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© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Ben Potter
Security Lead, Well-Architected, Amazon Web Services
Deenadayaalan Thirugnanasambandam
Cloud Architect, Amazon Web Services
Automating Incident Response
And Forensics In AWS
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
What To Expect
Where to Start
The Insider
The Instance
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Meet Bob
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Bob
Responsibilities:
• Security lead for DevOps team
• Identify security issues
• First level response
• Prevention
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Bob’s Interesting Experiences
1st IAM denied attempts
2nd Instance compromised
Going to talk about !
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Where To Start
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
NIST 800-61 Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide
Preparation
Detection &
Analysis
Containment,
Eradication,
and Recovery
Post-Incident
Activity
http://bit.ly/2pGqOs6
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
I’ve used these
https://aws.amazon.com/security/
http://aws.amazon.com/well-architected/
http://bit.ly/2pFqBW4
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
I’ve used these
http://bit.ly/2ITNuxF
https://www.sleuthkit.org/
http://bit.ly/2G6oZPY
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
All Code From Session
https://github.com/awslabs/aws-security-automation
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
AWS Well-Architected
• Design Principles
• Implement a strong identity foundation
• Enable traceability
• Apply security at all layers
• Automate security best practices
• Protect data in transit and at rest
• Prepare for security events
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Honeypot Or Indicators?
Honeypot is a deliberately misconfigured system
Indicators:
• Denies in AWS CloudTrail
• Denies to access Amazon S3 buckets
• Denies in Amazon VPC Flowlogs
• Abnormal behaviour
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
This Is What I Put In Place
• Enabled logging and security services
• AWS CloudTrail
• Amazon GuardDuty
• AWS Config
• Amazon VPC Flow Logs
• App & System Logs in Amazon CloudWatch Logs
• Started with most likely scenarios
?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
The Insider
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
How I’m Going To Detect Trudy
• Notified on access denied attempt
• Who attempted from where?
• What user / role was denied?
• History of the user / role?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
IAM Access Denied Responder
Lambda:
Publish
Access
Denied
Topic:
Access
Denied
Lambda:
Publish User
Trails
Topic:
Security
Message
Lambda:
Publish IAM
User History
Slack
CloudWatch
Event
AWS
CloudTrail
Lambda:
Publish
Slack
Lambda:
Publish
Chime
Amazon
Chime
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Alert!
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Demo
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
What I Learnt
• Automation is AWSome
• It saved me a lot of time
• IAM users should assume IAM roles with MFA enforced
• How can we improve?
• P4wned ex-employee Trudy … LOL
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
The Instance
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
EC2 Auto Clean Room Forensics
Topic:
Instance ID
Step Function:
Incident Response
Instance
Isolate
Instance SG2:
Remove
Auto Scaling
(+logic)
Snapshot
Volumes
Record
Metadata
Apply
Tags1: Notify
CloudFormation:
Clean Room
Create
Cleanroom3:
Run Basic
Forensics4:
Generate
Report5: Topic:
Forensics Report
Slack
Topic:
Instance
Incident
Verify
Instance
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oh No
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Thank You!
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Demo
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
What We Achieved
• No human interaction needed for isolation & investigation
• I was automatically given basic forensic info
• I have a mechanism to compare
• A security system didn’t break anything
And then?
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Lessons I (Bob) Learnt
• Incidents are always badly timed
• Security incidents can cause long term damage
• Prepare for an incident before it’s too late
• Practice through game days
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Always Stay Up To Date
Keep an eye on the security blog…
http://blogs.aws.amazon.com/security
© 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Thank You

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Automating Incident Response and Forensics in AWS - AWS Summit Sydney 2018

  • 1. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Ben Potter Security Lead, Well-Architected, Amazon Web Services Deenadayaalan Thirugnanasambandam Cloud Architect, Amazon Web Services Automating Incident Response And Forensics In AWS
  • 2. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What To Expect Where to Start The Insider The Instance ?
  • 3. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Meet Bob
  • 4. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Bob Responsibilities: • Security lead for DevOps team • Identify security issues • First level response • Prevention
  • 5. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Bob’s Interesting Experiences 1st IAM denied attempts 2nd Instance compromised Going to talk about !
  • 6. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Where To Start ?
  • 7. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. NIST 800-61 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide Preparation Detection & Analysis Containment, Eradication, and Recovery Post-Incident Activity http://bit.ly/2pGqOs6 ?
  • 8. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. I’ve used these https://aws.amazon.com/security/ http://aws.amazon.com/well-architected/ http://bit.ly/2pFqBW4 ?
  • 9. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. I’ve used these http://bit.ly/2ITNuxF https://www.sleuthkit.org/ http://bit.ly/2G6oZPY ?
  • 10. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. All Code From Session https://github.com/awslabs/aws-security-automation ?
  • 11. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. AWS Well-Architected • Design Principles • Implement a strong identity foundation • Enable traceability • Apply security at all layers • Automate security best practices • Protect data in transit and at rest • Prepare for security events ?
  • 12. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Honeypot Or Indicators? Honeypot is a deliberately misconfigured system Indicators: • Denies in AWS CloudTrail • Denies to access Amazon S3 buckets • Denies in Amazon VPC Flowlogs • Abnormal behaviour ?
  • 13. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This Is What I Put In Place • Enabled logging and security services • AWS CloudTrail • Amazon GuardDuty • AWS Config • Amazon VPC Flow Logs • App & System Logs in Amazon CloudWatch Logs • Started with most likely scenarios ?
  • 14. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. The Insider
  • 15. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. How I’m Going To Detect Trudy • Notified on access denied attempt • Who attempted from where? • What user / role was denied? • History of the user / role?
  • 16. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. IAM Access Denied Responder Lambda: Publish Access Denied Topic: Access Denied Lambda: Publish User Trails Topic: Security Message Lambda: Publish IAM User History Slack CloudWatch Event AWS CloudTrail Lambda: Publish Slack Lambda: Publish Chime Amazon Chime
  • 17. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Alert!
  • 18. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Demo
  • 19. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What I Learnt • Automation is AWSome • It saved me a lot of time • IAM users should assume IAM roles with MFA enforced • How can we improve? • P4wned ex-employee Trudy … LOL
  • 20. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. The Instance
  • 21. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. EC2 Auto Clean Room Forensics Topic: Instance ID Step Function: Incident Response Instance Isolate Instance SG2: Remove Auto Scaling (+logic) Snapshot Volumes Record Metadata Apply Tags1: Notify CloudFormation: Clean Room Create Cleanroom3: Run Basic Forensics4: Generate Report5: Topic: Forensics Report Slack Topic: Instance Incident Verify Instance
  • 22. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Oh No
  • 23. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Thank You!
  • 24. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Demo
  • 25. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What We Achieved • No human interaction needed for isolation & investigation • I was automatically given basic forensic info • I have a mechanism to compare • A security system didn’t break anything And then?
  • 26. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Lessons I (Bob) Learnt • Incidents are always badly timed • Security incidents can cause long term damage • Prepare for an incident before it’s too late • Practice through game days
  • 27. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Always Stay Up To Date Keep an eye on the security blog… http://blogs.aws.amazon.com/security
  • 28. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Thank You