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Bootloaders and
Trusted Firmware
David Brown
2019 April 24
Overview
● Signature introduction
● Two worlds: Cortex A and Cortex M
● Trusting your code: The root of trust
● Secure vs Non-secure
● Bootloaders, trusted firmware, and secure code, oh my
A Digital Signature
Image SHA256 Image Hash
32 bytes
EC Private Key
ECDSA
Sign Signature
32 bytes
Verify a Signature
Image
SHA256
Image Hash
32 bytes
EC Public Key
ECDSA
Verify
Signature
32 bytes
Good?
Cortex A vs Cortex M
Cortex A:
● “Big” CPUs
● Typically have:
○ GBs of RAM
○ GBs of storage: SSD/MMC/NAND
○ GHz CPU
○ Multiple cores common
● Think Raspberry Pi, Phones,
96Boards, Android, Linux, etc
Cortex M:
● “Small” CPUs
● Typically have:
○ KBs of RAM
○ MBs of ROM
○ 10-100s of MHz
○ Usually 1 core, some 2
● Think IoT: light bulbs, water meters
● Key here is to reduce cost and power
consumption
Root of trust
● How do we trust the code that is running?
● Chain of trust from first executed code on the system
Chain of Trust
Internal
boot code
Bootloader Trusted Firmware
Non-secure
Operating System
Trusted OS Application
Secure
Non-Secure
Optional
Internal
boot code
Bootloader
Trusted Firmware
Non-secure
Operating System
Trusted OS
Application
Secure Non-secure
Secure, Non-secure Interaction
● Strong memory protection
● Memory protection even of DMA
● Well defined and restricted communication
● Limits code that needs to be trusted
Bootloaders, Cortex-A
● Code resides in file or partition in a large device
● Each stage responsible for verifying the next state
○ BL1: Rom loader in SoC
○ BL2: Trusted firmware
○ BL3-1: Trusted OS/Platform
○ BL3-3: Non-trusted: U-Boot/UEFI
○ : Non-secure OS: Linux
○ : Apps
Bootloaders: Cortex-M
● Lives in a single flash space
● May execute right out of flash
● Fixed partitions and rigid upgrades
● Boot order:
○ Possible on-SoC init ROM
○ MCUboot: Validates 2 images
○ TF-M: Secure application
○ Application
Thank you
Join Linaro to accelerate deployment of your Arm-
based solutions through collaboration
contact@linaro.org

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Bootloaders, Trusted Firmware, and Secure Code

  • 2. Overview ● Signature introduction ● Two worlds: Cortex A and Cortex M ● Trusting your code: The root of trust ● Secure vs Non-secure ● Bootloaders, trusted firmware, and secure code, oh my
  • 3. A Digital Signature Image SHA256 Image Hash 32 bytes EC Private Key ECDSA Sign Signature 32 bytes
  • 4. Verify a Signature Image SHA256 Image Hash 32 bytes EC Public Key ECDSA Verify Signature 32 bytes Good?
  • 5. Cortex A vs Cortex M Cortex A: ● “Big” CPUs ● Typically have: ○ GBs of RAM ○ GBs of storage: SSD/MMC/NAND ○ GHz CPU ○ Multiple cores common ● Think Raspberry Pi, Phones, 96Boards, Android, Linux, etc Cortex M: ● “Small” CPUs ● Typically have: ○ KBs of RAM ○ MBs of ROM ○ 10-100s of MHz ○ Usually 1 core, some 2 ● Think IoT: light bulbs, water meters ● Key here is to reduce cost and power consumption
  • 6. Root of trust ● How do we trust the code that is running? ● Chain of trust from first executed code on the system
  • 7. Chain of Trust Internal boot code Bootloader Trusted Firmware Non-secure Operating System Trusted OS Application Secure Non-Secure Optional
  • 8. Internal boot code Bootloader Trusted Firmware Non-secure Operating System Trusted OS Application Secure Non-secure
  • 9. Secure, Non-secure Interaction ● Strong memory protection ● Memory protection even of DMA ● Well defined and restricted communication ● Limits code that needs to be trusted
  • 10. Bootloaders, Cortex-A ● Code resides in file or partition in a large device ● Each stage responsible for verifying the next state ○ BL1: Rom loader in SoC ○ BL2: Trusted firmware ○ BL3-1: Trusted OS/Platform ○ BL3-3: Non-trusted: U-Boot/UEFI ○ : Non-secure OS: Linux ○ : Apps
  • 11. Bootloaders: Cortex-M ● Lives in a single flash space ● May execute right out of flash ● Fixed partitions and rigid upgrades ● Boot order: ○ Possible on-SoC init ROM ○ MCUboot: Validates 2 images ○ TF-M: Secure application ○ Application
  • 12. Thank you Join Linaro to accelerate deployment of your Arm- based solutions through collaboration contact@linaro.org