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Mugabe verses Mandela: What Causes and Prevents Civil War in Southern Africa
Bethan Owen
PlSc 473
Prof Nelson

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Introduction
In 1964, a civil war began in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) shortly after the country
declared its independence from Great Britain. This war, also called the Rhodesian Bush
War, would take over 20,000 lives and officially last until 1979. In 1994 in neighboring
South Africa, meanwhile, apartheid ended and the minority white government handed
power over to the black majority of the country relatively peacefully. These two countries
both successfully fought the lack of rights that came under a small white minority, and
yet they went through very different experiences when it came to the handover of power
to the black majority.
I plan to examine the factors that led to a fifteen-year civil war in one instance and
an internationally lauded transition of power to the majority populace in another. Some
might argue that idealism played a role in reshaping these governments, emphasizing the
immorality of the repression of blacks in both countries and the roles of anti-apartheid
leader figures of the time such as Nelson Mandela. I plan to argue that while individual
revolutionary figures did play a role in these movements, the anti-apartheid ideology had
little practical sway. My primary argument is that geopolitics, especially the
conduciveness of each country’s geography to war, and international relations, primarily
the fall of communism and the effects of private sanctions, had much larger roles in the
process than any ideological shift of the people.
Theory
There is an ongoing academic debate as to what extent civil wars are caused by
realist motives, like economics, verses ideological reasons such as addressing grievances
against the government. Given the countries’ histories of resistance and their economic

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states at the respective times of the war and the end of apartheid, I believe the evidence in
the Rhodesian and South African cases show that it is government grievance, not
economics, that fueled the governmental changes in both countries. Despite this overall
ideological theory, however, elements of realism kept large scale civil war from breaking
out in South Africa.
There have been many studies indicating that economics are the primary, or only,
plausible cause of civil war. Economist Paul Collier, for example, argues that there are a
handful of specific economic requirements that must be met for a civil war to begin.
Meanwhile “objective measures of social grievance, such as inequality, a lack of
democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions, have had little systematic effect on risk.1”
Similarly, Collier and another researcher have written that initial income and natural
resources are primary causes of civil war, stating that “the relationship between civil wars
and ethnic diversity is non-monotonic. Highly fractionalized societies have no greater
risk of experiencing a civil war than homogenous ones.2” Despite the extreme disparities
between the lives of whites and blacks in southern Africa, Collier argues that only
economics should be considered a motive.
Collier also writes that civil wars can only take place if the concept of a civil war
is financially feasible. The only difference between a successful and failed revolutionary
group, he argues, is the income that each of these groups has to work with. “The factors
which account for this difference between failure and success are to be found not in the
1 Collier, Paul. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. Washington,D.C.:
World Bank, 2000. Oxford University, Apr. 2006. Web.
2 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "On Economic Causes of Civil War." Oxford University, 1998. Web.

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causes which these two rebel organizations claimed to espouse, but in their radically
different opportunities to raise revenue.3”
Assuming that this theory is correct, we would expect to see that the revolutionary
group in Rhodesia had more funding than any South African resistance, because their
opposition movement led to a civil war. Given that their motives were very similar, the
only difference, according to Collier, should be financing. Additionally we would expect
that the two countries would both be in poor financial situations around the time of the
revolts, as Collier states that economic difficulties are the only valid reason to initiate
civil war. Revolutionaries must believe that the cost of waging a war will be financially
worth it for them in the end. It then follows that we would expect these two countries to
see improved economies post-revolution, or to have experienced more domestic conflict
since. According to Collier’s theory if the economy did not improve, this would be
grounds for further civil war.
The primary dispute between the white and black Rhodesians seems to have
begun in 1956, when bus fares for blacks in the capital city (then Salisbury) were raised
to the point that taking the bus would cost blacks between eighteen and thirty percent of
their earnings4. This is in accordance with Collier’s theory; blacks began to revolt when
their economic status became too difficult to deal with. Income levels countrywide for
blacks were very low, fractions of what white Zimbabweans were earning. “Few attained
income levels sufficient to maintain economically stable lives,5” according to researcher
3 Collier, 1998
4 Muzondidya, James. Walking on a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of
Zimbabwe. Trenton, NJ: Africa World, 2005. Print.
5 Muzondidya, James. Walking on a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of
Zimbabwe. Trenton, NJ: Africa World, 2005. Print. (172)

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James Muzondidya, which would certainly qualify black Rhodesians for the kind of
economic dissatisfaction that Collier believes will lead to civil war.
Also in accordance with his theory, Rhodesian guerilla groups had external
funding and support, which made their rebellion financially possible6. The two primary
revolutionary groups, known as ZANU and ZAPU, were supported by China and the
Soviet Union, respectively. Neighboring countries Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania
also provided funding for the guerilla groups, as well as providing training and weapons
for the fighters, which greatly reduced the cost of waging a civil war7. The guerillas came
from a very poor economic group, which inspired their desire for civil war initially, and
yet managed to acquire sufficient funding to keep a revolution going. The Rhodesian
example is a very accurate representation of Collier’s realist theory of revolutionary
groups.
South Africa did not have a similar level of external financial support. However,
this external aid for Rhodesia only came after the civil war had already began8. If South
Africa had officially initiated a civil war, it seems reasonable to assume that South
African fighters would also have received assistance. However, the civil war never began
in South Africa, and it was not for a lack of economic incentive. Soon after the end of
apartheid, about one-third of South Africans lived in poverty9. If black Rhodesians and
South Africans both lived in poor economic conditions, and South Africans could assume
6 "Communist Support to Nationalists in Rhodesia." Communist Support to Nationalists in Rhodesia.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 Nov. 1975. Web.
7 Preston,Matthew. Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective. London: Tauris Academic
Studies, 2004. Print.
8 Preston, Matthew. Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective. London: Tauris Academic
Studies, 2004. Print.
9 "South Africa." South Africa. The World Bank, 2012. Web.

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some financial assistance from neighboring countries as was given to Rhodesia, it follows
that there are some elements of difference between the two countries that Collier’s theory
does not explain.
An argument against Collier’s realism can be found in the current economic well-
being of Zimbabwe and South Africa today. According to Collier’s theory, elements such
as social and living conditions have no impact on the likelihood of civil war; economic
incentives or disincentives are the only predictable variables. However Zimbabwe’s
adjusted GDP has plunged since its revolution, and is expected to fall further as time
passes. Additionally, poverty in Zimbabwe is currently at just over seventy percent10. By
Collier’s theory the country should now be more likely to experience civil disputes than
ever, and yet it was the era in which blacks had no civil or political rights—not the time
period when they were struggling the most economically—that they had a civil war.
While a better economy might have been the underlying motivation for the
rebellion, it was not the platform that black Rhodesian revolutionary leaders chose to
argue. Their stated motivations were to take power from the white minority and return it
to the black majority, and whether this was racially inspired or based on a desire to
elevate the everyman, it was rooted in idealism. This is exemplified in a 1974 edition of
the Zimbabwe News, in which Robert Mugabe’s political group ran the following:
“There is no ceasefire and there won’t be a ceasefire until there is a definite programme
to transfer power to the African people of Zimbabwe…[we are] committed to achieving
national independence.11”
10 "Zimbabwe." Zimbabwe. The World Bank, 2012. Web.
11 "Communist Support to Nationalists in Rhodesia." Communist Support to Nationalists in Rhodesia.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 Nov. 1975. Web.

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Additionally, the financial aid that Rhodesia received from foreign powers such as
China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea was based on communist sentiments. It could
be argued whether these countries were assisting in order to extend their own
international influence or the general ideals of communism, but either way they offered
their assistance because they hoped that Rhodesia would be receptive to communism.
This assistance, then, was based on the perceived ideology of Rhodesian revolutionary
leaders.
Given the evidence, I would argue that while realism and economic models might
be solid indicators of potential for civil disputes, ideological motives have the power to
play significant roles. According to analyst Colin Legum, “The root of the conflict in
southern Africa is of course entirely indigenous-that is, it arises from the determination of
black Africans to bring an end to the white supremacist regimes there.12” Rhodesia’s civil
war fit into Collier’s realist economic theory, but the financial funding that the
revolutionaries received—a crucial part of Collier’s theory—was given based on
ideological motives. While economic conditions might control the speed at which conflict
develops, political grievance seems to be a significant factor in these southern African
cases. Additionally, this realist theory does not adequately explain the lack of war in
South Africa, which I will attempt to explain further in this paper.
Causes
1. Geopolitics
The war in Rhodesia and the relative peace in South Africa may have been closely
related to mere geography. One primary difference between the two countries is that the
12 Legum, Colin. "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa." Global.Journal of Foreign
Affairs, July 1976. Web.

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Rhodesian whites were primarily farmers, who owned huge stretches of land throughout
the mostly rural country. Due to the white government’s discriminatory methods in land
distribution, on average an individual white farmer owned 6,100 acres of land, while the
average black farmer owned seven acres13.
Because there was so much land and comparatively so few white farmers, this
territory was very difficult for the white farmers to defend against guerilla tactics and
very easy for the black revolutionaries to attack. In contrast, the majority of the South
African whites lived in industrialized cities, making a guerilla war against them much
more difficult. This can be seen in the case of the Sharpeville Massacre. In response to a
peaceful apartheid protest, white police opened fire on a crowd of civilians, killing sixty-
nine people and injuring almost 200 others, after claiming that some of the protestors had
started throwing rocks. While this was a police response to a peaceful protest and not an
attempted war, it illustrated the extreme difficulty of physically attacking white
supremacy in South Africa. Because of the significant white advantage over weaponry
and control of the city, a South African war would be a challenge for the black population
to instigate, let alone win.
It should also be noted that while the civil war began in 1964, the black
Rhodesian fighters did not begin utilizing guerilla tactics against the white government
until around 1974, when the Portuguese government in neighboring Mozambique
collapsed, providing a “600 mile-long sanctuary14” for the fighters to utilize as they
initiated guerilla warfare against Rhodesian whites and vanished across the Mozambique
13 Licklider, Roy E. Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York UP, 1993. Web. 1
Dec. 2014 (130).
14 Licklider, Roy E. Stopping the Killing:How Civil Wars End. New York: New York UP, 1993. Web.1
Dec. 2014 (130).

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border. South Africa also shares this border with Mozambique, but has access to a much
shorter length of it in an area far from any major white settlements. That, combined with
the fact that there was no effectively strong government opposition in South Africa made
the border essentially useless for any attacks on the government.
This difference between the revolutionaries in both countries was not intent or
desire. Following the Sharpeville Massacre, the revolutionary political group African
National Congress (ANC) decided that peaceful protest was ineffective, and formed a
military wing in 1961 called the “Spear of the Nation,” headed by Nelson Mandela.
Throughout the 1960s the actions of this military wing included several street bombings,
attacks on police, and attempted murders. The actions of the group were severe enough to
warrant notice in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission15. The intent of the ANC
violence—ending apartheid and putting blacks in a position of power—was the same as
the groups attacking the government in Rhodesia. However, instead of guerilla war, these
attacks resulted in minimal causalities and minimal results—as seen by the continuation
of apartheid until the early 90s—and the arrest of several ANC leaders, including
Mandela himself.
I would argue that this is in large part due to the geography and placement of
whites within both countries. The revolutionaries in Rhodesia had the ability to attack
white land and disappear, hitting the white economy before vanishing into the rural
landscape. The idea of a guerilla war itself was impossible in South Africa, where whites
lived in urban areas that were much harder to successfully attack. While the desire for
violent revolution existed in the ANC, it was much more difficult to realize because of
15 Toka, Rodney. "Section 18." Proc. of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa,
Johannesburg.Web.

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the close quarters, dense population, and law enforcement presence of the cities. The
results of both attacks, in Rhodesia and South Africa, can be seen manifest in a civil war
in one country and a small-scale bombing campaign in another.
Additionally, the South African government mandated that every white citizen
undergo two years of military service, while blacks were prohibited from doing the same.
There was no such requirement in Rhodesia, furthering the weaponization gap between
countries and between the races in South Africa. More important than the training alone,
however, was the population in each country which made this militarization possible. In
1969, Rhodesia had a white population of 228,296, and a black population of 5.4
million16, making the white population about four percent of the population. Meanwhile
fourteen percent of South Africa’s population of 37 million was white17, giving the white
South Africans a significant statistical advantage over the Rhodesian whites. While both
white governments were distinct minorities, the South African whites had enough of a
population to give them an advantage in holding onto their governance.
Sheer numbers made it possible for white South Africans to maintain a police
force and a military, but there were so few white Rhodesians that as they began fighting
back against the guerilla fighters, it had a serious effect on their hold on the country. Due
to segregation, much of the high-skill and leadership positions in the country were held
by whites. As whites were eventually drafted into the mostly-black military to fight the
guerillas, these positions were left unfilled and the economy suffered as a result.18 White
16 Licklider, Roy E. Stopping the Killing:How Civil Wars End. New York: New York UP, 1993. Web.1
Dec. 2014 (130).
17 "World Population Prospects,the 2012 Revision." World Population Prospects,the 2012 Revision.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Web. 10 Dec. 2014.
18 Licklider, Roy E. Stopping the Killing:How Civil Wars End. New York: New York UP, 1993. Web. 1
Dec. 2014 (130).

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Rhodesians were simply unable to put up a strong enough resistance, while South African
whites had the advantage of comparative numbers and the protection of industrialized
cities.
2. International Factors
Communism affected both the Afrikaner mentality and the international
perception of the South African apartheid state. On an international level, western anti-
communist powers weighed in on the side of South Africa. Despite the clear human
rights abuses being committed in the country, the United States not only supported the
apartheid regime but labeled Mandela a terrorist in the 1980s. In 1969 Henry Kissinger,
U.S. Secretary of State, wrote that "The white minority has a monopoly of force which it
does not hesitate to use, and of power which it will not voluntarily yield ... for the
foreseeable future, South Africa will be able to maintain internal stability and effectively
counter insurgent activity.19"
While the U.S. itself was not the pinnacle of race relations in the late 1960s, the
primary reason that the U.S. expressed reluctance to disturb an established apartheid
regime is because that government could be trusted to oppose communism in a part of the
world where many countries and revolutionary movements were expressing interest in
turning to the ideology. In the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. looked to the relatively
well-off and western-friendly South Africa, a hegemon in the region, to fend off
communism. Rhodesia, a much poorer and less internationally involved state, did not fall
under U.S. consideration. The Rhodesian white government had no promises or even
vague reassuring statements from the Western powers; in fact, it went unrecognized by
19 Waldmeir, Patti. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Web (150)

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the western world, as the white government’s declaration of independence from Great
Britain was illegal under international law. Ian Smith’s memoir, “The Great Betrayal,”
focused extensively on Rhodesia’s abandonment by Great Britain. Smith claims that
British inaction led to the corrupt Mugabe regime.
There is evidence to suggest that the relaxation of the communist threat is what
led to the end of apartheid in South Africa, not any sweeping ideological movement. To
begin with, it must be stated that ending apartheid was obviously an extreme and very
controversial shift for the South African government which led to race riots and
bloodshed across the country and for a long time, the white government actively
promoted racism among its white inhabitants. “The South African government didn’t
allow television into the country for years, out of fear that it would convince us that
relationships between white and blacks were normal,” according to Glenda Griffin, who
grew up in Johannesburg in the midst of apartheid20. “We were so brainwashed.” When
the issue of ending apartheid was put to a vote, about thirty percent of the white
population voted to keep it in place. While the international community may have been
promoting idealism and racial equality, the South African whites were not converted
overnight. The change came instead from anti-communist sentiment and individual
leaders; these same elements also led to violence in Rhodesia.
The ANC and the majority of the other black anti-apartheid groups were
unapologetically communist, and the argument can be made that to the white South
African government that threat was much worse than the idea of coexisting whites and
blacks. “As long as the staunchly nationalist Afrikaners perceived themselves as facing
20 Griffin, Glenda. Personal interview. 15 Nov. 2014.

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complete disaster should they succumb to a communist foe, a small decrease in the
payoff to persisting in apartheid did nothing to alter the government’s course of action,”
according to one Yale economics report on the effect that economic sanctions had on the
country21. “The Afrikaner government of South Africa saw the ANC as a party of
godless communists, ready to take their country into the communist bloc. Once the
communist bloc fell apart … a political deal with the ANC became conceivable.”
While not on an international scale, there are strong elements of realism in regards
to the government’s take on the ANC. While the white South Africans perceived
communism as a threat, and one that the ANC endorsed, they were uncompromising on
the issue because they feared the destruction of their group and government. Once the
Soviet bastion of communism fell, the South African whites were much more receptive
towards the ANC and other movements because they believed the most potent threat to
their way of life had been eliminated.
In Rhodesia, the threat of communism took on another form. After the
government announced its Universal Declaration of Independence from Britain (UDI),
the white government exaggerated the threat of communism through a desire to keep
Rhodesians united.
Anti-communism had been central to the [government]’s strategy of achieving virtually unchallenged
control of white opinion following UDI. The emergency legislation and atmosphere following the
declaration, the censorship ofnewspapers on the grounds of national security, the diplomatic isolation of
the country,the growing guerrilla threat and the fact that most guerrillas received support from or were
trained in known communist countries, the wholesale guerrilla adoption of the communist titles of
‘comrade’, ‘cadre’ and associated Marxist vocabulary, the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations
and the consequent need for secrecy, and hostile external propaganda – all assisted the [government] in
21 Levy, Phillip. "SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA." International Legal Materials 24.5 (1985):
1464-473. Yale. Web.

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portraying Rhodesia as a victim of an enormous multi-faceted conspiracy to destroy white civilization
throughout southern Africa22.
While it is true that the guerilla groups attacking the white government held
communist ideologies and support, these propaganda techniques gave white Rhodesians
the impression that they were the last bastion of capitalism and civilization in Africa, and
solidified the idea that the communist blacks should never be given power. While the
communist scare in South Africa was also used as an excuse to discriminate against the
idea of black government, these Rhodesian propaganda techniques made citizens and
politicians alike less willing to compromise or negotiate with black leaders23.
Additionally, the timing of the South African revolution came around the time of the fall
of the USSR—in that regard, the white South African government had a reassurance of
the reduced strength of communism, where white Rhodesia didn’t.
South African whites as well as Rhodesians experienced fear of what the black
takeover would mean, even after the fall of communism. In the following popular South
African political cartoon24, the common sentiment of the white South African populace
can be seen. This emphasizes both how real the fear of communism and redistribution
was at the time, and how unlikely it would be for the majority white population to
support black government—it would take individual political figures to make an
otherwise unpopular political decision.
22 Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, Ca.1920s-
1980." Cold War History 7.2 (2007): 169-94. Web (15).
23 23 Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, Ca.1920s-
1980." Cold War History 7.2 (2007): 169-94. Web (15).
24 Francis, S., H. Dugmore, and Rico. "Madamand Eve at 20." The Guardian. N.p., 10 Dec. 2012. Web. 10
Dec. 2014.

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3. Leadership
Scholar Jeff Colgan wrote25 that the international community underestimates the
power of revolutionary leaders. According to Colgan, the power of any one revolutionary
figure can be so great that their aggression and recklessness will cause international
conflict. Similarly Peter McLaren argued26 the importance of individuals in revolutions,
stating that renowned revolutionaries Che Guevara and Paulo Freire could individually
“be used as the wellspring for creating the type of critical agency necessary to contest and
transform current global relations.27” These scholars take an idealistic approach to
revolutions, emphasizing the potential of individuals’ revolutionary goals. This theory
helps understand the events that took place in both Rhodesia and South Africa.
While the revolutions in Rhodesia and South Africa did not spark international
conflicts, this theory of the power of the individual seems to hold true in these instances.
25 Colgan, Jeff D. "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict." World Politics 65.04
(2013): 656-90. Web.
26 McLaren, Peter. Che Guevara, Paulo Freire, and the Pedagogy of Revolution.Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000. Print.
27 McLaren, Peter. Che Guevara, Paulo Freire, and the Pedagogy of Revolution.Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000. Web. (26)

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In Rhodesia particularly, Colgan’s theory about aggressive leaders seems relevant.
Throughout the civil war and associated negotiation processes, white president Ian
Smith’s own personal dogma prevented progress in regards to ending the segregation and
persecution of blacks. While he negotiated and conducted talks with both the militant
revolutionary leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and the non-militant black
reformist leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa, one American newsletter printed at the time
stated that all attempts at reconciliations and improved race relations failed, “largely
because of Smith's refusal to give up one iota of white power in Zimbabwe.”
“Despite the death and destruction that white rule had brought, Ian Smith
remained obdurate,” according to Mugabe’s biography28. “Only reluctantly did he accept
the need for an alliance with the moderate African leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa…even
then, so intent was Smith on showing that whites were effectively still in control that he
undermined with little chance of success Muzorewa had of bringing peace.” As the war
continued, white flight out of the country skyrocketed29, but Smith refused to yield
power, despite receiving counsel from within his own government and both American
and British governmental bodies to do so30.
Where another, more conservative or cautious leader might have expressed more
interest in a peaceful negotiation in order to preserve his people, there is strong evidence
that Smith’s political actions are a result of his rigid personal belief system that a black
28 Meredith, Martin. Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. New York: PublicAffairs,
2007. Web (6).
29 Licklider, Roy E. Stopping the Killing:How Civil Wars End. New York: New York UP, 1993. Web. 1
Dec. 2014.
30 Smith, Ian Douglas. The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith. London: Blake Pub., 1997.
Print.

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majority should never rule the country. In a recorded radio interview in 197631 he stated
“Let me say it again. I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia—not in a
thousand years.” As recently as 2000, well after post-revolutionary Zimbabwe’s
acceptance into the international community and universal condemnation of colonialism
and racial discrimination, Smith has publicly stated that he feels no remorse for the native
Rhodesians killed under his regime. “The more we killed, the happier we were,” he
said32. “We were fighting terrorists.” Smith, while not a revolutionary leader, fits
Colgan’s theory that individual leaders who are aggressive and unapologetic are much
more likely to provoke conflict.
Similarly, Robert Mugabe’s uniquely aggressive personality helped shape
Rhodesian history. According to one biography on Mugabe33, he alone among the
Rhodesian revolutionaries absolutely refused to negotiate with the Smith government.
Where even his equally militant rival Nkomo showed some willingness to compromise,
Mugabe “saw no reason to seek a compromise with Rhodesia’s white rulers that would
leave the structure of white society largely intact…Mugabe regarded armed struggle as an
essential part of the process of establishing a new society. 34” Smith and the non-militant
Muzorewa’s negotiations actually led to the mutual acceptance and signature of the
International Settlement in 1978, which was meant to end the Bush War. The settlement
31 Nigel Rees, "Sayings of the Century", Unwin paperbacks,1984, p. 247.
32 Watts,Carl Peter. Rhodesia'sUnilateral Declaration of Independence:An International History.New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Web (3).
33 Meredith, Martin. Mugabe:Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. New York: PublicAffairs,
2007. Web.
34 Meredith, Martin. Mugabe:Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. New York: PublicAffairs,
2007. Web (2).

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also led to the restructuring of the country into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the election of
March 1979, which saw the moderate Muzorewa as Prime Minister. This government
gave all control over the military, the police, the civil service, and the judiciary system to
the country’s whites. It was short-lived, in part due to Smith’s poor negotiation and
reluctance to compromise, but perhaps more so as Mugabe and Nkomo both refused to
acknowledge the new state, which would still be almost entirely ruled by whites, and
continued the guerilla war. After the ceasefire was announced in 1979, Mugabe won a
significant majority of popular votes to become the new president of Zimbabwe in the
election that followed. Both cases of Smith and Mugabe seem to lend credence to
Colgan’s theory that dynamic personalities are more likely to attract the support and
interest of the people, and are more likely to lead their people into conflict.
In South Africa, a similar phenomenon occurred with very different results. Prime
Minister F.W. de Klerk, who had previously been a hard-line conservative even in one of
South Africa’s most conservative parties, surprised the nation in 1990 by suddenly
freeing several political prisoners who were being held based solely on their political
party and offering his support for Nelson Mandela. This series of unprecedented political
choices he made were not based solely on idealism. Some argue that he realized the
inevitability of majority rule and conceded while others, including Nelson Mandela,
believe he predicted that white South Africans could not hold power for much longer and
so acted as he did in order to preserve it for as long as possible.
“Despite his seemingly progressive action, Mr. de Klerk was by no means the
great emancipator,” Mandela wrote in his autobiography35. “He did not make any of his
35 Waldmeir, Patti. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Web (150)

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reforms with the intention of putting himself out of power. He made them for the
opposite reason: to ensure power for the Afrikaner in a new dispensation.”
Regardless of his intentions, the fact remains that de Klerk took it upon himself to
create extreme political change in the country, from a position where he was not
obligated or expected to do so. His political party championed apartheid, and had any
other member of his party but de Klerk been in office, it is likely that apartheid would
have lasted longer than it did. “If South Africa had had to await a holy man for its
liberation, it would be languishing still in apartheid captivity,” wrote Patti Waldmeier36.
“Ethnic self-interest motivated de Klerk to act, more powerfully and reliably than
morality alone could have done.” De Klerk’s timing was highly unusual for a white
Afrikaner in the National Party. In this we see again that theories as to the importance of
individuals have can assist in explaining South African policies.
After his early beginnings of violent revolt against the government and his long
stint in the Robben Island Prison, Mandela became globally known for his work in
peacefully reforming the government. De Klerk and Mandela would go on to win the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 for their collaborative efforts to nonviolently end apartheid.
When Mandela first began negotiations with de Klerk and the National Party, however,
he was met with widespread dissent from the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups,
especially as he formally offered a ceasefire on behalf of the ANC and its military
branch37. As in Rhodesia, a significant portion of the black population thought that a
peaceful reconciliation with white South Africans would only lead to continued white
36 Waldmeir, Patti. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Web (150).
37 Sampson, Anthony. Mandela:The Authorized Biography.New York: Knopf, 1999. Print. (492-497)

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oppression. In deciding to cooperate with the white government, Mandela went against
many in his own party and his own formerly aggressive political beliefs.
Conclusion
Despite their similar political climate and system of white minority rule over an
oppressed black majority, Rhodesia and South Africa experienced a few key differences
that led to a civil war in Rhodesia and a nonviolent government change in South Africa.
From a realist perspective, it seems likely that the geography of the two countries and the
placement of their white settlers provided a convenient outlet for Rhodesian militants to
attack and a major obstacle for any potential South African uprising. Additionally, the
threat of communism may have played a role in Rhodesia’s refusal to compromise when
communism seemed most threatening. On the other hand, South Africa ended apartheid
as the USSR was collapsing, when the threat of communism had become more
negligible.
Finally, while I would argue that the realist elements have a more significant role
in the timing of the events that took place in southern Africa, I would argue from a more
idealist perspective that individual leaders also played significant roles in these events.
Courses of action were taken that would not necessarily have been duplicated if another
leader had been in their place. In Rhodesia, two aggressive personalities helped lead the
country to conflict while in South Africa two negotiators worked to avoid the same fate.
The puzzle as to what made Rhodesia and South Africa so different requires explanation
from both realist and idealist perspectives.

21. 21
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