CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates. 2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu. 3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
June 13, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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3
1
1) Saif al Islam al Qaddafi’s release may further polarize Libyan factions in the
civil war and drive support to Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2) Al Shabaab demonstrated strength on multiple fronts as U.S.-backed forces
began an offensive to degrade the group in southern Somalia.
3) Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri described the entire Muslim world as in a
single war with multiple fights, calling for unity of effort within the umma.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri emphasized that the Muslim world is engaged in a single
war on multiple fronts. He and al Qaeda ideologues continue to emphasize the broad unity of
the umma, the Muslim community, against external threats. Zawahiri’s June 9 video
statement promoted unity among Sunni Muslims regardless of national origin, echoing an
April speech in which he called on Syrian fighters to eschew nationalism. Al Qaeda leaders
seek to prevent the formation of a secular coalition government in Syria. Hay’at Tahrir al
Sham, the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, is advancing this goal in
western Syria’s Idlib province by forcing U.S.-backed opposition groups to disband and
taking increasing control over local governance structures.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to compete with other actors for influence over Syrian
armed opposition groups.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia is attempting to build its influence in Yemen in order to mediate political negotiations.
The Hadi government seeks to use Russian-printed riyals to pay government salaries.
Outlook: Russia will establish leverage over the Hadi government in order to broker a
political settlement and gain access to a naval base on the Yemeni coast.
Security
Hadi government-aligned militias advanced in Taiz governorate. Militias seized the
presidential palace in eastern Taiz city from al Houthi-Saleh forces after a 21-day battle.
Outlook: Hadi government-aligned forces will seize additional military sites in Taiz.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP aims to undermine the southern Transitional Political Council’s legitimacy. The council
seeks to be the security provider for southern Yemen. Likely AQAP militants attempted to
assassinate a security official in Abyan and attacked security forces in Hadramawt.
Outlook: AQAP will attack security targets and issue propaganda to reduce public trust in
the Transitional Political Council.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 07 JUN: Suspected
AQAP militants
attacked a security
convoy in Zinjibar,
Abyan.
2) 09 JUN: Coalition
warplanes struck al
Houthi-Saleh
positions in al
Khokha district, al
Hudaydah.
3) 12 JUN: Hadi
government-
aligned militias
seized the
presidential palace
in eastern Taiz city.
4) 12 JUN: An AQAP
suicide bomber
attacked a military
camp in Daw’an,
Hadramawt.
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4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Shabaab’s spokesman threatened “perpetual war” against Kenya as part of an ongoing
effort to create popular opposition to the intervention in Somalia before elections in August.
The group killed dozens of Kenyan personnel in the border region in recent weeks.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will focus operations on security targets in Garissa County, Kenya.
Security
SNA and AMISOM forces began an offensive to disrupt al Shabaab in southern Somalia. A
U.S. strike targeted an al Shabaab command and logistics node in response to attacks on
partner forces, marking the first strike under new Pentagon authorities in Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may go to ground in the south but will escalate attacks in Mogadishu.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab resurged in Puntland and displayed the range of its attacks zone. It raided a
military base and seized Af Urur town. It also intensified an assassination campaign in
Mogadishu since the Somali government’s push to stabilize the capital began in May.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely use Af Urur to stage spectacular attacks in Boosaaso.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
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1) 08 JUN: Al
Shabaab seized a
military base and Af
Urur town.
2) 10 JUN: SNA and
AMISOM began an
offensive in Lower
Shabelle region.
3) 11 JUN: A U.S.
airstrike hit an al
Shabaab site in
Sakow, Middle
Jubba region.
4) 11 JUN: Al
Shabaab attacked
a Kenyan convoy in
Liboi, Garissa
County.
5) 12 JUN: Kenyan
warplanes struck
Garas Dulan, Gedo
region.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The influence of former Qaddafi regime officials in Libya is growing. A militia aligned with the
Libyan National Army released Muammar al Qaddafi’s son, Saif al Islam, from house arrest
in Zintan. The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade released 30 Qaddafi-era officials days later.
Outlook: The feared return of the regime will drive support to Salafi-jihadi groups.
Security
The LNA moved to seize the last militant-held neighborhoods in Benghazi. It captured the
headquarters of the Libya Shield militia in Suq al Hout district, where militants had attempted
to block the LNA’s advance by destroying buildings. Militants attempted to assassinate the
mayor of Benghazi with an explosive device.
Outlook: Militants will conduct an assassination campaign targeting officials in Benghazi.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS cells seek to orchestrate attacks on international targets in Libya. The brother of the
Manchester bomber was reportedly involved in a plot to attack the UN envoy in Tripoli.
Outlook: ISIS militants will attack foreign officials and embassies in Tripoli.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
2
3
1
1) 06 JUN: Militants
destroyed buildings
to block LNA
ground attacks in
Suq al Hout district,
Benghazi.
2) 10 JUN: Militants
detonated an
explosive device
targeting the
convoy of the
mayor of Benghazi.
3) 11 JUN: Militias
clashed in Zintan
after the release of
Saif al Islam al
Qaddafi.
4) 12 JUN: The LNA
captured the
headquarters of the
Libya Shield militia
in Suq al Hout
district, Benghazi.
4

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| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Mass protests in Morocco may strain security forces and provide opportunities for Salafi-
jihadi groups to conduct attacks in the country. Protests began in the marginalized Rif region
but developed into a broader social movement, drawing thousands of marchers into the
streets of the capital, Rabat. A government crackdown caused additional mobilization.
Outlook: Covert cells in Morocco may attack as social unrest taxes security resources.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) seeks to erode morale
and constrain the operations of UN peacekeepers in northern Mali. JNIM militants shelled a
MINUSMA base on June 8 and then ambushed a patrol that responded to the attack, killing
several peacekeeprs.
Boko Haram-Shekau mounted its first complex assault in months on Maiduguri city, the
capital of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The attack is likely intended to fix security
forces in urban areas and increase Boko Haram’s freedom of movement in rural terrain.
Outlook: JNIM will force MINUSMA forces to concentrate in bases and urban areas. Boko
Haram will resume regular attacks on Maiduguri city.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
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3
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1) 06 JUN: Economic
protests continued
in Tataouine,
Tunisia.
2) 08 JUN: Police and
demonstrators
clashed during
protests in al
Hoceima, Morocco.
3) 11 JUN: Protesters
flooded the streets
of Rabat and called
on the Moroccan
government to
release opposition
leaders.
4) 11 JUN: Algerian
forces arrested six
suspected ISIS
militants in
Constantine.
4

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
3
1
1) 07 JUN: Boko
Haram launched a
complex attack on
Maiduguri, Borno
State, Nigeria,
killing 17 people.
2) 08 JUN: JNIM
militants shelled a
MINUSMA base in
Kidal, Mali, and
ambushed a patrol
responding to the
attack, killing four
peacekeepers.
3) 10 JUN: A Boko
Haram suicide
bomber attacked a
military camp in
Kolofata,
Cameroon.

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ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569