CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. 1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions. 2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis. 3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
April 18, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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3
1
1. U.S. ground forces deployed to Mogadishu to train Somali security forces,
which are preparing for a renewed offensive against al Shabaab.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is setting conditions to launch a major offensive to seize
Yemen’s second-largest port, al Hudaydah, after the month of Ramadan.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya has an
opportunity to gain local influence by brokering ceasefire in southern Libya.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
The al Qaeda network responded to the U.S. Tomahawk missile strikes targeting an Assad
regime airfield in Syria on April 6 by characterizing the military action as limited in
comparison to what the U.S. has done against Sunni Muslims and by highlighting the
warnings the U.S. issued to the Russian military in advance of the strikes. The
characterization may have been to prepare a narrative ahead of further U.S. action against
the Assad regime, which has not occurred.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will capitalize on the absence of a U.S. policy shift toward Syria to
continue to advance its narrative that it is the defender of Sunni Muslims.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seeks to capitalize on ethnic Pashtun grievances
against the Pakistani government in order to broaden its support base. The TTP attacked the
Pakistani census-taking process, which Pashtuns perceive as a means to reinforce ethnic
Punjabi dominance in the Pakistani national assembly.
Outlook: The TTP will broaden support among ethnic Pashtuns if the Pakistani census does
not sufficiently reflect Pashtun population growth.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Houthi-Saleh authorities in Sana’a are cracking down on dissenters. An al Houthi-
controlled criminal court sentenced a Yemeni journalist to death for “collaborating” with
outsiders. Thousands of al Houthi protestors demonstrated against “collaborators” in Sana’a.
Outlook: Al Houthi-Saleh forces will expand their campaign against political dissenters.
Security
Hadi government forces intensified efforts to seize a strategic military base in Taiz
governorate and announced demining operations near Yemen’s western coast. These
operations will support an offensive to seize al Hudaydah port from al Houthi-Saleh forces.
Outlook: Hadi government forces will secure strategic sites in Taiz throughout April.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP reportedly negotiated terms with tribal leaders in order to prevent anti-AQAP
mobilization and continue its operations. AQAP is prioritizing its local operations in the near-
term as a means of expanding its support base in the context of the civil war.
Outlook: AQAP will use safe havens to develop capabilities for future external attacks.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 08 APR: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces fired
eight ballistic
missiles at Hadi
government forces
in Mokha district.
2) 13 APR: Tribal
forces killed an
AQAP commander
in Rawdah district,
Shabwah.
3) 16 APR: AQAP
militants conducted
two attacks on al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in Damt, al Dhaleh
governorate.
4) 17 APR: The Saudi
Navy destroyed
four likely al Houthi-
Saleh attack boats
near Saudi coast.
5) 18 APR: Hadi
government forces
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces at
Camp Khaled ibn
Walid.
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5
4
1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali President Farmajo visited the UAE in an attempt to mollify bilateral relations. Emirati
military investment in the breakaway region of Somaliland outside of the Somali Federal
Government’s (SFG) purview exacerbated regional and domestic tensions.
Outlook: The UAE will increase investment in Somalia while maintaining ties to Somaliland.
Security
The U.S. troop deployment emboldened the SFG against al Shabaab. President Farmajo
declared war on al Shabaab on April 6. Dozens of U.S. 101st Airborne troops arrived in
Mogadishu on April 2 to provide training and logistical support to Somali security forces.
Outlook: The Somali Federal Government (SFG) may declare martial law in Mogadishu.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab targeted Somali National Army (SNA) forces in Mogadishu to preempt U.S.
efforts to strengthen local counterinsurgency forces. Al Shabaab conducts diversionary
attacks in Mogadishu to reduce operational pressure in the areas surrounding the capital.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will prioritize mass-casualty attacks in Mogadishu in the near term.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 02 APR: U.S.
troops arrived in
Mogadishu.
2) 05 APR: Al
Shabaab detonated
a VBIED near the
Ministry of Internal
Security in
Mogadishu.
3) 09 APR: Al
Shabaab detonated
a SVBIED targeting
a SNA commander
in Mogadishu.
4) 10 APR: Kenyan
jets targeted an al
Shabaab camp in
Gedo region.
5) 15 APR: ISIS-
linked militants
seized a village in
Bari region.
4
2 31
5

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar may be open to participating in the
UN-backed political process in order to gain Western support. Haftar met with UNSMIL head
Martin Kobler for the first time in over a year. Haftar also downplayed Russia’s role by
contradicting reports from early 2017 that Haftar agreed to permit Russian basing in Libya.
Outlook: Haftar will object to civilian control of the military under the UN framework.
Security
Militias from Libya’s coastal regions mobilized to the southwest to challenge the LNA’s
attempt to seize key military and economic sites. The UN-backed GNA called on regional
mayors to negotiate a permanent ceasefire.
Outlook: A diplomatic victory may allow the GNA to build local support in the southwest.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
The GNA Ministry of Defense stated that ISIS may have deployed sleeper cells to Tripoli,
Sirte, Bani Walid, and southern Libya.
Outlook: ISIS may attack Western targets in Tripoli, including embassies.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
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3
1
4
1) 04 APR: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes against
the BDB in Jufra.
2) 05-18 APR: The
LNA conducted
ground operations
and airstrikes
against rival militias
at Tamnahent
airbase, Sebha
airbase, and the
Sharara oil field.
3) 14 APR: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes against
the MSCD in
Fata’ih, south of
Derna.
4) 17 APR: Militants
resumed a
blockade of the
Wafa gas pipeline
after opening it for
three days.

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Protests resumed in cities across Tunisia. Citizens demonstrated against the lack of drinking
water and electricity, and clashed with the police while protesting education reform. Five
unemployed citizens tried to commit suicide during a demonstration in central Tunisia.
Outlook: AQIM and ISIS may exploit these grievances in order to increase recruitment.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The Malian state is unable to secure central Mali, which may be driving state fragmentation.
A Fulani militia group formed as a self-defense organization for the Fulani people against al
Qaeda and the Malian Army.
Boko Haram-Barnawi may attack Western targets in Nigeria. Nigerian authorities disrupted a
cell that planned to attack the American and British diplomatic posts in Abuja and Lagos,
Nigeria.
Outlook: The mobilization of Fulani militias in central Mali could inflame ethnic tensions from
which Salafi-jihadi groups draw support. Boko Haram-Barnawi may target Western posts in
other Lake Chad regions.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 03 APR: Tunisian
citizens protested
against
unemployment in
Tataouine.
2) 10 APR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a Salafi-
jihadi cell in
Enfidha, Sousse,
Tunisia.
3) 12 APR: Moroccan
authorities
dismantled a seven-
member ISIS
recruiting cell in Fes
Boulemane
province, Morocco.
4) 16 APR: Algerian
security forces killed
a militant in Oued
Essafsaf, Jijel
province.
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3 1
4

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
SAHEL
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3
1
4
1) 06 MAR: JNIM
killed a French
soldier near Douna,
Mopti Region, Mali
2) 12 MAR: Nigerian
forces interdicted a
Boko Haram-
Barnawi cell in
Abuja, Nigeria.
3) 13 MAR: Boko
Haram-Shekau
attacked a
checkpoint in
Dalori, Borno State,
Nigeria.
4) 18 APR: JNIM
attacked Malian
troops in Gourma-
Rharous, Timbuktu
Region, Mali, killing
four.

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Group for the Aid of Islam and the Muslims (JNIM)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569