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Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Verification and Validation of Robotic Assistants
Clare Dixon
Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool
1 University of Liverpool (UoL)
2 University of Hertfordshire (UoH)
3 Bristol Robotics Lab (BRL)
www.robosafe.org
Farshid Amirabdollahian2
Kerstin Dautenhahn2 Anthony Pipe3
Kerstin Eder3 Maha Salem2
Michael Fisher1 Joe Saunders2
Dejanira Araiza Illan3 Matt Webster1
Kheng Lee Koay2 David Western3
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 1 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Robotic Assistants
Robotic assistants are being developed to
help, or work closely with humans in
industrial, domestic and health care
environments (e.g. RI-MAN, Pearl,
Wakamaru, . . . )
The robots will need to be able to act
autonomously and make decisions to
choose between a range of activities.
In addition they will need to operate close
to, or in collaboration with humans.
How do we make sure they are trustworthy,
safe, reliable and do what they are
supposed to?
Wakamaru image by Nesnad (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL
(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 2 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
What is Trustworthiness and Safety?
Safety involves showing that the robot does nothing that
(unnecessarily) endangers the person.
There are ISO safety requirements and guidelines for
industrial robots (ISO 10218, 2011), personal care robots
(ISO 13482, 2014), and for collaborative robots (ISO
15066, 2016).
Trustworthiness involves social issues beyond pure safety.
It is not just a question of whether the robots are safe but
whether they are perceived to be safe, useful and reliable.
There are also legal (and ethical) issues such as what
happens when
the robot spills a hot drink on someone;
the robot doesn’t remind the person to take their medicine;
the robot doesn’t go to the kitchen when told?
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 3 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Robots in the Workplace and at Home
Currently many robots used in industry or domestic use operate
in limited physical space or have limited functionality. This helps
assure their safety.
Robots’ industrial environments are limited so they can
only move in a fixed area and have limited interactions with
humans e.g. welding or paint spraying robots.
Small or limited capability domestic robots, e.g., vacuum
cleaning robots, robot lawn mowers, pool cleaning robots
etc
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 4 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Trustworthy Robotic Assistants Project
The EPSRC funded Trustworthy Robotic Assistants Project
develops three different approaches to verification and
validation of robotic assistants.
Each approach is aimed at increasing trust in robotic assistants.
Formal Verification (Liverpool)
Simulation-based Testing (Bristol Robotics Laboratory)
End-user Validation (Hertfordshire)
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 5 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Robotic Assistants
We consider two use cases, domestic
and manufacturing.
A personal robot assistant (the Care-
O-bot R
,) located in a domestic house
in the University of Hertfordshire.
A co-operative manufacturing task
with BERT a robot at Bristol Robotics
Lab.
8 Journal Title XX(X)
• System model inaccuracies. All the verification
techniques use models of the real-world. The models
might have been constructed erroneously, or may be
inconsistent with the real world, or relative to one
another.
• Requirement model inaccuracies. In our approach,
the real-world requirements of the system are con-
verted into textual requirements, assertions and prop-
erties for verification. These requirements models
may not have been correctly formulated.
• Tool inaccuracies. It is possible that numerical
approximations affect the verification results. In
addition, third party tools can contain bugs that are
unknown to us.
We could now proceed to perform “Experiments.” As
before, we may find a problem with the textual require-
ments or the physical system during experimentation. At
Figure 2. BERT 2 engaged in the handover task.
robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby object, and holdsClare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 6 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Formal Verification
A mathematical analysis of all behaviours using logics, and
tools such as theorem provers or model checkers.
We focus on temporal verification using automatic tools
and techniques that do not require user interaction.
Model checking is a fully automatic, algorithmic technique
for verifying the temporal properties of systems.
Input to the model checker is a model of the system and a
property to be checked on that model.
Output is that the property is satisfied or a counter
example is given.
Model Checker
Property holds
or
counter example
Property eg
"always p"
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 7 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Robot Architectures and Verification
We assume an architecture where there is a separation
between the high level decision making layer and the low level
control layer.
etc
Control System
Sense and act
High level choices
Rational Agent
Low level control
Decision making
Avoidance
Reactive
Goal selection
Plan selection
Prediction
etc
We aim to represent and verify the decision making layer and
we don’t deal with low level control such as movement etc.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 8 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Simulation Based Testing
This is an exhaustive testing methodology widely used in
the design of micro-electronic and avionics systems.
These appeal to Monte-Carlo techniques and dynamic test
refinement in order to cover a wide range or practical
situations.
Tools are used to automate the testing and analyse the
coverage of the tests.
over Scenario
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 9 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
End User Validation
This approach involves experiments and user evaluations
in practical robotic scenarios.
Scenarios relating to robot human interaction are
developed to test some hypothesis and experiments with
users carried out.
This helps establish whether the human participants
indeed view the robotic assistants as safe and trustworthy.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 10 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Overall Approach
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 11 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
A Domestic Robot Assistant
Here we apply model checking to the
high level behaviours controlling the
(commercially available) Care-O-bot R
,
manufactured by Fraunhofer IPA.
It is based on the concept of a “robot
butler” which has been developed as a
mobile robotic assistant to support
people in domestic environments.
It has a manipulator arm, an articulated
torso, stereo sensors serving as “eyes”,
LED lights, a graphical user interface,
and a moveable tray.
The robot’s sensors monitor its current location, the state
of the arm, torso, eyes and tray.
Its software is based on the Robot Operating System.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 12 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Care-O-bot and Robot House
This is deployed in a domestic-type house (the robot
house) at the University of Hertfordshire.
The robot house is equipped with sensors which provide
information on the state of the house and its occupants,
such as whether the fridge door is open and whether
someone is seated on the sofa.
Low-level robot actions such as movement, speech, light
display, etc., are controlled by groups of high-level rules
that together define particular behaviours. 3
Fig. 2. A plan view of the ground floor of the University of Hertfordshire Robot House. Numbered boxes show the locations of sensors.
models, and their formal verification, are described in
Section IV.
• Figs. 2 and 3 have been added to provide additional
information on the Robot House and the user activity
within it.
move_tray_and_wait(lowered_position)
set_light(white)
wait()
set(tray_is_raised,false)
set(tray_is_lowered,true)Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 13 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Care-O-bot Decision Making: Behaviours
The Care-O-bot’s high-level decision making is determined
by a set of behaviours of the form precondition → action
(each a sequence of rules).
Examples of high-level rules can take the form “lower tray”,
“move to sofa area of the living room”, “say ‘The fridge
door is open’ ”, set a flag, check a sensor etc.
Only one behaviour executes at once.
Each behaviour has a priority (integer between 0 and 90).
Higher priority behaviours are executed in preference to
lower priority behaviours.
Each behaviour is flagged as interruptible or not.
Once it has started executing, a behaviour will execute to
completion, if it is not interruptible.
Users can add new behaviours.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 14 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
The S1-alertFridgeDoor Behaviour
Behaviours (a set of high level rules) take the form:
Precondition-Rules -> Action-Rules
27 Fridge Freezer Is *ON* AND has been ON for more than 30 secs
31 ::514:: GOAL-fridgeUserAlerted is false
32 Turn light on ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to yellow
34 move ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to ::2:: Living Room and wait for
completion
35 Turn light on ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to white and wait for
completion
36 ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 says ‘The fridge door is open!’ and
wait for completion
37 SET ::506::GOAL-gotoCharger TO false
38 SET ::507::GOAL-gotoTable TO false
39 SET ::508::GOAL-gotoSofa TO false
40 ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 GUI, S1-Set-GoToKitchen, S1-Set-WaitHere
41 SET ::514::GOAL-fridgeUserAlerted TO true
Its priority is 60 and it is not interruptible.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 15 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Models and Properties
We need to abstract away from some of the timing details
included in the database to obtain a model that is discrete,
finite and not too large.
We developed a (by hand) model in the input language for
the model checker NuSMV and later developed a tool
(CRutoN) to automatically translate from behaviours to
NuSMV input.
We also need a set of properties of the system to check
over the model.
Ideally these would come from a specification or standards
documents about what is expected of the robot with
respect to functionality, safety etc.
Here we focus on issues relating to the scheduling of
behaviours, priorities and interruptions (which at least
provide a sanity check).
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 16 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Sample Properties and Model Checking Results
1 ((fridge_freezer_on ∧ ¬goal_fridge_user_alerted) ⇒
♦(location = livingroom ∧ ♦say = fridge_door_open))
2 ((fridge_freezer_on ∧ ¬goal_fridge_user_alerted ∧
schedule = schedule_alert_fridge_door) ⇒
♦(location = livingroom ∧ ♦say = fridge_door_open))
Property Output Time (sec)
1 FALSE 11.1
2 TRUE 12.3
The model had 130,593 reachable states.
We did find a small bug in the behaviours (a flag was
wrongly set) but this was by inspection of the behaviours.
It would be better to try properties relating to the
requirements of the robot.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 17 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Discussion
CRutoN allowed us to translate from different databases of
behaviours into input for a model checker, setting
parameters to control particular aspects of the translation.
CRutoN uses an intermediate representation so that input
to different model checkers can potentially be generated.
Understanding the semantics of the robot execution cycle
took a lot of close work and interaction with UoH.
The state explosion problem means we have to find a
balance between the level of detail/abstraction and
verification times (timing details were not well represented).
We could deal better with uncertainty or timing constraints
by applying a different model checker.
The model of a person in the robot house was not
represented but this could be incorporated showing their
location for example.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 18 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Experiments with Trust and Reliability
In the robot house UoH experimented using two scenarios
where the robot appeared faulty or not.
In both scenarios the person was asked to carry out a task with
the robot.
Results suggested that although errors in a robot’s behavior are
likely to affect participant’s perception of its reliability and
trustworthiness, this doesn’t seem to influence their decisions
to comply with instructions (or not).
Their willingness to comply with the
robot’s instructions seem to depend
on the nature if the task, in particular,
whether its effects are irrevocable.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 19 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
The Manufacturing Scenario: Verification
The focus was on a table leg handover task. The gaze, hand
location and hand pressure of the human should be correct
before the handover takes place.
Journal Title XX(X)
All the verification
-world. The models
oneously, or may be
, or relative to one
s. In our approach,
he system are con-
assertions and prop-
quirements models
mulated.
ble that numerical
fication results. In
ontain bugs that are
“Experiments.” As
the textual require-
experimentation. At
formal verification
e compared against
cover that one of the
ed testing or formal
ents. In this case we
assets, as explained
e between the dif-
cover the cause of
isons are indicated
Formal Verification”
ulation-based Test-
Figure 2. BERT 2 engaged in the handover task.
robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby object, and holds
it out to the human. The robot announces that it is ready
to handover. The human responds verbally to indicate that
they are ready to receive. (For practical reasons, human-to-
robot verbal signals were relayed to the robot by a human
operator pressing a key.) Then, the human is expected to
pull gently on the object while looking at it. BERT 2 then
calculates three binary sensor conditions:
• Gaze: The human’s head position and orientation
relative to the object are tracked using the Vicon R
motion-tracking system for an approximate measure
of whether he/she is looking at the object.
11
RobotController_3S
Modelling was carried out using Probabilistic Timed Automata
and verification via the PRISM probabilistic model checker.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 20 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Manufacturing Scenario: Simulation and Experiments
Simulation based testing and real robot experiments (BRL)
12
code to be used in simulation and in the actual robot,
providing consistency between simulations, experiments,
and deployed use. A screenshot of the ROS/Gazebo
simulation can be seen in Figure 5.
For the simulator, additional ROS nodes were con-
structed in Python, to simulate BERT 2’s sensor sys-
tems and embedded actuation controllers. The pre-existing
URDF file describing BERT 2 was extended as described
previously for use in Gazebo. The simulated human
behaviour was controlled by a ROS node written in Python,
driving a simplified physical model of the head and hand.
Figure 5. Screenshot of the simulated handover task. The
human head and hand are represented in orange. The object
to be handed over is shown in blue.
A testbench was incorporated into the simulator. The
testbench comprised a test generator, a driver, a checker
and a coverage collector. Achieving the exploration of
meaningful and interesting sequences of behaviours from
the robot and its environment in an HRI task is a
challenging task. For this reason, we stimulate the robot’s
code in the simulation indirectly through stimulating its
environment (e.g., the person’s behaviour) instead, and we
use a combination of model-based and pseudorandom test
generation. Also, to alleviate the complexity of generating
and timing different types of system inputs, the test
generator is based on a two-tiered approach (Araiza-Illan
et al. 2016) where an abstract test is generated first and
then concretized by instantiating low-level parameters. The
high-level actions of the human in the simulator include
sending signals to the robot, or setting abstract parameters
for gaze, location and pressure. Low-level parameters
include the robot’s initial pose and the poses and force
vectors applied by the human during the interaction. For
example, we computed an abstract test of high-level actions
for the human, by exploring the model in UPPAAL⇤⇤
, so
that the
robot an
pressure
gaze, pr
released
the hum
The
simulato
monitor
describe
Finally,
triggerin
The s
5.2.1
assertio
in Pyth
If the
machine
to deter
postcon
For e
both ini
if (sens
wait
asse
Note th
be diff
same t
misinter
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verified
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5.3.1
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of a sy
unbiase
environ
to repro
safety c
quently,
be inac
such as
⇤⇤http:
††https
Prepared using sagej.cls
We carried out a small user valida-
tion study with 10 participants each
carrying out 10 handover tasks.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 21 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
The Manufacturing Scenario: Discussion
A number of properties checked inspired by the ISO
requirements, e.g. “At least 95% (60%) of handover
attempts should be completed successfully”.
Disagreement between outcomes from some of the
techniques meant further investigation and refinement of
the models was needed:
simulation based testing revealed that the robot sometimes
dropped the table leg accidentally (gripper failure) which
was not modelled in the formal verification;
real experiments revealed false negatives for the pressure
sensor and location sensor (they were wrongly reported as
too low/incorrect hand position) not represented elsewhere.
Some of the techniques were not suitable for verifying
some of the requirements, for example for aspects such as
speed or closeness formal verification may not be the best
technique to use.
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 22 / 23
Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions
Concluding Remarks
We gave an overview to the research carried out on the project
Trustworthy Robotic Assistants and discussed approaches to
trust and safety for robotic assistants.
We advocate the use of a suite of verification and validation
techniques at different levels of abstraction and coverability to
help gain assurance of the robot’s safety, reliability and
functional correctness.
We considered the combination of formal verification (model
checking), simulation-based testing, and user validation in
experiments with real robots in a domestic and collaborative
manufacturing scenario.
Papers available at www.robosafe.org
Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 23 / 23

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Verification and Validation of Robotic Assistants

  • 1. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Verification and Validation of Robotic Assistants Clare Dixon Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool 1 University of Liverpool (UoL) 2 University of Hertfordshire (UoH) 3 Bristol Robotics Lab (BRL) www.robosafe.org Farshid Amirabdollahian2 Kerstin Dautenhahn2 Anthony Pipe3 Kerstin Eder3 Maha Salem2 Michael Fisher1 Joe Saunders2 Dejanira Araiza Illan3 Matt Webster1 Kheng Lee Koay2 David Western3 Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 1 / 23
  • 2. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Robotic Assistants Robotic assistants are being developed to help, or work closely with humans in industrial, domestic and health care environments (e.g. RI-MAN, Pearl, Wakamaru, . . . ) The robots will need to be able to act autonomously and make decisions to choose between a range of activities. In addition they will need to operate close to, or in collaboration with humans. How do we make sure they are trustworthy, safe, reliable and do what they are supposed to? Wakamaru image by Nesnad (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 2 / 23
  • 3. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions What is Trustworthiness and Safety? Safety involves showing that the robot does nothing that (unnecessarily) endangers the person. There are ISO safety requirements and guidelines for industrial robots (ISO 10218, 2011), personal care robots (ISO 13482, 2014), and for collaborative robots (ISO 15066, 2016). Trustworthiness involves social issues beyond pure safety. It is not just a question of whether the robots are safe but whether they are perceived to be safe, useful and reliable. There are also legal (and ethical) issues such as what happens when the robot spills a hot drink on someone; the robot doesn’t remind the person to take their medicine; the robot doesn’t go to the kitchen when told? Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 3 / 23
  • 4. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Robots in the Workplace and at Home Currently many robots used in industry or domestic use operate in limited physical space or have limited functionality. This helps assure their safety. Robots’ industrial environments are limited so they can only move in a fixed area and have limited interactions with humans e.g. welding or paint spraying robots. Small or limited capability domestic robots, e.g., vacuum cleaning robots, robot lawn mowers, pool cleaning robots etc Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 4 / 23
  • 5. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Trustworthy Robotic Assistants Project The EPSRC funded Trustworthy Robotic Assistants Project develops three different approaches to verification and validation of robotic assistants. Each approach is aimed at increasing trust in robotic assistants. Formal Verification (Liverpool) Simulation-based Testing (Bristol Robotics Laboratory) End-user Validation (Hertfordshire) Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 5 / 23
  • 6. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Robotic Assistants We consider two use cases, domestic and manufacturing. A personal robot assistant (the Care- O-bot R ,) located in a domestic house in the University of Hertfordshire. A co-operative manufacturing task with BERT a robot at Bristol Robotics Lab. 8 Journal Title XX(X) • System model inaccuracies. All the verification techniques use models of the real-world. The models might have been constructed erroneously, or may be inconsistent with the real world, or relative to one another. • Requirement model inaccuracies. In our approach, the real-world requirements of the system are con- verted into textual requirements, assertions and prop- erties for verification. These requirements models may not have been correctly formulated. • Tool inaccuracies. It is possible that numerical approximations affect the verification results. In addition, third party tools can contain bugs that are unknown to us. We could now proceed to perform “Experiments.” As before, we may find a problem with the textual require- ments or the physical system during experimentation. At Figure 2. BERT 2 engaged in the handover task. robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby object, and holdsClare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 6 / 23
  • 7. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Formal Verification A mathematical analysis of all behaviours using logics, and tools such as theorem provers or model checkers. We focus on temporal verification using automatic tools and techniques that do not require user interaction. Model checking is a fully automatic, algorithmic technique for verifying the temporal properties of systems. Input to the model checker is a model of the system and a property to be checked on that model. Output is that the property is satisfied or a counter example is given. Model Checker Property holds or counter example Property eg "always p" Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 7 / 23
  • 8. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Robot Architectures and Verification We assume an architecture where there is a separation between the high level decision making layer and the low level control layer. etc Control System Sense and act High level choices Rational Agent Low level control Decision making Avoidance Reactive Goal selection Plan selection Prediction etc We aim to represent and verify the decision making layer and we don’t deal with low level control such as movement etc. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 8 / 23
  • 9. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Simulation Based Testing This is an exhaustive testing methodology widely used in the design of micro-electronic and avionics systems. These appeal to Monte-Carlo techniques and dynamic test refinement in order to cover a wide range or practical situations. Tools are used to automate the testing and analyse the coverage of the tests. over Scenario Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 9 / 23
  • 10. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions End User Validation This approach involves experiments and user evaluations in practical robotic scenarios. Scenarios relating to robot human interaction are developed to test some hypothesis and experiments with users carried out. This helps establish whether the human participants indeed view the robotic assistants as safe and trustworthy. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 10 / 23
  • 11. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Overall Approach Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 11 / 23
  • 12. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions A Domestic Robot Assistant Here we apply model checking to the high level behaviours controlling the (commercially available) Care-O-bot R , manufactured by Fraunhofer IPA. It is based on the concept of a “robot butler” which has been developed as a mobile robotic assistant to support people in domestic environments. It has a manipulator arm, an articulated torso, stereo sensors serving as “eyes”, LED lights, a graphical user interface, and a moveable tray. The robot’s sensors monitor its current location, the state of the arm, torso, eyes and tray. Its software is based on the Robot Operating System. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 12 / 23
  • 13. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Care-O-bot and Robot House This is deployed in a domestic-type house (the robot house) at the University of Hertfordshire. The robot house is equipped with sensors which provide information on the state of the house and its occupants, such as whether the fridge door is open and whether someone is seated on the sofa. Low-level robot actions such as movement, speech, light display, etc., are controlled by groups of high-level rules that together define particular behaviours. 3 Fig. 2. A plan view of the ground floor of the University of Hertfordshire Robot House. Numbered boxes show the locations of sensors. models, and their formal verification, are described in Section IV. • Figs. 2 and 3 have been added to provide additional information on the Robot House and the user activity within it. move_tray_and_wait(lowered_position) set_light(white) wait() set(tray_is_raised,false) set(tray_is_lowered,true)Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 13 / 23
  • 14. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Care-O-bot Decision Making: Behaviours The Care-O-bot’s high-level decision making is determined by a set of behaviours of the form precondition → action (each a sequence of rules). Examples of high-level rules can take the form “lower tray”, “move to sofa area of the living room”, “say ‘The fridge door is open’ ”, set a flag, check a sensor etc. Only one behaviour executes at once. Each behaviour has a priority (integer between 0 and 90). Higher priority behaviours are executed in preference to lower priority behaviours. Each behaviour is flagged as interruptible or not. Once it has started executing, a behaviour will execute to completion, if it is not interruptible. Users can add new behaviours. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 14 / 23
  • 15. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions The S1-alertFridgeDoor Behaviour Behaviours (a set of high level rules) take the form: Precondition-Rules -> Action-Rules 27 Fridge Freezer Is *ON* AND has been ON for more than 30 secs 31 ::514:: GOAL-fridgeUserAlerted is false 32 Turn light on ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to yellow 34 move ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to ::2:: Living Room and wait for completion 35 Turn light on ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 to white and wait for completion 36 ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 says ‘The fridge door is open!’ and wait for completion 37 SET ::506::GOAL-gotoCharger TO false 38 SET ::507::GOAL-gotoTable TO false 39 SET ::508::GOAL-gotoSofa TO false 40 ::0::Care-o-Bot 3.2 GUI, S1-Set-GoToKitchen, S1-Set-WaitHere 41 SET ::514::GOAL-fridgeUserAlerted TO true Its priority is 60 and it is not interruptible. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 15 / 23
  • 16. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Models and Properties We need to abstract away from some of the timing details included in the database to obtain a model that is discrete, finite and not too large. We developed a (by hand) model in the input language for the model checker NuSMV and later developed a tool (CRutoN) to automatically translate from behaviours to NuSMV input. We also need a set of properties of the system to check over the model. Ideally these would come from a specification or standards documents about what is expected of the robot with respect to functionality, safety etc. Here we focus on issues relating to the scheduling of behaviours, priorities and interruptions (which at least provide a sanity check). Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 16 / 23
  • 17. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Sample Properties and Model Checking Results 1 ((fridge_freezer_on ∧ ¬goal_fridge_user_alerted) ⇒ ♦(location = livingroom ∧ ♦say = fridge_door_open)) 2 ((fridge_freezer_on ∧ ¬goal_fridge_user_alerted ∧ schedule = schedule_alert_fridge_door) ⇒ ♦(location = livingroom ∧ ♦say = fridge_door_open)) Property Output Time (sec) 1 FALSE 11.1 2 TRUE 12.3 The model had 130,593 reachable states. We did find a small bug in the behaviours (a flag was wrongly set) but this was by inspection of the behaviours. It would be better to try properties relating to the requirements of the robot. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 17 / 23
  • 18. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Discussion CRutoN allowed us to translate from different databases of behaviours into input for a model checker, setting parameters to control particular aspects of the translation. CRutoN uses an intermediate representation so that input to different model checkers can potentially be generated. Understanding the semantics of the robot execution cycle took a lot of close work and interaction with UoH. The state explosion problem means we have to find a balance between the level of detail/abstraction and verification times (timing details were not well represented). We could deal better with uncertainty or timing constraints by applying a different model checker. The model of a person in the robot house was not represented but this could be incorporated showing their location for example. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 18 / 23
  • 19. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Experiments with Trust and Reliability In the robot house UoH experimented using two scenarios where the robot appeared faulty or not. In both scenarios the person was asked to carry out a task with the robot. Results suggested that although errors in a robot’s behavior are likely to affect participant’s perception of its reliability and trustworthiness, this doesn’t seem to influence their decisions to comply with instructions (or not). Their willingness to comply with the robot’s instructions seem to depend on the nature if the task, in particular, whether its effects are irrevocable. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 19 / 23
  • 20. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions The Manufacturing Scenario: Verification The focus was on a table leg handover task. The gaze, hand location and hand pressure of the human should be correct before the handover takes place. Journal Title XX(X) All the verification -world. The models oneously, or may be , or relative to one s. In our approach, he system are con- assertions and prop- quirements models mulated. ble that numerical fication results. In ontain bugs that are “Experiments.” As the textual require- experimentation. At formal verification e compared against cover that one of the ed testing or formal ents. In this case we assets, as explained e between the dif- cover the cause of isons are indicated Formal Verification” ulation-based Test- Figure 2. BERT 2 engaged in the handover task. robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby object, and holds it out to the human. The robot announces that it is ready to handover. The human responds verbally to indicate that they are ready to receive. (For practical reasons, human-to- robot verbal signals were relayed to the robot by a human operator pressing a key.) Then, the human is expected to pull gently on the object while looking at it. BERT 2 then calculates three binary sensor conditions: • Gaze: The human’s head position and orientation relative to the object are tracked using the Vicon R motion-tracking system for an approximate measure of whether he/she is looking at the object. 11 RobotController_3S Modelling was carried out using Probabilistic Timed Automata and verification via the PRISM probabilistic model checker. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 20 / 23
  • 21. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Manufacturing Scenario: Simulation and Experiments Simulation based testing and real robot experiments (BRL) 12 code to be used in simulation and in the actual robot, providing consistency between simulations, experiments, and deployed use. A screenshot of the ROS/Gazebo simulation can be seen in Figure 5. For the simulator, additional ROS nodes were con- structed in Python, to simulate BERT 2’s sensor sys- tems and embedded actuation controllers. The pre-existing URDF file describing BERT 2 was extended as described previously for use in Gazebo. The simulated human behaviour was controlled by a ROS node written in Python, driving a simplified physical model of the head and hand. Figure 5. Screenshot of the simulated handover task. The human head and hand are represented in orange. The object to be handed over is shown in blue. A testbench was incorporated into the simulator. The testbench comprised a test generator, a driver, a checker and a coverage collector. Achieving the exploration of meaningful and interesting sequences of behaviours from the robot and its environment in an HRI task is a challenging task. For this reason, we stimulate the robot’s code in the simulation indirectly through stimulating its environment (e.g., the person’s behaviour) instead, and we use a combination of model-based and pseudorandom test generation. Also, to alleviate the complexity of generating and timing different types of system inputs, the test generator is based on a two-tiered approach (Araiza-Illan et al. 2016) where an abstract test is generated first and then concretized by instantiating low-level parameters. The high-level actions of the human in the simulator include sending signals to the robot, or setting abstract parameters for gaze, location and pressure. Low-level parameters include the robot’s initial pose and the poses and force vectors applied by the human during the interaction. For example, we computed an abstract test of high-level actions for the human, by exploring the model in UPPAAL⇤⇤ , so that the robot an pressure gaze, pr released the hum The simulato monitor describe Finally, triggerin The s 5.2.1 assertio in Pyth If the machine to deter postcon For e both ini if (sens wait asse Note th be diff same t misinter The collecte verified The nu triggere coverag 5.3 E 5.3.1 imental custom in Figur of a sy unbiase environ to repro safety c quently, be inac such as ⇤⇤http: ††https Prepared using sagej.cls We carried out a small user valida- tion study with 10 participants each carrying out 10 handover tasks. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 21 / 23
  • 22. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions The Manufacturing Scenario: Discussion A number of properties checked inspired by the ISO requirements, e.g. “At least 95% (60%) of handover attempts should be completed successfully”. Disagreement between outcomes from some of the techniques meant further investigation and refinement of the models was needed: simulation based testing revealed that the robot sometimes dropped the table leg accidentally (gripper failure) which was not modelled in the formal verification; real experiments revealed false negatives for the pressure sensor and location sensor (they were wrongly reported as too low/incorrect hand position) not represented elsewhere. Some of the techniques were not suitable for verifying some of the requirements, for example for aspects such as speed or closeness formal verification may not be the best technique to use. Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 22 / 23
  • 23. Introduction Techniques and Approach The Domestic Scenario The Manufacturing Scenario Conclusions Concluding Remarks We gave an overview to the research carried out on the project Trustworthy Robotic Assistants and discussed approaches to trust and safety for robotic assistants. We advocate the use of a suite of verification and validation techniques at different levels of abstraction and coverability to help gain assurance of the robot’s safety, reliability and functional correctness. We considered the combination of formal verification (model checking), simulation-based testing, and user validation in experiments with real robots in a domestic and collaborative manufacturing scenario. Papers available at www.robosafe.org Clare Dixon Verification and Validation Robotic Assistants 23 / 23