CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives. 2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks. 3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
July 11, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1
3
1) Reported US policy discussions about reestablishing a diplomatic presence
in Benghazi strengthens Field Marshal Haftar as he gains control of the city.
2) Al Shabaab intensified an attack campaign in eastern Kenyan in an effort to
turn Kenyan public opinion against the military intervention in Somalia.
3) A governing council that rivals the UN- and U.S.-backed Yemeni government
is gaining power in southern Yemen.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
Salafi-jihadi groups are gaining strength in India-administered Kashmir. A new Salafi-jihadi
group led by former Hizbul Mujahideen commander Zakir Musa is attracting defectors from
groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. Statements from al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
(AQIS), as well as several ISIS-affiliated Telegram accounts, encouraged militants to
organize and conduct attacks in Kashmir.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will increase their focus on Kashmir in order to co-opt the
popular mobilization against Indian forces in the region.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The fragmentation of the internationally recognized Yemeni government threatens U.S.
policy for a unified Yemeni state. The Transitional Political Council for the South formed a
competing governmental structure, which has received international support.
Outlook: The Transitional Political Council will take control of more governing functions.
Security
Saudi-led coalition forces accelerated airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh forces in western
Taiz governorate. Coalition strikes are part of a larger effort to facilitate a northward
offensive along Yemen’s western coast toward al Hudaydah port.
Outlook: The frontline in Taiz governorate will not shift despite coalition airstrikes.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continued targeting al Houthi-Saleh forces in al Bayda governorate in coordination
with local Sunni tribes. AQAP propaganda emphasized the group’s role in defending the
local population against al Houthi-Saleh aggression.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to co-opt tribal militias that lack alternative support.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 08 JUL: ISIS
militants killed al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in Qayfa.
2) 09 JUL: Saudi-led
coalition warplanes
targeted al Houthi-
Saleh forces on the
Yemeni border.
3) 10 JUL: A reported
U.S. airstrike killed
an AQAP leader in
Shabwah.
4) 10 JUL: AQAP
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh
fighters in Rada’a.
5) 10 JUL: The al
Houthi-Saleh bloc
claimed to fire a
ballistic missile in
Taiz.
3
5
4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
U.S. President Donald Trump pledged nearly $126 million in humanitarian aid to Somalia at
the G20 summit to prevent an impending famine. The Somali government is also attempting
to regulate the security industry by imposing new taxes on firms operating in Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may disrupt humanitarian aid distribution by conducting IED attacks.
Security
The Puntland Security Force (PSF) destroyed several al Shabaab bases in the Galgala
Mountains, from which al Shabaab stages attacks throughout Bari region. A U.S. airstrike
reinforced Somali troops after al Shabaab raided their base in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may ambush military checkpoints in Boosaaso, Bari region.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is attempting to generate a Kenyan military withdrawal from Somalia. Militants
beheaded nine civilians and clashed with police in Lamu County, eastern Kenya. Al Shabaab
continued attacks intended to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may conduct a mass-casualty attack targeting Kenyan security forces.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
1
3
2
5
1) 04 JUL: A U.S.
airstrike targeted al
Shabaab militants
in Kismayo.
2) 05-08 JUL: Al
Shabaab
conducted raids in
Lamu County
3) 09 JUL: Puntland
forces destroyed al
Shabaab bases in
the Galgala
Mountains.
4) 08-10 JUL: Al
Shabaab
ambushed
Ethiopian AMISOM
troops in Halgan.
5) 11 JUL: Al
Shabaab shelled a
Kenyan base in
Mandera County.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The U.S. may back Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya. The Trump administration
is considering cooperation and intelligence-sharing between U.S. special operators and
Haftar’s forces. The policy also includes increased diplomatic engagement in Libya.
Outlook: Haftar will leverage U.S. counterterrorism support to strengthen his position in a
politically negotiated settlement.
Security
The LNA declared victory in Benghazi, culminating a three-year campaign to seize Libya’s
second-largest city from Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. The head of the UN-
backed GNA praised the operation, signaling continued rapprochement with the LNA.
Outlook: The LNA will seek to increase its influence in northwestern Libya, including Tripoli.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
AQIM and al Murabitoun militants fled Benghazi for southwestern Libya. AQIM uses a safe
haven in southwestern Libya to support operations in Mali, Algeria, and northern Libya.
Outlook: AQIM militants will regroup in the southwest before re-deploying to fight Haftar.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
2
3
1
1) 05 JUL: The LNA
seized the last
militant-held
neighborhoods in
Benghazi.
2) 05 JUL: Fighters
from the GNA-allied
al Bunyan al
Marsous coalition
clashed with LNA
fighters at two
locations in Sirte
district.
3) 09 JUL: Benghazi
Defense Brigades
vehicles passed
through Tajoura
city, Tripoli district.
4) 09-10 JUL: Pro-
GNC and pro-GNA
militias clashed in
Garabulli town.
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Moroccan police brutality and the ongoing trial of activist Nasser Zefzafi may galvanize
protests throughout the country. Protesters demonstrated in Rabat against the government’s
detainment of activists. Protests had been contained to the northern Rif region. Widespread
unrest provides opportunities for militant groups to recruit or conduct attacks.
Outlook: The severity of Zefzafi’s sentence will determine the strength of future protests.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
JNIM expanded operations across the Sahel in response to the launch of the G5 Sahel
multinational force. The group conducted an attack in Niger, its first outside of Mali, in
retaliation for Niger’s participation in the G5 Sahel force.
Rival factions of Boko Haram may be deconflicting in northern Nigeria and Niger. The ISIS-
recognized faction conducted attacks in areas of Nigeria’s Borno State in which the faction
led by Boko Haram emir Abubakr Shekau operates. Similarly, the Shekau faction is likely
responsible for attacks in Niger, where the ISIS-recognized faction operates.
Outlook: JNIM will attempt attacks outside Mali in G5 Sahel countries. The ISIS-recognized
Boko Haram faction will increase complex attacks on security forces in central Borno State.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 06 JUL: Tunisian
security forces
arrested two
suspected militants
in Zaghouan
Governorate.
2) 07 JUL: Tunisian
authorities arrested
a suspected AQIM
militant in Siliana
Governorate.
3) 08 JUL: Tunisian
security forces
detonated a
landmine near
Jebel Ouergha, Kef
Governorate.
4) 08 JUL: Protesters
clashed with
Moroccan police in
Rabat.
2
3 1
4

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
3
1
1) 04 JUL: ISIS
Wilayat Gharb
Ifriqiyya attacked a
Nigerian Army base
in Kamuya, Nigeria.
2) 05 JUL: JNIM
ambushed a
Nigerian Army
patrol in Midal,
Niger.
3) 10 JUL: Likely
JNIM militants
ambushed a Malian
army convoy in
Inkadagotan, Mali.
4) 11 JUL: CMA
forces seized
Anefis town after
multi-day clashes
with pro-
government
militias.
4

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ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569