CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates. 2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them. 3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
July 5, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1
2
3
1) Al Qaeda leadership statements emphasize the global nature of the fight
and requirement to defend Muslim lands from occupying forces.
2) Egypt’s influence over negotiations to end the Libyan civil war will produce a
settlement that fails to resolve core grievances that drive the conflict.
3) Al Qaeda associate JNIM is using hostages to secure its negotiating position
and undermine the launch of the G5 Sahel multinational force.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda’s central leadership is emphasizing the global nature of jihad. Senior al Qaeda
leader Sami al Oraidi released two statements urging Muslims to revitalize the Salafi-jihadi
movement. Oraidi called for popular mobilization against Western forces and framed the
conflict in the Arabian Peninsula within the global jihadist movement.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to stress the global, anti-nationalist nature of jihad to gain
strength among Salafi-jihadi organizations.
Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is increasing production of propaganda. AQIS
released two nashids (chants), two videos, and an English-language Code of Conduct in the
last week. AQIS’s Code of Conduct adheres to recent statements by al Qaeda’s central
leadership. It urges followers to seek the unification of jihad and avoid overtly civilian targets.
Outlook: AQIS will use messaging to increase its prominence among Salafi-jihadi groups in
the Indian Subcontinent.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Fractures within the Hadi government coalition weaken the internationally recognized
government of Yemen and increase the hurdles to reach a political resolution. President
Hadi oversaw the replacement of individuals in his government and military that had been
part of the southern Transitional Political Council.
Outlook: Hadi will seek to block the rumored political settlement on the table.
Security
Saudi-led coalition-backed forces gained territory in Sirwah district, Ma’rib governorate, as
part of a larger effort to seize Yemen’s capital from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Sirwah
district borders Sana’a governorate in northern Yemen.
Outlook: Hadi government-aligned forces will not gain full control of Ma’rib governorate.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continued its campaigns against al Houthi-Saleh forces and Emirati-backed security
forces. It portrays itself as a defender of local Sunni populations in order to build local ties.
Outlook: AQAP will increase its attacks against Emirati-backed forces in southern Yemen.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 28 JUN: AQAP
militants killed six al
Houthi-Saleh
fighters in central al
Bayda governorate.
2) 29 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
claimed to fire an
anti-tank missile
into Saudi Arabia.
3) 01 JUL: A reported
U.S. airstrike killed
AQAP militants in
Abyan governorate.
4) 04 JUL: Coalition
airstrikes targeted
al Houthi-Saleh
forces in Taiz.
5) 05 JUL: AQAP
militants attacked al
Hizam security
forces in Abyan.
3
5
4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The upcoming general election will affect Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. A recent
poll indicated that candidate Ralia Odinga, who supports a military withdrawal, is gaining
ground on incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta, who supports a troop surge in Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may attack Kenyan citizens to increase voter demand for withdrawal.
Security
Somali security forces escalated operations to disrupt al Shabaab in southern Somalia.
Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM forces briefly seized an al Shabaab stronghold in
Janale. A U.S. drone strike targeted an al Shabaab intelligence commander near Barawe.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may launch a mass-casualty attack in Mogadishu to show resilience.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab mobilized fighters to prevent former deputy leader Mukhtar Robow from
defecting to the Somali government. Robow opposes al Shabaab’s global Salafi-jihadi goals.
Al Shabaab also disrupted efforts to secure Kenyan supply lines in Gedo region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may raid SNA and AMISOM bases to retaliate against security efforts.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
1
3
2
5
1) 28 JUN: Al
Shabaab militants
targeted Mukhtar
Robow near Hudur.
2) 30 JUN: AMISOM
briefly seized al
Shabaab’s
stronghold in
Janale town.
3) 02 JUL: AFRICOM
conducted an
airstrike targeting al
Shabaab near
Barawe.
4) 03 JUL: Al
Shabaab
ambushed SNA
forces in Gedo.
5) 04 JUL: Al
Shabaab fired
mortars targeting
Villa Somalia.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Egypt is achieving its goal of shaping the outcome of the Libyan civil war. Civilian leaders
from Misrata city met with the Egyptian Army Chief of Staff to discuss a political deal to end
the war. Misratan leaders historically oppose the LNA, Egypt’s primary ally in Libya.
Outlook: An Egypt-led deal will exacerbate grievances that empower Salafi-jihadi groups.
Security
Security is worsening in the outskirts of Tripoli, Libya’s capital. A local militant group
ambushed a five-vehicle UN convoy in al Zawiya. Clashes also occurred at Mitiga airport.
Militias aligned with the UN-backed GNA ousted rival groups from the capital in early June.
Outlook: Attacks outside the capital will undermine the GNA’s legitimacy in Tripoli.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Militant groups continue to operate in eastern Libya despite the LNA’s advances against
Islamist militias, including al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked fighters, in Benghazi. Egyptian
warplanes bombed an armed convoy headed toward the Egyptian-Libyan border.
Outlook: Militants will continue an insurgency against the LNA outside of Benghazi.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
2 3
1
1) 27 JUN: Egyptian
warplanes bombed
an armed 12-
vehicle convoy
headed toward the
Egyptian-Libyan
border.
2) 28 JUN: Militants
ambushed an
UNSMIL convoy in
al Zawiya district.
3) 05 JUL: Rival
factions of the al
Buni Brigade
clashed near
Tripoli’s Mitiga
airport.
4) 05 JUL: Al Bunyan
al Marsous and
LNA forces clashed
in southern Sirte.
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Clashes between police and street vendors are a potential flashpoint for civil unrest in
Tunisia. Police arrested 47 protesters after the government banned vendors’ stalls. Tunisia’s
2011 Jasmine Revolution began when street vendors protested government interference.
Civil unrest provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to recruit or conduct attacks.
Outlook: The Tunisian government’s suppression of protests will increase unrest.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
JNIM seeks to strengthen its negotiating position and undermine the French-sponsored G5
Sahel counterterrorism force. The group released a proof-of-life video featuring six hostages.
The Malian government’s reported negotiations with JNIM are increasing tensions with
France. JNIM prioritizes attacks on French troops in northern Mali.
An official ISIS newsletter confirmed the presence of an ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction
in the Lake Chad basin. Boko Haram militants attacked civilians in southeastern Niger,
signaling a change from past operations that targeted security forces in the area.
Outlook: JNIM will attempt to negotiate with the hostages’ governments and Mali to
undermine French counterterrorism efforts. Boko Haram will attempt to spread into Niger.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 26 JUN: Tunisian
security forces
disrupted a
suspected ISIS-
linked financing cell
in Ben Guerdane.
2) 28 JUN: Tunisian
authorities arrested
a suspected
militant in Raf Raf.
3) 03 JUL: Moroccan
authorities
withdrew the
majority of security
forces from al
Hoceima, the
epicenter of multi-
month protests.
4) 03 JUL: Protesters
clashed with police
officers in Tunis.
2
4
1
3

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
3
1
1) 29 JUN: Likely
Boko Haram-
Shekau suicide
bombers attacked
refugees in
Kabalewa, Niger,
killing three people.
2) 29 JUN: A likely
Boko Haram-
Barnawi IED killed
four soldiers in
Kangarwa, Nigeria.
3) 02 JUL: Likely
Boko Haram-
Shekau militants
killed nine people
and kidnapped 30
others in N’Galewa,
Niger.

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569