CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth. 2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. 3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
July 12, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The Hadi government and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize
Sana’a militarily from the al Houthi-Saleh alliance.
2. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for
failing to submit to authority figures when he was an al Qaeda member.
3. Al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar called for Muslims to join jihad in Somalia and
conduct lone-wolf attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia.
2
1
3

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda continues to compete with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi
movement by emphasizing al Qaeda’s subscription to the methodology for success derived by Salafi-jihadi scholars. Al
Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri eulogized former al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Nasser al Wahayshi
and criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda
network in a July 10 statement. Al Qaeda leadership also continues to prime Hamza bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden’s son, for
a leadership role within the al Qaeda network by including him in propaganda efforts. Hamza bin Laden threatened revenge
against the United States for his father’s assassination and warned the American people that they are accountable for the
decisions of their leaders in a July 9 video released by al Qaeda’s media wing, al Sahab, on Telegram and Twitter. This
threat echoes a June 30 statement in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston
marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues to reaffirm its role in the al Qaeda network and ensure its vitality despite
rumored setbacks. TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah al Khorasani claimed to have a robust fighting force, contrary to information
indicating otherwise, in a July 5 statement. TTP spokesman Muhammad al Khorasani condemned the July 4 suicide
bombing outside the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia, in a July 7 statement. A reported U.S. airstrike may have
killed TTP’s military commander for Darra Adam Kheil and Peshawar regions, Khalifa Umar Mansoor, in Nangarhar
province, Afghanistan on July 9. Pakistani law enforcement agencies claimed to have killed a TTP military commander,
Hafez Nisar, in Battagram in northern Pakistan on July 10, 2016.
Outlook: Al Qaeda and its branches will continue to reaffirm their legitimacy against competition from the Islamic State of
Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Hamza bin Laden will occupy an increasingly visible role in al Qaeda’s information campaigns.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-led peace process is breaking down as President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and its military prepare
for an offensive to regain control of Sana’a from the al Houthi-Saleh alliance. President Hadi declared on July 10 that Sana’a
will soon be freed from al Houthi control. A member of Hadi’s government delegation ruled out returning to Kuwait talks on
July 15, and Hadi’s Foreign Minister said on July 8 that his delegation no longer trusts the UN Special Envoy for Yemen.
Outlook: The peace talks will not resume on July 15 should a government assault on Sana’a proceed.
Security
Government military forces are prepared to launch an offensive on Sana’a. Clashes between al Houthi-Saleh fighters and
government forces intensified outside of Sana’a and in neighboring al Jawf governorate, and military officials visited two
different bases near Sana’a to inspect troops for battle readiness. Yemeni army Gen. Mohsin Masrouf confirmed that the
government army is prepared to begin the battle to liberate Sana'a, and Maj. Gen. Mohammed Ali al Maqdashi claimed that
government forces will soon arrive in Amran and Sa’ada, al Houthi-Saleh strongholds.
Outlook: Government forces will launch a full-scale assault on Sana’a before the end of July.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continued its campaign to destabilize governance in Aden with a complex attack on a military compound in
Khormaksar, Aden on July 6, the first day of Eid al Fitr. A reported U.S. airstrike wounded four AQAP fighters in Jabul,
Ma’rib governorate. Yemeni security forces also raided an AQAP weapons cache in Lahij governorate and arrested an
AQAP member in Hadramawt. ISIS has not conducted a major attack since its June 26 coordinated explosive attack on
Yemeni security personnel in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
Outlook: AQAP will escalate its attacks against military personnel in Aden, and ISIS will attack a military target in Aden or al
Mukalla in coming weeks.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1
2
5
4
3
1) 06 JUL: AQAP
conducted a complex
attack on a military
base in Khormaksar,
Aden.
2) 06 JUL: Al Houthi
fighters clashed with
Saleh supporters in
Dhamar city.
3) 08 JUL: Hadi
government forces
clashed with al Houthi-
Saleh fighters in al
Jawf.
4) 09 JUL: Hadi
government forces
secured positions east
of Sana’a ahead of a
planned offensive.
5) 10 JUL: A reported
U.S. airstrike targeted
suspected AQAP
fighters in Ma’rib.

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The United Nations extended the authorization for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through May 31, 2017.
The AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) announced their intention to begin transitioning security responsibility to
Somali forces in 2018, and to withdraw completely by 2020.
Outlook: The Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali security apparatus will be incapable of providing adequate security
by 2020 without external assistance.
Security
Al Shabaab increased the frequency of its attacks on Kenyan targets following a brief lull in violence at the conclusion of
Ramadan. One hundred al Shabaab fighters raided a Kenyan police station in Wajir County on July 8. Al Shabaab
conducted a successful raid on the same station in April 2016.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to assault Kenyan security personnel and civilians in the border region between Kenya
and Somalia. Al Shabaab will target communications infrastructure in order to maximize its impact on civilians.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar called on Ethiopian and Kenyan Muslims to conduct lone-wolf attacks. He also called for
Somali Muslims to join jihad and noted the “depleted” morale of AMISOM forces. Umar extended Eid al Fitr greetings to al
Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri and blamed Turkey and NATO for Somalia’s economic troubles. Al Shabaab continues to
resist SNA and AMISOM attempts to drive the group from population centers. Al Shabaab militants repelled an effort by
coalition forces to recapture the town of Marka in Lower Shabelle region on July 11. Coalition forces have failed to rid Marka
of al Shabaab militants on multiple occasions.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase the frequency and intensity of its operations in southern Somalia as the national electoral
process begins on July 16.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1
2
3
4
1) 08 JUL: Al
Shabaab militants
raided a Kenyan
police station in Dijj,
Wajir County, Kenya.
2) 10 JUL: Al
Shabaab fighters
attacked an SNA and
AMISOM base in
Lanta Bure near
Mogadishu.
3) 10 JUL: Al
Shabaab attacked a
KDF convoy near
Baure in Lamu
County, Kenya.
4) 11 JUL: SNA and
AMISOM forces failed
to force al Shabaab
militants from Marka
town, Lower Shabelle
region.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan factions are leveraging the limited resumption of oil production to jockey for political and economic power. The
eastern and western branches of the National Oil Company (NOC) of Libya, which are aligned with rival governments,
announced their unification and their intention to coordinate with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and
regional militias to reopen two of Libya’s largest oil-producing sites. The House of Representatives (HoR) in eastern Libya,
which does not recognize the GNA, refused to acknowledge the unification without securing concessions.
Outlook: Oil production may spark clashes between competing factions in central and eastern Libya, drawing attention and
resources away from counterterrorism operations. Salafi-jihadi groups, likely ISIS, may attack oil sites as they reopen.
Security
Islamist militias with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia are cooperating against the Libyan National Army (LNA) in
an effort to recapture safe havens in eastern Libya. The Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB), a militant coalition based in
Ajdabiya, advanced towards Benghazi, prompting the LNA to declare a state of emergency. The LNA broke a temporary
ceasefire and resumed airstrikes on the Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna, which has declared support for the BDB.
Outlook: The Benghazi fight will likely stall, and the LNA will leverage the counter-extremist fight to expand in central Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
The fight for Sirte remains stalled, despite claims by Misratan forces operating under the GNA that they will clear ISIS’s final
stronghold in the city within days. ISIS controls limited territory in the city but remains capable of attacking behind the
Misratans’ front lines.
Outlook: ISIS may launch an explosive attack campaign in western Libya to counter its losses in Sirte.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1 2
3
4
1) 10 JUL: Misratan
forces continued to
attack ISIS’s
remaining strongholds
in central Sirte city.
2) 10 JUL: The BDB
mobilized from
Ajdabiya towards
Benghazi and clashed
with the LNA in Sultan.
3) 06 JUL: ISIS
militants launched a
counterattack to
recent LNA advances
in western Benghazi.
4) 09 JUL: The LNA
resumed airstrikes in
Derna after the
collapse of a June 25
ceasefire.

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM and ISIS continue to compete for dominance in the Maghreb region. Algerian security forces killed one likely AQIM
militant in eastern Algeria. Moroccan security forces arrested a Belgian national with ties to ISIS.
Outlook: AQIM will conduct small-scale attacks in Algeria to defend its safe havens from security forces.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Tunisian authorities are cracking down on Salafi-jihadi activity with renewed support from NATO. NATO pledged to increase
assistance and training for Tunisian Special Forces and open an intelligence center in the country. Tunisian security forces
have arrested more than 30 suspected terrorists in the past week. Many of the detainees have ties to the ISIS network in
Libya and Syria. ISIS is using its global network to actively challenge the Tunisian state.
Outlook: ISIS will continue efforts to develop cells and build popular support in Tunisia, especially as increased security
measures limit its options for cross-border attacks from Libya.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Rising tensions are threatening to derail the peace process in northern Mali, giving AQIM and affiliated groups the
opportunity to escalate against French and MINUSMA forces responding to the crisis. The emir of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate
called for Muslims to fight French and UN forces following the UN’s decision to deploy additional peacekeepers and
strengthen MINUSMA’s mandate. AQIM and affiliated groups may also be escalating activity in central Mali while
government and international forces focus on the north.
Outlook: AQIM will conduct attacks targeting French or MINUSMA forces attempting to restore peace in northern Mali.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
4
2
1
3
1) 07 JUL: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a terrorist
cell in Sidi Bouzid,
Tunisia.
2) 08 JUL: The
Algerian People’s
National Army
eliminated one
terrorist in El Mnihla,
Algeria.
3) 09 JUL: Tunisian
security forces
arrested 16 suspected
ISIS members in
Tunis, Tunisia.
4) 09 JUL: Moroccan
security forces
arrested an ISIS-
linked individual in
Fez, Morocco.

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
4
3
2
1
1) 07 JUL: Militants
attacked a Malian
outpost in Gossi, Mali.
2) 09 JUL: Militants
killed two Malian
soldiers in Koro, Mali.
3) 10 JUL: Militants
detonated an IED on a
MINUSMA supply
truck in Tabankort,
Mali.
4) 11 JUL: Militants
assassinated the
deputy mayor of Ouro
Modi, Mali.

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569