A presentation to donors in Ethiopia on the targeting of the productive safety net programme - PSNP - in Ethiopia

1. The politics of distributing social
transfers in Ethiopia
Tom Lavers
Global Development Institute (GDI), University of Manchester
Addis Ababa, 26th February 2019
tom.lavers@manchester.ac.uk

2. Study rationale
• States require certain capacities to distribute
transfers effectively
• But state capacity, state-society relations and
party legitimacy varies enormously within
Ethiopia (and other countries)
• Scope:
– PSNP – Selection; Graduation; and Appeals
– CBHI – Enrolment and exemptions (not covered
here)

3. Case selection

4. PSNP targeting in Oromiya and Tigray
(IFPRI 2015)

5. ‘Targeting’ in Afar compared to
livestock ownership (IFPRI 2015)
42
58
74
81
75
84
90
79 78
73 73
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest All

6. Targeting in the PSNP
Wereda FSTF
Regional FSTF
Kebele FSTF
Community
FSTF
Community
verification
Kebele Appeals
Committee
Selects wereda,
allocates quota
Allocates quota
between kebele
Allocates quota
between gott /
kushet
Posted publicly
and discussed
List
approved
Needs assessment /
approval
Needs assessment /
approval

7. Elders
Targeting the PSNP in Tigray
Kebele FSTF
Community
FSTF
Community
verification
Kebele Appeals
Committee
Allocates quota
between kushet
Posted publicly
and discussed
List
approved
DTs
1-5s
Allocates quota
between 1-5s
Allocates quota
between DTs
Chairman,
women & youth
leagues
Kushet leader,
women & youth
association
Individual /
household

8. Kebele Appeals
Committee
Targeting the PSNP in Oromiya
Kebele FSTF
Community
FSTF
Community
verification
Allocates quota
between kushet
Posted publicly
and discussed
List
approved
Male DTs
Male 1-5s
Chairman,
Women & youth
league
Kushet leader,
women & youth
association
Individual /
household
Aba Gadaa /
elders

9. Party leaders
Targeting the PSNP in Afar
Kebele FSTF
Community
FSTF
Community
verification
Kebele Appeals
Committee
Allocates quota
between kushet
Posted publicly
and discussed
DTs
1-5s
Clan leaders
Dhalla
Individual /
household
List
approved
Women & youth
association

10. Targeting and resource distribution
• Recurrent resistance narrow targeting in PSNP
– Multiple interpretations of targeting (2005-09)
– Full Family Targeting (2010-15)
– 5 per household (2016-20)
• ‘we don’t follow what the manual says … a
household with eight members is supposed to get
five quotas but we give them sometimes two or
three quotas to include other poorest households
with same economic status’ (int. respondent
TAZ4, CFSTF member).

11. Graduation targets
• Graduation targets pursued as quotas in final
years of GTP / PSNP3
• Pressure for graduation is returning – 80% of
PW participants by 2020 (Berhanu W/Michael)
• Annual and five year graduation targets
/quotas for kebele administration
– Variation in regional responses?

12. Conclusions
• Major variation in implementation structures
and capacity between regions
• Variation is embedded in long-run historical
processes, not amenable to short-term
change
• Dilution of transfers and pressure for
graduation remain key issues

13. Previous research on the politics of
adoption and design
http://www.effective-states.org/publications/
Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Social protection in an
aspiring ‘developmental state’: The political
drivers of Ethiopia’s PSNP‘, ESID Working Paper
73.
Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Social protection in an
aspiring ‘developmental state’: The political
drivers of Community-Based Health Insurance in
Ethiopia ‘, ESID Working Paper 71.