Understanding Zimbabwe with Sara Rich Dorman
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Zimbabwe’s recent history has been shaped by battles about who speaks for the nation, one fought out in struggles for control of political institutions, the media, and civil society. Sara Rich Dorman will examine the interactions of social groups — churches, NGOs, and political parties — from the liberation struggle, through the independence decades, as they engaged the state and ruling party and track how the relationship between Mugabe’s ruling party and activists was determined by the liberation struggle. She will discuss how both structural and direct violence were deployed by the regime, but also how ad-hoc and unplanned many of their interventions really were.
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Understanding Zimbabwe with Sara Rich Dorman
- 1. Global Development Institute Lecture Series #GDILecture @GlobalDevInst @UoMUrban
- 3. Chapter 2: The Politics of Liberation (1965-1980)
- 4. Chapter 3: The Politics of Inclusion (1980-1987)
- 5. Chapter 3: The Politics of Inclusion (1980-1987)
- 6. Chapter 2: The Politics of Liberation (1965-1980) Chapter 3: The Politics of Inclusion (1980-1987)
- 8. Chapter 4: The Politics of Durability (1987-1997)
- 9. Chapter 5: The Politics of Polarization (1998-2000)
- 10. Chapter 6: The Politics of Exclusion (2000-2008)
- 11. Chapter 6: The Politics of Exclusion (2000-2008)
- 12. Chapter 7: The Politics of Winner takes All (2008-2014)
- 14. Global Development Institute Lecture Series #GDILecture @GlobalDevInst @UoMUrban
Notas do Editor
- Intro: In this paper I suggest that despite Zimbabwe’s current noteriety for ‘patriotic history’ ZANU ’s post-1980 legitimation strategy focussed not on ‘liberationist’ discourses but instead focussed on societal demobilization. It argues that the politics of post-liberation societies are shaped by the experience of warfare, by the transformation of relations between guerrillas and civilians, and by the organization and power relations within the movement. Post-liberation politics is thus about how politics is organised, as much as the discourses that the regime uses. The story I tell in the book is not just about violence, ethnicity, political instrumentality, hard state, failing state, racial reconciliation, or racial enmity…we need a broader set of debates that incorporate cultural and normative politics of citizenship, voice and nation-building, as well as the more obvious material drivers and power politics. A larger goal is to respond to claims of ‘exceptionality’ – writing zimbabwe back in, but also – I hope – speaking to how we write african politics. In Zimbabwe, as in other African states which underwent negotiated transitions rather than victories through ‘the barrel of the gun’, the pressures on nationalist movements generated forms of coalition-building that translated into demobilized and quiescent political cultures after independence. The limited form of pluralism which typifies these political systems helps explain the particularity of the durable authoritarian—but not totalitarian—rule that follows. Nationalist movements generate particular kinds of discourses and norms of political behaviour. It is these norms which valorise unity and challenge democratic movements outside the liberation movement, which shape political understandings and expectations in the post-independence period, enabling and legitimizing the Mugabe regime’s dominance. Nevertheless, the historical evidence shows that movements did not always conform to these expectations, being instead heterogeneous and complex, which is also reflected in the post-independence political trajectory. I will argue that even November’s coup, which reshaped Zimbabwe’s politics, is also an indication of the power of liberation politics, although the material demands of that aging generation – seeing their last chances of seizing power and benefitting from access to the state – should not be discounted.
- Chapter2: the Politics of Nationalism (pictures from my own collection – except one later from Zoe). At independence, the Mugabe regime consolidated its electoral victory, taking control of state institutions, appealing to people’s desire for peace and development, and ensuring its monopoly on the use of violence through control of the coercive mechanisms of state. In those first years its willingness to deploy force against civilians was clearly signaled. In doing so, it shaped both the new state and the nation of Zimbabwe, constructing a set of understandings, norms and expectations that enabled its party to retain political control for over thirty five years. But to make sense out of this, we need to make sense out of ‘Nationalism’ – not a period but a reconceptualization of power relations. The political struggle in Zimbabwe has been over control of the state, but this is inescapably welded to the right to represent the nation – and that carries on through to the current period. We need to remember Independence as a result of armed revolution is very much the exception in Africa, but it shapes the countries which experience it. Generates a particular form of Limited pluralism (Linz). Nationalism – fundamentally heterogenous movements, bounded together (sometimes by choice, sometimes not) long trajectory of political movements – the two most important for our purposes are ZAPU and ZANU – which split from ZAPU in 1963; Mugabe became its leader in 1976 (only four years before independence). Peasant mobilization – hugely diverse experiences across the country. Eg maxwell/lan v alexander/mcgregor ; Kriger Flag ZANU/ZANU geographic divides internal parties Urban mobilization – workers, important legacy shapes post-colonial politicsn Churches / missionaries/ whites - also hugely divided Zolberg – ‘parties unifies’ not ‘parties uniques’.
- 1980 – independence / ZANU wins the most seats; creates a ‘unity government’ with some posts in cabinet for its old rivals ZAPU. Independence marked by this remarkably apolitical set of first day covers – setting the stage for discursive depoliticization -- contra to many assumptions, zimbabwe’s discourses in these years eschewed ‘liberation’ and instead focused on ‘development’. Pertinently for our discussion – KGV barracks only renamed Tongogara in 2015? (proposed in 2012) – decades after becoming a republic and years after leaving the Commonwealth. Why? Risked opening up debates that ZANU did not want to have and could not afford to have. Competing claims about contributions to the struggle; old rivalries. Ferguson speaks of how international bodies use development discourse to depoliticise, but Zimbabwe shows us how states – and local NGOs caught up in their discursive sphere do so as well. (Scott, Gaventa, Gramsci).
- Chaper 3: the politics of inclusion – In attempting to deal with this legacy – and a negotiated transition – NOT one at the ‘barrel of the gun’, we see the creation of a new ‘coalition’ – bringing in new groups – white farmers, donors, business interests – legal practices and institution building. Paradoxically the regime’s fetish for legal mechanisms provides openings for resistance later on… Zimbabwe’s politics shaped by strategies – discursive claims to foster national ‘unity’ – delegitimized autonomous action outside the ruling party – the most prominent NGOs were those linked to the liberation movements – either institutionally or through personal connections, those that were not – such as churches linked to Muzorewa or the trades unions – were very firmly to get in line. And they did so. Academics - suspect, but incorporated into the state. Women’s groups that existed were tightly link to the party/state. Etc Paul Nyathi ‘we laid down our advocacy’. NGOs weren’t shut down, but they did consciously ‘re-orient’ themselves to maintain good relations with the state. , The liberationist ethos and nationalist pattern of organizing meant that even groups like NGOs and churches, which were not necessarily reliant on the state financially, felt bound up with it and tied to the state project. (gatekeeper state). Societal demobilization – in rural areas and urban areas, the state moved against any organised groups/movements – eg attempts to claim land; urban informal areas ’cleared; women ‘rounded up’ on thestreets, ; even the war vets were not allowed to form their own representative organisation. Calls for national service, etc were dropped/ignored. Land reform – limited to abandoned farms,. Technocratic, NO RESTITUTION. All about production.
- Chapter 3:. This set of stamps, with its liberation iconography is actually notable for its unusualness – very exceptional. But what it also reveals is the subtle promotion of ZANU the party. This period was a period of prosperity and growth for many but not for all
- In Matabeleland, where ZAPU had been the dominant force during the liberation war, the government unleashed a genocide in which at least 20 000 civilians were killed. Human rights abuses – remarkably similar to those of the rhodesian regime all ’justified’ in terms of security – ZAPU’s leaders were accused of treason, as would be the leaders of all of Zimbabwe’s opposition parties. Securitised – let’s not forget there was a very real security issue – south africa was actively trying to destabilize zimbabwe and mozambique. And mugabe’s rhetoirc and claims were effective - Students at UZ marched – demanded to be sent to Matabeleland to fight ZAPU But we know that the claims against ZAPU were mostly trumped up, and it is best understood as an attack on ZAPU’s political base, a tension which continues to rumble on. In 1987 ZAPU was absorbed by ZANU … unity accord the second of three ‘unity’ governments - all of which merely enhanced ZANU’s position.
- Chapter 4 the politics of durability – coming back to Linz’s insight here about ‘limited pluralism’ – creates durable authoritarianism. Puzzle – political scientists at the time spoke of zimbabwe ‘democratizing’ (perhaps because of apparent liberalization’ and opening of some political space) but in fact, it became more authoritarian, with the introduction of laws that prevented protest… and the arrest of political party leaders like Ndabaningi Sithole in 1995 it’s also now that we first see ‘liberationist’ discourse re-emerging with tactical moves made around land and indigenization. Despite the unity accord which seemed to remove opposition to ZANU, the regime actually experiences more contestion as political space opened up ‘one party state debate’. – new ‘3rd generation’ Ngos – without ties to either the colonial regime or the liberation movements formed ; students and labour unions became vocal opponents –More independent newspapers start publishing Emergence of human rights groups, churches being more vocal, ‘liberalization’ of universities, unions etc actually served to ‘divide and rule’ – students union, academic voices, union voices all quieted. eg unions – one sector, one union rules revoked via labour relations act – enabled ZANU to create splinter unions. Likewise, student and academic voice weakened as ‘private’ universities opened. War vets scandal – Margaret Dongo able to use parliament and media to reveal misappropriation of funds. War vets march with impunity – first remobilization of this period -- payoff to them sparks financial crisis. New political parties formed 1990, 1995 – make ground in urban areas, especially effective in using the courts to challenge the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Finance act – also revealing the disorder of the electoral roll, but tied to old ‘white’ parties; little mass appeal. Margaret Dongo – deselected from her seat by ZANU becomes a key figure in ’independents’ movement – breathing new life into electoral politics. NGO coalitions , sectoral strikes, emerge and we see how when resources are reduced the coalition’s stability is threatened and coercion is used against a broader set of social groups,– when we see journalists arrested, NGOs threatened etc
- Chapter 5 1998-2000 – in this pivotal 2 year period, we see how the mobilization and privileging of certain members of the coalition weakens the regime’s hold over others. It also opens spaces for alternative accounts of nationalism or other ideologies to flourish. This resulted in a dramatic polarization of society between 1997 and 2000, as social groups formed networks and an electorally successful political party. The NCA was a coalition of churches and NGOs which successfully reframed debates and took control of the discursive stage getting people talking about presidential term limits and the role of the judiciary vis a vis the legislature. The regime tried to recapture the debate by launching their own ‘constitutional commission’ - another classic divide and rule move – appointing people from the NCA to the CC, and trying to capture their momentum. The CC used the media, and broadcast hearings from all around the country. It was unprecedented, but they were ‘hoist by their own petard’ because when the draft constitution came out, people realised that it did not accord with the hearings that they had watched, and which had been reported in the newspapers. The government lost constitutional referendum on 14 February, and the next day, the war vets issued a statement laying the blame at the foot of ZANU, and started occupying land. Faced with an election in June, which would be contested by the Movement for Democratic Change, whose membership closely paralleled that of the NCA, ZANU panicked, and accepted the war veterans critique and their challenge. Which is what led to the fast track land reform programme and the contested political scene post 2000…
- Chapter 6 The politics of exclusion we see that after 2000 exclusion was no longer unthinkable because the ever-increasing ranks of the excluded developed their own justificatory rhetoric and resources, but continued to be challenged by the regime’s hold on state institutions and its appeal for some social groups. Competition for control of the state is based on competing ideologies and interests, which manifest themselves in electoral and physical conflict after the 2000 election. Recreating the nationalist coalition – jingles, national dress, national heroes, national; service – remobilization. New, restrictive, citizenship laws – a newly exclusionary framing of what it means to be Zimbabwean – but also a transformation of the political and economic landscape – quite literally in some cases – the countryside was transformed with new homesteads and different cropping strategies, while prosperity and poverty alike transformed urban areas, marked also by infrastructural collapse – decline of health services, water treatment and more contributing to 2008’s cholera epidemic.
- MDC unable to access radio, indigenous language media. New legislation brought in that restricted the private press, extended political control over all aspects of the media. Electoral violence ; Public Order and Security Act was used to ban opposition party meetings. Politicization of the judiciary, traditional leaders ZANU captured and divided Churches, Trades Unions Given Zimbabwe’s straitened circumstances – rampant inflation- all of this would have been impossible without investments/line of credit from China and the windfall discovery of diamonds in Eastern Zimbabwe, which the government was able to ‘grab’.
- Chapter 7 2008 – ZANU experiences its first defeat at the polls – loses control of parliament ; almost certainly would have lost the presidential vote if the election had gone ahead – Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off election because of intense violence. Backed by his generals, Mugabe refused to concede, and under pressure from south africa, yet another ‘unity government’ /power-sharing agreement was implemented. The MDC came into government – tightly curtailed, but with control of the Finance Ministry, which enabled it to stabilize the economy. Civil society sidelined as politics becomes remobilized factionalized. (NB: new younger generation, without the ties that bound together the earlier generatiuon) ZANU – new strategies – not just recycling old narratives but a powerful interaction of indigenization, traditional leaders, housing co-ops and more. The 2013 election provided a moment of surprising coherence for ZANU as they focused on the prize – regaining full control of the state (Kriger). This is classic Winner takes all politics because there is nothing to lose from political mobilization and potentially everything to gain – Spoils politics, as Chris Allen called it.
- How to conclude? As the years wore on, the ZANU project struggled amidst economic and political uncertainty, and appeared to be wavering. The state institutions became weakened, as politicization and graft overwhelmed professionalism. Rumours and confusion spread over what was legal, and what illegal. Citizens uprooted from their homes no longer knew what to expect from their elected representatives or security forces. Norms and expectations relating to state action and service provision had been shattered. Few activists or opposition politicians in Zimbabwe have not been detained by police at least once, many have suffered far more. And those convicted were treated as criminals, denied the legitimacy of acting on political principle, or moral cause (Alexander). The painful legacies of abuse of authority, torture and loss, intensified by the continued refusal of perpetrators and their apologists to acknowledge these, permeate victims’ consciousness and weaken the foundations of the polity. By the end of the period covered in this book, it seemed inconceivable that the ageing generation of nationalist politicians could hold on any longer. But attempts by church people, NGOs, labour and community activists to imagine and articulate an alternative set of norms have been stymied. This failure to articulate fully a convincing alternative account of Zimbabwean citizenship and nationhood led Tendi to speak of Zimbabwe’s intellectual space having been ‘ceded’ to the nationalist public intellectuals – and here ‘nationlist’ means ZANU. The resurgence of the ZANU project, its conceptualization of Zimbabwe’s nationhood and its willingness to marshal violence in its interests reveal its continuing potency, even – perhaps especially? -- at times of great instability. What we have seen since I finished this book is the intense factionalization as the party searched for a successor to its president, and grappled with new economic challenges. Leading to mnangagwa’s ouster, then the coup…. We have also seen dramatic new re-articulations from citizens of the state they aspire to belong to – a reclaiming of nationalist idiom – and that should give us much hope. How much the coup overwhelms that…. Is to be seen in the next few months. Can ZANU reinvent itself again?