This presentation by Lucas Gutiérrez Rodríguez provides the scope of CCFP systematic review.

1. China’s
environment
and
power
relations:
The
case
of
the
Conversion
of
Cropland
to
Forest
Programme
Lucas
Gu(érrez
Rodríguez
Center
for
Interna(onal
Forestry
Research

2. Contents
• Introduc(on
• Problem
• Theore(cal
framework
(1)
• Power
rela(ons
(1)
• CCFP
systema(c
review
• Theore(cal
framework
(2)
• Power
rela(ons
(2)
• Discussion

3. Introduction
• 1998´s
floods
across
rural
China
• New
Forest
Policy
- Natural
Forest
Protec(on
Programme
(NFPP)
- Conversion
of
Cropland
to
Forest
Programme
(CCFP)
• CCFP´s
goals
- Soil
erosion
control
→ flood
preven(on
- Poverty
reduc(on
• Scale
- 25
provinces
&
32
million
households
- ~
25
mill
ha
(9
mill
cropland
+
15
mill
barren
land)
- 298
billion
CNY
=
42.82
billion
USD
(~
3
billion
USD/year)

4. Yangtze
and
Yellow
Rivers

5. CCFP
implementation
zones

6. Problem
• 1998´s
flooding
(Yangtze
River)
- antropogenic
soil
erosion
+
lake
dessica(on-­‐silta(on
- ENSO
+
geomorfology
• Soil
erosion
on
slopes
- natural
forests´
extrac(ve
uses
(State)
- natural
forests’
clearing
for
agriculture
(Small-­‐holders)
• Proposed
solu(on
- NFPP
(State
forests)
- CCFP
(Small-­‐holders)

7. Yunnan
(Yangtze
River
watershed)

8. Loess
Plateau
(Yellow
River
watershed)

9. Theoretical
framework
(1)
• CCFP
actors
- upstream
popula(ons
(small-­‐holder
households)
- central
government
and
provincial
government
(funds)
- county
government
(implementa(on)
• Compensatory
approach
- voluntary
- opportunity
cost
of
conver(ng
sloping
land
- grain
+
livelihood
allowance
+
tree
saplings
- grass
(2
y),
‘economic’
trees
(5
y),
‘ecological’
trees
(8
y)
• Rural
economic
re-­‐adjustment
- reduced
dependence
on
land
(agricultural
income)
- towards
off-­‐farm
employment
via
migra(on
- rural
economic
growth

10. Table 1. Conversion of cropland to forests program subsidy rates
SUBSIDY
COMPONENT
SUBSIDY RATES DURATION
Yangtze River
Watershed &
South China
or
Yellow River
Watershed &
North China
Ecological
Forests
Economic
Forests
Grasses
PILOT PHASE (1999-2001): 412 counties in 20 provinces1
ONE-TIME PAYMENT
Sapling/seedling Fee 750 CNY/ha
One-time, upon
enrollment
ANNUAL PAYMENTS2
i) Living Allowance
(Cash)
300 CNY/ha
Payment length as
yet undermined.ii) Annual Subsidy
(Grain)
2,250 kg/ha
(i.e. 3,150 CNY/ha)
or
1,500 kg/ha
(i.e. 2,100CNY/ha)
PHASE I - Full-scale implementation (2002-2007): 2,500 counties in 25 provinces3
ONE-TIME PAYMENT
Sapling/seedling Fee 750 CNY/ha
One-time, upon
enrollment
ANNUAL PAYMENTS
i) Living Allowance
(Cash)
300 CNY/ha
8
years
5
years
2
years
ii) Annual Subsidy
(Grain or cash
equivalent value)
2,250 kg/ha
(i.e. 3,150 CNY/ha)
or
1,500 kg/ha
(i.e. 2,100 CNY/ha)
PHASE II (2008-2016)
CONTINUED ANNUAL PAYMENTS
i) Living Allowance
(Cash)
300 CNY/ha
+ 8
years
+ 5
years
+ 2
yearsii) Annual Subsidy
(Cash only)
1,575CNY/ha or 1050 CNY/ha
Source: State Forestry Administration, 2003; State Council, 2007.
Average pilot phase exchange rate was 1 USD = 8.28 CNY; average phase I exchange rate was 1 USD = 8.10
CNY; average phase II exchange rate was 1 USD = 6.52 CNY.
1
The pilot phase lasted three years. It was launched in 1999 in Sichuan, Gansu and Shaanxi province. In 2000,
the pilot extended to 188 counties of 17 provinces, and in 2001 it further expanded to some 400 counties of 20
provinces.
2
Subsidy durations were not decided during the pilot phase. Upon full-scale implementation, the length of time
subsidies had already been delivered during the pilot phase was counted towards the formal subsidy lengths
stipulated.
3
Though a formal shift to cash-only subsidies was not stipulated until State Council (2007), State Council (2004)
provided standards for converting grain to cash subsidies at the rate of CNY 1.4/kg, since many locales paid
subsidies fully in cash by that time.

11. Power
relations
(1)
• Inter-­‐regional
- East
China
Vs
West
China
• Inter-­‐governmental
- Central
Vs
Provincial
• Government
–
Farmers
- Central,
Provincial
governments
Vs
Farmers
(taxes)
- Local
governments
Vs
Farmers
(implementa(on
&
voluntarism)
• Less
aeen(on
to
- Inter-­‐household
&
intra-­‐household
power
rela(ons
- Private
enterprises
-­‐
Farmers

12. CCFP
systematic
review
• Research
ins(tu(ons:
- CIFOR
(Indonesia)
- Forestry
Economic
Development
Research
Center
(China
SFA)
• Primary
ques(on
- What
socioeconomic
and
environmental
effects
has
the
Conversion
of
Cropland
to
Forest
Program
had
on
human
popula9ons
and
land
resources
during
its
first
15
years
in
China?
• Secondary
ques(ons
- How
effec9ve
has
the
CCFP
been
in
achieving
its
own
stated
objec9ves
of
soil
erosion
control,
flood
preven9on
and
poverty
reduc9on?
- Under
which
circumstances
would/have
farmers
revert(ed)
forestland
back
to
cropland?
- Are
there
any
unintended
socioeconomic/environmental
outcomes?

13. Theoretical
framework
(2)
• Popula(on
- CCFP
households
and
individual
members
- CCFP
enrolled
cropland,
barren
land,
economic
trees,
ecological
trees
• Interven(on
- CCFP
targe(ng
/
subsidies
/
skill-­‐training
/
enforcement
• Comparator
- In/out,
before/aier
CCFP,
upstream-­‐upstream
/
upstream-­‐downstream
• Outcome
- Household
produc(on/consump(on,
land
tenure,
food
security
and
nutri(on,
social
equity,
autonomy
&
power
rela(ons,
migra(on
&
remieances
- Flooding,
soil
erosion
&
nutrients,
forest
cover
&
volume,
biodiversity,
biomass,
carbon
storage,
energy
sources,
land-­‐use
change

14. • Social
equity
/
Ecosystem
func(ons
/
Socio-­‐ecological
feedbacks
• Hypothesis1
(socioeconomic
outcomes)
- the
CCFP
has
reduced
poverty
and
increased
rural
household
income,
via
planta9on
of
economic
trees,
migra9on
for
off-­‐farm
employment
(remiLances),
agricultural
produc9vity
enhancement
and
CCFP
compensa9on
delivery.
• Hypothesis
2
(environmental
outcomes)
- the
CCFP
has
reduced
soil
erosion
and
flood
risk
at
the
watershed
level,
by
increasing
forest
cover
and
standing
volume
in
vulnerable
sloping
lands,
due
to
higher
tree-­‐survival
rates
and
reduced
rates
of
land
reconversion
to
cropland.
• Hypothesis
3
(socio-­‐ecological
feedback
outcomes)
- the
CCFP
has
ac9vely
promoted
a
livelihood
re-­‐adjustment
by
reducing
local
dependence
on
sloping
lands,
reducing
generalized
poverty
levels
and
improving
land-­‐use
decisions
with
the
resul9ng
increase
in
forest
are
and
volume,
resul9ng
in
effec9ve
erosion
control
and
flood
preven9on.

15. AGGREGATE
DECREASED
DEPENDENCE
ON
SLOPING
LANDS
Targe(ng
Economic
trees
Ecological
trees
County-­‐level
CCFP
office
Sloping
cropland
Sloping
barren
land
Small-­‐holders
(households)
Mid-­‐term
Outcome(s)
Skill
training
&
species
selec(on
Lost
income
from
sloping
land
Immediate
Outcome(s)
Provincial
government
Central
government
funds
CCFP
Ins@tu@onal
Regulator(s)
Land-­‐use
conversion
Net
freed-­‐up
labor
((me
availability)
Food-­‐security
compensated
trees
+
allowance
Migra(on-­‐remieances
off-­‐farm
employment
Economic
tree
harvests
Intensifica(on
on
flat
cropland
Compensa(on
+
enforcement
Social
equity
Mediated
by
Ecosystem
services

16. AGGREGATE
DECREASED
DEPENDENCE
ON
SLOPING
LANDS
Broad
goal(s)
Posi(ve
environmental
change
Posi(ve
socioeconomic
change
End
of
Program
Outcome(s)
Decreased
soil
erosion
Poverty
reduc@on
Flood
control
on
watershed
level
Mid-­‐term
Outcome(s)
Food-­‐security
compensated
Migra(on-­‐remieances
off-­‐farm
employment
Economic
tree
harvests
Intensifica(on
on
flat
cropland
GENERALIZED
livelihood
improvement
GENERALIZED
Increase
in
forest
area
and
volume
Long-­‐term
Outcome(s)
Social
equity
Ecosystem
services
Mediated
by

17. Power
relations
(2)
• Social
equity
&
Ecosystem
services
- ‘Itself’
(generalized
livelihood
improvement)
- As
a
means
for
soil
conserva(on
(socio-­‐ecological
feedback)
- Factors1:
age,
gender,
educa(on
level,
income
group,
ethnicity
- Factors2:
biodiversity
(local
Vs
exo(c
species)
• Farmer
–
Farmer
- Intra-­‐household,
inter-­‐household,
inter-­‐personal
equity
• Farmer
–
Enterprises
–
Local
government
- Land
Ins(tu(ons:
collec(ve/coopera(ve/private
management
- Par(cipa(on
&
autonomy
in
decision-­‐making

18. Discussion
• Compensatory
approach
- ini(al
income
losses
(farmers
and
local
governments)
- upstream
landuse
re-­‐adjustment
• Urban-­‐rural
tensions
- Urbaniza(on/market
mechanisms/priva(za(on
pressures
- Countryside
policies/ins(tu(onal
mechanisms/collec(ve
ins(tu(ons
• Livelihood
transforma(on
- ageing
‘hollow’
villages
and
migra(on
- expansion
of
urban
lifestyles/aggregate
ecological
footprints
in
China
• Lower
bargaining
power
- Blaming
the
poor
for
environmental
degrada(on
- Economic
growth
&
urban
livelihoods
not
ques(oned
• Ecosystem
services
trade-­‐offs
(soil
erosion
Vs
air
pollu(on)

19. Thanks!