CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks. 2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue. 3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
April 25, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1
2
3
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the
scope of the conflict and deterring international intervention.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion threatens
nascent cooperation between rival political bodies in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid
provider in rural Somalia.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called on jihadists in Syria to eschew nationalism and
prepare for a protracted conflict with support from the broader umma. The statement
counters the Western narrative by framing the Syria conflict as a war for the Sunni
community, not just Syrians. An al Qaeda-linked group, the Imam Shamil Battalion, claimed
that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia as
retaliation for Russia’s role in Syria. No other group has claimed the attack at this time.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups may conduct terrorist attacks in countries involved in the
Syrian civil war.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
The spokesman of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group Jamatul Ahrar turned
himself in to Pakistani security forces. The surrender of Ehsanullah Ehsan, who was the
spokesman for the TTP’s Mehsud faction before defecting to JuA, may reflect internal
tensions within the group.
Outlook: Discord within Jamatul Ahrar may cause fighters to return to the main TTP faction
led by Fazlullah.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The al Houthi movement appealed to the Southern Movement’s shared grievances and
marginalization to encourage it to break from the Hadi government.
Outlook: The al Houthis and the Southern Movement may cooperate to exact concessions
from the Hadi government in future negotiations.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh cross-border attacks may be reducing domestic support for Saudi operations
inside Yemen. Pakistan will deploy a brigade to protect Saudi Arabia’s southern border,
where Saudi security forces have suffered heavy casualties.
Outlook: Cross-border attacks will harden Saudi Arabia against ceasefire proposals.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP made a strategic decision to prioritize the local fight in Yemen while encouraging its
followers to conduct attacks in the West. AQAP’s latest video called for attacks on the U.S.
Outlook: AQAP has external attack capabilities but will not attack the West in the near term.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 18 APR: A Saudi
helicopter crash
killed 12 officers in
Ma’rib governorate.
2) 20 APR: Security
at Aden Int’l Airport
prevented southern
Hadi government
officials from flying
to Beirut.
3) 20 APR: AQAP
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in al Sawmah, al
Bayda governorate.
4) 23 APR: A reported
U.S. airstrike killed
five AQAP militants
in al Sa’id district.
5) 23 APR: AQAP
militants attacked
Hadhrami Elite
Forces in Dawan
district, Hadramawt
governorate.
3
5
4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali Federal Government (SFG) created a National Security Council and National
Humanitarian Coordination Centre to facilitate security and humanitarian operations.
Outlook: The SFG will strengthen security cooperation with regional administrations.
Security
Kenyan military forces degraded al Shabaab’s operational capabilities in areas along the
Kenyan-Somali border. Kenyan forces killed 51 militants in Badhadhe in Lower Jubba region
on April 21. Kenya intensified military operations in Somalia in 2017.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may conduct attacks in Kenya to pressure the KDF to withdraw troops.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab attacks international aid organizations to usurp the role of humanitarian provider
and build popular support. Al Shabaab militants ambushed convoys carrying Emirati Red
Crescent and UN World Food Programme workers near Mogadishu on April 16 and 19. Al
Shabaab delivers aid to local populations throughout central and southern Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may blockade major supply routes in order to restrict aid operations.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 16-19 APR: Al
Shabaab
ambushed
international aid
convoys outside
Mogadishu.
2) 21 APR: KDF
artillery and ground
forces killed 51 al
Shabaab militants
in Badhadhe.
3) 23 APR: Al
Shabaab
ambushed a
Puntland State
military convoy with
an IED in the
Galgala Mountains.
4) 23 APR: Al
Shabaab
conducted three
IED ambushes in
Mogadishu area.
4
2
3
1

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) may be willing to participate in the UN-backed
political process. The HoR speaker and the GNA State Council president reached a
preliminary agreement to work together to solve the Libyan crisis. The HoR also elected a
delegation to participate in the UN-brokered political process.
Outlook: GNA-HoR cooperation will bring HoR-aligned players into the political dialogue.
Security
The LNA seeks to conclude its main offensive in eastern Libya to prioritize its expansion into
southwestern Libya. The LNA redoubled efforts to clear the remaining militant-held pockets
in Benghazi. It also deployed reinforcements to contest an airbase in southwestern Libya.
Outlook: A continued insurgency in the east will constrain the LNA’s expansion.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Disaggregated ISIS cells likely operate in smuggling transit zones. Militias reportedly killed a
suspected ISIS leader in Sabratha, a smuggling hotbed in northwestern Libya.
Outlook: ISIS will use smuggling networks to acquire funds and materiel.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 21 MAR: The
MSCD established
checkpoints in
northern Derna.
2) 21 MAR: Misratan
institutions tried to
overthrow the
Misrata Municipal
Council.
3) 22 MAR: The LNA
clashed with the
Misratan Third
Force near
TamnahintTK
airbase and Sebha.
4) 18 MAR: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes against
the MSCD in
southern Derna.
5) 28 MAR: Hadi
government
forces advanced
2
31
4
1) 19 APR: Militants
blew up a bridge
between Sabri and
al Lathama districts
in Benghazi.
2) 19 APR: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes against
the Misratan Third
Force at
Tamnahent
airbase.
3) 19, 24 APR: The
LNA conducted
airstrikes against
the BRSC in
Benghazi.
4) 24 APR: Militias
killed Libyan ISIS
fighter Abdullah
Dabbashi in
Sabratha.
5) 24 APR: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes against
the Third Force at
the Sebha airbase.
5

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
ISIS retains military capabilities in northeastern Algeria. Algerian security forces arrested an
ISIS-affiliated suicide bomber in Constantine on April 19. A second bomber detonated his
suicide belt during the raid. Algerian forces killed several alleged ISIS leaders in 2017.
Outlook: Algerian security forces will maintain pressure on ISIS in the near term.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The Burkinabe Salafi-jihadi group Ansar al Islam returned to the Fhero Forest on the Malian-
Burkinabe border following a French-backed Malian-Burkinabe joint operation intended to
clear the area. Ansar al Islam is part of the al Qaeda network in the Sahel but may also have
ties to the ISIS in the Greater Sahara group.
Boko Haram-Shekau continued intermittent attacks in Borno State, Nigeria. Militants
detonated an IED that killed three Nigerian soldiers in Gwoza on April 19. The Nigerian Army
thwarted a suicide bombing and arrested several militants in Borno on April 23 and 24.
Outlook: Ansar al Islam will retain its safe haven in the absence of a holding force. Boko
Haram-Shekau will conduct intermittent bombings and raids in Borno State but will not
control terrain in the near term.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 18 APR: Tunisian
forces dismantled a
thirteen-member
militant cell
in Bizerte
governorate.
2) 19 APR: Algerian
security forces
disrupted an ISIS-
affiliated suicide
bombing in
Constantine,
northern Algeria.
3) 21 APR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a four-
member ISIS cell in
Manouba
governorate.
2
3
1

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
SAHEL
2
3
1
4
1) 19 MAR: A Boko
Haram-Shekau IED
killed three soldiers
near Gwoza, Borno
State, Nigeria.
2) 24 MAR: Nigerian
forces thwarted two
Boko Haram-
Shekau attacks on
the Nigeria-
Cameroon border.
3) 24 MAR: Ansar al
Islam returned to
the Fhero Forest.
4) 25 APR: Al Qaeda
associate JNIM
distributed leaflets
threatening the
Congress for
Justice in Azawad
group in Zouera,
Timbuktu Region,
Mali.

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ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Group for the Aid of Islam and the Muslims (JNIM)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569