CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG. 2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017. 3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
February 28, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on
al Shabaab.
2. Russia supports a military leader in Libya as part of a broader strategy to
counter NATO and draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence.
3. An increase in U.S. airstrikes on al Qaeda leaders will not meaningfully
degrade the al Qaeda network in Syria or globally.
1
2
3

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
The U.S. increased its targeting of al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Syria. A U.S. airstrike
killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on
February 26. Al Masri fought in Afghanistan, served on al Qaeda’s shura council, and
participated in planning the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Al
Qaeda in Syria is unifying the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership and now
operates alongside Syrian opposition groups as part of the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.
Outlook: U.S. airstrikes targeting al Qaeda leadership will have no meaningful impact on
global al Qaeda operations.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
Pakistan is attempting to balance tense relations with Afghanistan with the threat of Salafi-
jihadi militants based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Pakistani military
launched operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group Jamatul Ahrar
(JuA).
Outlook: Pakistan’s crackdown may limit JuA’s operations in the near term, but will not
degrade the group’s safe havens in the border region and in Afghanistan.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Saudi government is lobbying the Trump administration to support the Saudi-led
coalition campaign against the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Saudi state media increased reporting
on casualties caused by al Houthi-Saleh cross-border attacks in southern Saudi Arabia.
Outlook: The Saudi-led coalition will prioritize military over political solutions in Yemen.
Security
Iran may have transferred technology to support production of offensive drones by al Houthi-
Saleh forces. An al Houthi-Saleh exhibition revealed drones similar to those that Iran’s
Ghods Aviation Industries gave to Lebanese Hezbollah for use against Israel.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction may grow more dependent on Iranian support.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is undermining Emirati-backed security forces in southern Yemen through military and
information operations. AQAP and ISIS have demonstrated their ability to cooperate in
central Yemen, although AQAP remains dominant.
Outlook: AQAP’s ability to operate in central and southern Yemen will increase.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 24 FEB: AQAP
conducted a
SVBIED attack on al
Hizam forces in
Zinjibar, Abyan.
2) 24 FEB: AQAP and
ISIS Wilayat al
Bayda seized Laqah
village in al Bayda.
3) 26 FEB: AQAP
militants detonated
an IED targeting al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in al Nadirah, Ibb.
4) 28 FEB: Militants
prevented a UN
Under-Secretary
from entering Taiz.
5) 28 FEB: Popular
resistance forces
killed an al Houthi
judge in Dhamar.
5
4
3
2
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The planned construction of a UAE base in Somaliland could exacerbate tensions between
the Emiratis and the Saudis in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Those
tensions could permit other international actors to involve themselves in the region.
Outlook: Saudi Arabia will probably not prevent the UAE construction of this base.
Security
The Pentagon has recommended easing restrictions on airstrikes and deploying additional
Special Operations Forces fight alongside Somali National Army troops in order to increase
pressure on al Shabaab.
Outlook: Additional U.S. capabilities could slow the resurgence of al Shabaab as long as
AMISOM forces do not accelerate their withdrawal timeline.
Al Shabaab
Intensified al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu are likely intended to draw Somali security
resources to the capital and let al Shabaab operate in surrounding critical terrain.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely attempt to seize Afgoi in the near term.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
5
1) 22 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants clashed
with KDF forces
near Kismayo.
2) 22 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants fired mortar
shells into
Mogadishu after the
presidential
inauguration.
3) 23 FEB: Al Shabaab
seized Elhur town,
Mudug region.
4) 25-26 FEB: Al
Shabaab
assassinated three
government officials
in Mogadishu.
5) 27 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants detonated a
VBIED in
Mogadishu.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia is lobbying the U.S. to back Libyan national Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar.
Russia supports the LNA partly to strengthen its relationship with Egypt, the LNA’s main
backer. Russia has reached out to both sides of Libya’s civil war. Russia aims to become a
significant player in Libya while decreasing Western influence in the region.
Outlook: Russia will try to leverage Western concerns in Libya to advance its interests.
Security
Turf wars between rival militias in Tripoli threaten the UN-backed GNA. Hardline Islamist
militias challenged GNA-aligned militias for control in Tripoli. The GNA brokered a ceasefire,
indicating that it can influence some militias in the capital.
Outlook: Clashes in Tripoli will increase due to the GNA’s military weakness.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), which includes Ansar al Sharia, is
conducting an assassination campaign to undermine the LNA’s control of Benghazi city.
Outlook: The BRSC will prioritize asymmetric attacks over controlling terrain in Benghazi.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 20 FEB: Militias
from Zliten and
Misrata clashed in
Suq al Thulatha.
2) 21 FEB: The
LNA conducted
airstrikes against
the BRSC in
Benghazi.
3) 23-24 FEB: The al
Burki brigade
clashed with
the Ghneiwa
militia in Abu Salim
district, Tripoli.
4) 22, 26 FEB:
Militants detonated
two VBIEDs in
Benghazi, killing
two LNA members
and injuring seven
others.
2
4
3
1

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
ISIS claimed its first bombing in Algeria since October 2016. ISIS has the capability to
conduct small-scale IED attacks in northeastern Algeria. Algerian security forces cracked
down on the group in 2015 and 2016.
Outlook: ISIS will not expand its area of operations in Algeria in the near term.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
An ISIS-linked militant group may be gaining capabilities in the Mali-Niger border region.
France deployed a small force to counter the group, led by Abu Walid al Sahrawi, after an
attack on Nigerien security forces. France seeks to protect its economic interests in Niger.
Boko Haram’s Shekau faction continues to weaken because of famine in its area of
operations. The Barnawi faction of Boko Haram, with ties to both ISIS and AQIM, has
developed a local support base that may allow it to draw more recruits than Shekau. ISIS or
al Qaeda may exploit the growing strength of Barnawi’s faction to expand in West Africa.
Outlook: Sahrawi’s group may target Burkinabe or Malian targets as French forces reinforce
Niger. The ISIS-linked Boko Haram faction will expand its area of operations in the Lake
Chad region.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 25 FEB: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a five-
member ISIS-
affiliated cell in El
Mourouj, Ben
Arous, Tunisia.
2) 26 FEB: ISIS in
Algeria claimed
credit for a briefcase
bomb attack in
Constantine
province. Algerian
police fired on and
killed the attacker
before the bomb
detonated.
3) 28 FEB: Algerian
security forces killed
nine militants in
Azeffoun, Titi
Ouzou, Algeria.
2
3
1

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 21 FEB: The Macina
Liberation Front
stopped inter-ethnic
clashes in Ke-
Macina, Mali.
2) 22 FEB: A Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bomber
attacked a
checkpoint in
Amchide,
Cameroon.
3) 23 FEB: ISIS linked
militants killed 15
Nigerien soldiers
near Ouallam, Niger.
4) 26 FEB: The
Nigerian army
arrested three
Chadian members of
Boko Haram-
Barnawi in Gombe,
Nigeria.
2
3
1
4

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569