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SQL Injection – The Unknown Story
Rob Rachwald, Director of Security Strategy, Imperva
Live Webinar - October 26, 2011
Agenda

 SQL Injection: A Short Primer
 SQL Injection Today
   + Attack Statistics
   + Attack Process
   + Attack Tools
 Mitigation Checklist
Today’s Presenter
Rob Rachwald, Dir. of Security Strategy, Imperva
 Research
   + Directs security strategy
   + Works with the Imperva Application Defense Center
 Security experience
   + Fortify Software and Coverity
   + Helped secure Intel’s supply chain software
   + Extensive international experience in Japan, China, France, and
      Australia
 Thought leadership
   + Presented at RSA, InfoSec, OWASP, ISACA
   + Appearances on CNN, SkyNews, BBC, NY Times, and USA Today
 Graduated from University of California, Berkeley
SQL Injection Primer
Reason for Data Loss from Hacking: 2005-2011



                                          Other
                                          17%




                                                    SQL injection
                                                       83%




                                       Total=315,424,147 records
                                             (856 breaches)
Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Total Web Application Vulnerabilities


   # of websites
   (estimated: July 2011)*                    : 357,292,065
                                                x
   # of vulnerabilities**                     : 230
                                                                1%

                                            821,771,600
                    vulnerabilities in active circulation
*Source: http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2011/07/08/july-2011-web-server-survey.html
**Source: https://www.whitehatsec.com/home/resource/stats.
How Many SQL Injections?

            821,771,600
    vulnerabilities in active circulation

         What About SQL Injections?
          10%?     82,177,160
          20%?     164,354,320
          30%?     246,531,480
SQL Injection Means Business, Literally
SQL Injection: Defined
SQL Injection: Technical Impact


             Retrieve sensitive data from the
             organization




             Steal the site’s administrator password




             Lead to the downloading of malware
SQL Injection: Business Impact




        Breach Date
       March 15, 2011
                              Breach Date
                            January 19, 2009
SQL Injection Today: Attack Stats
Still a Very Relevant Attack


 On average, we identified 53 SQLi attacks per hour and
  1,093 attacks per day.
SQL Injections By the Hour
Majority of Attacks from Small Number of Hosts


 41% of all SQLi attacks originated from just 10 hosts
SQL Injection Today: Attack Process
Hackers Increasingly Bypass Simple Defenses
   1'/**/aND/**/'8'='3


1 DeClARe @x varchar(99) set
@x=0x77616974666f722064656
c61792027303a303a323027
exec(@x)--

   concat() and char()


    x' wAiTfOr dELay '0:0:20'--
Getting Started

 Option 1a: Dorking
   + Intent: Find something generally vulnerable
 Option 1b: General purpose scanner
   + Intent: Find something specifically vulnerable
Step 1a: Google Dorks
Step 1a: Google Dorks



                        What is It?
  A google search term targeted at finding vulnerable websites.


               How Does It Work?
  An attacker armed with a browser and a dork can start listing
    potential attack targets. By using search engine results an
  attacker not only lists vulnerable servers but also gets a pretty
    accurate idea as to which resources within that server are
                        potentially vulnerable.
Dorking in Action
Automated Dorking (Desktop)
Carrying Out Attacks via Compromised Hosts
Dork Power: Queries Per Hour
Dork Power: Queries Per Day
Dorking in Action (Non SQL Example)
Dork Origins

         Country          # of Dork Queries   % of Dork Queries
 Islamic Republic of Iran      227,554               41
 Hungary                       136,445               25
 Germany                        80,448               15
 United States                  19,237               3.5
 Chile                          17,365                3
 Thailand                       16,717                3
 Republic of Korea              11,872                2
 France                         10,906                2
 Belgium                        10,661                2
 Brazil                          7,559               1.5
 Other                          8,892                 2
Step 1b: Scanners

 Choose the target site
 Scan it with scanner to find vulnerabilities
 Expand the vulnerability into full blown exploit
Step 1b: Automated Scanning, Service
Step 1b: Automated Scanning, Service
Step 3: Automated Attack Tools

        SQLmap




                                 Havij
Automated Tools

 Havij/SQLmap pick up where scanner stops and exploit
  the application
    + Inserts sql statements
    + Will not scan full app, just specific areas. Makes a small hole
      really big
    + Fetches specific information, such as column data
SQLi Attack Vectors

 Direct query manipulation
 Discovering the database structure
 Union Select SQL injection
 Time-based blind SQL injection
 Bypassing simple parameter sanitation
Step 4: Harvest
SQL Injection Today: Attack Tools
Main Automated Attack Tools

       SQLmap




                              Havij
Attacks From Automated Tools
Mitigation Checklist
Step 1: Dork Yourself

 Put detection policies in place (using the data source
  monitoring solution) to depict move of sensitive data to
  public facing servers.
 Regularly schedule “clean ups”. Every once in a
  while, a clean-up should be scheduled in order to verify
  that no sensitive data resides in these publicly accessible
  servers.
 Periodically look for new data stores that hold
  sensitive data. Tools exist today to assist in the task of
  detecting database servers in the network and classifying
  their contents.
Step 2: Create and Deploy a Blacklist of Hosts
that Initiated SQLi Attacks

                       Positives
                         + Blocks up to 40% of
                           attack traffic
                         + Easy
                       Negatives
                         + Does not deal with the
                           underlying problem
Step 3: Use a WAF to Detect/Block Attacks

 Positives
   + Can block many attacks
   + Relatively easy
   + Can accelerate SDLC
 Negatives
   + Can become a crutch
   + Potential for false positives
Step 4: WAF + Vulnerability Scanner



                    “Security No-Brainer #9:
                Application Vulnerability Scanners
                   Should Communicate with
                      Application Firewalls”
                                                 —Neil MacDonald, Gartner




Source: http://blogs.gartner.com/neil_macdonald/2009/08/19/security-no-brainer-9-application-vulnerability-
scanners-should-communicate-with-application-firewalls/
Virtual Patching through Scanner Integration

 Apply SecureSphere policies based on scan
 results
 Monitor attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities
 Fix and test vulnerabilities on your schedule


                             Scanner finds
                             vulnerabilities
        Customer
        Site

                      SecureSphere imports
Monitor and protect
                          scan results
 Web applications
Step 5: Stop Automated Attack Tools

                     Positives
                       + Detects automated tool
                          fingerprints to block many
                          attacks
                        + Relatively easy
                     Negatives
                       + Potential for false
                          positives
Step 6: Code Fixing

                       Positives
                         + Root cause fixed
                         + Earlier is cheaper
                       Negatives
                         + Expensive, time
                            consuming
                          + Never-ending process
Summary: The Anti-SQL Stack


              Dork Yourself

                Blacklist

                  WAF

                WAF + VA
             Stop Automated
                 Attacks
               Code Fixing
About Imperva
Our Story in 60 Seconds




        Attack              Usage
      Protection            Audit

       Virtual              Rights
      Patching            Management

      Reputation            Access
       Controls             Control
Webinar Materials

 Get LinkedIn to
 Imperva Data Security Direct for…

                            Answers to
        Post-Webinar
                             Attendee
         Discussions
                            Questions



      Webinar Recording    ADC Research
            Link             Report
www.imperva.com

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SQL Injection - The Unknown Story

  • 1. SQL Injection – The Unknown Story Rob Rachwald, Director of Security Strategy, Imperva Live Webinar - October 26, 2011
  • 2. Agenda  SQL Injection: A Short Primer  SQL Injection Today + Attack Statistics + Attack Process + Attack Tools  Mitigation Checklist
  • 3. Today’s Presenter Rob Rachwald, Dir. of Security Strategy, Imperva  Research + Directs security strategy + Works with the Imperva Application Defense Center  Security experience + Fortify Software and Coverity + Helped secure Intel’s supply chain software + Extensive international experience in Japan, China, France, and Australia  Thought leadership + Presented at RSA, InfoSec, OWASP, ISACA + Appearances on CNN, SkyNews, BBC, NY Times, and USA Today  Graduated from University of California, Berkeley
  • 5. Reason for Data Loss from Hacking: 2005-2011 Other 17% SQL injection 83% Total=315,424,147 records (856 breaches) Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
  • 6. Total Web Application Vulnerabilities # of websites (estimated: July 2011)* : 357,292,065 x # of vulnerabilities** : 230 1% 821,771,600 vulnerabilities in active circulation *Source: http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2011/07/08/july-2011-web-server-survey.html **Source: https://www.whitehatsec.com/home/resource/stats.
  • 7. How Many SQL Injections? 821,771,600 vulnerabilities in active circulation What About SQL Injections?  10%? 82,177,160  20%? 164,354,320  30%? 246,531,480
  • 8. SQL Injection Means Business, Literally
  • 10. SQL Injection: Technical Impact Retrieve sensitive data from the organization Steal the site’s administrator password Lead to the downloading of malware
  • 11. SQL Injection: Business Impact Breach Date March 15, 2011 Breach Date January 19, 2009
  • 12. SQL Injection Today: Attack Stats
  • 13. Still a Very Relevant Attack  On average, we identified 53 SQLi attacks per hour and 1,093 attacks per day.
  • 14. SQL Injections By the Hour
  • 15. Majority of Attacks from Small Number of Hosts  41% of all SQLi attacks originated from just 10 hosts
  • 16. SQL Injection Today: Attack Process
  • 17. Hackers Increasingly Bypass Simple Defenses 1'/**/aND/**/'8'='3 1 DeClARe @x varchar(99) set @x=0x77616974666f722064656 c61792027303a303a323027 exec(@x)-- concat() and char() x' wAiTfOr dELay '0:0:20'--
  • 18. Getting Started  Option 1a: Dorking + Intent: Find something generally vulnerable  Option 1b: General purpose scanner + Intent: Find something specifically vulnerable
  • 20. Step 1a: Google Dorks What is It? A google search term targeted at finding vulnerable websites. How Does It Work? An attacker armed with a browser and a dork can start listing potential attack targets. By using search engine results an attacker not only lists vulnerable servers but also gets a pretty accurate idea as to which resources within that server are potentially vulnerable.
  • 23. Carrying Out Attacks via Compromised Hosts
  • 26. Dorking in Action (Non SQL Example)
  • 27. Dork Origins Country # of Dork Queries % of Dork Queries Islamic Republic of Iran 227,554 41 Hungary 136,445 25 Germany 80,448 15 United States 19,237 3.5 Chile 17,365 3 Thailand 16,717 3 Republic of Korea 11,872 2 France 10,906 2 Belgium 10,661 2 Brazil 7,559 1.5 Other 8,892 2
  • 28. Step 1b: Scanners  Choose the target site  Scan it with scanner to find vulnerabilities  Expand the vulnerability into full blown exploit
  • 29. Step 1b: Automated Scanning, Service
  • 30. Step 1b: Automated Scanning, Service
  • 31. Step 3: Automated Attack Tools SQLmap Havij
  • 32. Automated Tools  Havij/SQLmap pick up where scanner stops and exploit the application + Inserts sql statements + Will not scan full app, just specific areas. Makes a small hole really big + Fetches specific information, such as column data
  • 33. SQLi Attack Vectors  Direct query manipulation  Discovering the database structure  Union Select SQL injection  Time-based blind SQL injection  Bypassing simple parameter sanitation
  • 35. SQL Injection Today: Attack Tools
  • 36. Main Automated Attack Tools SQLmap Havij
  • 39. Step 1: Dork Yourself  Put detection policies in place (using the data source monitoring solution) to depict move of sensitive data to public facing servers.  Regularly schedule “clean ups”. Every once in a while, a clean-up should be scheduled in order to verify that no sensitive data resides in these publicly accessible servers.  Periodically look for new data stores that hold sensitive data. Tools exist today to assist in the task of detecting database servers in the network and classifying their contents.
  • 40. Step 2: Create and Deploy a Blacklist of Hosts that Initiated SQLi Attacks  Positives + Blocks up to 40% of attack traffic + Easy  Negatives + Does not deal with the underlying problem
  • 41. Step 3: Use a WAF to Detect/Block Attacks  Positives + Can block many attacks + Relatively easy + Can accelerate SDLC  Negatives + Can become a crutch + Potential for false positives
  • 42. Step 4: WAF + Vulnerability Scanner “Security No-Brainer #9: Application Vulnerability Scanners Should Communicate with Application Firewalls” —Neil MacDonald, Gartner Source: http://blogs.gartner.com/neil_macdonald/2009/08/19/security-no-brainer-9-application-vulnerability- scanners-should-communicate-with-application-firewalls/
  • 43. Virtual Patching through Scanner Integration  Apply SecureSphere policies based on scan results  Monitor attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities  Fix and test vulnerabilities on your schedule Scanner finds vulnerabilities Customer Site SecureSphere imports Monitor and protect scan results Web applications
  • 44. Step 5: Stop Automated Attack Tools  Positives + Detects automated tool fingerprints to block many attacks + Relatively easy  Negatives + Potential for false positives
  • 45. Step 6: Code Fixing  Positives + Root cause fixed + Earlier is cheaper  Negatives + Expensive, time consuming + Never-ending process
  • 46. Summary: The Anti-SQL Stack Dork Yourself Blacklist WAF WAF + VA Stop Automated Attacks Code Fixing
  • 48. Our Story in 60 Seconds Attack Usage Protection Audit Virtual Rights Patching Management Reputation Access Controls Control
  • 49. Webinar Materials Get LinkedIn to Imperva Data Security Direct for… Answers to Post-Webinar Attendee Discussions Questions Webinar Recording ADC Research Link Report