Russian subversion of the usa final phase

Russian Subversion of the USA Final Phase
Dec 4 2014
Toby posted the following to the forum
I believe that the medias' job should be to alert us to the things that are going on
around us, including clear and present dangers to our way of life as we know it.
--> that is supposed to be the role of the press.

But because the press failed so miserably in this respect, moreover the press assumed
the role not to inform us, but to disinform us so that we are so distracted from all the
stuff that we are bombarded with that we cannot even figure out what is happening on
our own anymore, there emerged a branch of the press, calling itself "alternative
news", claiming to take over the role of the press for those interested in knowing what
is really going on in the world.
Unfortunately this "alternative press" also got hijacked very quickly, or for every REAL
source, the conspirators inserted 30 disinfo agents into the "alternative media camp"
in order to re-establish that status quo: there simply being too much information for an
average person to dig himself through, not to mention sorting out all the B.S.
I mean look at it: we are bombarded with a lot of stuff that is not really so extremely
relevant when put next to the REAL NEWS.
REAL NEWS among other things, I consider:
--> the communist long range strategy as published by Golitsyn and Sejna, and how far
we have progressed within the final phase (perestroika, "breakdown" of Warshaw Pact
and USSR in order for Europe to disarm and send US troops home to then land a full
scale attack at Europe and the US after an economic collapse will have strengthened
the communist parties in all the target countries)
But unfortunately you hear nothing about this on the alternative media outlets.
In my opinion, especially during these times now, the following should be published
and republished on a daily basis so that people get it:
-Russia faked the breakdown of communism
Golitsyn foretold in his book New lies for Old (1984) that is the soon to begin offensive
"final phase" of communism:
- that the USSR would collapse,
- the Berlin wall would fall
- Germany reunified
- Warsaw Pact dissolved (hoping that NATO would dissolve)
- Balkan states split up (Sejna said this in hios 1982 book "we will bury u"
- US troops will withdraw from Europe
- economic collapse
- re-emerging Russia as a strong nation asserting itself on the world stage

Further anticipated:
- complete isolation of the USA so that it will withdraw into its fortress America
unwilling to defend Europe when attacked by Russia
--> aha - here is probably the reason why why the US is so vilified 24/7.
I mean what they are doing on the world stage is not good. I am not saying that. But we
need to keep in mind that they are "steered" by the same puppet masters that steer
Russia: the high finance.
I invite everyone to check it out:
Read the second last chapter (called "the final phase") of Golitsyns book "New Lies for
Old" (1984). You can find it on the internet here:
a href="http://www.spiritoftruth.org/newlies4old.pdf"> New Lies for Old (Golitsyn, 1984
Then take a look at his second book The Perestroika deception (1995) here:
The Perestroika Deception
THAT is in my opinion at least - the kind of stuff that is presently of uttermost
importance.[/b] All the other stuff that we read about Russia, the US, etc is in my
opinion right now rather secondary - with the exception of civil war issues in the US,
maybe - and probably published with the purpose to still blur the role of Russia and the
USSR up the the last moment.
ok - I just wanted to put this as a bit food for thought. Everyone will have to agree with
me that considering the importance of this communist long range strategy, that there
really is relatively little (as compared to its importance) on the net about it and its
consequences to our way of life
(btw. I am saying this from an European Perspective. Naturally all that is taking place in
the US currently is of outermost importance for all those living there. But even the
emerging civil war in the US can be seen very nicely in perspective through the
communist long range plan.
After all: The USA is the mortal enemy of the communist system.
I strongly recommend the lecture by (genuine) KGB defector Yuri Bezmenow on the
subversion of the USA. It is on youtube, here:

Yuri Bezmenow lecture on the subversion of the USA
What is so nice there is also the way he explains how communist intelligence is not
James Bond stuff mostly, but mostly deals with disinformation. That is: most KGB
agents are sitting at newspapers, run media outlets, including "alternative media
outlets" for sure, to try and control what information we receive.
--> with that in mind we can look at folks like Fulford from a totally different and new
perspective. I wish u all a good day,
Toby
My comment: I had a college professor who stated "Communism is the right idea, but it
was tried on the wrong people. America has the right people." They may have given up
on Russia.
The KGB could very well now be seated in the City of London financial district and
colleges of America. It was, after all, a Jewish outfit. Factor that into all of this.
Discuss this on the forum
http://www.reactorbreach.com/showthread.php?tid=1989
http://www.jimstonefreelance.com/
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS AND USA ATTACK PROPHECIES
http://www.2shared.com/complete/p1jWX17B/RUSSIAN_NUCLEAR_WAR_PREPARATI
O.html
RUSSIA'S UNDENIABLE NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS
by J. R. Nyquist AUG 27 2007
Since 1998 I have publicly warned of Russia’s war preparations.
The idea of preparing for nuclear war is absurd for most Americans, because the idea
of nuclear war makes no sense in a consumer society.

However that may be, Russia’s war preparations were as undeniable then as they are
today. And Russia is not a consumer society.
In the late 1990s Russia was refurbishing huge nuclear war bunkers and building
underground cities.
The only purpose such bunkers and cities could serve is in relation to a future nuclear
war. For a country that was supposedly broke to be spending its precious resources
on something so expensive, so far out of the way of “normal” expectations, seemed
inexplicable.
“Oh well,” people would shrug.
“The Russians are used to doing this sort of thing. It gives them psychological
comfort. Let them do what they want. It needn’t trouble us.” The public missed the fact,
however, that Russia was continuing to violate arms control agreements.
It was not admitting to all the nuclear warheads it possessed, and was not reliably
disposing of them. It was developing new, deadly, biological and chemical weapons.
Why in the midst of peace, a few short years after the end of the Cold War, were the
Russians adhering to this insane path? Were they anticipating a future war?
The answer must be yes.
And the answer continues to be yes. In the 1990s Russia forged an alliance with China
that involved a growing series of joint military exercises.
Why would the Russians do this? Why would they seek to develop a joint military
capability that would link Russian missile power with Chinese manpower?
For over a decade the Russians have been providing the Chinese with technology and
weapons.
This is not merely a commercial transaction, as some would insist. These transactions
are carefully considered strategic steps. Since the mid-1990s, Russia and China have
initiated joint-armaments programs that further solidified their military partnership.
It is obsolete thinking to suppose Russia and China are enemies. It must be
understood, as a practical matter, that Russia and China are underdog powers locked
in a struggle for primacy with the United States.
The only sensible strategy, if Russia and China expect to emerge on top, is to unite
against the Americans.
And that is what the two countries have been doing for the past decade.
A week ago today, on August 17, the Russians and Chinese conducted joint military
exercises on Russian soil, in the southern Ural Mountains. These coincided with
strategic air operations involving Russian nuclear bombers.
The combination of ground exercises with nuclear bomber exercises is a characteristic
of Soviet nuclear war theory, which holds that troops must be used to follow up
nuclear strikes.

President Putin and China’s President Hu Jintao watched the exercises while holding a
summit in Bishkek (the capital of former Soviet Kyrgyzstan).
While China and Russia insist that their preparations aren’t aimed at any specific
power, only a simpleton would believe them. (I am sad to acknowledge that many
Americans, in this regard, are simpletons.)
Last week, in an obvious upgrading of nuclear war readiness, Russian President
Vladimir Putin announced the resumption of long-range nuclear bomber patrols that
had previously been suspended in 1992. “I made the decision to restore flights of
Russian strategic bombers on a permanent basis,” said Putin.
“Combat duty has begun.” For some reason, Americans cannot digest Putin’s
statement or his decision to resume bomber patrols. Why is this happening? Well, we
say to ourselves, there is no reason other than the peculiar psychology of the
Russians.
President Bush has not put U.S. strategic bombers on patrol.
And why should he? Russia isn’t our enemy. We are all friends. We are all economic
partners and allies in the war against terror.
In Washington the State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, responded to the
Russian announcement of permanent strategic bomber patrols by saying, “It’s
interesting.
We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet
Union. It’s a different era. If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old
aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that’s their decision.”
It’s as if the Russian military had resumed stamp collecting or archery.
There is no strategic alarm, no threat, no difficulty and no discomfiture. Let them play
with their obsolete toys.
We are living in a new era, and these activities no longer trouble us.
The Cold War ended and the animosity between the great powers is gone.
Say good-bye to it. Any evidence to the contrary is not evidence. We’re living in “a
different era.” Anyone who doesn’t know this, even if they are the president of the
Russian Federation, is out-of-step.
One might imagine Washington’s reaction to a Russian missile strike against U.S.
targets. “It’s interesting,” the State Department would purr. “This is not the sort of
missile strike we would have expected from the Soviet Union.
Of course, it’s a different era. If Russia feels that they want to launch some old, useless
missiles, that’s their decision.”
Our lack of imagination, our inability to grasp our enemy’s thought process, leads us
to dismiss what is obvious. The Russians are getting ready. Why isn’t the American
side responding?

Why aren’t the Americans getting ready?
We have been seduced by a series of comforting illusions. We are also absorbed in a
struggle against Islamic terrorism (only we are at pains to admit the “Islamic” aspect of
it).
The American shopping mall regime produces stupefaction and complacency.
The regime is predicated on economic optimism and entertainment. This optimism is
about to be shattered. The Russians know this is going to happen, and they are
preparing even as we fail to prepare.
Experts: U. S. unprepared for nuclear terror attack
"...attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded freeway where you'll be stuck
in traffic and get the maximum radiation exposure." Yet, "...the only choice for most
people would be to flee" because they are unprepared!
By Greg Gordon McClatchy Newspapers
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16812686.htm
Thu, Mar. 01, 2007
WASHINGTON - Although the Bush administration has warned repeatedly about the
threat of a terrorist nuclear attack and spent more than $300 billion to protect the
homeland, the government remains ill-prepared to respond to a nuclear catastrophe.
Experts and government documents suggest that, absent a major preparedness push,
the U. S. response to a mushroom cloud could be worse than the debacle after
Hurricane Katrina, possibly contributing to civil disorder and costing thousands of
lives.
"The United States is unprepared to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear attack,"
Pentagon analyst John Brinkerhoff concluded in a July 31, 2005, draft of a confidential
memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "We were unable to find any group or office with a
coherent approach to this very important aspect of homeland security. ...
"This is a bad situation. The threat of a nuclear attack is real, and action is needed now
to learn how to deal with one."
Col. Jill Morgenthaler, Illinois' director of homeland security, said there's a
"disconnect" between President Bush's and Vice President Dick Cheney's nuclear
threat talk and the administration's actions.
"I don't see money being focused on actual response and mitigation to a nuclear
threat," she said.

Interviews by McClatchy Newspapers with more than 15 radiation and emergency
preparedness experts and a review of internal documents revealed:
The government has yet to launch an educational program, akin to the Cold War-era
civil defense campaign promoting fallout shelters, to teach Americans how to shield
themselves from radiation, especially from the fallout plume, which could deposit
deadly particles up to 100 miles from ground zero.
Analysts estimate that as many as 300,000 emergency workers would be needed after a
nuclear attack, but predict that the radiation would scare many of them away from the
disaster site.
Hospital emergency rooms wouldn't be able to handle the surge of people who were
irradiated or the many more who feared they were.
Medical teams would have to improvise to treat what could be tens of thousands of
burn victims because most cities have only one or two available burn-unit beds. Cham
Dallas, director of the University of Georgia's Center for Mass Destruction Defense,
called the predicament "the worst link in our health care wall."
Several drugs are in development and one is especially promising, but the government
hasn't acquired any significant new medicine to counteract radiation's devastating
effects on victims' blood-forming bone marrow.
Over the last three years, several federal agencies have taken some steps in nuclear
disaster planning. The Department of Health and Human Services has drawn up
"playbooks" for a range of attack scenarios and created a Web site to instruct
emergency responders in treating radiation victims.
The Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is geared to use
real-time weather data, within minutes of a bombing, to create a computer model that
charts the likely path of a radioactive fallout plume so that the government can warn
affected people to take shelter or evacuate. The government also has modeled likely
effects in blast zones.
Capt. Ann Knebel, the U. S. Public Health Service's deputy preparedness chief, said her
agency is using the models to understand how many people in different zones would
suffer from blast injuries, burns or radiation sickness "and to begin to match our
resources to the types of injuries."
No matter how great the government's response, a nuclear bomb's toll would be
staggering.

The government's National Planning Scenario, which isn't public, projects that a
relatively small, improvised 10-kiloton bomb could kill hundreds of thousands of
people in a medium-sized city and cause hundreds of billions of dollars in economic
losses.
The document, last updated in April 2005, projects that a bomb denoted at ground level
in Washington, D. C., would kill as many as 204,600 people, including many
government officials, and would injure or sicken 90,800. Another 24,580 victims would
die of radiation-related cancer in ensuing years. Radioactive debris would contaminate
a 3,000-square-mile area, requiring years-long cleanup, it said.
Brinkerhoff, author of the confidential memo for the Joint Chiefs, estimated that nearly
300,000 National Guardsmen, military reservists and civil emergency personnel would
be needed to rescue, decontaminate, process and manage the 1.5 million evacuees.
The job would include cordoning off the blast zone and manning a 200-mile perimeter
around the fallout area to process and decontaminate victims, to turn others away from
the danger and to maintain order. Brinkerhoff estimated that the military would need to
provide 140,000 of the 300,000 responders, but doubted that the Pentagon would have
that many. And the Public Health Service's Knebel cited studies suggesting that the
"fear factor" would reduce civil emergency responders by more than 30 percent.
Planning for an attack seems to evoke a sense of resignation among some officials.
"We are concerned about the catastrophic threats and are trying to improve our
abilities for disasters," said Gerald Parker, a deputy assistant secretary in Health and
Human Services' new Office of Preparedness and Response. "But you have to look at
what's pragmatic as well."
Dr. Andrew Garrett of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster
Preparedness, put it this way: "People are just very intimidated to take on the problem"
because "there may not be apparent solutions right now."
The U. S. intelligence community considers it a "fairly remote" possibility that
terrorists will obtain weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which is
more accessible, to build a nuclear weapon, said a senior intelligence official who
requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information. The official
said intelligence agencies worry mainly about a makeshift, radioactive "dirty bomb"
that would kill at most a few hundred people, contaminate part of a city and spread
panic.

But concerns about a larger nuclear attack are increasing at a time when North Korea
is testing atomic weapons and Iran is believed to be pursuing them. Al-Qaida's
worldwide network of terrorists also reportedly has been reconstituted.
The 9/11 Commission's 2004 report rated a nuclear bombing as the most consequential
threat facing the nation.
"We called for a maximum effort against the threat," Lee Hamilton, the panel's vice
chairman, told McClatchy Newspapers. "My impression is that we've got a long ways to
go. ... I just think it would overwhelm us."
Dr. Ira Helfand, a Massachusetts emergency care doctor who co-authored a report on
nuclear preparedness last year by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, chided the
administration for trying "to create a climate of fear rather than to identify a problem
and address it." The doctors' group found the government "dangerously unprepared"
for a nuclear attack.
Government officials say they have drafted playbooks for every sort of radioactive
attack, from a "dirty bomb" to a large, sophisticated device.
But radiation experts and government memos emphasize the chaos that a bigger bomb
could create. Emergency responders could face power outages, leaking gas lines,
buckled bridges and tunnels, disrupted communications from the blast's
electromagnetic pulse and streets clogged by vehicle crashes because motorists could
be blinded by the bright flash accompanying detonation.
No equipment exists to shield rescue teams from radiation, and survivors would face
similar risks if they tried to walk to safety.
Defense analyst Brinkerhoff proposed having troops gradually tighten the ring around
the blast zone as the radiation diminished, but warned that the government lacks the
hundreds of radiation meters needed to ensure that they wouldn't endanger
themselves. He said those making rescue forays would need dosimeters to monitor
their exposure.
Emergency teams would have no quick test to determine the extent of survivors'
radiation exposure. They would have to rely on tests for white blood cell declines or
quiz people about their whereabouts during the blast and whether they had vomited.
For those with potentially lethal acute radiation sickness, only limited medication is
available, said Richard Hatchett, who's overseeing nearly $100 million in research on

radiation countermeasures for the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious
Diseases.
The Department of Health and Human Services might commit to a limited purchase of
one promising drug as early as this month. But currently federal health officials plan to
fly victims of acute radiation sickness to hospitals across the country for bone marrow
transplants.
The National Planning Scenario expressed concern that uninformed survivors of an
attack could be lethally exposed to radiation because they failed to seek shelter,
preferably in a sealed basement, for three to four days while radioactive debris
decayed. Another big problem: Only a small percentage of Americans store bottled
water, canned food and other essentials for an ordeal in a shelter.
Helfand said it would be too late to help most people near the blast, but that advance
education could save many people in the path of the fallout.
Education is critical, he said, because attempting to evacuate could "put you on a
crowded freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation
exposure."
California's emergency services chief, Henry Renteria, said it might be time "to re-
establish an urban area radiation shelter program."
Brinkerhoff wrote that people could build their own radiation-proof shelters if the
government engaged in "large-scale civil defense planning" and gave them meters and
dosimeters to monitor the radiation.
Since there hasn't been "any enthusiasm to address this kind of preparedness,"
Brinkerhoff concluded, the only choice for most people would be to flee.
much, much more at:
http://www.2shared.com/complete/p1jWX17B/RUSSIAN_NUCLEAR_WAR_PREPARATI
O.html
David Alan Rosenberg on: U.S. Planning for a Soviet Nuclear Attack
In the fifties, it's a case that clearly, from all the data we have, Soviet nuclear readiness
was incredibly low; that the Russians were not really able to do anything to match the
Strategic Air Command in terms of its capabilities to keep its forces up and all. And the
ability to launch a surprise attack did not seem particularly great. But the problem was

what we didn't know. The intelligence revolution, as represented by satellites in
particular (the recently declassified photo satellites that used to drop their packages
and get caught by airplanes, you know), that doesn't come until the 1960s.
The Soviet Union explodes an atomic bomb in August of 1949. It's disclosed to the
world in September. In the spring and summer of 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do
some consideration of an additional targeting category. And in August of 1950, the
Joint Chiefs lay on the Strategic Air Command the requirement to in fact also to begin
targeting Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States and its
allies. And this is one of the great drivers of any kind of nuclear competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union, at least on the America side. And that is the
requirement to be able, under the right circumstances, to launch a disarming first
strike against the Soviet Union. A preemptive strike, not a preventive war but a
preemptive strike against Soviet nuclear capability.
And this, in turn, means that as more air fields are identified in the Soviet Union, as
Soviet military capability, aerial capability grows, that by the 1950s you're now talking
about the growth of so-called counter-force targets. That includes nuclear production
facilities and major air bases. And then starting in the mid-fifties, with dispersal air
fields, where the Soviet air force could disperse to and then launch strikes, that it
causes this huge increase in potential targets beyond the traditional city bombing
requirement.
And the fact is then, how are you going to be able to take out these targets? Are you
going to go in and just launch a strike against the air bases and the nuclear production
facilities, and then hold back your bombers from attacking cities? Well, the problem is
that no one had told LeMay that that was what he was supposed to do. And he felt he
didn't have the resources that could launch a series of strikes into the Soviet Union,
because the likelihood of Soviet air defenses (which were constantly working and
improving at this time-- Soviets made great, great progress in terms of both anti-
aircraft artillery and in early warning, although none of it was--was, you know, so
overwhelmingly proficient as to prevent the Americans from truly getting in), but the
fact that this could, in fact, slow a strike, take out enough of his bombers to prevent a
series of strikes. And so LeMay plans the equivalent of one big air strike that will take
out both nuclear capability and retardation targets (that which they can find), and also
urban industrial targets, in one big attack.
And by the mid-fifties (`54, `55), you're talking about 750 airplanes, 750 targets that
SAC is contemplating attacking if it has, in fact, an adequate warning time, which
under strategic warning (based on the equivalent of various forms of signals,
intelligence that the Russians were in fact moving their forces to attack Western

Europe as well as preparing their forces to attack the United States), would mean that
they could get perhaps 24 or 36 hours warning. And whether the President of the
United States would then act on that warning time to launch the United States first is
another question, although it's clear that Eisenhower understood that he would, in fact,
if given this kind of warning, be willing to use his forces to (as he says in December
1954) "blunt the enemy offensives".
And so you've got the dynamics of an arms competition at work here, that is being
fueled by increasing capability in aircraft, and bigger and bigger nuclear weapons, until
by `54, `55, the first hydrogen bombs, the first thermonuclear weapons are now
entering the inventory that will allow you to take out large air fields or significant
portions of cities in ways that the smaller fission weapons would not in fact do. And
that begins to pile up even more and more weaponry and capability.
The other problem is that SAC has a series of analytical formulae that it puts together,
that relate to the question of what will be the damage that needs to be laid on against
targets. And that means that there needs to be a certain kind of redundancy that
insures that enough weapons will land on what is a designated ground zero. And so
you will see a certain amount of duplication from SAC alone, in terms of taking this on.
And then the problem is that in the mid-fifties, you see the Navy developing its own
nuclear capability, charged under the various agreements governing roles and
missions of the Armed Forces. Navy carrier aircraft will be attacking targets of naval
interest, as they're called, within the Soviet Union. They could include air fields that
could launch Soviet aircraft to attack, with nuclear weapons, U.S. forces at sea,
submarine bases. And in some cases, the Navy, being somewhat paranoid about the
Air Force during this period, the Air Force being somewhat paranoid about the Navy
during this period -- as one old friend who worked on this used to note, "Well, we
finally got to the point where we weren't trusting SAC to hit everything that we needed,
so we'd go against cities where battery factories were located, that made batteries for
submarines. And they were deep in central Russia. But we were always going against
those with much smaller yield weapons than SAC was" -- that you then had a lot of
what SAC always decried as endless duplication and needless duplication in nuclear
targeting.
And the other part of the problem was that then you would also have the problem of
deconfliction, which was a case that you had numbers of aircraft coming in, aircraft
that were launched from perhaps the European command, U.S. Air Force tactical
aircraft that might be going against targets that could affect the land battle in Western
Europe, SAC aircraft coming in from the continental United States or stationed
overseas, and carrier aircraft coming in from the Mediterranean or from the Norwegian
Sea - and they might all simultaneously be going against a series of targets that would

mean that they could be passing each other and dropping weapons at moments where
one airplane could in fact either be flying into the blast of another, or in a more benign
sense, airplanes could in fact be flying close enough so that the pilots could in fact get
blinded and irradiated by the blast of a nuclear weapon going off nearby. And so there
was a serious need to try to find ways of deconflicting these incoming strikes, which
led to the creation of what were known as worldwide coordinating conferences that
were held annually, in which there were a lot of debates that went on about all of this.
And so finally it was decided in the summer of 1960 to in fact not to create a single
strategic command, but to create a joint strategic target planning staff out in Omaha, at
SAC headquarters, that would attempt to put together two products: a national
strategic target list that would, in fact, serve as the basis for all national nuclear war
planning for Strategic Air Command and for Polaris submarines, and then put together
a Single Integrated Operational Plan that in fact would control the forces going against
those targets. And that would include SAC forces in the U.S. and overseas, theater
forces, carrier aviation, and submarine forces.
The problem was that SAC had developed its own approach to nuclear war planning.
And so when the Navy sent people out to Omaha, they were in effect forced to go along
with the SAC approach, both analytically in terms of weighting targets and in terms of
their value in a war plan and what was going to be attacked and serving as a priority,
and also, given what the national strategic target and attack policy laid out, what you
were going to hit in terms of how much damage was going to be expected, what your
probability of damage was going to be in terms of-- against how much of industrial
floor space, against how much of the counter-force capability that you were going to
be working against a Soviet means of delivering. And these were very, very high levels
of what's known as damage expectancy: what damage would be expected, assuming
the weapons; how many weapons would get to the target, and would both arrive and
do their job.
And as a result, you created what's been called by some people a doomsday machine
that, if you had 28-hour strategic warning, would launch over 3,000 weapons at 1,050
designated ground zeros in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and in
Eastern European states, that would be destroyed all at once, and (it) has been
estimated as resulting in 285 million prompt deaths. And that was the American
nuclear war plan that was created in 1960, that was briefed to the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1960.
And when Secretary Thomas Gates, the Secretary of Defense, and General Lyman
Leominster, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, called the President to say, well, we've
got a first cut of this war plan, and we're going to approve it, Eisenhower, who was not
briefed on it, in this phone call says, "Well, announce-- put my name on it too, saying

that I've in fact reviewed this," when in fact there does not appear to have been any
real indication that President Eisenhower was ever fully briefed on this war plan, other
than perhaps by his science advisor, the late George Kistiakowsky, who in fact, at the
instigation of Admiral Arlie Burke (the Chief of Naval Operations who was so disturbed
at so many of the abuses that went on in putting this plan together) convinced
Kistiakowsky to in fact go out to study the problems of this war plan. And he produced
a report. But that report, in effect, was what the Kennedy Administration inherited
instead.
And this set up the foundation for nuclear war planning for, in many ways, for decades
to come, in that it established a joint pattern for planning that subsequent presidential
administrations and military services (the Army and the Air Force and the Navy) have
been working to sort of find ways of breaking this up into much more discrete and
potentially militarily useful options, rather than this kind of doomsday plan. And much
of the debates over nuclear war planning in the United States, in effect, have revolved
around the question of just how flexible one's plan should be.
back to Interview Transcripts
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interview/rosenberg02.html
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MILITARY STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR ATTACK
PROPHECIES.docx
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/160350852/RU...PROPHECIES
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MILITARY STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR ATTACK PROPHECIES
Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War
by Richard Pipes
Baird Professor of History, Harvard University
Reprinted from Commentary, 1977
A Summary of the Argument by Bill Somers
American and Soviet nuclear doctrines are diametrically opposed. They are products
of totally different historical experiences and political and socioeconomic systems.
The apparent contradictions in Soviet nuclear doctrine and the dangers of U. S.

unilateral adherence to a strategy of mutual deterrence are best understood when put
in historical perspective.
The American view of war has been conditioned by the ideas characteristic of a
Western commercial society. Underlying it is the notion that human conflict results
from misunderstandings that can be resolved by negotiation. Marxism, on the other
hand, holds conflict to be normal (and military forces as a political tool and a part of
grand strategy. Americans generally regard war as an abnormal situation and want to
end it rapidly through technological superiority and with the least possible loss of
friendly (but not necessarily enemy) lives. Large peacetime forces are an unwelcome
expense.
These contrary views of war were affected differently by the coming of nuclear
weapons. In the U. S., atomic and thermonuclear bombs were considered "absolute"
weapons, capable of destroying a society or even a civilization, and against which
there was no defense. Thus, Clausewitz's dictum that war is an extension of politics
was considered dead. Since nuclear war could serve no rational political purpose, the
function of strategic forces should be to avert war. Because of the vast
destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a "sufficiency" of weapons to retaliate was
believed to be enough. Numerical superiority was thought to have little meaning. To
ensure a stable balance, in which conflicts could be resolved by negotiation, the USSR
should even have the ability to do unacceptable second-strike damage to the U. S. This
concept of mutual deterrence, or mutual assured destruction, became U. S. policy and
as nuclear delivery capabilities improved, remained the foundation of a somewhat
more flexible policy.
These U. S. strategic theories were developed largely by civilian scientists and
"accountants," with little contribution from military professionals. The theorists were
guided significantly by fiscal imperatives -- the desire to reduce the defense budget
while retaining a capacity to deter Soviet threats to U. S. interests. The theories were
formulated without reference to their Soviet counterparts, and in the belief that we can
"educate" the Soviets to adopt our views.
In the USSR, where strategy is considered a science and the special province of the
military, nuclear weapons were not held to be "absolute," except perhaps briefly after
Stalin's death. The idea of mutual deterrence was never accepted. Soviet theorists
rejected the idea that technology determines strategy. They adapted nuclear weapons
to their traditional Clausewitzian view of war as an extension of politics.
The Communist revolution eliminated that segment of Russian society that was most
Westernized, and put the peasant class in power. History had taught the Russian
peasant that cunning and coercion assured survival; cunning when weak; cunning and
coercion when strong. "Not to use force when one had it indicated some inner
weakness." That concept of the use of power and the fact that, since 1914, the USSR
has lost up to 60,000,000 citizens through war, famine, and purges and survived has no
doubt conditioned the development of Soviet nuclear strategy. Soviet nuclear doctrine,
expounded in a wide range of Russian defense literature, has five related elements:

• Preemption (first strike).
• Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and because the war may last for
some time, even though the initial hours are decisive).
• Counterforce targeting.
• Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.
• Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the U. S. under its concept of
mutual deterrence.
Soviet Doctrine is both a continuation and an extension of the Soviet belief that all
military forces -- nuclear and conventional -- serve a political purpose as guarantor of
internal control and an instrument for territorial expansion. Thus, large military forces
are accepted in the Soviet Union as a rational capital investment, regardless of their
impact on social programs.
Soviet writing on nuclear strategy has been largely ignored, or has been ridiculed in
this country because if its jingoism and crudity, and the obscurity of Communist
semantics. It is a strategy of "compellance," in contrast to the U. S. doctrine of
deterrence.
But "... the relationship of Soviet doctrine and Soviet deployments (is) sufficiently
close to suggest that ignoring or not taking seriously Soviet military doctrine may have
very detrimental effects on U. S. security."
Finally, "... as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on
the function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist. And unilateral deterrence
is feasible only if we understand the Soviet war-winning strategy and make it
impossible for them to succeed."
Article Preview
Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight & Win a Nuclear War
Richard Pipes — July 1977
- Abstract
IN A RECENT interview with the New Republic, Paul Warnke, the newly appointed head
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded as follows to the question of
how the United States ought to react to indications that the Soviet leadership thinks it
possible to fight and win a nuclear war. “In my view,” he replied, “this kind of thinking
is on a level of abstraction which is unrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in
those terms, which would indulge what I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet
nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate them into the real world of strategic
nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win.”
Even after allowance has been made for Mr. Warnke’s notoriously careless syntax,
puzzling questions remain. On what grounds does he, a Washington lawyer, presume
to “educate” the Soviet general staff composed of professional soldiers who thirty
years ago defeated the Wehrmacht-and, of all things, about the “real world of strategic
nuclear weapons” of which they happen to possess a considerably larger arsenal than

we? Why does he consider them children who ought not to be “indulged”? And why
does he chastise for what he regards as a “primitive” and unrealistic strategic doctrine
not those who hold it, namely the Soviet military, but Americans who worry about their
holding it?
________________________________________
About the Author
Richard Pipes is professor of history emeritus at Harvard and the author most recently
of Russian Conservatism and Its Critics (Yale).
The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R.
Foreign Affairs, Fall 1984
by Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble
Presidential campaigns do more than choose individuals for high office: our history shows
many instances where elections have moved the country closer to a decisive resolution of longstanding
issues. The 1984 presidential campaign gives the candidates a historic opportunity to build
public support for reducing the risk of nuclear war. The American electorate is now psychologically
prepared to take a giant step toward real arms reductions.
For several years now a great change, largely unnoted, has transformed the outlook of the
American electorate toward nuclear arms. There is a dawning realization among the majority of
voters that the growth in nuclear arsenals on both sides has made the old "rules of the game"
dangerously obsolete. The traditional response of nations to provocations and challengesto their
interest has been the threat of force and, in the event of a breakdown of relations, resort to war.
However much suffering war may have created in the past, the old rules permitted winners as well as
losers.
But an all-out nuclear war, at present levels of weaponry, would wipe out the distinction
between winnersand losers. All would be losers and the loss irredeemable. Thisgrim truth is now
vividly alive for the American electorate. Moreover, for the average voter the danger is real and
immediate–far more so than among elites and experts. Americans are not clear about the policy
implications of this new reality. They do not know how it should be translated into day-to-day
transactions with the Soviet Union to reduce the danger. But there is an impatient awareness that the
old responses are not good enough, and a sense of urgency about finding new responses.
–By an overwhelming 96 percent to 3 percent, Americans assert that "picking a fight with the
Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world...."
–By 89 percent to 9 percent, Americans subscribe to the view that "there can be no winner in
an all-out nuclear war; both the United States and the Soviet Union would be completely
destroyed."
—By 83 percent to 14 percent, Americans say that while in past wars we knew that no matter
what happened some life would continue, "we cannot be certain that life on earth will
continue after a nuclear war."
—And, by 68 percent to 20 percent, the majority rejects the concept that "if we had no
alternative we could fight and win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union."
These findings are from a new national study conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation to
probe attitudes toward nuclear arms. The picture of the electorate's state of mind that follows has
been pieced together from a number of excellent national surveys of public attitudes conducted over
the past several years by a variety of organizations. These include: Gallup, Harris, New York Times/
CBS, Time Soundings (conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White), ABC News/Washington Post,

The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R. 2
NBC News/Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, Research and Forecasts, and the Public Agenda
study, the most recent.
The Public Agenda survey underscores what many others have discovered: Americans have
come to believe that nuclear war is unwinnable, unsurvivable.
II
In the postwar period, U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union have oscillated between policies
of containment (drawing lines against overt Soviet involvement), and policies of détente that
depended on "managing" a carrot/stick relationship between the superpowers. Our shifts from one
policy to the other have depended more on internal American politics than on Soviet actions. In the
early 1970s, détente enjoyed immense popularity with the public. As the decade moved toward its
close, however, differing Soviet and American interpretations of détente had begun to create
tensions (for example, in Angola). The watershed event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979 and the reaction of the Carter Administration. This event marked the public start of
the present "down phase" of disillusionment in the United States with the policies of détente, and of
deeply troubled relations with the Soviets.
President Carter characterized the Afghanistan invasion as "the worst threat to world peace
since World War II." The public, which had momentarily set aside its mistrust of the Soviet Union in
the early and middle 1 970s, now responded with renewed mistrust and frustration over our apparent
impotence to counter Soviet aggression. (The frustration was aggravated, coincidentally, by this
country's inability to free the hostages in Iran.) This combination of events le d to a steep increase in
public support for strengthening our defenses, and a mood of deep disillusionment with détente The
Public Agenda survey shows that two-thirds of the public (67 percent) endorse the view that the
"Soviet Union used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed forces while lulling us into a
sense of false security."
In 1980 and 1981 the backlash against détente reached a high peak of intensity. The public
mood was characterized by injured national pride, unqualified support for increasing the defense
budget, and a general desire to see American power become more assertive.
The public is now having second thoughts about the dangers of such an assertive posture at a
time when the United States is no longer seen to maintain nuclear supremacy. The electorate is still
wary, still mistrustful, and still convinced that the Soviets will seize every possible advantage they
can; yet, at the same time, Americans are determined to stop what they see as a drift toward nuclear
confrontation which, in the electorate's view, neither we nor the Soviets desire. The stage is being set
for a new phase in our relationship with the Soviets.
For the United States, "normal relations" between the two superpowers are clearly not the
"friendly relations" the American people associated with the 1970s policy of détente At the same
time, Americans are skeptical about the kind of containment policy that prevailed so often in the
past. From our Vietnam experience, votersdraw the lesson that we must keep uppermost in mind the
limits of American power. And from the present standoff on nuclear arms they draw the lesson that
we must avoid being provocative and confrontational.
Large majoritiesnow support a relatively nonideological, pragmatic live -and-let-live attitude
that potentially can provide the political support for a new approach to normalizing relations
between the two superpowers.
In shaping new policy proposals it will be useful for candidates to hold clearly in view two
major findings that emerge from the many studies of public attitudes toward nuclear arms. The first
is that Americans have experienced a serious change of heart about the impact of nuclear weapons
on our national security. The second is that voter perceptions of the Soviets are not as black-andwhite
as they once were; there are many shades of gray—nuances and subtleties that have an
important bearing on policy. An inference follows from these findings: voters are psychologically
prepared to consider much more dramatic and far-reaching arms-control policies than existing ones,
because existing policies are rooted in the old rules of the game when there wasa chance of winning
if war broke out.
III

At the very start of the nuclear age in August 1945, a Gallup poll found that the
overwhelming majority of citizens approved the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. America was war-weary, and the new weapon held the promise of ending the conflict and
saving American lives. Yet, when asked in the same survey whether the United States should use
poison gas against Japanese cities if it would shorten the war and save American lives, most
Americans answered no. In the summer of 1945, then, in spite of the suffering the war had caused,
Americans clearly understood the ideas of deterrence and retaliation, and the need to weigh concerns
other than that of simply ending the war.
In 1954, Gallup reported that 54 percent of the public felt that the invention of the hydrogen
bomb made another world war less likely. By 1982, however, the Gallup survey revealed that
American thinking had undergone a radical change. In that year, responding to the same question
posed a generation earlier, nearly two in three (65 percent) now said the development of the bomb
was a bad thing.
The reasons for this change are clear-cut. Twenty-nine years ago, Gallup had found that only
27 percent of the public agreed that "mankind would be destroyed in an all-out atomic or hydrogen
bomb war." The Public Agenda asked those they interviewed in 1984 if they agreed or disagreed
with this statement: "There can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war; both the US and the Soviet
Union would be completely destroyed." An overwhelming 89 percent concurred. This and other
responses reflect a dramatic shift in people's thinking about what nuclear war would be like. Nuclear
war is no longer seen as a rational policy for the US government to consider.
In part, this extraordinary change reflects Americans' revised understanding of the relative
strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union. When the United States alone had the bomb,
most Americans had few doubts about our safety. Even after the Soviets achieved nuclear status, and
even after the advent of the hydrogen bomb, American confidence in our nuclear superiority gave
most people a feeling of security. In 1955, for example, when only 27 percent said an all-out nuclear
war would destroy mankind, Americans were nearly unanimous (78 percent) in believing that the
United States had more nuclear weaponsthan the Soviet Union. Today, only ten percent believe we
have nuclear superiority; a majority now feels that the two sides are roughly equal in destructive
capability, and at a level felt to be terrifying.
Concern about the issue has also increased, especially among the young. Only five percent of
the public says they find themselves thinking about the possibility of nuclear war less than they did
five years ago. A majority—and nearly three in four young adults between the ages of 18 and 30—
says they think about the issue more often than they did five years ago. There is also majority
agreement, 68 percent (rising to 78 percent among adults under 30), that if both sides keep building
missiles instead of negotiating to get rid of them, it is only a matter of time before they are used. A
sizable number expects that day to come soon: 38 percent of the American people, and 50 percent of
those under 30, say that all-out nuclear war is likely to occur within the next ten years. This is a
vision of the future that is far different from that held in the mid-1950s when most people said the
development of the bomb was a good thing, deserving of a central role in our military strategy.
Americans have also arrived at an astonishingly high level of agreement that we must adapt
our future policies to these "facts of life":
—That nuclear weapons are here to stay. They cannot simply be abolished, and because
mankind will maintain its knowledge of how to make them, there can be no turning back to a
less threatening time (85 percent).
—That both we and the Soviets now have an "overkill" capability, more destructive
capability than we could ever need, and the ability to blow each other up several times over
(90 percent).
—That there can be no such thing as a limited nuclear war: if either side were to use nuclear
weapons, the conflict would inevitably escalate into all-out war (83 percent).
—That the United States no longer has nuclear superiority (84 percent), and that we can
never hope to regain it; that the arms race can never be won, for if we did have a bigger
nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92
percent); and that building new weaponsto use as "bargaining chips" doesn't work because

the Soviets would build similar weapons to match us (84 percent).
It is this fundamental sense that our own lives may be at risk that accounts for another
startling change in public opinion. A consensus level of 77 percent says that by the end of the decade
it should be US policy not to use nuclear weapons to respond to a conventional Soviet attack. Nearly
the same number (74 percent) say it should be current policy never to use small nuclear weapons in a
battlefield situation.
IV
Public attitudes toward the Soviet Union are highly complex. Americans believe that the
Soviet Union is an aggressive nation, both militarily and ideologically, which presses every
advantage, probes constantly for vulnerabilities, interprets every gesture of conciliation and
friendship as weakness, fails to keep its promises, cheats on treaties, and, in general, gets the better
of us in negotiations by hanging tough.
At the same time, however, there is less concern than in the past about communist subversion
from within or about the political appeal of communist ideology to our closest allies. Americans hold
the Russian people in high esteem, believe that America is able to live in peace with a variety of
communist countries, see the Russians caught in the same plight as ourselves in seeking to avert a
suicidal nuclear arms race, credit the Soviets with legitimate security concerns, and believe they are
genuinely interested in negotiation. Huge majorities feel that America has been less forthcoming in
working things out with the Russians than it might be and that we have to share some of the blame
for the deterioration in the relationship.
This ambivalent attitude represents a change in outlook from the last presidential election in
1980 to the present one. In 1980, Americans were in an assertive anti-Communist, anti-Soviet mood,
ready to support cold-war kinds of initiatives. But in politics, timing is all. Surveys show that
Americans feel that the power imbalance that prevailed in 1980 has now been partly or wholly
corrected and that more constructive negotiations are possible.
Today, the majority of Americans have reached a conclusion about communism that can best
be described as pragmatic rejection. As they have in the past, Americans today firmly re ject the
social values of communism, and see them as opposed to all our fundamental beliefs. But there is
little fear today that communist subversion threatens the United States, that communists will engage
in sabotage, form a fifth column, or convert millions of Americans to their cause. Americans today
are confident that communism holds little appeal in this country. They differentiate among
communist countries, too, and the threat they pose to our security. For example, in the Public
Agenda survey, people concur with near unanimity that "our experience with communist China
proves that our mortal enemiescan quickly turn into countries we can get along with" (83 percent).
This sense that communism is something we can tolerate without accepting, something with which
we can coexist without endorsing, represents another and perhaps fundamental shift in the public's
thinking since the beginning of the nuclear age.
Admittedly, public attitudes toward dealing with the threat of communism often seem
contradictory and confused. In recent years computer-based statistical methods have permitted some
very subtle and powerful analyses which divide the public into like-minded subgroups. At the Public
Agenda, analyst Harvey Lauer performed such an analysis on their survey findings, with some
revealing and important results.
Lauer's "cluster analysis" showed that public attitudes are most sharply divided by four
variables: (1) the presence or absence of ideological animosity toward the Soviet Union; (2) the
inclination to see the conflict between the United States and the USSR in religious terms or
pragmatic terms; (3) the tendency to minimize or to stress the threat of nuclear war; and (4) the
favoring of an assertive or a conciliatory policy toward the Soviets.
The four groups that Lauer's cluster analysis reveals can be characterized as follows. One
group he calls the "threat minimizers." They constitute 23 percent of the Public Agenda's national
cross-section. Like virtually everyone else, they believe that nuclear war is unwinnable. But unlike
most other Americans, they do not think there is any real chance that it will happen. Consequently
they are prepared to take far greater risks than the rest of the public. They are less interested in
negotiation than in building up our military strength. They reject conciliatory gestures in favor of

weakening the Soviet Union in every way possible. Demographically, this group is predominantly
male (69 percent), older than other groups, and fairly well educated, with good incomes. Politically,
they tend to be conservative and Republican.
At the opposite extreme is to be found the youngest and best educated of the four groups.
Constituting 21 percent of the sample this group believesthe possibility of nuclear disaster is real
and urgent, they have faith in conciliation over confrontation, they want to see the United States take
the initiative in reducing our nuclear arms, and most strikingly, they are almost totally free of the
ideological hostility that the majority of Americans feel toward the Soviet Union. They see the
Soviet threat almost completely in military terms. Like the first group, it, too, is more male than
female (56 percent to 44 percent), but unlike the first group it tends to be liberal rather than
conservative.
What about the two middle groups where the majority of Americans are to be found? The
single largest of the four groups—31 percent—is made up of Americans who are ideologically
opposed to communism and the Soviets but are peaceful and nonassertive in their strategic thinking
about how to deal with the Soviet threat. They see communism as an ide ological threat, but they also
think a lot about the possibility of nuclear war. They believe the Soviet Union takes advantage of us
and cheats on our treaties with it, but they also believe that the United States has not done enough to
reach serious arms control agreementswith the Soviets. They urge that we reach an accommodation
with the Soviets on a peaceful coexistence, "live-and-let-live" basis, and not attempt to reform or
change them. Demographically, this is the most female of the four groups (60 percent); they are
fairly young, of average education, and middle-of-the-road in their political orientation.
The fourth group, representing one quarter of the population (25 percent) tends to see the
conflict between us and the Soviets in religious terms. They see the Soviet Union as an "evil empire"
threatening our moral and religious values. A majority of them believe that in the event of a nuclear
holocaust their faith in God would ensure their survival. Unlike all the other groups, they believe that
some day the United States is going to have to fight the Russians to stop communism.
In many respects, the religious anti-communism of this group predisposes it to endorse the
utmost in nuclear military strength for the United States. But, paradoxically, it is the most
apprehensive about the imminent threat of a nuclear holocaust. Consequently, it sees great danger to
the United States in efforts to weaken the Soviets too much, lest they respond "like cornered rats." A
majority among them believes the United States has not done enough in negotiations with the
Soviets, and a large minority would even opt for unilateral reductions in our nuclear stockpile.
Most of the contradictions in public responses are concentrated in this subgroup. There is,
however, an emotional logic underlying their seeming inconsistency: they fear communism as an
ideology and would smite it with the sword—but they fear the threat of nuclear war more than they
fear communism and therefore they are more willing than most Americans to sheathe the sword.
They want the United States to be as strong militarily as possible, but they also fear the
consequences of our using our military strength aggressively. Their activism derives from the fact
that the likelihood of nuclear war is a living reality for them. They are concerned to do everything
they can to avert catastrophe. Of all the four groups, they most yearn for strong leadership and
authority to set down a policy that will allay their anxieties. They are the only one of the four groups
where a majority believesthat the subject of nuclear weapons is too complex for them to think about
and should therefore be left "to the President and to the experts." Demographically, they are the least
well educated of the four groups, disproportionately Democratic but not liberal.
A profile of ambivalent American attitudes toward the Soviet Union can be seen gra phically
in the following table. It summarizes both the positive and negative attitudes toward the Soviet
Union and toward communism as an ideology.
AMBIVALENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM*
Negative Views % Agree % Disagree
"During the 1970s,when we were trying to

improve relations,the Soviets secretly builtup
their military strength"**
90 6
"The Soviets are constantly testing us,probing for weaknesses,and
they're quick to take advantage wheneverthey find any"**
82 14
"The Soviets treatour friendly gestures as weaknesses" ** 73 23
"The Soviets used détenteas an opportunity to build up their armed
forces while lulling us into a false sense of security"***
67 20
"If we are weak,the SovietUnion, at the right moment,will attack
us or our allies in Europe and Japan" * * *
65 27
"The Soviets only respondto military strength"***61 34
"The Soviets lie, cheatand steal—do anything to further the cause
of communism"***
61 28
"The Soviets have cheated on justaboutevery treaty and
agreementthey've eversigned"***
61 24
"In pastagreementsbetweenthe US and the Soviet Union, the
Soviets almostalways got the better part of the bargain"***
58 31
"Wheneverthere'strouble in the world—in the Middle East,
CentralAmerica,or anywhere else—chances are the Soviets are
behind it"***
56 38
The Public Mood:Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R. 8
More AcceptingViews %
Agree
%
Disagree
"The Russian people are notnearly as hostile to the US as their
leaders are and,in fact, the Russians could be our friends if their
leaders had a differentattitude"**
88 6
"The US has to acceptsome of the blame for the tension that has
plagued U.S.-Sovietrelations in recentyears"***
76 16

"You can'tunderstandhow the Russians behave withoutrealizing
that their homeland has been invaded many,many times. They are
obsessed with their own military security"***
75 19
"The idea that the Soviets are the cause of all the world's troublesis
a dangerousoversimplification" * * *
70 26
"The US often blames the Soviets for troubles in other countries
that are really causedby poverty,hunger,political corruptionand
repression" * * *
68 26
"Just 40 years ago,the Germans invadedthe Soviet Union and
killed millions of Russian citizens.It's perfectly understandable
why they oppose our putting nuclearmissiles on German soil"***
58 35
"The Sovietleadersbelieve thatPresidentReagan is trying to
humiliate them, and this is not a good climate for negotiating on
matters of life and death"***
51 40
"The degree to which the Soviets cheaton arms controlis
overstated by Americans who oppose negotiatingwith them in the
first place"***
44 41
# Totals do not add to 100% because"Not Sure" responses are omitted
** Time/Yankelovich,Skelly and White, 1983
*** Public Agenda,1984
There is somewhat of a generation gap on attitudes toward the Soviets, with older Americans
expressing more suspicion of and hostility toward Soviet motives and actions than younger
Americans. For example, 76 percent of those over 60 agree that the Soviets lie, cheat and steal —do
anything to further the cause of communism—compared to 52 percent among those under 30. More
older than younger Americans also believe that the Soviets cheat on treaties and agreements(76
percent to 49 percent). On the other hand, young Americans, perhaps more skeptical of authority to
begin with, believe the degree of Soviet cheating is overstated by those who oppose negotiating with
them in the first place. (Fifty-nine percent of those under 30 express such a view, compared to only
32 percent among those over 60.)
V
Such is the nature of public ambivalence toward the Soviet Union that it dooms to failure any
one-dimensional policy that appealsexclusively to one side of public attitudes. A policy of undiluted
anti-communism that emphasizes only the negatives cannot hope to win solid majority support. The
time is past when successful candidates can simply run against the Politburo. Similarly, a onedimensional
policy of détente—if détente is interpreted as it was in the 1970s, as "making friends"

with the Russians—cannot win solid majority support either.
No amount of public opinion analysis can fashion the correct policy. What opinion polls can
reveal, however, and what we propose to describe are the boundaries or constraints which the
public's thinking imposes on policy. To sustain a complex and difficult policy, one that may call for
public sacrifice, restraint and understanding, it is prudent to seek to win solid and lasting support
from the electorate. Our analysis of opinion data suggests that to achieve such support in today's
climate, such a policy would have to be conceived within the following guidelines:
1. The United States must not adopt any policy that the majority of Americans will
perceive as "losing the arms race."
Most Americans believe that the United States cannot regain nuclear superiority, that the
arms race cannot be won, and that we can never return to a time when our nuclear monopoly gave us
a sense of nearly total security. People are nearly unanimous in the view that if we had a bigger
nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92 percent).
By nearly eight to one (84 percent), the public opposes the idea of building new weaponsto use as
"bargaining chips" to get concessions in negotiations.
But, in spite of the feeling that we can never "win" the arms race, Americans are afraid we
could "lose" it. Nearly six in ten (57 percent) say we must continue to develop new and better
nuclear weapons so as not to lose the arms race. A particular concern fueling this sentiment is the
fear that "technological breakthroughs" could make the weapons we now have obsolete (71 percent).
2. Americans are convinced that it is time for negotiations, not confrontations, with the
Soviets.
Following from the view that nuclear weaponscan never be abolished and that the arms race
cannot be won, Americans see only one way to reduce the risk of nuclear war—through
negotiations. Americans overwhelmingly concur that "picking a fight" with the Soviet Union is too
dangerous in a nuclear world, that we should be thinking of peaceful solutions (96 percent).
Americans feel that the Soviets are as afraid of nuclear war as we are (94 percent) and that it is in
our mutual interest to find ways to negotiate to reduce the risk of war.
Some people see a most ominous trend: that we and the Soviets are drifting toward
catastrophe. Sixty-eight percent of Americans feel that if we and the Soviets keep building nuclear
weaponsinstead of negotiating to get rid of them, "it's only a matter of time before they are used."
This concern is especially pronounced among women (75 percent) and those under 30 (78 percent).
By 50 percent to 22 percent, people say the United States would be safer if we spent less time and
effort building up our military forces and more on negotiating with the Soviets. Again, women and
younger Americans agree even more strongly. The idea of building more dangerous nuclear weapons
to get the Soviets to make concessions on arms control is rejected by a margin of 62 percent to 31
percent. Half the public fears that President Reagan is playing nuclear "chicken" with the Soviets (50
percent).
3. The dominant attitude of Americans is that of "live-and-let-live" pragmatism, not an
anti-Communist crusade, nor a strong desire to reform the Russians.
Americans say that peacefully coexisting with communist countries is something we do all
the time (71 percent). And by a margin of 67 percent to 28 percent, people agree that we should let
the communists have their system while we have ours, that "there's room in the world for both."
A solid majority also feels no strong desire to involve the United States in reforming the
Soviet Union. Nearly six in ten (58 percent) agree that we've been trying to change Soviet behavior
for 60 years, and that it is time we stopped trying to do so. By a margin of 59 percent to 19 percent,
Americans also say we would be better off if we stopped treating the Soviets as enemies and tried to
hammer out our differences in a live-and-let-live spirit. And, by a margin of 53 percent to 22
percent, Americans feel that the United States would be safer if we stopped trying to prevent the
spread of communism to other countries, and learned to live with them the way we live with China
and Yugoslavia.
4. A national reconsideration of the strategic role for nuclear weaponsis badly needed.
Our present policies are almost universally misunderstood. More than eight out of ten
Americans (81 percent) believe it is our current policy to use nuclear weapons "if and only if" our

adversaries use them against us first. Almost the same massive majority believesthat this is what our
national policy should be. Only 18 percent agree that we should use nuclear weapons against a
conventional Soviet attack in Europe or Japan; and more than three out of four (76 percent) agree
that we should use nuclear weaponsif, and only if, the Soviets use them against our alliesfirst.
At the same time, however, the public holds many other attitudes that are actually or
potentially in conflict with this majority position. Only a third of all Americans (33 percent) know
that nuclear weapons are less expensive than conventional forces. At the same time, substantial
majorities(66 percent) say that they would be willing to pay higher taxes for defense if we and the
Soviets reduced our nuclear weapons and replaced them with non-nuclear forces.
More important than economic arguments is the concern of the majority, summarized above,
that we not "lose" the arms race by falling behind the Soviets in technology or weapons. There is
also great reluctance to appear "weak" in Soviet eyes, since the public is persuaded that the Soviets
interpret conciliatory gestures on our part as signs of weakness.
In brief, Americans fear that the danger of nuclear war has seriously weakened our security.
They also realize that the present standoff between us and the Soviets excludes the use of nuclear
weaponsas an option for achieving policy goals. But they have not yet thought through the strategic
and policy implications of this awesome change in the rules. Their present preferences are clear: to
move toward less rather than greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
5. Finally, Americans are prepared—somewhat nervously—to take certain risks for
peace.
So dangerous is the present situation, and so gravely does it threaten our security, that the
public feels it is time to change course and, in doing so, to take some initiatives in the cause of
peace.
The idea of a bilateral and verifiable nuclear freeze hasbeen supported by upwards of 75
percent of the public for several years. But beyond a freeze, majoritiesa lso endorse other strategies
containing an explicit element of risk. For example, a 61-percent majority favors the idea of
declaring a unilateral six-month freeze on nuclear weapons development to see if the Soviets will
follow suit, even if they might take advantage of it; 56 percent favor signing an arms control
agreement with the Soviets, even if foolproof verification cannot be guaranteed. Finally, 55 percent
favor expanding trade with the Soviets and making other cooperative gestures, even if that makes
them stronger and more secure.
In sum, a fair conclusion from the variety of surveys and interviews is that the American
electorate wants to reverse the present trend toward relying ever more heavily on nuclear weaponsto
achieve the nation's military and political objectives. The public finds the long-term risks of
continuing the way we are going to be simply unacceptable.
much, much more at:
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/160350852/RU...PROPHECIES
http://www.reactorbreach.com/showthread.php?tid=1989&pid=8044#pid8044
New Lies for Old by Anatoliy Golitsyn, 1984
http://www.spiritoftruth.org/newlies4old.pdf

Nuclear War Survival Skills NP
http://www.nukepills.com/nuclear-war-survival-skills-pdf-download/
WE WILL BURY YOU
http://www.spiritoftruth.org/We_Will_Bury_You.pdf
The Perestroika Deception
http://www.spiritoftruth.org/The_Perestroika_Deception.pdf
The Spirit Of Truth Blog- An Historical Epiphany- Russia's Lying To This World
Jesus said to them, "If God were your Father, you would love me, for I have come here
from God. I have not come on my own; God sent me. Why is my language not clear to
you? Because you are unable to hear what I say. You belong to your father, the devil,
and you want to carry out your father’s desires. He was a murderer from the beginning,
not holding to the truth, for there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks his native
language, for he is a liar and the father of lies. Yet because I tell the truth, you do not
believe me!" [John 8:42-45]
The site of Jesus’ baptism by John the Baptist opened to the public after 42 years this
week:
After 42 years as a closed military zone, the site where John baptized Jesus along the
shores of the Jordan River will permanently open to the public with a special ceremony
on January 18.
Guess who showed up to be baptized at the historic site by the waters of the Jordan
River?
Why...Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, of course!

The Russian media says President Dmitry Medvedev has taken a dip in the Jordan
River in commemoration of Jesus' baptism.
RIA Novosti and ITAR-Tass say Medvedev was dunked three times - in line with
Orthodox tradition - at a site in western Jordan where Jesus is said to have been
baptized by John the Baptist. [Yahoo News]
What was the occasion?
The Orthodox Epiphany that commemorates when Jesus was baptized in those very
same waters some 2000 years ago:
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev took an Epiphany dip in the holy waters of the
Jordan River on Wednesday.
Epiphany, also know as Theophany, is one of the Great Christian Feasts. The Russian
Orthodox Church celebrates it on January 19 in line with the Julian calendar.
The Russian leader visited a Russian Orthodox center for pilgrims, currently being
built near the area where Jesus Christ is believed to have been baptized by John the
Baptist.
"Visiting the Jordan River on Epiphany Day is a great joy for any Orthodox believer. I'm
convinced that the hotel will soon take in its first pilgrims. Happy holiday," Medvedev
wrote in the guest book. [Ria Novosti]
On January 19th, the Russian Orthodox Church celebrates Epiphany.
Epiphany is one of the main Christian holidays, one of twelve, which is celebrated and
has been since the first ages of Christianity. On this day, Our Lord Jesus Christ was
baptized in the River Jordan.
The Gospels say that St. John the Baptist, also known as John the Forerunner, who
started the practice of baptizing people, received a revelation that the Savior of
mankind would come to him to be baptized. Several days later, Jesus Christ came to
him. When Jesus was baptized, the Holy Spirit in the image of a dove descended on
Him, and John heard the voice of God the Father: “This is My beloved Son, in Whom I
am well pleased”.

“Christ’s mission was to deify man’s nature – and to sanctify the whole world. By
receiving baptism in the River Jordan, He sanctified the water element – and thus the
whole of nature,” said Archbishop of Egoryevsk Marc. [Voice Of Russia]
Why is it that the formerly atheistic, KGB Kremlin elite are "finding God"?
How about because THEY THINK THEY EFFECTIVELY ARE GOD and believe
themselves to be the ultimate AUTHORity in human HIStory!
"History is a capricious creature. It depends on who writes it." - Mikhail Gorbachev
Notably, the Wikipedia entry for "epiphany" states:
An epiphany (from the ancient Greek epiphaneia, "manifestation, striking appearance")
is the sudden realization or comprehension of the (larger) essence or meaning of
something. The term is used in either a philosophical or literal sense to signify that the
claimant has "found the last piece of the puzzle and now sees the whole picture," or
has new information or experience, often insignificant by itself, that illuminates a
deeper or numinous foundational frame of reference.
Here's an historical 'epiphany' for you.
I've been trying to warn this world for almost 20 years now about the evil intentions of
the "Old Enemy".
Russia's ruling elite did away with their false and failing ideological front of
Communism to replace it with a 'new lie for old':
CHRISTIANITY!
The Kremlin, deluded by its historical messianic complex, is implementing a multi-year
apocalyptic plan, in concert with common allies, to "save" the world from the sinful,
materialistic West and evil, "Zionist" Jews via historically unprecedented mass deceit
and murder.
I'm here trying to save you from this absurd historical lie. Hence, the "Apocalypse":

An Apocalypse (Greek: apokálypsis; "lifting of the veil" or "revelation") is a disclosure
of something hidden from the majority of mankind in an era dominated by falsehood
and misconception, i.e. the veil to be lifted.
The term also can refer to the eschatological final battle, the Armageddon, and the idea
of an end of the world. In Christianity The Apocalypse of John is the Book of
Revelation, the last book of the Christian Bible.
The Man of Lawlessness
Concerning the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and our being gathered to him, we
ask you, brothers, not to become easily unsettled or alarmed by some prophecy, report
or letter supposed to have come from us, saying that the day of the Lord has already
come. Don’t let anyone deceive you in any way, for [that day will not come] until the
rebellion occurs and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the man doomed to
destruction. He will oppose and will exalt himself over everything that is called God or
is worshiped, so that he sets himself up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be
God.
Don’t you remember that when I was with you I used to tell you these things? And now
you know what is holding him back, so that he may be revealed at the proper time. For
the secret power of lawlessness is already at work; but the one who now holds it back
will continue to do so till he is taken out of the way. And then the lawless one will be
revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will overthrow with the breath of his mouth and destroy
by the splendor of his coming. The coming of the lawless one will be in accordance
with the work of Satan displayed in all kinds of counterfeit miracles, signs and
wonders, and in every sort of evil that deceives those who are perishing. They perish
because they refused to love the truth and so be saved. For this reason God sends
them a powerful delusion so that they will believe the lie and so that all will be
condemned who have not believed the truth but have delighted in wickedness. [2
Thessalonians 2]
http://thespiritoftruth.blogspot.com/2011/01/historical-epiphany-russias-lying-to.html

Russia's Secret War Plans
"America will be totally destroyed." - Col. Stanislav Lunev
Westerners, for the most part, continue to take news regarding Russia, China, North
Korea, Georgia, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. at face value. This self-deluding
needs to stop if the free world is to have any chance of survival.
Defectors from Russia and former Soviet states have long been warning the West that
it is being duped into defeat:
One of the most remarkable defectors in this regard is Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the
highest-ranking defector from Russia's military intelligence services, the GRU. In 2001,
Lunev was interviewed by NewsMax.com and HERE IS A CRITICAL EXCERPT THAT
EVERYONE SHOULD LISTEN TO VERY CLOSELY (full interview). Russia is pursuing
an all-out third world war against the West in a necessarily secretive way, and it
appears Moscow's plans are nearing a violent phase. (READ ABOUT RUSSIA'S
SECRET NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING BUNKER.)
At the current juncture, multiple critical flashpoints are heating up to a potentially
explosive level: North Korea vs. South Korea, Israel vs. Iran, Georgia vs. Russia, etc.
Regarding North Korea's recent provocations, just keep in mind the following key
facts:
Today, China supplies about 90% of North Korea's oil, 80% of its consumer goods and
45% of its food. Beijing is Pyongyang's only formal military ally and its primary backer
in the United Nations Security Council and other diplomatic forums. If it weren't for the
Chinese, there would be no North Korean missile program, no North Korean nuclear
program and no North Korea. (Forbes)
Pyongyang would not be testing nukes and/or otherwise provoking a confrontation
with the West unless it has at least tacit approval from Beijing. The threat of China
applying what would effectively be strangling economic sanctions means that North

Korea's behavior is shaped by Chinese policy toward its Stalinist neighbor. So the real
question here is not what the supposed madman, Kim Jong Il, is up to....but rather
what is China up to?
"U.S. policy for dealing with the North Korean situation is inadequate because it
focuses on North Korea in isolation as a rogue state, and naively seeks help from the
Russians and Chinese to solve the problem. The North Korea situation and any future
nuclear incident, wherever it occurs, must be seen against the background of Sino-
Soviet 'convergence' strategy: the interaction of Russian and Chinese policy and the
moves they make to derive strategic gains from critical situations should be closely
studied."
- Anatoliy Golitsyn, the highest ranking KGB defector to the West, The Perestroika
Deception, 1990, p.46
China operates in concert with Russia (especially with regard to the North Korean
puppet state that was originally established by Russia after World War Two), and
Russia shapes history according to astrology similar to the occult practices of Hitler's
Germany in waging World War Two.
"Astrology is a quite serious science. It helps us launch spacecraft, missiles; we use it
broadly to forestall suicides among the personnel. Experience shows it is
unreasonable to reject it. Our estimates and forecasts are usually corroborated up to
70-75 percent." - Viktor Yakovlev, Commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
"Believe it or not, every three months a summary of astrological prognoses predicting
the place and date of future extraordinary occurrences is sent from the St. Petersburg
Naval Scientific Research Institute to the Russian Defense Ministry's General Staff." -
Komsomolskaya Pravda; January 21, 1998
Note that the first of a triple conjunction between Jupiter and Neptune just occurred.
This is more rare than I had thought, last occurring in 1971. The last time a triple
conjunction occurred involving outer planets was 1993. With the third Saturn-Neptune
conjunction in 1989, the Berlin Wall came down as the staged "Velvet Revolutions"
took place in Eastern Europe.
Notably, when the Berlin Wall came down, a major phase of "peaceful" convergence
between East and West, Communism and Capitalism, got underway.

Korea's DMZ constitutes the final Cold War "battleline" between world Communism
and Capitalism, East and West.
With this week's conjunction of Jupiter and Neptune, North Korea carried out an
underground test of an atomic bomb the size of the ones dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and test launched medium range ballistic missiles stirring regional tensions.
Should North Korea go back to war with South Korea, a major phase of "violent"
convergence between East and West will be underway. That a new Korean conflict,
potentially involving nuclear weapons, may be in the works is suggested by concerns
of Russian officials:
In Moscow, news agencies quoted an official as saying that Russia is taking
precautionary security measures because it fears tensions over the test could lead to
nuclear war. (Reuters)
Russian intelligence agencies received task to thoroughly monitor developments in
Korean peninsula
Russia has revealed an unprecedented level of concern over Pyongyang's increasing
belligerence and is taking security measures as a precaution against the possibility
that tension over North Korea could escalate into nuclear war, The Moscow Times
reports, referring to unidentified officials. Sensitive political decisions taken by
Moscow are traditionally revealed by anonymous officials through Russian news
agencies.
A security source told news agency Interfax that the standoff triggered by Pyongyang's
recent nuclear test could affect the security of Russia's far eastern regions, which
border North Korea. "The need has emerged for an appropriate package of
precautionary measures," the paper cites the unidentified source. "We are not talking
about stepping up military efforts but rather about measures in case a military conflict,
perhaps with the use of nuclear weapons, flares up on the Korean peninsula." The
official did not elaborate further, The Moscow Times notes.
Radio Ekho Moskvy reported earlier this week that Russian intelligence agencies had
received task to thoroughly monitor developments in the Korean peninsula and to
report immediately on changes of situation. (Axis News)

All said and done, the megolamaniacal totalitarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing
continue to tailor world history toward an apocalyptic world war with great success
because the West is wholly deluded and unaware of the secret war plan unfolding.
As long as people fail to think for themselves and no one calls these evildoers to
account for their occultic machinations against humanity, then the free world
ultimately will be subject to the fate of the North Korean people:
When will people make a stand against 'The Old Enemy'?
The Soviets never start a war. By definition, the United States or, more generally
speaking, "imperialism is the source of all antagonistic conflicts of the present day
world, the source of war danger." [General Major A.S. Milovidov, quoted in Soviet
Strategy For Nuclear War, p.98]
Speaking of the surprise unleashing of a nuclear war, the following should be noted.
Recently the command element of the U.S. army, evidently, does not exclude the
possibility of opening military operations even in the main theaters with the use of just
conventional means of destruction. Such a beginning of war can create favorable
conditions for the movement of all nuclear forces to the regions of combat operations,
bringing them into the highest level of combat readiness, and subsequently inflicting
the first nuclear strike with the employment in it of the maximum number of missile
launch sites, submarines and aircraft at the most favorable moment.
One of the advantages the Soviets see of the conventional phase is the possibility that
it provides cover to operations to initiate a nuclear attack, preparations that might
otherwise be detected and provide warning. The notion of striking at "the most
favorable moment" included in this quote is often encountered in Soviet military
literature, especially in regard to surprise attack. [From Soviet Strategy For Nuclear
War, p.103]
"We believe that the main determinant in the attack is the most decisive operation
possible, having for its purpose the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and
particularly the destruction of his nuclear weapons; that is, the achievement of results
such that he would no longer be capable of offering further resistance within the limits

of missions being carried out, or which would be needed for general capitulation. In
the past this aim was possible of achievement only with the successive forward
movement of land forces (or the enemy) to close with the enemy and to destroy his
firepower. In the modern attack, when the mission of destruction can be accomplished
by nuclear strikes, made at any depth, practically speaking, forward movement
becomes a secondary item. It is not even necessary in certain cases. The situation can
arise, for example, when the enemy, as a result of the massive nuclear strikes inflicted
upon him, such strikes being the main part of the attack, capitulates and peace-loving
forces accede to political power in his country..." [Lt. Gen. G. Lobov, as quoted in
Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War, p.26]
"In view of the immense destructive force of nuclear weapons and the extremely
limited time available to take effective counter-measures after an enemy launches its
missiles, the launching of the first massed nuclear attack acquires decisive importance
for achieving the objectives of war." [K. Moskalenko, Marshal of the Soviet Union, as
quoted in Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War, p.36]
"Today's weapons make it possible to achieve strategic objectives very quickly. The
very first nuclear attack on the enemy may inflict such immense casualties and
produce such vast destruction that his economic, moral-political and military
capabilities will collapse, making it impossible for him to continue to struggle, and
presenting him with the fact of defeat." [Colonel M.P. Skirdo, as quoted in Soviet
Strategy For Nuclear War, p.17]
"There is profound error and harm in the disoriented claims of bourgeois ideologues
that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear war." [A.S. Milovidov, Russian Military
Theorist, as quoted in Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War, p.10]
http://thespiritoftruth.blogspot.com/2009/05/russias-secret-war-plans.html
Robert Parry: Fake Evidence BlamingRussia
For MH17?

Click on image for article.
 Robert Parry: Fake Evidence Blaming Russia For MH17?
by Robert Parry, via http://thenewsdoctors.com/
Exclusive: Pointing the finger of blame at Russian President Putin for the Malaysia Airlines shoot -down last

July, an Australian news show claims to have found the spot where the Russian BUK missile battery made its
getaway, but the images don’t match, raising questions of journalistic fakery, writes Robert Parry.
–
TND Guest Contributor: Robert Parry
–
An Australian television show claims to have solved the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shoot -down mystery – the
Russians did it! – but the program appears to have faked a key piece of evidence and there remain many of the
same doubts as before, along with the dog-not-barking question of why the U.S. government has withheld its
intelligence data.
–
The basic point of the Australian “60 Minutes” program was that photographs on social media show what some
believe to be a BUK anti-aircraft launcher aboard a truck traveling eastward on July 17, 2014, the day of the
shoot-down, into what was generally considered rebel-controlled territory of eastern Ukraine, south and east
of Donetsk, the capital of one of the ethnic Russian rebellious provinces.
–
Citing one image, the program’s narrator says the “launcher is heading east further into rebel territory,” south
and east of Donetsk.
–
However, in mid-July, the ethnic Russian rebels were reeling under a Ukrainian military offensive to the north
of Donetsk. Despite shifting their forces into the battle zone, they had lost Sloviansk, Druzhkivka,
Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk. In other words, the lines of control were fluid and chaotic in mid-July 2014
with the possibility that an unmarked Ukrainian government truck, maybe carrying a concealed anti-aircraft
battery, could have moved into the titular rebel zone, especially in the lightly defended south.
–
Another problem with the Australian TV account is that the video and photographic images show the truck
heading eastward toward Russia, but there are no earlier images of the truck moving westward from Russia
into eastern Ukraine. If the mysterious truck was supposedly so obvious on the day of the shoot-down, why
wasn’t it obvious earlier?
–
For the Australian TV account to be true – blaming the Russians – the launcher would have to have crossed
from Russia into Ukraine, traveled somewhere west of Donetsk, before turning around and heading eastward
back toward Russia, yet the trail seems to begin only with photos on July 17 showing the truck headed east.
–
Indeed, I was told shortly after the MH-17 crash, which killed 298 people including Australians, that one of the
problems that U.S. intelligence analysts were having in pinning the blame on the Russians was that they could
not find evidence that the Russians had delivered a BUK missile system to the rebels who – until then – were
known only to have short-range Manpads incapable of reaching MH-17 flying at around 33,000 feet.
–
read more.

Click on image for article.
end
May 21, 2015 Posted by mosesman | GeoPolitics
| Illuminati, Russia, US, War, New_World_Order, MSM, propaganda,Terrorism, Ukraine, NAT
O, genocide, Fraud, Psyop, Australia, Crime, Malaysia, Europe | Leave a comment
https://socioecohistory.wordpress.com/tag/propaganda/
The Communist Long Range Strategy (re titled to match the front page)
Author Message
Guest
Guest
Post: #1
The Communist Long Range Strategy (re titled to match the front page)
Please allow me to open a new thread on this, even though I already posted this as a
reply to the Fulford thread, as most will not see my reply somewhere burried on this
forum.
---> I think it is important to bring back to our memories what kind of stuff Fulford has written
when he entered the "alternative media" stage via Henry Makow
Hello folks,

I personally dont understand how Jim considers this Fulford guy as a valuable "truth"
source.
He used to write on henrymakow.com, talking about an ultimatum that he, as the
speaker of some mega powerful asian/chinese killer gang, was conveying an ultimatum
to the illuminati and the Rockefellers in the name of those Chinese/ asian gangs: stop
screwing the world or they would kill every day a major illuminati member or stuff like
that.
I mean the whole thing already sounded so stupid.
But I guess Henry let him write his stuff - benefit of the doubt, I guess.
But when Fulford then sent Henry a photo showing him standing next to David Rockefeller, Henry
dropped Fulford as a disinfo agent, I assume.
Here is the link to the makow article with the photo:
Fulford next to Rockefeller on Makow
(does anybody know how to insert photos from my computer??)
Makow rightly asks:
is that the face of someone waiting with an ultimatum for Rockefeller to either get Rockefeller to
stop ruining the world or he will be killed by chinese or asian gangs, ...or someone who stands next
to his hero?
Naturally Fulford, assuming he is a disinfo agent, will here and then come with some interesting
information. That is the way they work.
--> check ou Pg 93 on Golitsyns book "New lies for old" for some details on the Soviet "new
methodology" on disinformation
But the intent(ion) of releasing so called "secondary secrets" is to lead us the wrong way with the
stuff that he publishes along with it.
Greetings Alex
P.S.: your are a cool guy, Jim. I loved ut fuku article.
Here is a map on what the russian onslaught onto Europe will look like, based to KGB
defectors like Sejna and other Documents:
Russias / USSR military strategy for Europe
(This post was last modified: 12-04-2014 10:57 PM by Phoenix.)
12-04-2014 04:49 AM
guest
Guest
Post: #2
request for account
oh, one more thing
How can I get an account, please.

I had once made one by the name of "Tabui" but then forgot to
activate it.
Could you please reactivate my account for me Jim, thanks
12-04-2014 04:55 AM
donQuixote
Knight of windmills
Posts: 919
Joined: Oct 2014
Post: #3
RE: FULFORD
Thanks @Tabui for your Fulford thread.
I may be wrong here, but I think that what you say is that :
Fulford is proven disinfo.
The truth is as one sees it and you have the right to your own brand of truth as anyone else, and
we can remain friends as long as nobody pushes his credo on anyone else.
In contrast, my belief here is that :
- Fulford does connects some dots that managed to escape my attention and therefore I benefit
from this heads-up.
- and there are many people that "enter" our somewhat awaken state trough
Fulford's connection and he is definitely doing this con brio.
I believe therefore that Fulford is useful to all of us here, regardless where his true place is in the
bigger scheme of things (no reliable way to decide here, the evidences are circumstantial and
sketchy at best) and/or our perception of where this place may be.
Who will take any MSM spewing sewage sycophant over an Icke, Fulford, or Wilkock ?
If one say : " But they derail the movement !"
I'll simply ask : "What movement ?"
To "move" you need a critical number of activists/agents of change and Fulford provides this
service however unreliable or off the mark his reports are being perceived by you (me, anyone).
Who fears Fulford, who wants him discredited and ousted are exactly those that have everything
to lose from the the World reaching the above mentioned "critical mass" of clued people
That's why we tamper here any and all attempts to marginalize those that are the "power
houses" of spreading, one way or another, the message that MSM avoids like the plague :
"This World is screwed at the hands of a psychopathic and murderous bunch of gangsters bent
on our destruction !"

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