SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 40
Making and breaking 
security in embedded 
devices 
Yashin Mehaboobe 
SDR Engineer, Bastille Networks
#whoami 
•Security enthusiast 
•SDR Engineer @ Bastille Networks 
•Hardware tinkerer 
•Speaker: C0C0n 2013, Nullcon V, HITB Amsterdam and Kaspersky Cyberconference 
•Organiser, Defcon Kerala 
twitter.com/YashinMehaboobe 
github.com/sp3ctr3 
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/yashin-mehaboobe/38/a2/367
Why embedded? 
•Large numbers 
•Critical infrastructure dependent on embedded devices 
•Network devices (both enterprise and SOHO) 
•Even if it’s not critical: 
•Botnet fodder 
•Pivoting 
•Storage for the bad guys 
•On the internet and unsecured (Mostly)
But…..why?! 
•REPRODUCTION: 
•Understand how the product works by reverse engineering it 
•Build a similar product 
•$$$$$Profit$$$$$$$$ 
•FREE STUFF!: 
•Bypass restrictions 
•Get premium services 
•UNLOCKING FEATURES: 
•Ex:Install dd-wrt 
•Don’t have to pay extra
But…..why?! 
•ACCESS TO OTHERWISE SECURE NETWORKS 
•No one expects the embedded inquisition! 
•SOHO/Enterprise routers are not audited most times 
•No one checks the firmware
TOOLS OF THE TRADE 
Choose your weapons!
A word about equipment 
•Good equipment = $$$$ 
•Use open source equipment such as the bus pirate, hackRF, OpenBench etc… 
•Commercial tools work better in most of the cases 
•Would be a good investment 
•Have at least one each of the separate categories of tools 
•Logic Analyzer 
•RF Spectrum Analyzer 
•Oscilloscope 
•JTAG debugger 
•Etc……
LOGIC ANALYZERS 
•Monitor communication 
•Decode protocols 
•Replay (in some cases) 
•Cheap (44$ to 500$++) 
•Open source ones: 
•Open Bench 
•Bus Pirate
RF Analysis tools 
•For scanning the RF frequencies 
•Recognizing signals 
•Storing and replay 
•SDRs are your friends! 
•Example: 
•RFExplorer 
•RTL-SDR 
•HackRF/BladeRF/USRP
Oscilloscope 
•Digital/Analog 
•Useful for noting timing 
•Can also help in recognition of 
communication protocol 
•Very much needed
Debug Ports
Debug ports FTW 
•Ports setup to allow developer/engineer access during testing/repairing 
•Loved by hackers because of the access it provides 
•Different types: 
•JTAG 
•Serial 
•LPC (Xbox/TPM) 
•Allow access to boot messages 
•Allows you to log in without authentication 
•Sometimes you can even access bash
Debug ports identification 
1.Identify the ports 
2.Connect the debugger/communication device 
3.Profit! 
•First step is the most complex 
•Methodology varies from protocol to protocol 
•Number of points is a good indication
Identifying Serial ports 
•Serial has 4 lines: 
•Vcc 
•Ground 
•Rx 
•Tx 
•Identify ground pin with a multimeter continuity test 
•Find vcc by powering up and checking vcc + ground with multimeter 
•Tx will be the pin with high activity 
•Rx will be the other 
•Identify baudrate by trial and error 
•JTAGulator has support for serial
JTAG ports 
•Joint Test Action Group 
•Used for debugging, updating firmware etc… 
•Running homebrew on Xbox 
•Dumping firmware 
•Use JTAGulator for finding JTAG ports 
•OpenOCD has support for a large number of JTAG 
debuggers
Defending against debug port attacks 
•Disable unneeded ports 
•Use authentication for the debug ports 
•Shell access should not be given without authentication 
•Unfortunately these defenses may not be practical in some cases
Electronic bus attacks
SPI,UART and I2C 
•SPI, UART and I2c are some of the more commonly used protocols in embedded 
devices 
•There is no authentication or authorization 
•It is trivial to sniff traffic 
•Very easy to replay attacks 
•Bus pirate would be a good tool 
•Hardware hackers swiss army knife 
•Developed by Dangerous Prototypes
Radio communication
Sniffing radio signals 
•Use to be hard and expensive 
•With the arrival of SDRs the situation changed 
•Now you can RX and TX with hardware ranging from 20$ RTL SDR to 1000$ devices 
•Most signals aren’t encrypted 
•Some rely on FHSS (Not a good idea)
Tools used 
•For most radio communication attacks an SDR would suffice 
•Mainly because they can TX and RX in a wide range of frequencies 
•Some examples are 
•USRP B210 
•HackRF 
•BladeRF 
•RTLSDR 
•You can also use RFCat (cc1111 based attack toolkit) 
•Ubertooth One can be used for Bluetooth sniffing 
•OR sniff the buses of the transmitter
RF attacks 
•Jamming 
•Basically DoS at RF level 
•Decreases SNR 
•Techniques differ 
•Some even disrupt handshakes 
•Replay 
•Capture signal 
•Store it 
•Replay at some other time
Defenses against RF attacks 
•FHSS is effective against jamming 
•Use of encryption will defeat most sniffing attacks 
•Encryption is built into most transmitters 
•Unfortunately it is not used as much as it should be 
•Rolling code system is a good defense against replay attack
Flash memory forensics
Flash memory 
•Nonvolatile 
•Used to store data 
•Firmware is usually stored in flash memory 
•Usually uses SPI for communication 
•Usually does not have any protection
Extracting data from flash memory 
•In circuit: 
•Don’t remove the chip 
•Use a chip programmer or bus pirate to read data 
•Desoldering 
•The chip should be removed by desoldering it. 
•It is then accessed using a chip programmer to get the data 
•Firmware can be extracted in this manner
Defenses against Flash memory 
forensics 
•OTP memory protection bits 
•Doesn’t allow the modification of flash memory 
•Only useful against modification attacks 
•Encryption 
•Storing the firmware/data encrypted would defeat memory forensics 
•Also not storing confidential info on the chip
Firmware/Code Analysis
(In)Security 
•Code is outdated in most devices 
•Routers are the worst transgressors 
•Most are internet facing 
•Have more vulns than a CTF challenge 
•Code is available for us to check and find vulns
Firmware 
•Almost always linux 
•Bootloader is usually Uboot 
•Serial output usually gives you hints about the device 
•Some may be obfuscated 
•Can be obtained by either: 
•JTAG dump 
•Flash dump via Serial 
•Flash dump via chip desoldering 
•From the company website
Analysing firmware 
•Usually various sections wrapped into one bin file 
•You can use dd to separate 
•Best option is to use binwalk 
•Binwalk is a tool by Craig (of devttys0 blog(great resource for hw reversing)) 
•Automatically analyze and extract firmware files
Defenses 
•Review your code! 
•Obfuscate your firmware 
•Review your code again!
Invasive attacks
Invasion of chips 
•Pretty easy to notice 
•Chips will be desoldered and/or destroyed in the process 
•Processors are mapped using microscopes 
•Very complicated attacks 
•Usually done for replication of chips
Resources 
Stuff that helped me and may help you
Blogs 
•http://www.devttys0.com/ 
•http://www.bunniestudios.com/ 
•http://travisgoodspeed.blogspot.com 
•http://www.grandideastudio.com/
Thanks! 
Questions?

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)
Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)
Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)Security Weekly
 
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008guest642391
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...CODE BLUE
 
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014Takeda Pharmaceuticals
 
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesTop 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesJustin Black
 
Security Testing: Fuzzing
Security Testing: FuzzingSecurity Testing: Fuzzing
Security Testing: FuzzingAndrei Rubaniuk
 
How to hide your browser 0-days
How to hide your browser 0-daysHow to hide your browser 0-days
How to hide your browser 0-daysZoltan Balazs
 
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against it
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against itRansomware - what is it, how to protect against it
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against itZoltan Balazs
 
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015CODE BLUE
 
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel Protector
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel ProtectorBlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel Protector
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel ProtectorSeunghun han
 
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabled
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode EnabledBSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabled
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabledpricemcdonald
 
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent SandboxHITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent SandboxSeunghun han
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...CODE BLUE
 
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_fin
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_finKavya racharla ndh-naropanth_fin
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_finPacSecJP
 
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization Technology
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization TechnologyA Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization Technology
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization TechnologyFFRI, Inc.
 
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad Usb
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad UsbHITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad Usb
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad UsbSeunghun han
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak Guilfanov
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak GuilfanovCODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak Guilfanov
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak GuilfanovCODE BLUE
 

Mais procurados (20)

Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)
Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)
Attacking Embedded Devices (No Axe Required)
 
Arduino Forensics
Arduino ForensicsArduino Forensics
Arduino Forensics
 
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - Hack in The Box Dubai 2008
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...
CODE BLUE 2014 : DeviceDisEnabler : A hypervisor which hides devices to prote...
 
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014
Hacker's and painters Hardware Hacking 101 - 10th Oct 2014
 
Fuzzing
FuzzingFuzzing
Fuzzing
 
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakesTop 10 secure boot mistakes
Top 10 secure boot mistakes
 
Security Testing: Fuzzing
Security Testing: FuzzingSecurity Testing: Fuzzing
Security Testing: Fuzzing
 
How to hide your browser 0-days
How to hide your browser 0-daysHow to hide your browser 0-days
How to hide your browser 0-days
 
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against it
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against itRansomware - what is it, how to protect against it
Ransomware - what is it, how to protect against it
 
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
 
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel Protector
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel ProtectorBlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel Protector
BlackHat Asia 2017-Myth and Truth about Hypervisor-Based Kernel Protector
 
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabled
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode EnabledBSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabled
BSides DFW2016-Hack Mode Enabled
 
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent SandboxHITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox
HITBSecConf 2017-Shadow-Box-the Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox
 
ShinoBOT Suite
ShinoBOT SuiteShinoBOT Suite
ShinoBOT Suite
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...
CODE BLUE 2014 : Embedded Security in The Land of the Rising Sun by BEN SCHMI...
 
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_fin
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_finKavya racharla ndh-naropanth_fin
Kavya racharla ndh-naropanth_fin
 
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization Technology
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization TechnologyA Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization Technology
A Hypervisor IPS based on Hardware Assisted Virtualization Technology
 
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad Usb
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad UsbHITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad Usb
HITBSecConf 2016-Create Your Own Bad Usb
 
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak Guilfanov
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak GuilfanovCODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak Guilfanov
CODE BLUE 2014 : [Keynote] IDA and digital security by Ilfak Guilfanov
 

Destaque

Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Jaap van Ekris
 
Securing embedded systems (for share)
Securing embedded systems (for share)Securing embedded systems (for share)
Securing embedded systems (for share)AndrewRJamieson
 
Network Security: Protecting SOHO Networks
Network Security: Protecting SOHO NetworksNetwork Security: Protecting SOHO Networks
Network Security: Protecting SOHO NetworksJim Gilsinn
 
Embedded based home security system
Embedded based home security systemEmbedded based home security system
Embedded based home security systemNIT srinagar
 
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of Things
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of ThingsEnabling embedded security for the Internet of Things
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of Thingsteam-WIBU
 
Security in embedded systems
Security in embedded systemsSecurity in embedded systems
Security in embedded systemsRaghav S
 
Embedded Systems Security
Embedded Systems Security Embedded Systems Security
Embedded Systems Security Malachi Jones
 
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure Device
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure DeviceEmbedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure Device
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure DevicePriyanka Aash
 
Network security and protocols
Network security and protocolsNetwork security and protocols
Network security and protocolsOnline
 
introduction to Embedded System Security
introduction to Embedded System Securityintroduction to Embedded System Security
introduction to Embedded System SecurityAdel Barkam
 
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014Security Weekly
 
ppt on embedded system
ppt on embedded systemppt on embedded system
ppt on embedded systemmanish katara
 
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
FirewallApo
 

Destaque (20)

PACE-IT: Securing the Workstation
PACE-IT: Securing the WorkstationPACE-IT: Securing the Workstation
PACE-IT: Securing the Workstation
 
Pace IT - Setting Up a SOHO Network
Pace IT - Setting Up a SOHO NetworkPace IT - Setting Up a SOHO Network
Pace IT - Setting Up a SOHO Network
 
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
Embedded Systems, Asset or Security Threat? (6 May 2014, (ICS)2 Secure Rotter...
 
Securing embedded systems (for share)
Securing embedded systems (for share)Securing embedded systems (for share)
Securing embedded systems (for share)
 
Network Security: Protecting SOHO Networks
Network Security: Protecting SOHO NetworksNetwork Security: Protecting SOHO Networks
Network Security: Protecting SOHO Networks
 
Embedded based home security system
Embedded based home security systemEmbedded based home security system
Embedded based home security system
 
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of Things
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of ThingsEnabling embedded security for the Internet of Things
Enabling embedded security for the Internet of Things
 
Security in embedded systems
Security in embedded systemsSecurity in embedded systems
Security in embedded systems
 
Embedded Systems Security
Embedded Systems Security Embedded Systems Security
Embedded Systems Security
 
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure Device
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure DeviceEmbedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure Device
Embedded Systems Security: Building a More Secure Device
 
Network security and protocols
Network security and protocolsNetwork security and protocols
Network security and protocols
 
Security in Embedded systems
Security in Embedded systems Security in Embedded systems
Security in Embedded systems
 
introduction to Embedded System Security
introduction to Embedded System Securityintroduction to Embedded System Security
introduction to Embedded System Security
 
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014
The Internet Of Insecure Things: 10 Most Wanted List - Derbycon 2014
 
Firewall
Firewall Firewall
Firewall
 
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
 
ppt on embedded system
ppt on embedded systemppt on embedded system
ppt on embedded system
 
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
Firewall
 
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
Firewall
 
Firewall presentation
Firewall presentationFirewall presentation
Firewall presentation
 

Semelhante a Making and breaking security in embedded devices

Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.
Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.
Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.Priyanka Aash
 
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trashSteelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trashinfodox
 
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hacked
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hackedDEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hacked
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hackedFelipe Prado
 
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon Yang
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon YangPractical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon Yang
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon YangLyon Yang
 
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...Alexander Bolshev
 
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...Felipe Prado
 
Network security basics
Network security basicsNetwork security basics
Network security basicsSkillspire LLC
 
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front Door
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front DoorSocially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front Door
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front DoorMike Felch
 
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...JosephTesta9
 
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bag
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bagHow to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bag
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bagBeau Bullock
 
Workshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityWorkshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityUC San Diego
 
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android DataDefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android DataMichael Smith
 
SIGFOX Makers Tour - Barcelona
SIGFOX Makers Tour - BarcelonaSIGFOX Makers Tour - Barcelona
SIGFOX Makers Tour - BarcelonaNicolas Lesconnec
 
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOT
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOTInsecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOT
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOTPrice McDonald
 

Semelhante a Making and breaking security in embedded devices (20)

Reverse engineering
Reverse engineeringReverse engineering
Reverse engineering
 
SIGFOX Makers Tour - Madrid
SIGFOX Makers Tour - MadridSIGFOX Makers Tour - Madrid
SIGFOX Makers Tour - Madrid
 
Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.
Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.
Breaking Smart Speakers: We are Listening to You.
 
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trashSteelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash
Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash
 
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hacked
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hackedDEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hacked
DEF CON 27 - XIAOHUIHUI - all the 4g modules could be hacked
 
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon Yang
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon YangPractical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon Yang
Practical IoT Exploitation (DEFCON23 IoTVillage) - Lyon Yang
 
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...
Practical reverse engineering and exploit development for AVR-based Embedded ...
 
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...
DEF CON 27 - ORANGE TSAI and MEH CHANG - infiltrating corporate intranet like...
 
Network security basics
Network security basicsNetwork security basics
Network security basics
 
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front Door
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front DoorSocially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front Door
Socially Acceptable Methods to Walk in the Front Door
 
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...
BSides Rochester 2018: Esteban Rodriguez: Ducky In The Middle: Injecting keys...
 
Coporate Espionage
Coporate EspionageCoporate Espionage
Coporate Espionage
 
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bag
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bagHow to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bag
How to Build Your Own Physical Pentesting Go-bag
 
Vectors
VectorsVectors
Vectors
 
Workshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityWorkshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network Security
 
Presentation1
Presentation1Presentation1
Presentation1
 
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android DataDefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data
DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data
 
SIGFOX Makers Tour - Barcelona
SIGFOX Makers Tour - BarcelonaSIGFOX Makers Tour - Barcelona
SIGFOX Makers Tour - Barcelona
 
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOT
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOTInsecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOT
Insecure Obsolete and Trivial - The Real IOT
 
Security Onion
Security OnionSecurity Onion
Security Onion
 

Último

办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一diploma 1
 
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...ttt fff
 
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...Amil baba
 
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作ss846v0c
 
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degreeyuu sss
 
existing product research b2 Sunderland Culture
existing product research b2 Sunderland Cultureexisting product research b2 Sunderland Culture
existing product research b2 Sunderland CultureChloeMeadows1
 
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubai
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls DubaiDubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubai
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubaikojalkojal131
 
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...Amil baba
 
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作f3774p8b
 
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)861c7ca49a02
 
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar ...
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert  in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar  ...Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert  in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar  ...
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar ...amilabibi1
 
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall Available
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall AvailableCall Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall Available
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall AvailableCall Girls in Delhi
 
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCR
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCRReal Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCR
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCRdollysharma2066
 
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...Amil Baba Dawood bangali
 
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degreeyuu sss
 
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptx
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptxthe cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptx
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptxLeaMaePahinagGarciaV
 
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degreeyuu sss
 
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一C SSS
 

Último (20)

办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(CSU毕业证书)澳洲查理斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...
毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#degree美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#毕业文凭制作#回国入职#diploma#d...
 
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...
NO1 Certified Vashikaran Specialist in Uk Black Magic Specialist in Uk Black ...
 
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作
美国IUB学位证,印第安纳大学伯明顿分校毕业证书1:1制作
 
young call girls in Gtb Nagar,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
young call girls in Gtb Nagar,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Serviceyoung call girls in Gtb Nagar,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
young call girls in Gtb Nagar,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
 
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
 
existing product research b2 Sunderland Culture
existing product research b2 Sunderland Cultureexisting product research b2 Sunderland Culture
existing product research b2 Sunderland Culture
 
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubai
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls DubaiDubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubai
Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Spring Break Fast Call Girls Dubai
 
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...
NO1 Qualified Best Black Magic Specialist Near Me Spiritual Healer Powerful L...
 
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Erfurt FH学位证,埃尔福特应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
 
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)
5S - House keeping (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke)
 
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar ...
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert  in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar  ...Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert  in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar  ...
Hindu amil baba kala jadu expert in pakistan islamabad lahore karachi atar ...
 
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall Available
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall AvailableCall Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall Available
Call Girls In Munirka>༒9599632723 Incall_OutCall Available
 
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCR
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCRReal Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCR
Real Sure (Call Girl) in I.G.I. Airport 8377087607 Hot Call Girls In Delhi NCR
 
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
NO1 Certified Black Magic Specialist Expert In Bahawalpur, Sargodha, Sialkot,...
 
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
专业一比一美国旧金山艺术学院毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实工艺展示#真实防伪#diploma#degree
 
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptx
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptxthe cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptx
the cOMPUTER SYSTEM - computer hardware servicing.pptx
 
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree
1:1原版定制美国加州州立大学东湾分校毕业证成绩单pdf电子版制作修改#真实留信入库#永久存档#真实可查#diploma#degree
 
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
(办理学位证)韩国汉阳大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
young call girls in Khanpur,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
young call girls in  Khanpur,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Serviceyoung call girls in  Khanpur,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
young call girls in Khanpur,🔝 9953056974 🔝 escort Service
 

Making and breaking security in embedded devices

  • 1. Making and breaking security in embedded devices Yashin Mehaboobe SDR Engineer, Bastille Networks
  • 2. #whoami •Security enthusiast •SDR Engineer @ Bastille Networks •Hardware tinkerer •Speaker: C0C0n 2013, Nullcon V, HITB Amsterdam and Kaspersky Cyberconference •Organiser, Defcon Kerala twitter.com/YashinMehaboobe github.com/sp3ctr3 http://www.linkedin.com/pub/yashin-mehaboobe/38/a2/367
  • 3. Why embedded? •Large numbers •Critical infrastructure dependent on embedded devices •Network devices (both enterprise and SOHO) •Even if it’s not critical: •Botnet fodder •Pivoting •Storage for the bad guys •On the internet and unsecured (Mostly)
  • 4. But…..why?! •REPRODUCTION: •Understand how the product works by reverse engineering it •Build a similar product •$$$$$Profit$$$$$$$$ •FREE STUFF!: •Bypass restrictions •Get premium services •UNLOCKING FEATURES: •Ex:Install dd-wrt •Don’t have to pay extra
  • 5. But…..why?! •ACCESS TO OTHERWISE SECURE NETWORKS •No one expects the embedded inquisition! •SOHO/Enterprise routers are not audited most times •No one checks the firmware
  • 6. TOOLS OF THE TRADE Choose your weapons!
  • 7.
  • 8. A word about equipment •Good equipment = $$$$ •Use open source equipment such as the bus pirate, hackRF, OpenBench etc… •Commercial tools work better in most of the cases •Would be a good investment •Have at least one each of the separate categories of tools •Logic Analyzer •RF Spectrum Analyzer •Oscilloscope •JTAG debugger •Etc……
  • 9. LOGIC ANALYZERS •Monitor communication •Decode protocols •Replay (in some cases) •Cheap (44$ to 500$++) •Open source ones: •Open Bench •Bus Pirate
  • 10.
  • 11. RF Analysis tools •For scanning the RF frequencies •Recognizing signals •Storing and replay •SDRs are your friends! •Example: •RFExplorer •RTL-SDR •HackRF/BladeRF/USRP
  • 12. Oscilloscope •Digital/Analog •Useful for noting timing •Can also help in recognition of communication protocol •Very much needed
  • 14. Debug ports FTW •Ports setup to allow developer/engineer access during testing/repairing •Loved by hackers because of the access it provides •Different types: •JTAG •Serial •LPC (Xbox/TPM) •Allow access to boot messages •Allows you to log in without authentication •Sometimes you can even access bash
  • 15. Debug ports identification 1.Identify the ports 2.Connect the debugger/communication device 3.Profit! •First step is the most complex •Methodology varies from protocol to protocol •Number of points is a good indication
  • 16. Identifying Serial ports •Serial has 4 lines: •Vcc •Ground •Rx •Tx •Identify ground pin with a multimeter continuity test •Find vcc by powering up and checking vcc + ground with multimeter •Tx will be the pin with high activity •Rx will be the other •Identify baudrate by trial and error •JTAGulator has support for serial
  • 17. JTAG ports •Joint Test Action Group •Used for debugging, updating firmware etc… •Running homebrew on Xbox •Dumping firmware •Use JTAGulator for finding JTAG ports •OpenOCD has support for a large number of JTAG debuggers
  • 18. Defending against debug port attacks •Disable unneeded ports •Use authentication for the debug ports •Shell access should not be given without authentication •Unfortunately these defenses may not be practical in some cases
  • 20. SPI,UART and I2C •SPI, UART and I2c are some of the more commonly used protocols in embedded devices •There is no authentication or authorization •It is trivial to sniff traffic •Very easy to replay attacks •Bus pirate would be a good tool •Hardware hackers swiss army knife •Developed by Dangerous Prototypes
  • 22. Sniffing radio signals •Use to be hard and expensive •With the arrival of SDRs the situation changed •Now you can RX and TX with hardware ranging from 20$ RTL SDR to 1000$ devices •Most signals aren’t encrypted •Some rely on FHSS (Not a good idea)
  • 23. Tools used •For most radio communication attacks an SDR would suffice •Mainly because they can TX and RX in a wide range of frequencies •Some examples are •USRP B210 •HackRF •BladeRF •RTLSDR •You can also use RFCat (cc1111 based attack toolkit) •Ubertooth One can be used for Bluetooth sniffing •OR sniff the buses of the transmitter
  • 24. RF attacks •Jamming •Basically DoS at RF level •Decreases SNR •Techniques differ •Some even disrupt handshakes •Replay •Capture signal •Store it •Replay at some other time
  • 25. Defenses against RF attacks •FHSS is effective against jamming •Use of encryption will defeat most sniffing attacks •Encryption is built into most transmitters •Unfortunately it is not used as much as it should be •Rolling code system is a good defense against replay attack
  • 27. Flash memory •Nonvolatile •Used to store data •Firmware is usually stored in flash memory •Usually uses SPI for communication •Usually does not have any protection
  • 28. Extracting data from flash memory •In circuit: •Don’t remove the chip •Use a chip programmer or bus pirate to read data •Desoldering •The chip should be removed by desoldering it. •It is then accessed using a chip programmer to get the data •Firmware can be extracted in this manner
  • 29. Defenses against Flash memory forensics •OTP memory protection bits •Doesn’t allow the modification of flash memory •Only useful against modification attacks •Encryption •Storing the firmware/data encrypted would defeat memory forensics •Also not storing confidential info on the chip
  • 31. (In)Security •Code is outdated in most devices •Routers are the worst transgressors •Most are internet facing •Have more vulns than a CTF challenge •Code is available for us to check and find vulns
  • 32. Firmware •Almost always linux •Bootloader is usually Uboot •Serial output usually gives you hints about the device •Some may be obfuscated •Can be obtained by either: •JTAG dump •Flash dump via Serial •Flash dump via chip desoldering •From the company website
  • 33. Analysing firmware •Usually various sections wrapped into one bin file •You can use dd to separate •Best option is to use binwalk •Binwalk is a tool by Craig (of devttys0 blog(great resource for hw reversing)) •Automatically analyze and extract firmware files
  • 34.
  • 35. Defenses •Review your code! •Obfuscate your firmware •Review your code again!
  • 37. Invasion of chips •Pretty easy to notice •Chips will be desoldered and/or destroyed in the process •Processors are mapped using microscopes •Very complicated attacks •Usually done for replication of chips
  • 38. Resources Stuff that helped me and may help you
  • 39. Blogs •http://www.devttys0.com/ •http://www.bunniestudios.com/ •http://travisgoodspeed.blogspot.com •http://www.grandideastudio.com/