SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 19
CIPHERING
                AND

 AUTHENTICATION
               IN GSM




Presented by     : Mr. Che Sokunth
OBJECTIVES
         Authentication

      o   To check whether the MS is authorized to access the network


      oTo provide parameters that enable the MS to calculate a new ciphering
      key
      o   To understand the Key Generation Algorithm



         Ciphering
      o   To prevent user information and security over Um interface
      o   To understand the ciphering algorithm and involve parameter




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION
      o   When The Authentication procedure start?


               The Subscriber data is changed in VLR or HLR

               The MS first access to the network

               The Kc is mismatch

               The first time a subscriber initiated the service
                    MS originates a call.
                    MS is called.
                    MS is activated or deactivated.
                    Supplementary service is initiated.




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION OVERVIEW
      oThe   Authentication triplet: RAND, Kc and SERS


      o   When registering, each subscriber is assigned MSISDN and IMSI


      o   The SIM writer generate the IMSI and Ki


      o   The AuC use PRNG to generate the Random number RAND


      oIn AuC. The RAND and Ki are used to generated SRES through
      algorithm A3 and Kc through algorithm A8




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 1

      When a MS requests access to the network, the MSC/VLR will normally
      require the MS to authenticate. The MSC will forward the IMSI to the HLR
      and request authentication Triplets.




                   Request Access,                 IMSI Request
                    TMSI or IMSI               Authentication Triplet
           MS
                                     MSC                                HLR




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 2

      When the HLR receives the IMSI and the authentication request, it first
      checks its database to make sure the IMSI is valid and belongs to the
      network. Once it has accomplished this, it will forward the IMSI and
      authentication request to the Authentication Center (AuC).




              Request Access,                  IMSI Request
               TMSI or IMSI                Authentication Triplet

       MS                       MSC                                      HLR



                                                 IMSI, Request Triplet




                                                                         AuC

PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 3

      The AuC will use the IMSI to look up the Ki associated with that IMSI.
      The Ki is the individual subscriber authentication key. It is a 128-bit
      number that is paired with an IMSI when the SIM card is created. The Ki
      is only stored on the SIM card and at the AuC. The Auc will also generate
      a 128-bit random number called the RAND.




                                          IMSI




                                                              RAND
                            AuC
                                                                Ki




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 4

      The RAND and the Ki are inputted into the A3 encryption algorithm. The
      output is the 32-bit Signed Response (SRES). The SRES is essentially
      the "challenge" sent to the MS when authentication is requested.

                                            AuC




                         RAND          Ki




                                A3


                                SRES



PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 4

      The RAND and Ki are input into the A8 encryption algorithm. The output
      is the 64-bit Kc. The Kc is the ciphering key that is used in the A5
      encryption algorithm to encipher and decipher the data that is being
      transmitted on the Um interface.
                                            AuC




                         RAND          Ki         RAND        Ki




                                A3                       A8


                                SRES                     Kc



PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 5

      The RAND, SRES, and Kc are collectively known as the Triplets. The
      AuC may generate many sets of Triplets and send them to the
      requesting MSC/VLR. This is in order to reduce the signalling overhead
      that would result if the MSC/VLR requested one set of triplets every time
      it wanted to authenticate the. It should be noted that a set of triplets is
      unique to one IMSI, it can not be used with any other IMSI.




                                                AuC

                          RAND          Ki                RAND        Ki




                                 A3                              A8
                                                 Triplet
                                             RAND, SRES, Kc
                                             RAND, SRES, Kc
                                             RAND, SRES, Kc
                                 SRES                            Kc
                                             RAND, SRES, Kc
                                             RAND, SRES, Kc
PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 6

      Once the AuC has generated the triplets (or sets of triplets), it forwards
      them to the HLR. The HLR subsequently sends them to the requesting
      MSC/VLR.




                                    IMSI Triplet

                        MSC                               HLR



                                           IMSI Triplet




                                                          AuC


PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 7

      The MSC stores the Kc and the SRES but forwards the RAND to the MS
      and orders it to authenticate.




                                RAND           RAND
                MS                                            MSC


                                                               SRER
                                                                Kc




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 8
      The MS has the Ki stored on the SIM card. The A3 and A8 algorithms
      also reside on the SIM card. The RAND and Ki are inputted into the A3
      and A8 encryption algorithms to generate the SRES and the Kc
      respectively.

                                               MS




                         RAND          Ki       RAND        Ki




                                A3                     A8


                                SRES                   Kc



PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
CIPHERING OVERVIEW
       The information is ciphered on the Um interface. The implementation
      of ciphering guarantees the information security and prevents user
      information or conversation contents from unauthorized access by
      using the same Kc


       The A8 algorithm is used to generation the Kc base on the basic of
      the capability of BTS and MS with the same Ki and RAND


       The A5 algorithm is used to cipher and decipher the information
      (Signaling, Speech and Data) between BTS and MS


         NEs involved : MS, BTS, BSC, MSC/VLR, HLR and AUc




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
KC AND ALGORITHMS SELECTION
      oKc is computed on the MS and network side by using the A8 algorithm
      (Ki and RAND)


      oIn the call access procedure, the MS sends an Establish Indication
      message to the BSC
           • If ECSC set to No, Classmark 1 or Classmark 2 is sent, indicating that
             MS support A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3 Ciphering Algorithm
           • If ECSC set to Yes, Classmark 1, Classmark 2 and Classmark 3 is sent,
             indicating that A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, A5/4, A5/5, A5/6, and A5/7 ciphering
             algorithms.




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
CIPHERING PROCEDURE
      When the Authentication procedure is completed. The MSC send the Ciphering
      Command message (Kc) that order MS should perform the Ciphering and which
      Ciphering Algorithm should be used.
                                          MS          BSS          MSC             VLR    HLR
      1. Pre-send Triplet to VLR                                         RAND
                                                            RAND
                                               SDCCH
      2. Authentication Request                             CKSN     T3260 Start


                                               SDCCH
      2. Authentication Response
                                               SRES

      4. Starting Ciphering                                          T3260 Stop

                                            SDCCH/A5         Kc
      5. Ciphering Mode Command
      and Complete                              Kc




      The ciphering procedure generally applies to location update, service access, and
      inter-BSC handover



PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
CIPHERING PROCEDURE- COMPLETE

      The BTS inputs the Kc and the data payload into the A5 encryption algorithm
      resulting in an enciphered data stream. The MS also inputs the Kc and the
      data payload into the A5 encryption algorithm resulting in an enciphered data
      stream. It should be noted that the A5 algorithm is a function of the Mobile
      Equipment (ME) and not the SIM card.
      On receiving a valid Ciphering Mode message , MS load the Kc in the SIM card and
      compare. If not, MS sends an RR Status Message – Protocol Error and no further
      processing.




                Data                                                        Data
         MS                     A5      Ciphering Data       A5
                Kc                                                          Kc




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
REFERENCE DOCUMENT

         GBSS12.0 – Authentication and Ciphering
         ETSI GSM TS 08.08
         ETSI GSM TS 04.08
         Telecomedu.blogspot.com




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
QUESTION




PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Ericsson optimization opti
Ericsson optimization optiEricsson optimization opti
Ericsson optimization optiTerra Sacrifice
 
Kpi analysis
Kpi analysisKpi analysis
Kpi analysisavneesh7
 
Roaming International - Stratégies
Roaming International - StratégiesRoaming International - Stratégies
Roaming International - StratégiesKEY Dolce
 
What is SS7? An Introduction to Signaling System 7
What is SS7?  An Introduction to Signaling System 7What is SS7?  An Introduction to Signaling System 7
What is SS7? An Introduction to Signaling System 7Alan Percy
 
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.001 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00Ahmed Gad
 
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...Jean de la Sagesse
 
Basic GSM Call Flows
Basic GSM Call FlowsBasic GSM Call Flows
Basic GSM Call Flowsemyl97
 
Gsm security
Gsm securityGsm security
Gsm securityAli Kamil
 
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS Stack
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS StackVoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS Stack
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS StackVikas Shokeen
 
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...Zorays Solar Pakistan
 
Gsm architecture and call flow
Gsm architecture and call flowGsm architecture and call flow
Gsm architecture and call flowMohd Nazir Shakeel
 
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting Assim Mubder
 
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice CallSimplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call3G4G
 

Mais procurados (20)

Ericsson optimization opti
Ericsson optimization optiEricsson optimization opti
Ericsson optimization opti
 
GSM CALL FLOW
GSM CALL FLOWGSM CALL FLOW
GSM CALL FLOW
 
Kpi analysis
Kpi analysisKpi analysis
Kpi analysis
 
Roaming International - Stratégies
Roaming International - StratégiesRoaming International - Stratégies
Roaming International - Stratégies
 
Call flows
Call flowsCall flows
Call flows
 
What is SS7? An Introduction to Signaling System 7
What is SS7?  An Introduction to Signaling System 7What is SS7?  An Introduction to Signaling System 7
What is SS7? An Introduction to Signaling System 7
 
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.001 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00
1 omo112050 bsc6000 gsm v9 r8c12 cell parameters issue1.00
 
GSM Channel Concept
GSM Channel ConceptGSM Channel Concept
GSM Channel Concept
 
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...
2 g and 3g kpi improvement by parameter optimization (nsn, ericsson, huawei) ...
 
c1 & c2 values
c1 & c2 values c1 & c2 values
c1 & c2 values
 
VoLTE flows - basics
VoLTE flows - basicsVoLTE flows - basics
VoLTE flows - basics
 
Basic GSM Call Flows
Basic GSM Call FlowsBasic GSM Call Flows
Basic GSM Call Flows
 
Gsm security
Gsm securityGsm security
Gsm security
 
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS Stack
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS StackVoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS Stack
VoLTE Interfaces , Protocols & IMS Stack
 
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...
Gsm architecture, gsm network identities, network cases, cell planning, and c...
 
Gsm architecture and call flow
Gsm architecture and call flowGsm architecture and call flow
Gsm architecture and call flow
 
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting
Call Setup Success Rate Definition and Troubleshooting
 
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice CallSimplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call
Simplified Call Flow Signaling: 2G/3G Voice Call
 
Sdcch drop rate
Sdcch  drop  rateSdcch  drop  rate
Sdcch drop rate
 
Gsm channels
Gsm channelsGsm channels
Gsm channels
 

Semelhante a Authentication and Ciphering

Gsm security and encryption
Gsm security and encryptionGsm security and encryption
Gsm security and encryptionRK Nayak
 
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and Bitcoin
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and BitcoinCrypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and Bitcoin
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and BitcoinPriyanka Aash
 
Securing Wireless Cellular Systems
Securing Wireless Cellular SystemsSecuring Wireless Cellular Systems
Securing Wireless Cellular SystemsACMBangalore
 
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010Alex Tan
 
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2 IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2 mohammad norozzudegan
 
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2Client server computing in mobile environments part 2
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2Praveen Joshi
 
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...IRJET Journal
 
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity Analysis
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity AnalysisMultiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity Analysis
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity AnalysisIJCERT
 
IMS/RCS Technology
IMS/RCS TechnologyIMS/RCS Technology
IMS/RCS TechnologyLeliwa
 
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath Control
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath ControlSSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath Control
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath ControlMike Thompson
 
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)Hamidreza Bolhasani
 
Authenticated Encryption Gcm Ccm
Authenticated Encryption Gcm CcmAuthenticated Encryption Gcm Ccm
Authenticated Encryption Gcm CcmVittorio Giovara
 
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system Syed Ahmad Chan Bukhari, PhD
 
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...Amazon Web Services
 
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTS
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTSA REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTS
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTSIJNSA Journal
 

Semelhante a Authentication and Ciphering (20)

Security Issues Implement GSM.pptx
Security Issues Implement GSM.pptxSecurity Issues Implement GSM.pptx
Security Issues Implement GSM.pptx
 
Gsm
GsmGsm
Gsm
 
Gsm security and encryption
Gsm security and encryptionGsm security and encryption
Gsm security and encryption
 
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and Bitcoin
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and BitcoinCrypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and Bitcoin
Crypto 101: Encryption, Codebreaking, SSL and Bitcoin
 
Securing Wireless Cellular Systems
Securing Wireless Cellular SystemsSecuring Wireless Cellular Systems
Securing Wireless Cellular Systems
 
Final gsm1
Final gsm1Final gsm1
Final gsm1
 
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010
Ghl systems net matrix terminal line encryption 2009 2010
 
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2 IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2
IMS Authentication with AKAv1 and AKAv2
 
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2Client server computing in mobile environments part 2
Client server computing in mobile environments part 2
 
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...
Conservation Of Battery Power by Alleviating DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor N...
 
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity Analysis
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity AnalysisMultiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity Analysis
Multiple Encryption using ECC and Its Time Complexity Analysis
 
IMS/RCS Technology
IMS/RCS TechnologyIMS/RCS Technology
IMS/RCS Technology
 
Gsm
GsmGsm
Gsm
 
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath Control
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath ControlSSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath Control
SSL/TLS Eavesdropping with Fullpath Control
 
Mamouth white paper
Mamouth white paperMamouth white paper
Mamouth white paper
 
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)
Mobile Networks Architecture and Security (2G to 5G)
 
Authenticated Encryption Gcm Ccm
Authenticated Encryption Gcm CcmAuthenticated Encryption Gcm Ccm
Authenticated Encryption Gcm Ccm
 
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system
AN Intelligent Realtime multiple vessel collision risk assessment system
 
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...
AWS re:Invent 2016: Encryption: It Was the Best of Controls, It Was the Worst...
 
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTS
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTSA REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTS
A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING IDENTITY PRIVACY IN UMTS
 

Mais de Sokunth Che

Location Updating
Location UpdatingLocation Updating
Location UpdatingSokunth Che
 
Switching System
Switching SystemSwitching System
Switching SystemSokunth Che
 
Base Station System
Base Station SystemBase Station System
Base Station SystemSokunth Che
 
Access And Radio Theory
Access And Radio TheoryAccess And Radio Theory
Access And Radio TheorySokunth Che
 
System Introduction
System IntroductionSystem Introduction
System IntroductionSokunth Che
 
GSM Among Other Systems
GSM Among Other SystemsGSM Among Other Systems
GSM Among Other SystemsSokunth Che
 
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologies
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologiesIntroduction to packet service evolution & new technologies
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologiesSokunth Che
 
Basic english usage
Basic english usageBasic english usage
Basic english usageSokunth Che
 

Mais de Sokunth Che (14)

SMS
SMSSMS
SMS
 
Handover
HandoverHandover
Handover
 
Call Setup
Call SetupCall Setup
Call Setup
 
Location Updating
Location UpdatingLocation Updating
Location Updating
 
Switching System
Switching SystemSwitching System
Switching System
 
Base Station System
Base Station SystemBase Station System
Base Station System
 
Mobile Station
Mobile StationMobile Station
Mobile Station
 
Cell Planning
Cell PlanningCell Planning
Cell Planning
 
Access And Radio Theory
Access And Radio TheoryAccess And Radio Theory
Access And Radio Theory
 
Air Interface
Air InterfaceAir Interface
Air Interface
 
System Introduction
System IntroductionSystem Introduction
System Introduction
 
GSM Among Other Systems
GSM Among Other SystemsGSM Among Other Systems
GSM Among Other Systems
 
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologies
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologiesIntroduction to packet service evolution & new technologies
Introduction to packet service evolution & new technologies
 
Basic english usage
Basic english usageBasic english usage
Basic english usage
 

Último

1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi 6.pdf
1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi  6.pdf1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi  6.pdf
1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi 6.pdfQucHHunhnh
 
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphZ Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphThiyagu K
 
9548086042 for call girls in Indira Nagar with room service
9548086042  for call girls in Indira Nagar  with room service9548086042  for call girls in Indira Nagar  with room service
9548086042 for call girls in Indira Nagar with room servicediscovermytutordmt
 
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...anjaliyadav012327
 
Organic Name Reactions for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
Organic Name Reactions  for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptxOrganic Name Reactions  for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
Organic Name Reactions for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptxVS Mahajan Coaching Centre
 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxSOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxiammrhaywood
 
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global ImpactBeyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global ImpactPECB
 
microwave assisted reaction. General introduction
microwave assisted reaction. General introductionmicrowave assisted reaction. General introduction
microwave assisted reaction. General introductionMaksud Ahmed
 
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)eniolaolutunde
 
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp 9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp  9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp  9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp 9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...Pooja Nehwal
 
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdf
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdfDisha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdf
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdfchloefrazer622
 
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxCARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxGaneshChakor2
 
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptx
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptxThe basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptx
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptxheathfieldcps1
 
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy Consulting
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy ConsultingGrant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy Consulting
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy ConsultingTechSoup
 
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SD
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SDMeasures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SD
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SDThiyagu K
 
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104misteraugie
 
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3JemimahLaneBuaron
 
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeMeasures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeThiyagu K
 

Último (20)

1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi 6.pdf
1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi  6.pdf1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi  6.pdf
1029-Danh muc Sach Giao Khoa khoi 6.pdf
 
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphZ Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
 
9548086042 for call girls in Indira Nagar with room service
9548086042  for call girls in Indira Nagar  with room service9548086042  for call girls in Indira Nagar  with room service
9548086042 for call girls in Indira Nagar with room service
 
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...
JAPAN: ORGANISATION OF PMDA, PHARMACEUTICAL LAWS & REGULATIONS, TYPES OF REGI...
 
Advance Mobile Application Development class 07
Advance Mobile Application Development class 07Advance Mobile Application Development class 07
Advance Mobile Application Development class 07
 
Organic Name Reactions for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
Organic Name Reactions  for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptxOrganic Name Reactions  for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
Organic Name Reactions for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxSOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
 
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global ImpactBeyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
 
microwave assisted reaction. General introduction
microwave assisted reaction. General introductionmicrowave assisted reaction. General introduction
microwave assisted reaction. General introduction
 
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
 
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp 9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp  9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp  9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...
Russian Call Girls in Andheri Airport Mumbai WhatsApp 9167673311 💞 Full Nigh...
 
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdf
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdfDisha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdf
Disha NEET Physics Guide for classes 11 and 12.pdf
 
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxCARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
 
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptx
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptxThe basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptx
The basics of sentences session 2pptx copy.pptx
 
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy Consulting
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy ConsultingGrant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy Consulting
Grant Readiness 101 TechSoup and Remy Consulting
 
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SD
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SDMeasures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SD
Measures of Dispersion and Variability: Range, QD, AD and SD
 
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104
Nutritional Needs Presentation - HLTH 104
 
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3
Q4-W6-Restating Informational Text Grade 3
 
Mattingly "AI & Prompt Design: Structured Data, Assistants, & RAG"
Mattingly "AI & Prompt Design: Structured Data, Assistants, & RAG"Mattingly "AI & Prompt Design: Structured Data, Assistants, & RAG"
Mattingly "AI & Prompt Design: Structured Data, Assistants, & RAG"
 
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeMeasures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
 

Authentication and Ciphering

  • 1. CIPHERING AND AUTHENTICATION IN GSM Presented by : Mr. Che Sokunth
  • 2. OBJECTIVES  Authentication o To check whether the MS is authorized to access the network oTo provide parameters that enable the MS to calculate a new ciphering key o To understand the Key Generation Algorithm  Ciphering o To prevent user information and security over Um interface o To understand the ciphering algorithm and involve parameter PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 3. AUTHENTICATION o When The Authentication procedure start?  The Subscriber data is changed in VLR or HLR  The MS first access to the network  The Kc is mismatch  The first time a subscriber initiated the service  MS originates a call.  MS is called.  MS is activated or deactivated.  Supplementary service is initiated. PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 4. AUTHENTICATION OVERVIEW oThe Authentication triplet: RAND, Kc and SERS o When registering, each subscriber is assigned MSISDN and IMSI o The SIM writer generate the IMSI and Ki o The AuC use PRNG to generate the Random number RAND oIn AuC. The RAND and Ki are used to generated SRES through algorithm A3 and Kc through algorithm A8 PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 5. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 1 When a MS requests access to the network, the MSC/VLR will normally require the MS to authenticate. The MSC will forward the IMSI to the HLR and request authentication Triplets. Request Access, IMSI Request TMSI or IMSI Authentication Triplet MS MSC HLR PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 6. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 2 When the HLR receives the IMSI and the authentication request, it first checks its database to make sure the IMSI is valid and belongs to the network. Once it has accomplished this, it will forward the IMSI and authentication request to the Authentication Center (AuC). Request Access, IMSI Request TMSI or IMSI Authentication Triplet MS MSC HLR IMSI, Request Triplet AuC PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 7. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 3 The AuC will use the IMSI to look up the Ki associated with that IMSI. The Ki is the individual subscriber authentication key. It is a 128-bit number that is paired with an IMSI when the SIM card is created. The Ki is only stored on the SIM card and at the AuC. The Auc will also generate a 128-bit random number called the RAND. IMSI RAND AuC Ki PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 8. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 4 The RAND and the Ki are inputted into the A3 encryption algorithm. The output is the 32-bit Signed Response (SRES). The SRES is essentially the "challenge" sent to the MS when authentication is requested. AuC RAND Ki A3 SRES PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 9. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 4 The RAND and Ki are input into the A8 encryption algorithm. The output is the 64-bit Kc. The Kc is the ciphering key that is used in the A5 encryption algorithm to encipher and decipher the data that is being transmitted on the Um interface. AuC RAND Ki RAND Ki A3 A8 SRES Kc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 10. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 5 The RAND, SRES, and Kc are collectively known as the Triplets. The AuC may generate many sets of Triplets and send them to the requesting MSC/VLR. This is in order to reduce the signalling overhead that would result if the MSC/VLR requested one set of triplets every time it wanted to authenticate the. It should be noted that a set of triplets is unique to one IMSI, it can not be used with any other IMSI. AuC RAND Ki RAND Ki A3 A8 Triplet RAND, SRES, Kc RAND, SRES, Kc RAND, SRES, Kc SRES Kc RAND, SRES, Kc RAND, SRES, Kc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 11. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 6 Once the AuC has generated the triplets (or sets of triplets), it forwards them to the HLR. The HLR subsequently sends them to the requesting MSC/VLR. IMSI Triplet MSC HLR IMSI Triplet AuC PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 12. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 7 The MSC stores the Kc and the SRES but forwards the RAND to the MS and orders it to authenticate. RAND RAND MS MSC SRER Kc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 13. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE - 8 The MS has the Ki stored on the SIM card. The A3 and A8 algorithms also reside on the SIM card. The RAND and Ki are inputted into the A3 and A8 encryption algorithms to generate the SRES and the Kc respectively. MS RAND Ki RAND Ki A3 A8 SRES Kc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 14. CIPHERING OVERVIEW  The information is ciphered on the Um interface. The implementation of ciphering guarantees the information security and prevents user information or conversation contents from unauthorized access by using the same Kc  The A8 algorithm is used to generation the Kc base on the basic of the capability of BTS and MS with the same Ki and RAND  The A5 algorithm is used to cipher and decipher the information (Signaling, Speech and Data) between BTS and MS  NEs involved : MS, BTS, BSC, MSC/VLR, HLR and AUc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 15. KC AND ALGORITHMS SELECTION oKc is computed on the MS and network side by using the A8 algorithm (Ki and RAND) oIn the call access procedure, the MS sends an Establish Indication message to the BSC • If ECSC set to No, Classmark 1 or Classmark 2 is sent, indicating that MS support A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3 Ciphering Algorithm • If ECSC set to Yes, Classmark 1, Classmark 2 and Classmark 3 is sent, indicating that A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, A5/4, A5/5, A5/6, and A5/7 ciphering algorithms. PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 16. CIPHERING PROCEDURE When the Authentication procedure is completed. The MSC send the Ciphering Command message (Kc) that order MS should perform the Ciphering and which Ciphering Algorithm should be used. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1. Pre-send Triplet to VLR RAND RAND SDCCH 2. Authentication Request CKSN T3260 Start SDCCH 2. Authentication Response SRES 4. Starting Ciphering T3260 Stop SDCCH/A5 Kc 5. Ciphering Mode Command and Complete Kc The ciphering procedure generally applies to location update, service access, and inter-BSC handover PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 17. CIPHERING PROCEDURE- COMPLETE The BTS inputs the Kc and the data payload into the A5 encryption algorithm resulting in an enciphered data stream. The MS also inputs the Kc and the data payload into the A5 encryption algorithm resulting in an enciphered data stream. It should be noted that the A5 algorithm is a function of the Mobile Equipment (ME) and not the SIM card. On receiving a valid Ciphering Mode message , MS load the Kc in the SIM card and compare. If not, MS sends an RR Status Message – Protocol Error and no further processing. Data Data MS A5 Ciphering Data A5 Kc Kc PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE
  • 18. REFERENCE DOCUMENT  GBSS12.0 – Authentication and Ciphering  ETSI GSM TS 08.08  ETSI GSM TS 04.08  Telecomedu.blogspot.com PRESENTED BY: MR. SOKUNTH CHE

Notas do Editor

  1. The A5 ciphering algorithm generates a 114-bit encryption serial number a 114-bit decryption serial number based on the 64-bit Kc stored in the MS and the network3.3 Algorithm SelectionThe ciphering algorithms are selected on the basis of the capabilities of the network and MS.The process of selecting the ciphering algorithms is as follows:1. In the call access procedure, the MS sends an Establish Indication message to the BSC.- If the parameter ECSC in the system information is set to No, the MS reports Classmark 1 or Classmark 2, indicating whether the MS supports A5/1, A5/2, and A5/3 ciphering algorithms.- If the parameter ECSC in the system information is set to Yes, the MS reports Classmark 1, Classmark 2, and Classmark 3, indicating whether the MS supports A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, A5/4, A5/5, A5/6, and A5/7 ciphering algorithms.2. On receiving the Ciphering Mode Command message from the MSC, the BSC checks the classmarks reported by the MS. If the BSC does not receive Classmark 3, the BSC sends a Classmark Enquiry message to the MS, asking the MS to report Classmark 3. Classmark 3 defines whether an MS supports A5/4, A5/5, A5/6, and A5/7 ciphering algorithms.The selection of the ciphering algorithms follows the following principles:.. The ciphering algorithms to be adopted should be those allowed in the ciphering command delivered by the MSC, allowed in the BSC data configuration, and supported by the MS... The BSC selects the appropriate ciphering algorithms based on the priorities of the algorithms, and then sends an Encryption Mode Command message to the BTS.
  2. If authentication is successful, the VLR will request the MSC to start ciphering procedures using the “Start Ciphering” message. This message contains information indicating whether ciphering is required. If authentication fails the HLR will be notified and an “Authentication Reject” message will be sent to the mobile.The MSC will start ciphering procedures by sending the “Ciphering Mode Command” This message contains the encryption information required by the BSS. The new mode is applied for reception on the network side after the message has been sent. In the CIPHER MODE COMMAND, the MSC specifies which of the ciphering algorithms may be used by the BSS. Upon receipt of the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message indicating ciphering, the mobile station shall start transmission and reception in the indicated mode. Whenever the mobile station receives a valid CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message, it shall, if a SIM is present and considered valid by the ME and the ciphering key sequence number stored on the SIM indicates that a ciphering key is available, load the ciphering key stored on the SIM into the ME. The BSS then selects an appropriate algorithm, taking into account the MS ciphering capabilities. The CIPHER MODE COMPLETE message returned to the MSC indicates the chosen ciphering algorithm message to the BSS. Upon receipt of the CIPHERING MODE COMPLETE message the network starts transmission in the new mode. Whether the traffic or signaling information between the mobile and the BTS can be encrypted. Generally, A5 algorithms and KC(ciphering key) are used during the ciphering. For the encryption (MS or BTS) , the information is processed with KC via A5;for the decryption(BTS or MS),the received information is also processed with KC via A5.