SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 30
Cyber Security
         Robin Hoods and Criminals
Ziv Ichilov
DefensePro Product Manager, Radware
ICTExpo Helsinki, April 2012
Breaking News

Anonymous has taken down the following this week

• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

• Department of Justice (DOJ)

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

• Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)




                                                                  2
AGEND
DoS – What is it about?
2011 DoS Attacks
Robin Hoods or Criminals
Protect Yourself – What is Missing?
Radware Attack Mitigation System
AGENDA
DoS – What is it about?
2011 DoS Attacks
Robin Hoods or Criminals
Protect Yourself – What is Missing?
Radware Attack Mitigation System
DoS – Originators and Goals


• Hacktivisim
   – Gain Public Attention
       • Protestors


• Cyber Crime
   – Extortion
       • Criminals
   – Business Affairs
       • Competition
   – Data Theft
       • DoS for Covering Surreptitious Attacks (criminals)


• Cyber War
   – Country Level Attacks
   – Business / Military Intelligence
   – “Real” Critical Infrastructure Paralysis



                                                                              5
DoS – Digital Sit-in or Crime



• Protest – Digital Sit-in
    “A sit-in or sit-down is a form of direct action that involves one or more persons
      nonviolently occupying an area for a protest, often to promote political, social, or
      economic change.” Wikipedia

    “There’s no such thing as a DDoS attack. A DDoS is a protest, it’s a digital sit-it. It is
      no different than physically occupying a space. It’s not a crime, it’s speech.
      Nothing was malicious, there was no malware, no Trojans. This was merely a
      digital sit-in. It is no different from occupying the Woolworth’s lunch counter in the
      civil rights era” Jay Leiderman (sept 2011, TPM)




                                                                                                 6
DoS – How does it Look


• Simple Way
   – Excessive or specially crafted traffic causing network/server/application
     resources misuse, thus preventing legitimate traffic to reach its destination
     and limits the service providing, generated by tools, humans or both.
     Can be based on Volume / Rate / Vulnerability Exploitation


• Detailed
   – Layer 3 Floods –
     targeting the network equipment, and the actual pipe capacity

   – Layer 4 Floods –
     targeting the servers (physical or virtual), their stack resources

   – Layer 7 Floods –
     targeting real applications and services



                                                                                     7
DoS – Effects


• Direct Effects
   – Embarrassing nuisance and inconvenience
   – Revenue and reputation loss


• Side Effect
   – Immediate Data Loss
   – Penetration to the Organization


• Long Term Effect
   – Infection – Involuntary Be Harness to Future Attacks




                                                                            8
AGENDA
DoS – What is it about?
2011 DoS Attacks
Robin Hoods or Criminals
Protect Yourself – What is Missing?
Radware Attack Mitigation System
Size does not matter!


    – Most organization may never experience an intense attack
    – Less intensive application attacks can cause more damage than network
      attacks

                                 The impact of application flood attacks
                                 are much more severe than network
                                 flood attacks


             76 percent of the
          attacks surveyed were
               under 1Gbps



76% of attacks are below 1Gbps


                                                                              10
Network Attacks and Application Attacks Coexist




                                                  11
Which Elements Are Bottlenecks For DDoS?




Internet link
                   Stateful devices are
is saturated
                   vulnerable to DDoS
(27% of the
                   (36% of the attacks)
  attacks)




                                                           12
More Organization Are Threatened by DoS




                                          13
Anonymous Attacks Grow




                         14
AGENDA
DoS – What is it about?
2011 DoS Attacks
Robin Hoods or Criminals
Protect Yourself – What is Missing?
Radware Attack Mitigation System
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


• SONY Example
  – Massive DoS attack taking down the PlayStation
    network for hours

  – Initiated after filing a sue against hacker who broke
    PS3 protection mechanism

  – During attack CC data of millions of users was stolen

  – Anonymous involvement was partially denied




                                                                              16
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


• Sic Semper Tyrannis
   – Long campaign against the Vatican web infrastructure

   – Started with a failed attempt to hack Vatican systems and databases
   – Continued as a massive DoS attack lasting for days, in repeating waves




                                                                              17
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


• Russian Presidential Elections
   – During elections time in Russia, first Duma and then for Presidency ...

   – DDoS attacks on protestors blogs, parties websites, reporting websites etc.

   ““It can’t be long before we observe a DDoS attack between two political parties based
      on one and the same botnet.” Eugene Kaspersky (blog)




                                                                                            18
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


• The Israeli Case

January 3rd
   Saudi hacker 0xOmar leaks tens of thousands Israeli credit card numbers
   and other personal sensitive information.
January 16th
   0xOmar and the Pro-Palestinian “Nightmare” hacker group sends an email
   to the Jerusalem Post, threatening to attack EL-AL website.
    EL-AL, Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, First International Bank of Israel and
   Discount Bank websites are attacked and are unavailable for hours.
January 17th
   Israeli hacker group “IDF-Team” retaliates by attacking Saudi and UAE’s
   Stock Exchanges websites
January 18th
   More Israeli websites targeted: Bank of Israel website under attack



                                                                             19
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


• The Israeli Case

  In the following weeks, dozens of Israeli web sites were attacked by
  Pro-Palestinian hacker groups
  A Cyber War emerged




                                                                         20
Robin Hoods or Criminals?


"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." ?

• DoS activity is considered today as illegal activity in most of the world

• DoS attacks are used for launching surreptitious attack

• Well known examples for criminal hacktivism




                                                                              21
AGENDA
DoS – What is it about?
2011 DoS Attacks
Robin Hoods or Criminals
Protect Yourself – What is Missing?
Radware Attack Mitigation System
What is Missing


What We Have?
• Most of DDoS/DoS Attack Types are Known
   – Network floods, SYN floods, GET floods, Invite floods, etc.


• Protection Methodologies are Known
   – Rate limit, Black list/haul, Authentication (Challenge), Behavioral Analysis, etc.


• High Performance Mitigation Devices Exist




                                                                                          23
What is Missing


What is Missing?

• Intelligence
   – In detection – application data consideration
   – In identification of attackers – smart algorithms and authentication methods
   – In mitigation – real-time dynamic filtering

• Capabilities
   – Dealing with new challenges – further analysis, secured traffic, etc.
   – Experienced Human Touch – for visibility and expertise

• Cooperation
   – On premises always-on immediate detection (including layer 7)
   – In-the-Cloud detection & mitigation for high rate attacks (link saturation)
   – More than Anti-DoS protection devices – WAF/NG-FW/IPS/Etc.



                                                                                    24
What is Missing? – Exmaple

Israel Attacks Example – Attackers Distribution




           • Usage of bots reduces Geo-IP importance d


                                                                25
DDoS Attack Tools Become Prevalent

                                  Public Attacks




       LOIC                         Mobile LOIC          webLOIC




                            Inner Circle Attacks
Network             Application           Low & Slow   Vulnerability based
                    Flood

UDP floods          Dynamic HTTP floods   Slowloris    Intrusion attempts
SYN floods          HTTPS floods          Pyloris      SQL Injections
Fragmented floods                         R.U.D.Y      #RefRef
FIN+ACK floods                                         XerXes




                                                                             26
Attack Mitigation System
Radware Attack Mitigation System (AMS)




                                         31
Radware end-to-end mitigation solution


         On-premises protection against:
         • Application DDoS attacks
         • SSL based attacks                                                      Internet
         • Low & Slow attacks

SSL attacks                                                        ISP Core Network
 Protection



              NBA
                    Anti-DoS
                               IPS                              In-the-cloud
                                                              Anti-DoS Service


      Attack Mitigation System                                                           Anti-DoS

                                                              Attack Mitigation System
                           In-the cloud protection against:
  Customer site            • Volumetric bandwidth attacks


                                                                                                    32
Thank you
Ziv Ichilov       zivi@radware.com
DefensePro Product Manager, Radware

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
Ajeet Choudhary
 

Mais procurados (17)

Cyber war
Cyber warCyber war
Cyber war
 
Cyber Warfare vs. Hacking (in English)
Cyber Warfare vs. Hacking (in English)Cyber Warfare vs. Hacking (in English)
Cyber Warfare vs. Hacking (in English)
 
Cybersecurity Awareness- Libya' 1st Cybersecurity Days Conference (CDC)
Cybersecurity Awareness- Libya' 1st Cybersecurity Days Conference (CDC)Cybersecurity Awareness- Libya' 1st Cybersecurity Days Conference (CDC)
Cybersecurity Awareness- Libya' 1st Cybersecurity Days Conference (CDC)
 
In the Line of Fire - The Morphology of Cyber-Attacks
In the Line of Fire - The Morphology of Cyber-AttacksIn the Line of Fire - The Morphology of Cyber-Attacks
In the Line of Fire - The Morphology of Cyber-Attacks
 
Tierpoint webinar: Multi-vector DDoS attacks: detection and mitigation_Jan2016
Tierpoint webinar: Multi-vector DDoS attacks: detection and mitigation_Jan2016Tierpoint webinar: Multi-vector DDoS attacks: detection and mitigation_Jan2016
Tierpoint webinar: Multi-vector DDoS attacks: detection and mitigation_Jan2016
 
GTB Data Loss Prevention
GTB Data Loss PreventionGTB Data Loss Prevention
GTB Data Loss Prevention
 
Cyber warfare ss
Cyber warfare ssCyber warfare ss
Cyber warfare ss
 
2012 Global Application and Network Security Report
2012 Global Application and Network Security Report2012 Global Application and Network Security Report
2012 Global Application and Network Security Report
 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace
Sovereignty in CyberspaceSovereignty in Cyberspace
Sovereignty in Cyberspace
 
Cyberwarfare
CyberwarfareCyberwarfare
Cyberwarfare
 
Cyber state
Cyber stateCyber state
Cyber state
 
In the Line of Fire-the Morphology of Cyber Attacks
In the Line of Fire-the Morphology of Cyber AttacksIn the Line of Fire-the Morphology of Cyber Attacks
In the Line of Fire-the Morphology of Cyber Attacks
 
Cyber Warfare -
Cyber Warfare -Cyber Warfare -
Cyber Warfare -
 
Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
Cyber crimeppt1-1209117277348428-8
 
Security Lifecycle Management Process
Security Lifecycle Management ProcessSecurity Lifecycle Management Process
Security Lifecycle Management Process
 
Cyber crime
Cyber crimeCyber crime
Cyber crime
 
Public Private Partnership - Combating CyberCrime
Public Private Partnership - Combating CyberCrime Public Private Partnership - Combating CyberCrime
Public Private Partnership - Combating CyberCrime
 

Semelhante a Robin Hoods And Criminals

7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
shreemala1
 
Raimund genes from traditional malware to targeted attacks
Raimund genes    from traditional malware to targeted attacksRaimund genes    from traditional malware to targeted attacks
Raimund genes from traditional malware to targeted attacks
Graeme Wood
 
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber CafeAsal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
Amy Lenzo
 

Semelhante a Robin Hoods And Criminals (20)

Apresentação Allen ES
Apresentação Allen ESApresentação Allen ES
Apresentação Allen ES
 
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili SaghafiComputer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
 
The Art of Cyber War [From Black Hat Brazil 2014]
The Art of Cyber War [From Black Hat Brazil 2014]The Art of Cyber War [From Black Hat Brazil 2014]
The Art of Cyber War [From Black Hat Brazil 2014]
 
Kaseya Connect 2012 – A Kaspersky Researcher Perspective
Kaseya Connect 2012 – A Kaspersky Researcher PerspectiveKaseya Connect 2012 – A Kaspersky Researcher Perspective
Kaseya Connect 2012 – A Kaspersky Researcher Perspective
 
DDoS Attack PPT by Nitin Bisht
DDoS Attack  PPT by Nitin BishtDDoS Attack  PPT by Nitin Bisht
DDoS Attack PPT by Nitin Bisht
 
nitinbisht-170409175645 (2).pdf
nitinbisht-170409175645 (2).pdfnitinbisht-170409175645 (2).pdf
nitinbisht-170409175645 (2).pdf
 
7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
7 mike-steenberg-carlos-lopera-us-bank
 
DDoS Explained
DDoS ExplainedDDoS Explained
DDoS Explained
 
DDoS.pptx
DDoS.pptxDDoS.pptx
DDoS.pptx
 
Network Security - Luxury or Must Have?
Network Security - Luxury or Must Have? Network Security - Luxury or Must Have?
Network Security - Luxury or Must Have?
 
DNS Cybersecurity in 2012-2015
DNS Cybersecurity in 2012-2015DNS Cybersecurity in 2012-2015
DNS Cybersecurity in 2012-2015
 
The Art of Cyber War: Cyber Security Strategies in a Rapidly Evolving Theatre
The Art of Cyber War:  Cyber Security Strategies in a Rapidly Evolving TheatreThe Art of Cyber War:  Cyber Security Strategies in a Rapidly Evolving Theatre
The Art of Cyber War: Cyber Security Strategies in a Rapidly Evolving Theatre
 
Dos n d dos
Dos n d dosDos n d dos
Dos n d dos
 
The Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack
The Anatomy of an Anonymous AttackThe Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack
The Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack
 
Aleksei zaitchenkov slides about DOS Attacks
Aleksei zaitchenkov slides about DOS AttacksAleksei zaitchenkov slides about DOS Attacks
Aleksei zaitchenkov slides about DOS Attacks
 
Nominum 2016 Fall Data Revelations Security Report
Nominum 2016 Fall Data Revelations Security ReportNominum 2016 Fall Data Revelations Security Report
Nominum 2016 Fall Data Revelations Security Report
 
Nominum Data Science Security Report, Fall 2016
Nominum Data Science Security Report, Fall 2016Nominum Data Science Security Report, Fall 2016
Nominum Data Science Security Report, Fall 2016
 
Raimund genes from traditional malware to targeted attacks
Raimund genes    from traditional malware to targeted attacksRaimund genes    from traditional malware to targeted attacks
Raimund genes from traditional malware to targeted attacks
 
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber CafeAsal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
Asal and Rethemeyer - Cyber Cafe
 
Ddos extortion campaigns
Ddos extortion campaignsDdos extortion campaigns
Ddos extortion campaigns
 

Robin Hoods And Criminals

  • 1. Cyber Security Robin Hoods and Criminals Ziv Ichilov DefensePro Product Manager, Radware ICTExpo Helsinki, April 2012
  • 2. Breaking News Anonymous has taken down the following this week • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) • Department of Justice (DOJ) • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) • National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) • Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 2
  • 3. AGEND DoS – What is it about? 2011 DoS Attacks Robin Hoods or Criminals Protect Yourself – What is Missing? Radware Attack Mitigation System
  • 4. AGENDA DoS – What is it about? 2011 DoS Attacks Robin Hoods or Criminals Protect Yourself – What is Missing? Radware Attack Mitigation System
  • 5. DoS – Originators and Goals • Hacktivisim – Gain Public Attention • Protestors • Cyber Crime – Extortion • Criminals – Business Affairs • Competition – Data Theft • DoS for Covering Surreptitious Attacks (criminals) • Cyber War – Country Level Attacks – Business / Military Intelligence – “Real” Critical Infrastructure Paralysis 5
  • 6. DoS – Digital Sit-in or Crime • Protest – Digital Sit-in “A sit-in or sit-down is a form of direct action that involves one or more persons nonviolently occupying an area for a protest, often to promote political, social, or economic change.” Wikipedia “There’s no such thing as a DDoS attack. A DDoS is a protest, it’s a digital sit-it. It is no different than physically occupying a space. It’s not a crime, it’s speech. Nothing was malicious, there was no malware, no Trojans. This was merely a digital sit-in. It is no different from occupying the Woolworth’s lunch counter in the civil rights era” Jay Leiderman (sept 2011, TPM) 6
  • 7. DoS – How does it Look • Simple Way – Excessive or specially crafted traffic causing network/server/application resources misuse, thus preventing legitimate traffic to reach its destination and limits the service providing, generated by tools, humans or both. Can be based on Volume / Rate / Vulnerability Exploitation • Detailed – Layer 3 Floods – targeting the network equipment, and the actual pipe capacity – Layer 4 Floods – targeting the servers (physical or virtual), their stack resources – Layer 7 Floods – targeting real applications and services 7
  • 8. DoS – Effects • Direct Effects – Embarrassing nuisance and inconvenience – Revenue and reputation loss • Side Effect – Immediate Data Loss – Penetration to the Organization • Long Term Effect – Infection – Involuntary Be Harness to Future Attacks 8
  • 9. AGENDA DoS – What is it about? 2011 DoS Attacks Robin Hoods or Criminals Protect Yourself – What is Missing? Radware Attack Mitigation System
  • 10. Size does not matter! – Most organization may never experience an intense attack – Less intensive application attacks can cause more damage than network attacks The impact of application flood attacks are much more severe than network flood attacks 76 percent of the attacks surveyed were under 1Gbps 76% of attacks are below 1Gbps 10
  • 11. Network Attacks and Application Attacks Coexist 11
  • 12. Which Elements Are Bottlenecks For DDoS? Internet link Stateful devices are is saturated vulnerable to DDoS (27% of the (36% of the attacks) attacks) 12
  • 13. More Organization Are Threatened by DoS 13
  • 15. AGENDA DoS – What is it about? 2011 DoS Attacks Robin Hoods or Criminals Protect Yourself – What is Missing? Radware Attack Mitigation System
  • 16. Robin Hoods or Criminals? • SONY Example – Massive DoS attack taking down the PlayStation network for hours – Initiated after filing a sue against hacker who broke PS3 protection mechanism – During attack CC data of millions of users was stolen – Anonymous involvement was partially denied 16
  • 17. Robin Hoods or Criminals? • Sic Semper Tyrannis – Long campaign against the Vatican web infrastructure – Started with a failed attempt to hack Vatican systems and databases – Continued as a massive DoS attack lasting for days, in repeating waves 17
  • 18. Robin Hoods or Criminals? • Russian Presidential Elections – During elections time in Russia, first Duma and then for Presidency ... – DDoS attacks on protestors blogs, parties websites, reporting websites etc. ““It can’t be long before we observe a DDoS attack between two political parties based on one and the same botnet.” Eugene Kaspersky (blog) 18
  • 19. Robin Hoods or Criminals? • The Israeli Case January 3rd Saudi hacker 0xOmar leaks tens of thousands Israeli credit card numbers and other personal sensitive information. January 16th 0xOmar and the Pro-Palestinian “Nightmare” hacker group sends an email to the Jerusalem Post, threatening to attack EL-AL website. EL-AL, Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, First International Bank of Israel and Discount Bank websites are attacked and are unavailable for hours. January 17th Israeli hacker group “IDF-Team” retaliates by attacking Saudi and UAE’s Stock Exchanges websites January 18th More Israeli websites targeted: Bank of Israel website under attack 19
  • 20. Robin Hoods or Criminals? • The Israeli Case In the following weeks, dozens of Israeli web sites were attacked by Pro-Palestinian hacker groups A Cyber War emerged 20
  • 21. Robin Hoods or Criminals? "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." ? • DoS activity is considered today as illegal activity in most of the world • DoS attacks are used for launching surreptitious attack • Well known examples for criminal hacktivism 21
  • 22. AGENDA DoS – What is it about? 2011 DoS Attacks Robin Hoods or Criminals Protect Yourself – What is Missing? Radware Attack Mitigation System
  • 23. What is Missing What We Have? • Most of DDoS/DoS Attack Types are Known – Network floods, SYN floods, GET floods, Invite floods, etc. • Protection Methodologies are Known – Rate limit, Black list/haul, Authentication (Challenge), Behavioral Analysis, etc. • High Performance Mitigation Devices Exist 23
  • 24. What is Missing What is Missing? • Intelligence – In detection – application data consideration – In identification of attackers – smart algorithms and authentication methods – In mitigation – real-time dynamic filtering • Capabilities – Dealing with new challenges – further analysis, secured traffic, etc. – Experienced Human Touch – for visibility and expertise • Cooperation – On premises always-on immediate detection (including layer 7) – In-the-Cloud detection & mitigation for high rate attacks (link saturation) – More than Anti-DoS protection devices – WAF/NG-FW/IPS/Etc. 24
  • 25. What is Missing? – Exmaple Israel Attacks Example – Attackers Distribution • Usage of bots reduces Geo-IP importance d 25
  • 26. DDoS Attack Tools Become Prevalent Public Attacks LOIC Mobile LOIC webLOIC Inner Circle Attacks Network Application Low & Slow Vulnerability based Flood UDP floods Dynamic HTTP floods Slowloris Intrusion attempts SYN floods HTTPS floods Pyloris SQL Injections Fragmented floods R.U.D.Y #RefRef FIN+ACK floods XerXes 26
  • 28. Radware Attack Mitigation System (AMS) 31
  • 29. Radware end-to-end mitigation solution On-premises protection against: • Application DDoS attacks • SSL based attacks Internet • Low & Slow attacks SSL attacks ISP Core Network Protection NBA Anti-DoS IPS In-the-cloud Anti-DoS Service Attack Mitigation System Anti-DoS Attack Mitigation System In-the cloud protection against: Customer site • Volumetric bandwidth attacks 32
  • 30. Thank you Ziv Ichilov zivi@radware.com DefensePro Product Manager, Radware

Notas do Editor

  1. Orchestrated by a Brazilian guy Havittaja, these attacks were for the lulz, but also for public attention to arrested Anonymous supporters participating in last 24 months attacks, mainly in the UK and the US.
  2. What happens after the Backend server clogs depends on the type of CDN service provided, two options here:Static content still provided by CDN, dynamic content unavailable2. Service is not provided at all when backend server is not responsive