This presentation was given during the session at COP22 titled "Measuring and monitoring performance, and managing risks in REDD+" organized by CIFOR in partnership with EU, NORAD, DFID UKAid, and SDC. http://www.cifor.org/cifor-at-cop22/sessions/09-nov/measuring-monitoring-performance-managing-risks-redd/

1. Equity risks in a REDD+
results-based framework
COP 22 Marrakech, 9 Nov 2016
Grace Wong, Maria Brockhaus, Amy Duchelle,
Lasse Loft, Cecilia Luttrell, Pham Thu Thuy, Le
Ngoc Dung

2. Renewed focus on REDD+ post-
Paris
 Paris Agreement reaffirms REDD+ as a results-based
payment approach – and commits to finance
 Forests and REDD+ included in at least 38 (I)NDCs
 Measuring “results” or policy performance – different
challenges for the different phases of REDD+
 Non-carbon benefits - importance can be integrated within
REDD+ financing, but not as a requirement of conditionality
 Non-market approaches - joint mitigation and adaptation
recognized as an alternative to results-based payments,
subject to REDD+ safeguards
 Safeguards - “in accordance with national circumstances”,
requirement for results-based payment (COP 19 Warsaw)

3. Equity matters
 Highly debated and difficult
to assess as equity
perceptions are not
universal, but relational
depending on contexts
 Equity can have significant
positive feedback on policy/
program outcomes and
legitimacy
 Potential trade-offs with
effectiveness and efficiency
 Not only an issue for
safeguards

4. Article 5 and results-based
payments for REDD+
Recognizes the importance of adequate and predictable
financial resources, including for results-based payments,
as appropriate, for the implementation of policy approaches and positive
incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation,
and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks; as well as alternative policy approaches,
such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and
sustainable management of forests; while reaffirming the
importance of non-carbon benefits associated with such
approaches; encouraging the coordination of support from,
inter alia, public and private, bilateral and multilateral
sources, such as the Green Climate Fund, and alternative
sources in accordance with relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties.

5. Article 5 and three key questions
related to REDD+ performance
1. What is adequate and predictable finance, and how can it be
structured to effectively incentivize REDD+ results? In essence,
what is the ‘right’ payment size for REDD+? Whose and which
costs are considered when determining payment size?
What is the appropriate timing and sequencing of payments?
2. What should qualify as performance in REDD+, given
that the different phases of REDD+ implementation require
different definitions of performance: installing
institutional/technical infrastructure, policy change, equity and
livelihoods outcomes, and reduced carbon emissions? How can
performance and results be measured?
3. How can non-carbon benefits be integrated into a
results-based payment mechanism? How can non-carbon benefits
be safeguarded?

6. 1. How can adequate, predictable and
effective REDD+ finance be achieved,
who pays?
 Command-and-control disincentives are most cost-effective
in Brazil towards reducing deforestation  equity concerns
lead to incorporation of PES in the policy mix to partially
compensate for lost opportunities (Börner et al. 2015,
2014)
 Subnational institutions are highly involved in the
implementation of REDD+  high level of subsidization by
subnational governments, even though many of these costs
are not financial (Luttrell et al., 2016)
 Lessons from Fairtrade, certification and PES: upfront
payments are important to enable broad participation, but
transfers risks of non-performance to the buyer or donor
(Tjajadi et al. 2015, Loft et al. 2014)

7. 2. What qualifies as ‘performance’ in
REDD+? How can it be measured?
 Different REDD+ phases require different metrics (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and McNeill, 2012)
 Policy study of 13 countries showed that the three countries
with access to performance-based finance for REDD+
combined with national ownership over the REDD+ process
advanced relatively more quickly in implementing policy
reforms (Brockhaus et al. 2016).
 Risks for under- or non-performance are influenced by a
complex set of political, socioeconomic and environmental
factors (Loft et al., 2016)
 Risk of biased assessments and reference level setting
(Angelsen 2016)

8. 3. How can non-carbon benefits be
integrated and safeguarded in a results-
based payment mechanism?
 To be eligible for results-based finance, REDD+ countries
must develop national Safeguard Information Systems (SIS)
to monitor and regularly report on the social and
environmental impacts of REDD+ (Duchelle and Jagger 2014)
 Lack of guidance in reporting risks lack of action (Loft et al.
2016, Menton et al 2014)
 Lessons from Voluntary Partnership Agreements in FLEGT
relates to independent and formal civil society monitors and
multi-stakeholder processes (Luttrell and Fripp 2015)
 Allowing for a broad review of performance can enhance
accountability and transparency, and increase commitment
and confidence in the system (Angelsen 2016)

9. Conclusion
 REDD+ as a results-based finance:
• needs to consider both carbon and non-carbon-related
performance and outcomes
• still lacks clear, context-relevant criteria and metrics to help
justify and mobilize payments.
 Equity risks:
• Distributional equity: Understanding variation in costs and
who is bearing different costs of REDD+ is critical for setting
payments to incentivize effective and equitable outcomes
• Procedural equity: Enabling access to data (SIS,
performance review) can support legitimacy
• Contextual equity: Ensuring agreement on performance,
outcomes and their indicators is critical to national/local
ownership

10. We acknowledge the support from:
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), the European Union
(EU), the UK Government, the International Climate Initiative (IKI) of the German
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear
Safety (BMUB), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the
CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry (CRP-FTA) with
financial support from the CGIAR Fund.
& all research partners and individuals
that have contributed to this research
www.cifor.org/knowledge-tree
www.cifor.org/gcs
Thank you

11. Country
Profiles
Media-based discourse
analyses
Info Briefs
Working Papers Journal Articles