These are the presentation slides used in the Dec 17, 2013 Webinar, "Patent Trolls & Damages" presented by Managing IP and sponsored by LexisNexis.
Speakers:
James Nurton, Managing Editor, Managing IP, Moderator
Eric Bensen, Author & Consultant, www.ericbensen.com
and Of Counsel, Vandenburg & Feliu LLP, NY
Bryan Butler, IP Counsel, IBM
Charles Macedo, Partner, Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP, www.arelaw.com
Recently, there has been a rise in allegations that the high costs of the patent litigation system in the US are being exploited to reach settlements even on low-value patents. This has led to concerns from technology companies as well as end-users that the patent system is impeding business development and innovation.
Key to this debate is the question of damages in litigation: How are they awarded? What is proportionate? Are any changes in the law needed? In this webinar, our panellists will look at the issues raised by the troll debate, what strategies plaintiffs and defendants can adopt and what changes, if any, are needed.
2. Back to Basics:
Using Existing Law to Constrain “Trolls”
Eric E. Bensen
Author & Consultant, www.ericbensen.com
Of Counsel, Vandenburg & Feliu LLP, NY, www.vanfeliu.com
3. Overview
1. Introduction
a) “Trolls”: Who are We Talking About?
b) “Trolls”: What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
2. Existing Law & “Trolls”
a) Current State of the Law
b) Supreme Court Precedent – Apportionment
3. Conclusion
4. Introduction
Who are We Talking About?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Trolls
Non-Practicing Entities
Patent Assertion Entities
Patent Monetization Entities
“Trolls”
5. Introduction
“Trolls” – What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
Question:
If every patent suit involved: (i) valuable patents (ii) being asserted with a good faith basis
to believe infringement has occurred …
… would we be talking about Trolls?
6. Introduction
“Trolls” – What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
The “Troll Problem”: Excessive number of suits where:
1.
2.
3.
Trivial (or worthless) patents are asserted.
Claims are brought in bad faith.
Both.
7. Introduction
“Trolls” – What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
The “Troll Problem”: Excessive number of suits where:
1.
2.
3.
Trivial (or worthless) patents are asserted.
Suits are brought in bad faith.
Both.
8. Introduction
“Trolls” – What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
The “Troll Problem”: Excessive number of suits where:
1.
2.
3.
Trivial (or worthless) patents are asserted.
Suits are brought in bad faith.
Both.
Why do trivial/worthless patents wreak such havoc on industry?
9. Introduction
“Trolls” – What Problem Do We Seek to Address?
Damages awards are too often out of proportion to the value of the patent:
Key Facts
Reasonable Royalty
Some infringing units sold for as little as $97
$96/unit
i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft, Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
“Technology Fee” was $5/unit
$50/unit
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 383 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Anticipated profit was $8.00/unit
$31.80/unit
Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Competitor sold infringing units for $1,295/unit
Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
$7,736/unit
10. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Current State of the Law
Today, there are substantial inconsistencies in patent law. E.g.:
1.
Smallest Saleable Unit:
Is the smallest saleable unit containing the patented feature a proper base for a
royalty award (Laserdynamics) or not (Lucent)?
2.
Total Revenues:
Can a patentee “always” use the the total revenues from a product as royalty base
as long as the rate is low enough (Lucent) or not (Uniloc)?
11. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Current State of the Law
Today, there are substantial inconsistencies in patent law. E.g.:
3.
Arbitrary Profit Splitting:
If the 25% Rule is unacceptable because it require an arbitrary division of profits
(Uniloc), why is the analytical method acceptable (Lucent)?
4.
Profit Requirement:
Must an infringer be left with an anticipated profit (Lindemann, Innovatio*) or not
(Monsanto)?
12. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Illustration
Question: Does it make economic sense to bring suit for infringement of a patent
that claims a trivial feature of a smart phone?
Before the right court or panel:
•
•
•
•
The phone, i.e., “smallest saleable unit,” can be the base for a royalty award.
Total revenues can be presented to the jury.
Expert can advocate an arbitrary split of the profits on the phone.
No infringer profit required.
13. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
Between 1854 and 1915 the Supreme Court decided more than 30 patent damages
cases: Apportionment was required every time.
Basic Rule:
“The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion
the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented feature
and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and
not conjectural or speculative ….”
Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)
14. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
Specific Rules:
1.
Patent Claims an Entire Marketable Article:
No apportionment.
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 141-42 (1878)
2.
Patent Claims an Entire Marketable Article, defendant adds an improvement:
Burden initially on defendant to show that improvement had value.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfr. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 617 (1912)
3.
Patent claims an improvement or component:
Burden on patentee to show the value contributed by the claimed invention.
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 491 (1854)
15. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
Specific Rules – Entire Market Value Rule:
“If the improvement is required to adapt the machine to a particular use, and there is
no other way open to the public of supplying the demand for that use, then it is clear
the infringer has by his infringement secured the advantage of a market he would
not otherwise have had, and that the fruits of this advantage are the entire profits he
has made in that market.”
Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1881)
16. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
Specific Rules – Reasonable Royalties:
A reasonable royalty is an approximation of market price for a license to the patent.
“[A]s the patent had been kept a close monopoly, there was no established royalty. In
that situation it was permissible to show the value by proving what would have been a
reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its utility and advantages,
and the extent of the use involved ”
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915)
See also Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. 315, 320 (1866)
(A proper reasonable royalty calculation necessarily satisfies the apportionment
requirement.)
17. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
In sum:
1. A patentee’s recovery must be based on the value of the invention.
a) A patentee’s recovery may be based on the value of the entire article only where
the entire market value rule is satisfied.
2. Reasonable royalties:
a) Real world licenses for the patent are the best evidence.
b) Otherwise:
Base = Profit attributable to the invention (the apportioned value)
Royalty = Portion of base that a reasonable licensee would pay for a
license
Rembrandt Social Media, L.P. v. Facebook, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171127, **23-24 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2013)
18. Existing Law & “Trolls”
Supreme Court Precedent - Apportionment
Question: Does it make economic sense to bring suit for infringement of a patent
that claims a trivial feature of a smart phone?
Smart Phone
Federal Circuit
Supreme Court
Royalty Base:
Phone
Patented Feature
Total Revenues:
Admissible
Not Admissible
Arbitrary Profit Split:
Permitted
Not Permitted
Infringer Expected Profit:
Not Required
Required
19. Conclusion
Consistent application of existing Supreme Court law:
1.
Would reduce the incentive to sue on trivial patent: Trivial Inventions = Trivial
Recovery
20. Conclusion
Consistent application of existing Supreme Court law:
1.
Would reduce the incentive to sue on trivial patent: Trivial Inventions = Trivial
Recovery
2.
But, without reducing innovation: Substantial Invention = Substantial Recovery
21. What are “trolls” and what is wrong with
them?
Charles R. Macedo
Partner
Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP, www.arelaw.com
22. What are “trolls” and what is wrong with
them?
• Non practicing entities;
• Asserting patents of dubious
quality and suspect validity;
and
• Extracting nuisance payments
based on high cost of litigation
23. Is our patent system failing and if so
how?
• Efficiency – Patent Litigation Costs Too Much
Median Cost of Defending Patent Infringement Claims by NPE
Less than $1 million at risk
End of discovery
Inclusive, all costs
$1‐$10 million at risk
$10‐$25 million at risk
More than $25 million at risk
0
1
2
3
Median cost in millions
4
Source: AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2013
24. Is our patent system failing and if so
how?
• Predictability – No one knows what the law is, or will
be
Obviousness – Changed by KSR
Patent Eligibility ‐‐ Bilski, Mayo, Myriad and now Alice
Multi Party Actors – Akamai
…..
25. Is our patent system failing and if so
how?
• Reliable – Courts and PTABs keep coming up with
different decisions
Courts
PTO
Fresenius:
Jury awarded over $14 million
Federal Circuit affirmed
Fresenius:
Reexam found claims invalid
Versata:
Jury awarded $345 million
Versata:
PTAB found not patent‐eligible
26. Is our patent system failing and if so
how?
• Acceptable – News media and special interests
• Vermont and Nebraska Attorneys General called in to
action in their respective states because of public
reaction to seemingly inappropriate notice letters.
• Vermont passed legislation including a requirement
that senders of “demand letters” post a bond if it is
likely that the patent assertion is being made in bad
faith
• Etc.
27. Is our patent system failing and if so
how?
• Fair – Many perceived new AIA Post-Issuance
Proceedings as anti-patent owner
Source: USPTO Presentation
28. Proposed Anti-Troll Legislation
(HR 3309, the Goodlatte Bill)
•
Heightened pleading requirement - Requiring "detailed specificity" as to
"how the terms in each [asserted] claim … correspond to the functionality
of [each] accused instrumentality."
•
Attorney-fees - will be awarded to a prevailing party. The new provision
would require an award of fees "unless the court finds that the position of
the nonprevailing party . . . was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust."
•
Discovery - limited until after a ruling on claim construction.
•
Transparency of Ownership - the patentee in an infringement litigation
must disclose anyone with a financial interest and "ultimate parent entity"
of the patentee.
29. Proposed Anti-Troll Legislation
(HR 3309, the Goodlatte Bill) (cont.)
•
Stay for Customer Suits - customer suits would be stayed so long as the
customer agrees to be bound by the results of that case.
•
IP in Bankruptcy - when a foreign company goes bankrupt, its trustee would
no longer have the power to cancel licenses associated with US patent rights.
•
Shrinking Post-Grant-Review Estoppel- changes estoppel against the
petitioner from "any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have
raised during that post-grant review" to only grounds actually raised.
30. Proposed Anti-Troll Legislation
(Other legislation)
• Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013 (H.R. 2605) Tax
deduction carryover for patent development expenditures where profit is
made years later.
• Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013 (S. 1013) (Senators Cornyn and
Grassley) Smaller version of Goodlatte's Innovation Act that would focus on
(1) raising pleading requirements (2) limiting discovery costs (especially preclaim-construction); and (3) awarding attorney fees for the prevailing party.
• End Anonymous Patents Act (H.R. 2024) Requirement that the patent
owner regularly update ownership information in the public record, including
the "ultimate parent entity."
• Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013 (H.R. 2639) Includes many
provisions in parallel to the Goodlatte Innovation Act, but also includes a
"sanction for abusive litigation" with mandatory review of each case by the
court to ensure that no Rule 11(b) violations occurred.