…
Impact of share class proliferation
Fund managers Less revenue per unit; less control of distribution?
Cost increases; operational risk; back book?
Transfer agency and
asset servicing
Scoping additional work & agreeing terms
Possibly nugatory IT spend
Platforms Fund manager deal-making (or not?)
Adviser communications & investor consent?
Pricing pressure vs charges for re-reg/ conversion?
Distributors and
advisers
Extra impetus towards restricted fund choice?
Ease of moving assets?
Customer comms & consent; suitability
Clients Increasing awareness; but confusion and uncertainty
Demand for greater transparency and trust
Some movement to execution-only venues?
Regulator Drive to understand costs and incentives
Assess potential for conflicts of interests
Benefits of competition for customers

4. 2013 was a year of speculation about what might happen

5. But the dog didn’t bite as expected
• many fund managers held the line on pricing,
especially for their best products
• if preferential terms were agreed, these were
deployed using unit rebates, not unique share classes
• so we didn’t see the amount of share class
proliferation originally feared
• it’s been a non-event, but it still puts into stark relief
the implications of changing the industry…
• …. from being demand-led to being supply-led
• the aftermath of the share class haggle has left many
issues not yet wrestled to the ground

6. This is not a get-out-of jail card for
large parts of the industry
• hard questions remain:
– what does the post-RDR world look like now?
– what should the industry be doing about it?
• we look at the impacts on four key layers:
– fund managers, who face nine challenges
– platforms, confronted by seven threats
– advisers, who could do better at orchestrating demand
– clients, who have needs they are struggling to meet
• we explore four scenarios of the future…
• and set out next steps for the retail investments
industry

7. Nine challenges for fund managers
Recycled inflows “Only around half of the fund operators actually took money in. These
operators reported net retail inflows of £23bn, offset by outflows of
£8.8bn” IMA, Asset Management Survey 2012 -13
Legacy books Rich pricing on legacy funds
Challenge to justify continued high charges
Profitless variety 185 “strategically useful” funds in a universe of 70,000 funds
Active vs passive Inexorable rise of passive puts pressure on active propositions to
demonstrate value for money
Lack of pricing
power
Middle-ranking, undifferentiated fund managers facing weak &
diminishing pricing power
Offer to investors What is the proposition and how is its value communicated? How can
fund managers be sure they are treating customers fairly?
How to get product
to market
Commission no longer available as a marketing option.
Which combination of the 4P’s will have the most impact?
A reduced take Intermediaries such as platforms and advisers have very strong
incentives to reduce the take available to fund managers
Making sense of
costs
Growing pressure to unbundle underlying costs
Needs agreed standards, or action by the regulator

8. Seven threats to platforms
Commoditisation
of platform
services
No significant opportunity for distinctive competitive
advantage other than dependable and resilient servicing
Increased cost
awareness
Portfolio admin costs have increased significantly
Cost minimisation the new imperative for investors
Non-scaleable
costs
Economies of scale difficult to realise
Most processes remain manually intensive
Unsustainable
cost of sales
Race to attract assets leads to expensive adviser service
standards, and unaffordable variety in processes and
systems
Price reductions Drive down to 10bps charge level threatens sustainability
Unclear business
rationales
Why did we set up a platform in the first place?
Is our business model sustainable?
Service fees
replace ad
valorem charge
Fixed service fees threaten revenue models which rely on
cross-subsidy from larger investors

9. Distributors and advisers
• how to demonstrate sustained suitability?
• scope for increasingly segmented offerings
– holistic financial planning , for those who can afford it
– D2C/ execution-only, for those who can’t
– occupational = quasi-retail?
– scaleable volume advice propositions
• how to orchestrate demand and drive better value?
• more layers of intermediation (and expense)?
– DFM/ restricted propositions = quasi-institutional?
– business intelligence providers
– adviser software providers = gatekeepers

10. Clients have unmet needs
• they want to deal with organisations
– they can trust
– which provide a dependable return
– at a cost they perceive as reasonable
– when compared with the value provided
• …… and have in mind relevant experiences from
other industries:
– Ryanair, Aldi, Amazon, John Lewis
• strengthening contest for influence over the
customer
• and do we know what we mean by “fiduciary”?

11. Some regulatory imponderables remain
• what’s involved in rebalancing from:
– a rules-based/ enforcement regime, towards
– “getting the market to work better”?
• what exactly are the practical implications of
“behavioural economics”?
• in what circumstances will “caveat emptor” apply?
• does pricing convergence confirm the existence of
competition (or not)?
• how will “conflicts of interest” be interpreted?
• does a duty of “candour” apply?
• what does “transparency” mean in practice?

12. Two main drivers will influence the
transformation of UK retail investments
1. The extent to which customer demand is
successfully aggregated, putting pressure on
the upstream value chain
2. The extent to which technology is fully
exploited, increasing customer access and
slashing end-to-end costs

14. Two scenarios for continued supplier dominance
Classic British fudge
• lots of talk, but little real change delivered
• incumbents still milk the current model
• industry remains expensive and inefficient in comparison with
other sectors
Jurassic Park IV
• a battle of the dinosaurs, to the last man standing
• competition greatly intensified through distributor pressure,
reducing the take available for other parts of the value chain
• but incompetent IT and clunky processes bring down the
weaker, sub-scale players
• delivery of value to the customer is still impaired

15. Two scenarios for technology transformation
Enhanced value extraction
• IT-enabled change reduces costs, transforms distribution
effectiveness and mitigates risk
• but increasingly dominant suppliers extract the value to enrich
themselves, and do not share the benefits with the customer…
• … for whom outcomes do not dramatically improve
Retail Investment Review-max
• Amazon-like disintermediation
• endless interrogation of supply chain costs by informed critics
• radical price reduction and frictionless transacting
• exposure of well-rewarded talent, vigorous competition, instant
availability
• niche players and new entrants can succeed

16. Faites vos jeux – place your bets
Option A Option B Option C
Fund
managers
Focus on specialist
talent provision
Aim for cost
leadership
Integrate with
distribution
Transfer
agency and
asset
servicing
Promote industry
collaboration to
capture benefits of
electronic trading
Monetise data Enter platform
domain/
de-duplicate adviser
CRM
Platforms Move towards fund
management
Build out towards
distribution
Go for economies of
scale
Distributors
and advisers
Holistic financial
planning
Adviser software
houses command
more of the value
chain
Automated services
to mass affluent

17. What the industry should be doing
• do something!
• be outward-looking, get
educated, keep informed
• avoid group-think; involve
all corporate functions
• review & strengthen what
you are good at
• divest or outsource what
you’re not going to be good
at
• search for and secure
pricing power
• identify, analyse and reduce
costs:
– cull funds
– simplify the business
– pay less for externally-
procured services
• appraise technology
carefully
• have a Plan B

18. A note on methods
Research was conducted by Andrew Lloyd, David DAN Norman and David
Taylor during Autumn 2013.
Structured discussions were held with 17 people from 15 organisations,
including platforms, global transfer agents and broker/ dealers, UK
distributors, global and UK-focused investment managers, a global
performance analytics provider and industry commentators.
Interviewees held senior roles within IT, business development,
proposition or operations functions, or had business unit P&L
responsibility.
The organisations involved had aggregate assets under management of
some GBP4trn.
In addition the research drew upon data sources and research reports in
the public domain, including those published by industry bodies such as:
– the Investment Management Association, in particular the IMA’s 2012 – 2013 Asset
Management Survey, and
– the Wealth Management Association

19. Andrew Lloyd
E: andrew@lloydfsconsulting.co.uk
M: 07841 602 613
David DAN Norman
E: david.norman@tcfinvestment.com
M: 07789 396 836
David Taylor
E: david.taylor@ocp.co.uk
M: 07768 077 796