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UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAYS™ 
Challenges of Cybersecurity Implementations for 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 
2014 
Process Control Systems 
Michael Firstenberg, Director of Industrial Security 
Waterfall Security Solutions
Security Landscape 
● 1M ICS hosts on the Internet? 500K in NA? 
Really only 7,000 
● Heartbleed – encryption in lots of products, 
websites & VPNs broken 
● NSA supply chain revelations. Does anyone 
really believe it was only the NSA? 
● Always more ICS vulnerabilities found, and 
patching change-controlled network is slow 
Heartbleed drives home the point: all 
software has bugs. Some bugs are 
security holes. So in practice, all software 
can be hacked 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 2
Threat Resources Methods 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 
Existing 
Protection Examples 
Nation-state, 
sleeper insiders 
High Highly targeted, 
autonomous 
none Stuxnet, NSA 
supply chain 
Targeted Persistent 
Attacks 
Medium Targeted, manual 
remote control 
NEI Aurora, Night 
Dragon, Shady 
Rat, Ghostnet, 
Disgruntled insider 
with access to ICS 
Low Targeted: social 
engineering 
ISA, API, 
NERC-CIP 
Maroochy 
Insider with access 
to IT network 
Low Targeted: social 
engineering 
NIST IT examples 
Organized crime Medium Highly volume, 
automated 
ISA, API, 
NERC-CIP 
Zeus, Conflicker 
Who Are We Worried About?
Targeted Persistent Attacks 
● Use “spear phishing” or server attacks to punch through firewalls 
● Use custom malware to evade anti-virus 
● Operate malware by interactive remote control 
● Steal administrator passwords / password hashes 
● Create new administrator accounts on domain controller 
● Use new accounts to log in – no need to “break in” any more – 
defeats software update programs 
IT teams are unable to block 
these targeted attacks at the 
corporate perimeter. 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 4
IT vs ICS - Safety, Reliability, Confidentiality 
Attribute Enterprise / IT Control System 
Scale Huge – 100,000’s of devices 100-500 devices per DCS 
Priority Confidentiality Safety and reliability 
Target Data Equipment 
Exposure Constant exposure to Internet 
content / attacks 
Exposed to business 
network, not Internet 
Equipment 
lifecycle 
3-5 years 10-20 years 
Security 
discipline: 
Speed / aggressive change – stay 
ahead of the threats 
Security is an aspect of safety 
- Engineering Change Control 
(ECC) 
The difference between IT and ICS is control 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 5
Reliability + Safety Risks = Soft ICS Interior 
● Cyber safety and reliability risks arise from ability to control physical 
equipment 
● Testing security updates and AV updates for reliability and safety 
takes longer – sometimes much longer 
● There are tens of thousands of vulnerabilities are waiting to be 
discovered in ICS software 
● Old, out-of-support hardware and software 
● Encrypted/authenticated communications debate 
for critical devices may never be resolved 
Strong perimeter protection will 
always be disproportionately important 
in ICS defense-in-depth programs 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 6
Physical Security 
● Strictly control access to critical ICS computers 
● Reduce risks due to USB, CD-ROMS, cell phone connections and other 
removable media / networking 
● Reduce risks due to rogue laptops & other equipment plugged into 
ICS / safety networks 
● Entire ICS network must lie within physical security perimeter 
● No silver bullet: 
● Insider threat is still real 
● Distant adversaries can 
compromise equipment 
over Internet / remote 
control 
Photo: Idaho National Labs 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 7
Sneakernet 
● Device control – low-impact software to control which users and ports 
can accept which kinds of USB / CD / DVD device 
● Network Access Control – refuses access to unauthorized laptops 
● Supply chain - offline scans of hard disks of new equipment, physical 
inspections 
● The most cautious firms purchase USB peripherals from distant, 
random locations 
● Training & Awareness 
Be paranoid. 
Everything that crosses the physical 
or cyber perimeter is a threat 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 8
Device Control & Whitelisting 
● Whitelisting: strictly control what software is allowed to run where 
● Currently used more for “devices” with complex embedded 
operating systems than for entire ICS systems 
● Device control: forbid entirely the execution of software from 
removable media, control what kinds of USB devices (keyboards, 
mice) are allowed to be connected to which ports 
● Less intrusive than whitelisting, applied more commonly to larger 
parts of ICS systems 
● No silver bullet: 
● Cannot prevent remote control 
of legitimate applications 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 9
Cyber Perimeter - How Secure are Firewalls Really? 
Attack Type UGW Fwall 
1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls your attack through firewall 
2) Social engineering – steal a password / keystroke logger / shoulder surf 
3) Compromise domain controller – create ICS host or firewall account 
4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / buffer-overflowd 
5) Attack exposed clients – compromised web svrs/ file svrs / buf-overflows 
6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies / command injection 
7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunneling / malware propagation 
8) Firewall vulnerabilities – bugs / zero-days / default passwd/ design vulns 
9) Errors and omissions – bad fwall rules/configs / IT reaches through fwalls 
10) Forge an IP address – firewall rules are IP-based 
Firewall have been with us for 30 years now. The good guys and 
the bad guys both know how to defeat them 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 10 
Photo: Red Tiger Security 
Attack Success 
Rate: 
Impossible Routine Easy
Technical Shortcomings of Firewalls 
● Well short of secure initially 
● The “deny any any” rule 
● Order of your firewall ruleset 
● Multiple administration services 
● Multiple passwords 
A Tufin Technologies survey found that 
86% of hackers believe that they can 
break through any firewall. 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 11 
Photo: Idaho National Labs
Technical Shortcomings – Part 2 
● Software and hardware issues (e.g. code updates, loose power cables) 
can affect ops and business. 
● May not be able to operate in harsher conditions of plants and need to 
be replaced more often 
● Dependencies on corporate network, where SLAs are not as high 
● New vulnerabilities are introduced with new software 
Firewalls have external dependencies 
which affect their capabilities. 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 12
Technical Shortcomings Part 3 
All TCP connections through the firewall are bi-directional 
Outbound access = Inbound C&C 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 13 
?
Technical Shortcomings Part 3 
All TCP connections through the firewall are bi-directional 
Outbound access = Inbound C&C 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 14
Unidirectional Security Gateways: Server Replication 
● Hardware-enforced unidirectional server replication 
● Replica server contains all data and functionality of original 
● External clients communicate only with replica historian 
● 100% secure from online attacks from external networks 
● Replicate historian servers, OPC servers, RDB servers, Modbus, etc. 
PLCs 
RTUs 
Industrial Network Corporate Network 
Historian 
Waterfall 
TX appliance 
Waterfall 
RX appliance 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 15 
Workstations 
Replica 
Historian 
Waterfall 
TX agent 
Waterfall 
RX agent 
Unidirectional Historian replication
Waterfall FLIP™ Defeats Interactive Remote Control 
● Unidirectional Gateway whose direction can be reversed: 
● Chemicals / refining / mining / pharmaceuticals: batch instructions 
● Water systems: periodic security updates & anti-virus signatures 
● Remote unstaffed sites: substations, pumping stations 
● Trigger: button / key, schedule 
● Stronger than firewalls, 
stronger than removable media 
The FLIP is a 
Unidirectional 
Gateway that 
can “flip over” 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 16
Deep Content Control 
● Trend in firewalls for 30 years is towards increasingly deep 
understanding, inspection of, and control of communications protocols 
● Deep content control inspects and controls individual fields, tags, 
values, flags & files passing between networks 
● Supports open protocols, proprietary protocols, ICS protocols, 
fragmented protocols – anything that an endpoint can make sense of 
● DCC is generally a client, pulling only desired data. Servers try to sort 
out anything a client/attacker sends them. 
Deep Content Control 
protects both ICS networks 
from IT networks, and IT 
networks from ICS networks 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 17
Evolving Best Practices – Unidirectional Gateways 
NERC CIP exempts 
unidirectionally-protected 
sites from 
over 35% of 
requirements 
DHS recommends 
unidirectional gateways 
in security 
assessments (ICS 
CERT) 
NRC & NEI exempts 
unidirectionally-protected 
sites from 21 of 26 
cyber-perimeter rules 
Unidirectional gateways – 
limit the propagation of 
malicious code (ISA SP- 
99-3-3 / IEC 62443-3-3) 
ENISA - unidirectional 
gateways provide 
better protection than 
firewalls 
NIST - unidirectional 
gateways prevent any 
connectivity of traffic 
between domains 
(800-82) 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 18
Best Practices Continue to Evolve 
Unidirectional gateways defeat targeted attacks, insider attacks 
& malware propagation 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 19
Waterfall Security Solutions 
● Headquarters in Israel, sales and operations office in the USA 
● Hundreds of sites deployed in all critical infrastructure sectors 
2012, 2013 & 2014 Best Practice awards for Industrial 
Network Security and Oil & Gas Security Practice 
IT and OT security architects should consider Waterfall 
for their operations networks 
Waterfall is key player in the cyber security market – 
2010, 2011, & 2012 
● Strategic partnership agreements / 
cooperation with: OSIsoft, GE, Siemens, 
and many other major industrial vendors 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 20
ICS Relies Heavily on Perimeter Protection 
● If IT protections cannot prevent modern attacks from breaching IT 
networks, why are they adequate for ICS networks? 
● Unidirectional Gateways defeat modern interactive remote control 
attacks 
● Everything crossing physical or cyber perimeters is a threat 
● Deep Content Control supports open protocols as well as proprietary, 
industrial protocols 
Hardware-enforced unidirectional 
protections are today’s best practices 
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 21

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[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Michael Firstenberg

  • 1. UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAYS™ Challenges of Cybersecurity Implementations for Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 2014 Process Control Systems Michael Firstenberg, Director of Industrial Security Waterfall Security Solutions
  • 2. Security Landscape ● 1M ICS hosts on the Internet? 500K in NA? Really only 7,000 ● Heartbleed – encryption in lots of products, websites & VPNs broken ● NSA supply chain revelations. Does anyone really believe it was only the NSA? ● Always more ICS vulnerabilities found, and patching change-controlled network is slow Heartbleed drives home the point: all software has bugs. Some bugs are security holes. So in practice, all software can be hacked Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 2
  • 3. Threat Resources Methods Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions Existing Protection Examples Nation-state, sleeper insiders High Highly targeted, autonomous none Stuxnet, NSA supply chain Targeted Persistent Attacks Medium Targeted, manual remote control NEI Aurora, Night Dragon, Shady Rat, Ghostnet, Disgruntled insider with access to ICS Low Targeted: social engineering ISA, API, NERC-CIP Maroochy Insider with access to IT network Low Targeted: social engineering NIST IT examples Organized crime Medium Highly volume, automated ISA, API, NERC-CIP Zeus, Conflicker Who Are We Worried About?
  • 4. Targeted Persistent Attacks ● Use “spear phishing” or server attacks to punch through firewalls ● Use custom malware to evade anti-virus ● Operate malware by interactive remote control ● Steal administrator passwords / password hashes ● Create new administrator accounts on domain controller ● Use new accounts to log in – no need to “break in” any more – defeats software update programs IT teams are unable to block these targeted attacks at the corporate perimeter. Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 4
  • 5. IT vs ICS - Safety, Reliability, Confidentiality Attribute Enterprise / IT Control System Scale Huge – 100,000’s of devices 100-500 devices per DCS Priority Confidentiality Safety and reliability Target Data Equipment Exposure Constant exposure to Internet content / attacks Exposed to business network, not Internet Equipment lifecycle 3-5 years 10-20 years Security discipline: Speed / aggressive change – stay ahead of the threats Security is an aspect of safety - Engineering Change Control (ECC) The difference between IT and ICS is control Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 5
  • 6. Reliability + Safety Risks = Soft ICS Interior ● Cyber safety and reliability risks arise from ability to control physical equipment ● Testing security updates and AV updates for reliability and safety takes longer – sometimes much longer ● There are tens of thousands of vulnerabilities are waiting to be discovered in ICS software ● Old, out-of-support hardware and software ● Encrypted/authenticated communications debate for critical devices may never be resolved Strong perimeter protection will always be disproportionately important in ICS defense-in-depth programs Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 6
  • 7. Physical Security ● Strictly control access to critical ICS computers ● Reduce risks due to USB, CD-ROMS, cell phone connections and other removable media / networking ● Reduce risks due to rogue laptops & other equipment plugged into ICS / safety networks ● Entire ICS network must lie within physical security perimeter ● No silver bullet: ● Insider threat is still real ● Distant adversaries can compromise equipment over Internet / remote control Photo: Idaho National Labs Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 7
  • 8. Sneakernet ● Device control – low-impact software to control which users and ports can accept which kinds of USB / CD / DVD device ● Network Access Control – refuses access to unauthorized laptops ● Supply chain - offline scans of hard disks of new equipment, physical inspections ● The most cautious firms purchase USB peripherals from distant, random locations ● Training & Awareness Be paranoid. Everything that crosses the physical or cyber perimeter is a threat Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 8
  • 9. Device Control & Whitelisting ● Whitelisting: strictly control what software is allowed to run where ● Currently used more for “devices” with complex embedded operating systems than for entire ICS systems ● Device control: forbid entirely the execution of software from removable media, control what kinds of USB devices (keyboards, mice) are allowed to be connected to which ports ● Less intrusive than whitelisting, applied more commonly to larger parts of ICS systems ● No silver bullet: ● Cannot prevent remote control of legitimate applications Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 9
  • 10. Cyber Perimeter - How Secure are Firewalls Really? Attack Type UGW Fwall 1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls your attack through firewall 2) Social engineering – steal a password / keystroke logger / shoulder surf 3) Compromise domain controller – create ICS host or firewall account 4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / buffer-overflowd 5) Attack exposed clients – compromised web svrs/ file svrs / buf-overflows 6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies / command injection 7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunneling / malware propagation 8) Firewall vulnerabilities – bugs / zero-days / default passwd/ design vulns 9) Errors and omissions – bad fwall rules/configs / IT reaches through fwalls 10) Forge an IP address – firewall rules are IP-based Firewall have been with us for 30 years now. The good guys and the bad guys both know how to defeat them Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 10 Photo: Red Tiger Security Attack Success Rate: Impossible Routine Easy
  • 11. Technical Shortcomings of Firewalls ● Well short of secure initially ● The “deny any any” rule ● Order of your firewall ruleset ● Multiple administration services ● Multiple passwords A Tufin Technologies survey found that 86% of hackers believe that they can break through any firewall. Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 11 Photo: Idaho National Labs
  • 12. Technical Shortcomings – Part 2 ● Software and hardware issues (e.g. code updates, loose power cables) can affect ops and business. ● May not be able to operate in harsher conditions of plants and need to be replaced more often ● Dependencies on corporate network, where SLAs are not as high ● New vulnerabilities are introduced with new software Firewalls have external dependencies which affect their capabilities. Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 12
  • 13. Technical Shortcomings Part 3 All TCP connections through the firewall are bi-directional Outbound access = Inbound C&C Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 13 ?
  • 14. Technical Shortcomings Part 3 All TCP connections through the firewall are bi-directional Outbound access = Inbound C&C Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 14
  • 15. Unidirectional Security Gateways: Server Replication ● Hardware-enforced unidirectional server replication ● Replica server contains all data and functionality of original ● External clients communicate only with replica historian ● 100% secure from online attacks from external networks ● Replicate historian servers, OPC servers, RDB servers, Modbus, etc. PLCs RTUs Industrial Network Corporate Network Historian Waterfall TX appliance Waterfall RX appliance Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 15 Workstations Replica Historian Waterfall TX agent Waterfall RX agent Unidirectional Historian replication
  • 16. Waterfall FLIP™ Defeats Interactive Remote Control ● Unidirectional Gateway whose direction can be reversed: ● Chemicals / refining / mining / pharmaceuticals: batch instructions ● Water systems: periodic security updates & anti-virus signatures ● Remote unstaffed sites: substations, pumping stations ● Trigger: button / key, schedule ● Stronger than firewalls, stronger than removable media The FLIP is a Unidirectional Gateway that can “flip over” Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 16
  • 17. Deep Content Control ● Trend in firewalls for 30 years is towards increasingly deep understanding, inspection of, and control of communications protocols ● Deep content control inspects and controls individual fields, tags, values, flags & files passing between networks ● Supports open protocols, proprietary protocols, ICS protocols, fragmented protocols – anything that an endpoint can make sense of ● DCC is generally a client, pulling only desired data. Servers try to sort out anything a client/attacker sends them. Deep Content Control protects both ICS networks from IT networks, and IT networks from ICS networks Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 17
  • 18. Evolving Best Practices – Unidirectional Gateways NERC CIP exempts unidirectionally-protected sites from over 35% of requirements DHS recommends unidirectional gateways in security assessments (ICS CERT) NRC & NEI exempts unidirectionally-protected sites from 21 of 26 cyber-perimeter rules Unidirectional gateways – limit the propagation of malicious code (ISA SP- 99-3-3 / IEC 62443-3-3) ENISA - unidirectional gateways provide better protection than firewalls NIST - unidirectional gateways prevent any connectivity of traffic between domains (800-82) Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 18
  • 19. Best Practices Continue to Evolve Unidirectional gateways defeat targeted attacks, insider attacks & malware propagation Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 19
  • 20. Waterfall Security Solutions ● Headquarters in Israel, sales and operations office in the USA ● Hundreds of sites deployed in all critical infrastructure sectors 2012, 2013 & 2014 Best Practice awards for Industrial Network Security and Oil & Gas Security Practice IT and OT security architects should consider Waterfall for their operations networks Waterfall is key player in the cyber security market – 2010, 2011, & 2012 ● Strategic partnership agreements / cooperation with: OSIsoft, GE, Siemens, and many other major industrial vendors Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 20
  • 21. ICS Relies Heavily on Perimeter Protection ● If IT protections cannot prevent modern attacks from breaching IT networks, why are they adequate for ICS networks? ● Unidirectional Gateways defeat modern interactive remote control attacks ● Everything crossing physical or cyber perimeters is a threat ● Deep Content Control supports open protocols as well as proprietary, industrial protocols Hardware-enforced unidirectional protections are today’s best practices Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2014 by Waterfall Security Solutions 21