Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in 4G Mobile Networks
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Video Also Available : https://youtu.be/JlOK6LeZ9oM The 4th Generation of mobile communications has been designed to fulfill strict security requirements. However many publications found critical vulnerabilities especially in the authentication and key agreement protocol which is the essential part of the security of the network. This project intends to give an in-depth insight into this issue. It focuses on the enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement protocol in 4G mobile networks. The research to be done aims to present an in-depth study of the areas of vulnerability for 4G standard. The aim is then to research and analyze the solutions presented in order to overcome the attacks made on the 4G Network and then to simulate similar attacks on the proposed solutions for the 4G Network, specifically on the AKA Protocol using the AVISPA Simulator. There is an urgent need to be in synchronization with the evolution of wireless communication and the much-anticipated 4G standard, which promises wonders. This Proposal explores the trends in the evolution of wireless communication and its advantages in security over the earlier systems. It outlines the requirements that are to be met by the 4G standard and also attempts to analyze the technical challenges that demand solutions during the course of the development and implementation of the next generation of wireless communication. The development of the 4G wireless standard began in 2005 and is expected to be fully completed approximately by mid-2015. Researchers all around the world and industry communities are racing against time to find solutions for open issues in 4G networks. Hopefully as a second objective, all the researches and findings help me to contribute in providing a new extension for the AKA Protocol.
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Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in 4G Mobile Networks
- 1. Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in 4G Mobile Network Presented by: Ahmad Kabbara ( CNE) Student id:201110061 Ahmad.Kabbara@outlook.com Mobile : 71418179 FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MARITIME STUDIES C O M M U N I C AT I O N A N D N E T W O R K E N G I N E E R I N G D E PA R T M E N T FINAL YEAR PROJECT FYP596: 2013 - 2014 Project Supervisor: Dr. Bacem Bakhache Bakhache@hotmail.com 03172319 Project Reviewer 1: Dr. Kassem Ahmad Kassem.ahmad@liu.edu.lb 03012333 Project Reviewer 2: Eng. Hikmat Adhami Hikmat.adhami@gmail.com 03205239 Faculty Dean: Dr. Walid Kamali Walid.kamali@gmail.com 70139077 Rev5 27/6/2014
- 2. This project intends to give an in-depth insight into the issue of security in 4th generation mobile network specifically in the authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol. The aim is to analyze the 4G AKAs and their Enhancements and propose a new solution to overcome the attacks made on the 4G network and to oppose to the vulnerabilities found in the 4G AKA Enhancements. This Solution will be tested based on some QOS parameters and by the AVISPA tool (Safe/Unsafe results). Abstract 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 2 /44
- 3. Introduction Security in 4G Mobile Networks EPS-AKA Vulnerabilities & Existing Solution Analysis Our Proposed Solution Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing Project Management Difficulties, Assessments & Acquired Skills Outline 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 3 /44
- 4. Introduction
- 5. Even though the new network generation represents the most important evolution in the mobile network, many security issues and breaches have been identified, and multiple non successful enhancements have been proposed. So in order to overcome these vulnerabilities we propose an enhancement that will be inspired from some of the successful enhancements in order to provide a better and more powerful protocol. Introduction 1/2 Overview 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 5 /44
- 6. All time integrity and confidentiality protection of control plane. User identity confidentiality (IMSI). Mutual authentication between all entities. Introduction 2/2 Objectives • Search for vulnerable areas. Analyze • Write AKAs in HLPSL Code. Program • Implement AKAs & Solutions on AVISPA. • Compare the protocols based on QOS parameters Test Project Methodology 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 6 /44
- 7. Security in 4G Mobile Networks
- 8. Mobile security has become increasingly important in mobile computing. It is of particular concern as it relates to the security of personal and business information. A smartphone user is exposed to various threats when he uses his phone. These threats can disrupt the operation of the smartphone, and transmit or modify the user data. For these reasons, The protocols deployed there must guarantee the privacy/confidentiality and integrity of the information the terminal handles. Security in 4G Mobile Networks Introduction 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 8 /44
- 9. 4G Mobile Network Security Credentials 1/3 Integrity and Confidentiality Protection 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 9 /44
- 10. 4G Mobile Network Security Credentials 2/3 Symmetric Key Cyphering 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 10 /44
- 11. 4G Mobile Network Security Credentials 3/3 Asymmetric Key Cyphering 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 11 /44
- 12. Security in 4G Mobile Networks 1/6 EPS AKA Keys derivation Overview 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 12 /44
- 13. Security in 4G Mobile Network 2/6 EPS AKA Procedure UE eNB MME HSS/AuC NAS attach request (IMSI) AUTH data request (IMSI, SNid) AUTH data response AV ( 1… n )Authentication Request (AUTN, RAND, KSIasme) Authentication Response (RES) NAS SMC (confidentiality and integrity algorithm) NAS Security Mode Complete S1AP Initial Context Setup Compute CK & IK, & Kasme Compare RES & XRES AUTN = (XSQN || AMF || MAC Generation of authentication vectors At AUC/HSS Side AVUMTS = (RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN Verify that SQN is in the correct range Verify MAC=XMAC Security Context AS Security Mode Complete AS security Mode Command 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 13 /44
- 14. f1 f2 f3 f5f4 Generate RAND Generate SQN K AMF MAC XRES CK IK AK AUTN = (XSQN || AMF || MAC Generation of authentication vectors At AUC Side f1 f2 XMAC RES CK IK AK Verify that SQN is in the correct range Verify MAX=XMAC K f5 SQN ⊕ RAND AMF MAC AUTN f4f3 Network Authentication CK IK KDF XSQN KASME SNID XSQN XSQN = xor (SQN,AK) Generation of authentication vectors At HSS/UE Side AVEPS = (RAND || XRES || KASME || AUTN AVUMTS = (RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN Generation of Encryption and integrity Keys Security in 4G Mobile Network 3/6 EPS AKA Keys Derivation Methods 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 14 /44
- 15. K KASME KNASenc KNASint KeNB KRRCintKUPencKUPint KRRCenc CK , IK USIM/AuC UE/HSS UE/MME UE/eNB Security in 4G Mobile Network 4/6 EPS Key Hierarchy 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 15 /44
- 16. Encryption and integrity of NAS signaling Integrity and Encryption of RRC/AS signaling User Plane Encryption Security in 4G Mobile Network 5/6 EPS Key Derivation Purpose 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 16 /44
- 17. Derived Key= KDF (Kin, S), or KDF=HMAC-SHA-256 S= FC|| P0| |L0|| P1|| L1||….|| Pn|| Ln Saize of derived key (bits) Output derived key Input secret key Kin FC (1 octet) P0, P1, …., Pn L0, L1,..,Ln (2 octets) KASME CK||IK 0x10 SNid, SQN⊕AK 0x0003, 0x0006 256 KeNB KASME 0x11 La valeur Count de la liaison montante NAS 0x0004 256 KeNB* KeNB 0x13 PCI, EARFCN- DL 0x0002, 0x0002 256 KNASenc, KNASint, KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPenc, KUPint KASME ou KeNB 0x15 Algorithm Distinguisher & Algo-ID 0x0001, 0x0001 128 KDF KASME S=0x15||0x 02||0x 0001||0x 01|| 0x 0001 HMAC SHA-256 Integrity Algorithm ID Integrity Algorithm ‘0001’: EIA1 SNOW 3G ‘0010’: EIA2 AES ‘0011’: EIA3 ZUC KNASint Encryption Algorithm ID Encryption Algorithm ‘0001’: EEA1 SNOW 3G ‘0010’: EEA2 AES ‘0011’: EEA3 Not defined Security in 4G Mobile Network 6/6 Key Derivation Function 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 17 /44
- 18. EPS-AKA Vulnerabilities & Existing Solution Analysis
- 19. K Security in 4G Mobile Network 1/4 EPS-AKA Vulnerabilities UE eNB MME HSS/AuC NAS attach request (IMSI , UESecCap) AUTH data request (IMSI, SNid) AUTH data response AV ( 1… n ) Authentication Request (AUTN, RAND, KSIasme) Authentication Response (RES) NAS SMC (confidentiality and integrity algorithm) NAS Security Mode Complete S1AP Initial Context Setup Compute CK & IK, & Kasme Compare RES & XRES AUTN = (XSQN || AMF || MAC) Generation of authentication vectors At AUC/HSS Side AVUMTS = (RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN)AS Security Mode Complete AS security Mode Command Passive Attacks(eavesdropping) & Active Attacks Bidding Down Attack AVEPS = (RAND || XRES || KASME || AUTN) Replay Attack f1 f3 f5f4 Generate RAND Generate SQN AMF MAC XRES CK IK AK Attack against the permanent Key K by 1-Cypher-text only attack on f1 2-Known Plaintext Attack on f2 Attack to recover KASME & K f2 MITM attack against AVs 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 19 /44 Attack to recover KASME & K
- 20. Security Enhanced Authentication & Key Agreement – SE AKA IMSI is cyphered and all transmission links between the entities are protected. New key generation method. Ensured Confidentiality Authentication & Key Agreement – EC AKA Asymmetric encryption of some messages using HSS and MME public keys. Symmetric encryption of some messages using new encryption key generated in HSS and UE. Security in 4G Mobile Network 2/4 Existing Solutions 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 20 /44
- 21. Advantages: All transmission connections between the nodes of the EPS all secured by asymmetric cyphering. Inconvenients: Vulnerable against Reject attack Vulnerable against Service Blocking(MITM) Vulnerable against Brute Force or Intelligent Brute Force attack against IMSI Security in 4G Mobile Network 3/4 Existing Solutions – SE AKA 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 21 /44
- 22. Advantages: Oppose the dictionary attack against IMSI Inconvenients: Vulnerable against Reject Attack Vulnerable against Denial of Service Attack against HSS/AuC Vulnerable against MITM Attack: Security in 4G Mobile Network 4/4 Existing Solutions – EC AKA 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 22 /44
- 24. Inspired from the tested protocols (SE & EC AKA) Need to oppose to most vulnerabilities. based on both Public key and Symmetric key Cyphering. New Key Derivation functions. New keys generated. The Solution will be tested by AVISPA to ensure its success. Proposed Solution Introduction 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 24 /44
- 25. Proposed Solution The Revolutionary EPS AKA–upon 1st registration NAS attach request (IDHSS, B= ({IMSI, SQNUE , RandEK, RandTHK, RandTIK, UEsecCap, MACTIK1}_PKH)) AUTH data request (A=({SNid, Network-Type, RandTEK1}_PKH) || B) AUTH data response (C1=({UEsecCap, RandTEK2, MACTIK3}_PKM ) || C2=({EK, RandTHK, SQNHSS, AVEPSi (1… n), MACTIK2}_TEK)) Authentication Request (D1=({AUTN(i), RAND(i), KSIASME, SQNHSS,MACRIK}_REK),D2=({ChosenUEsecCap, THK}_EK)) Authentication Response (RESEK , MACRIK) NAS Security Mode Complete ({ReplayedUEsecCap,[IMEISV-request], NAS-MAC}_REK) NAS SMC ([IMEISV-request], NAS-MAC) Initial Context Setup (UEsecCap, KeNB) AS Security Mode Complete (AS-MAC) AS security Mode Command (Int Algo, Enc Algo, AS-MAC) Generation of Authentication vectorsHSS authentication Generation of Cyphering and Integrity Keys UE authentication & Generation of Cyphering and Integrity Keys UE eNB MME HSS/AuC 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 25 /44
- 26. The Revolutionary EPS AKA Av’s Generation & Authentication Process f1 f2 f3 f5f4 Generate RAND Generate SQN K AMF MAC XRES CK IK AK S-MAC ⊕ S-XRES ⊕ SQNHSS EK f1 f2 XMAC RES CK IK AK Verify that SQNUE & SQNHE and SQN in the correct range Verify MAC=XMAC K f5 RAND AMF S-MAC AUTN f4f3 Network Authentication ⊕ SQNHSS MAC AUTN = (SQNAK|| AMF || S-MAC) Generation of authentication vectors At AUC Side AVUMTS= (RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN) Generation of Encryption and integrity Keys at UE Side AVEPS = (RAND || S-XRES || KASME || AUTN) 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 26 /44
- 27. The Revolutionary EPS AKA Keys Derivation Functions Derived Key= KDF (Kin, S), or KDF=HMAC-SHA-256 S= FC|| P0| |L0|| P1|| L1||….|| Pn|| Ln Size of derived key (bits) Output derived key Input secret key Kin FC (1 octet) P0, P1, …., Pn L0, L1,..,Ln KASME CK||IK 0x10 SNid, SQNAK 0x0003, 0x0008 512 TIK1 K 0x15 RandTIK 0x0010 128 TEK RandTEK1||Ran dTEK2 0x1D IDHSS 0x0004 256 TIK2 Trunc (TEK) 0x15 SNid 0x0003 128 EK K 0x1E RandEK 0x0010 128 THK Trunc (KASME) 0x1F RandTHK 0x0010 256 REK Trunc(THK) 0x15 Distinguisher Algo & Algo ID 0x0001, 0x0001 128 RIK Trunc(THK) 0x15 Distinguisher Algo & Algo ID 0x0001, 0x0001 128 HMAC SHA-3-256/512 CK IK KDF 512 KASME SNID SQNAK IDHSS KDF 256 TEK RandTEK1 RandTEK2 Input Kin & S and output parameters of KDF for R-AKA Trunc (TEK) SNid KDF 256 TIK2 K RandTIK KDF 256 TIK1 Distinguisher Algo Algo ID KDF 256 REK Trunc(THK) Kin S=0x15||0x 08||0x 0001||0x 01|| 0x 0001HMAC SHA-3-256 KDF HMAC SHA-3-256 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 27 /44
- 28. Proposed Solution The Revolutionary EPS AKA NAS attach request (IDHSS, B= ({IMSI, SQNUE , RandEK, RandTHK, RandTIK, UEsecCap, MACTIK1}_PKH)) AUTH data request (A=({SNid, Network-Type, MACTIK2}_TEK) || B) AUTH data response (C=({UEsecCap, EK, RandTHK, SQNHSS, AVEPSi (1… n),MACTIK2}_TEK))Authentication Request (D1=({AUTN(i), RAND(i), KSIASME, SQNHSS,MACRIK}_REK),D2=({ChosenUEsecCap, THK}_EK)) Authentication Response (RESEK , MACRIK) NAS Security Mode Complete ({ReplayedUEsecCap,[IMEISV-request], NAS-MAC}_REK) NAS SMC ([IMEISV-request], NAS-MAC) Initial Context Setup (UEsecCap, KeNB) AS Security Mode Complete (AS-MAC) AS security Mode Command (Int Algo, Enc Algo, AS-MAC) Generation of Authentication vectorsHSS authentication Generation of Cyphering and Integrity Keys UE authentication & Generation of Cyphering and Integrity Keys UE eNB MME HSS/AuC 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 28 /44
- 29. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing
- 30. Used for the analysis of large-scale Internet security protocols and applications. Based on High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). Can be downloaded on desktop or accessed directly from the browser Compatible only with Macintosh and Linux environments. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing AVISPA Overview 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 30 /44
- 31. Protocol name Protocols are defined role by role (UE,MME,HSS) the knowledge that each role in the protocol is supposed to have at the beginning of a protocol session the sequence of messages of the protocol ( transitions) the description of the knowledge of the principals the intruder's knowledge and capabilities and goals Environment Role containing all constants declaration HLPSL Protocol Specification Role Goals to be satisfied Own knowledge Transitions 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 31 /44
- 32. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing Protocols Testing with AVISPA AVISPA Result AKA protocols Safe TR-AKA Safe EC-AKA Unsafe SE-AKA Unsafe EPS- AKA AVISPA Results for the tested Protocols 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 32 /44
- 33. Additional cost of each protocol compared to the cost of the standard EPS- AKA protocol TR-AKA and EC-AKA protocols do not require additional expenditure, compared with EPS-AKA. A software update will do the job. SE-AKA protocol relies on digital certificates to users so The MME must have UE public key (certificate). SE-AKA requires additional investment compared to EPS-AKA ($ 50 / certificate). Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing QOS Parameters – Cost Analysis 1 TR-AKA, EC-AKA, EPS-AKA 2 SE-AKA Protocols are arranged in ascending order of cost: 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 33 /44
- 34. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing QOS Parameters – Security/Risk Analysis Security Level AKA protocols 1 TR-AKA 2 EC-AKA 3 SE-AKA 4 EPS- AKA Potocols are listed in desceandant order based on the security of each one Risk=Active Value*Perceived Threat*Vulnerability Vulnerability EPS-AKA SE-AKA EC-AKA TR-AKA 1- IMSI Confidentiality Protection No No Yes Yes 2- Resistance against Rejet Attack No No No Yes 3- Resistance against DOS Attack over UE No No Yes Yes 4- Resistance against services blockage by MITM Attack No No Yes Yes 5- Confidentiality of the interface MME-HSS No Yes Yes Yes 6- Confidentiality of the interface UE-MME No No Yes Yes 7- Resistance against DOS Attack over HSS No No No Yes 8- Resistance against MME identity theft No No No Yes TR-AKA is the most secured protocol compared to the three tested protocols. EC-AKA also is somehow secured and at the same time vulnerable against some attacks. SE-AKA and EPS-AKA are totally unsecured and vulnerable against all the identified attacks in the above table 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 34 /44
- 35. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing QOS Parameters – Signaling Traffic & Overhead Analysis 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Uplink (Radio and Backhaul Interfaces) Downlink (Radio and Backhaul) Core Traffic 204 260 4562 1180 1024 14780 1180 394 7951 1212 586 7709 EPS-AKA SE-AKA EC-AKA TR-AKA Additional Traffic Percentage 3GPP EPS-AKA SE-AKA EC-AKA Overhead over the radio (%) +289% -18% +14% Overhead over the Core interface (%) +62% -38% 5% Total Overhead % +76% -35% -7% TR-AKA has more traffic than 3GPP EPS-AKA and less Traffic than SE-AKA and EC-AKA TR-AKA has more traffic than 3GPP EPS-AKA and less Traffic than SE-AKA and EC-AKA 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 35 /44
- 36. Proposed Solution Analysis & Testing Results Summary Studied Protocols TR-AKA EC-AKA SE-AKA EPS-AKA Safety 1 1 4 4 Security 1 2 3 4 Cost 1 1 3 1 Overhead 2 3 4 1 The TR-AKA has the best results in the first three parameters and achieved very good results in the remaining parameter. The excellent performance of TR-AKA places it as the best AKA protocol proposed to date. 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 36 /44
- 38. Actual vs. Preliminary Budget Item Prelimanry Cost Actual Cost Sub Total Description Articles $25/ Article/40 Articles $25/ Article $1,750 70Articles Internet Usage $44/ Month $44/ Month $440 10Months Transportation $6/ day $6/ day $756 126Months / 6 Months Printing Report $25/ Copy $25/ Copy $125 5 Copies Printing Book $70/ Copy $70/ Copy $420 6 Books Designing & Printing Poster $60/ Poster $60/ Poster $60 1Poster Labour ---- $7/ Hour $10,500 1500Average working hours 5h/day over 10 months Grand Total $2,081 $14,051 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 38 /44
- 39. Time Schedule 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 39 /44
- 40. Pert Chart 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 40 /44
- 41. Difficulties, Assessments & Acquired Skills
- 42. Difficulties & Assessments Acquired Skills - Faced many problems in the programing language. - Tried to solve the Protocol Simulation & intruder simulation issue on SPAN with no success. - Faced too many problems configuring and installing AVISPA on different OS platforms. - Learned a new programing language. - Improved my knowledge in Mobile Security. - Improved my project management abilities Difficulties, Assessments & Acquired Skills 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 42 /44
- 43. Future Work Conclusion • Testing of TR-AKA against internal and external attacks. • Investigation of power consumption & how the battery life is affected by the use of the proposed protocol. • Comparison of processing & transmission delays for TR-AKA & studied protocols The TR-AKA succeeded to perform very well on all the studied parameters(Safety, Security, Cost & Signaling Overhead) and outperformed SE-AKA & EC-AKA Future Work 11/07/2014FYP596 Enhancement of the Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 4G Mobile Network - Ahmad Kabbara 43 /44
- 44. Thank You I welcome any comments or suggestions for improvements
Notas do Editor
- The objectives of our project are: The methodology that I have followed is:
- Advantages: All transmission connections between the nodes of the EPS all secured by asymmetric cyphering. Inconvenients: Vulnerable against Reject attack: Sending multiple A intercepted msgs Vulnerable against Service Blocking(MITM): change Snid Vulnerable against Brute Force or Intelligent Brute Force attack against IMSI
- Based on the research performed in this project, three areas of future research are recommended: The TR-AKA was proposed to resolve the security issues in the 4G network, it was suggested to secure the LTE network against all attacks (MITM, DOS, cryptanalyze attacks against security functions etc..). The TR-AKA succeeded to perform very well on all the studied parameters(Safety, Security, Cost & Signaling Overhead) and outperformed SE-AKA & EC-AKA where “1” means the best and “4” the weakest.