Social Justice AdvocacyCommunity Collaborationand Systems.docx

Social Justice Advocacy:
Community Collaboration
and Systems Advocacy
Sandra I. Lopez-Baez and Matthew J. Paylo
• h ' h i s article discusses the community collaboration and
systems advocacy domains of the ACA (American Counseling
Association) Advocacy Competencies (J. A. Lewis, M. S.
Arnold, R. House, & R. L. Toporek, 2002). A case illustration
is presented, and the 8 Advocacy Competencies within each
domain are applied to the case study.
This article addresses the community collaboration and sys-
tems advocacy domains articulated by the American Counsel-
ing Association (ACA) Task Force on Advocacy Competencies
(Lewis, Arnold, House, & Toporek, 2002). These domains
involve the community, school, and interacting systems in
which clients live, study, and work. These components of
the client's environment must be addressed in the blueprint
for a social justice agenda that counselors need to follow in
advocating on behalf of their clients. The community col-
laboration and systems advocacy domains can be compared
with the mesosystem level addressed by Bronfenbrenner
(1979) in his Ecological Model. Ecological theory contends
that the mesosystem serves as a link in the interaction among
the systems surrounding the individual. These systems consist
of family, school, work, neighborhood, church, community
agencies, day care, and so on.
The ACA Advocacy Competencies (Lewis et al., 2002)
suggest that counselors intervene in two interrelated domains
within the school/community level of advocacy, namely, com-

munity collaboration and systems advocacy. Counselors can
intervene in the advocacy process either by assuming a posi-
tion as an ally to others in the school/community or by moving
from an ally position to a position of leadership in advocating
for the desired change needed within the school/community.
Community collaboration refers to counselors assuming the
role of an ally. It can take the form of being aware ofthe recur-
rent issues within schools/communities that impede clients'
growth and development. Alerting organizations or agencies
already working for change within a school/community of
counselors' skills and ideas to facilitate the change process
(Lewis et al., 2002) is necessary. Systems advocacy takes the
community collaboration a step further in that counselors
assume a leadership role to implement a systematic plan to
address the issues at hand (Lewis et al., 2002). Within this
domain. Lewin's (1948) theory of force field analysis aids in
the evaluation of driving forces that facilitate change in con-
trast to the restraining forces impeding change, which together
create equilibrium within a school, community, or society.
Force field analysis provides a framework for looking at the
factors (forces) that infiuence a situation both positively and
negatively, in particular social situations. It looks at forces that
are either driving movement toward a goal (helping forces) or
blocking movement toward a goal (hindering forces). Lewin's
theory of force field analysis along with the aforementioned
domains must be conceptualized as being interrelated, rather
than distinct.
As noted previously, the two Advocacy Competency do-
mains discussed in this article are community collaboration and
systems advocacy. Community collaboration, which consists
of eight Advocacy Competencies, is conceptualized in the fol-
lowing manner: Counselors use their "unique awareness" of
"specific difficulties in the environment" (Lewis et al., 2002,
p. 2) to work with organizations to bring about change. Lewis

et al. (2002) pointed out counselors' skills in interpersonal
relations, communication, training, and research, which can be
made available in collaborating with organizations to promote
changes that foster clients' growth and healthy development.
In community collaboration, Lewis et al. (2002) suggested
that eight Advocacy Competencies are needed by counselors
to intervene at the community level: (a) identify environmental
factors that impinge upon students' and clients' development,
(b) alert community or school groups with common concerns
related to the issue, (c) develop alliances with groups working
for change, (d) use effective listening skills to gain understand-
ing ofthe group's goals, (e) identify the strengths and resources
that the group members bring to the process of systemic change,
(f) communicate recognition of and respect for these strengths
and resources, (g) identify and offer the skills that the coun-
selor can bring to the collaboration, and (h) assess the effect of
counselor's interaction with the communify (p. 2).
Lewis et al. (2002) described systems advocacy, also
consisting of eight Advocacy Competencies, as the identifi-
cation and eradication of "systemic factors that act as bar-
riers to their students' or clients' development" (p. 2). For a
Sandra I. Lopez-Baez, Counselor Education, The University of
Virginia; Matthew J. Paylo, Fluvanna Correctional Center for
Women,
Troy, Virginia. Correspondence concerning this article shouid
be addressed to Sandra I. Lopez-Baez, Counseior Education,
Curry
School of Education, The University of Virginia, 405 Emmet
Street, South, PO Box 400269, Charlottesvilie, VA 22904 (e-
mail: slopez-
[email protected] ).
© 2009 by the American Counseling Association. Ail rights
reserved.

276 Journal of Counseling & Development Summer 2009 •
Volume 87
Social Justice Advocacy: Community Coliaboration and
Systems Advocacy
counselor to intervene at the systemic level, he or she must
(a) identify environmental factors impinging on students'
or clients' development; (b) provide and interpret data to
show the urgency for change; (c) in collaboration with other
stakeholders, develop a vision to guide change; (d) analyze
the sources of political power and social influence within the
system; (e) develop a step-by-step plan for implementing the
change process; (f) develop a plan for dealing with probable
responses to change; (g) recognize and deal with resistance;
and (h) assess the effect of counselor's advocacy efforts on
the system and constituents (Lewis et al., 2002, p. 2). Lewis
et al. (2002) acknowledged the difficulties encountered in
bringing about systemic changes and the qualities required of
those who work toward change, namely, "vision, persistence,
leadership, collaboration, systems analysis, and strong data"
(p. 2). Counselors, by virtue of their training, possess these
qualities for facilitating change along with a strong profes-
sional commitment to bring about change in their clients.
Counselors are the right persons to take the leadership in this
endeavor as part of their professional roles.
According to Lewis, Lewis, Daniels, and D'Andrea (1998),
counselors have unique insight into the effects of oppression
on their clients' health and well-being. Such insight must
be accompanied by the responsibility for actively working
to alleviate oppression. Oppression refers to the systematic
disadvantage of one group by other groups who hold more

power in society. Counselors, as professionals who interact
both with clients and with the systems that oppress them, must
respond to the call of advocating on behalf of their clients to
bring about change. Advocacy is a way of empowering indi-
viduals to work toward systemic changes. Counselors then
become allies in working with clients to change systems that
oppress, as well as in rebuilding communities and systems
that operate in nonoppressive ways. For such change to take
place, counselors must make a personal and professional com-
mitment to change and to take the role as allies on behalf of
clients as well as alongside of clients.
• C a s e Illustration
In the following case study, the counselor (the second author)
begins by exploring the microsystem (individual level) of the
client. Further exploration reveals issues that resonate at the
community and systemic levels (mesosystem).
Danny (a pseudonym) is a 13-year-old African American
male adolescent recently referred for family treatment because
he found it difficult to attend the required day-treatment school
placement. Developmentally, he was like most children his age,
meeting all the age developmental milestones, including read-
ing and writing at the appropriate grade level. He has recently
missed more than 20 days of school in the past 2 months, and
counseling has been required as a preemptive measure. Danny
currently resides in a rented, two-bedroom apartment in a rural
community with his mother and older sister. Occasionally, his
mother's boyfriend is present but spends very little time inter-
acting or engaging with Danny. The community in which the
family lives has a below-average economy because a number
of mills and businesses have relocated or gone out of business.
Financial hardships are a part of the family's existence. Going
paycheck to paycheck and without ever receiving alimony
checks from Danny's father, the family gets by as they can.

Danny's mother and father separated and divorced 2 years prior,
requiring Danny's mother to seek employment to provide for
the family. Lacking a formal education, she assumed a number
of low-paying, physically demanding positions that placed a
high demand on her time. The most recent job change hap-
pened as many new difficulties arose with Danny at school.
The difficulties at the public school led to Danny's placement
in the day-treatment school.
Danny's mother indicated that his placement in the day-
treatment school resulted from the public school reporting that
Danny had behavior problems in the classroom. The behavior
problems consisted of walking around the classroom, negative
comments to his teacher and peers, and an inability to follow
classroom rules on a daily basis. Danny's mother also reported
that Danny has never been physically aggressive at the school
or at home, although he has displayed verbal aggression when
directly agitated or assigned a task.
As the case unfolded, the presenting issue in treatment was
truancy. The increase in truancy created a great deal of fric-
tion between Danny and his mother, between Danny and his
sister, and between the school and the family. The school had
contacted the legal court system without discussing Danny's
truancy behaviors with him or his mother. Danny was assigned
a probation officer, thus adding another system to Danny's
world. The school took the matter to the legal realm despite
a relatively seamless transition from the public school to the
day-treatment school.
Initially, Danny's new teachers in the day-treatment school
reported appropriate behaviors, stating that he displayed the
ability to conform to classroom rules. They also reported that
his attendance was one of the highest among his peers until
the past 2 months. When treatment began, a theme that was
prevalent in other cases with students attending this day-

treatment
school emerged from family sessions. Each student who at-
tends the day-treatment school is provided transportation to
and from the school on a daily basis. The school employs a
number of different van drivers to pick up students because
many of the students reside in counties far from the treatment
facility. The van arrives at the student's home, beeps twice, and
allows the student 5 minutes or so to board the bus, providing
ample time for pickup. The van then picks up other students
within adjacent communities, proceeding eventually to the
facility. The same transportation arrangement is provided to
students at the end of the school day.
Danny reported in family sessions that on trips to school,
five to six children were always present. He contended that he
was "made fun of" and "disrespected" by all but one of the
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Lopez-Baez & Paylo
students. He stated that the driver did not stop the instigation or
intimidation. In fact, the driver occasionally added comments
of his own, thereby fueling other students' responses. Although
Danny did not explicitly say so, it was apparent and inferred
from his narrative that bullying was an acceptable behavior on
the drive to school because it was neither defused nor reported
by the driver, thus creating a climate of intolerance to racial
differences. Moreover, the driver was apparently not held
accountable for managing the situation or his own behavior.
After further reports from Danny, it became apparent that he
was being discriminated against and oppressed because of
his race and socioeconomic status. Is the bullying on the van

exacerbating the presenting issue of truancy? Alternatively,
have the actions on the van been the sole cause of the recent
issue of truancy? Should the counselor intervene at the indi-
vidual or the community level?
• C a s e Discussion
Traditionally, counselors and most other helping profes-
sionals have helped ground individuals by understanding
their internal world. This individualistic approach has been
extremely helpful and appropriate sometimes, although not
in every case or situation. This traditional mind-set disre-
gards the social ramifications of the multiple systems that
significantly influence and maintain individuals' behaviors,
thoughts, and sense of self. It is reasonable to contend that
individuals do not grow and develop in isolation. Because
development is affected by both internal and external forces,
the external forces must also be considered when concep-
tualizing the clients' difficulties and particular situation.
Working through this consideration has spurred a number
of theories within the counseling field. Ecological theorists,
family systems theorists, and multicultural counselors have
refuted the traditional stance of an individual in isolation,
arguing that behaviors, thoughts, and feelings are rooted
in a sociocultural identity, Atkinson, Thompson, and Grant
(1993) concurred with these considerations by contending
that even though counselors are trained in the areas of indi-
vidual psychotherapy, they lack understanding and training
to resort to other required roles in the counseling relation-
ships that depend on conceptualizing the client systemically.
These roles (e,g,, change agent, advocate, consultant) require
a new helping paradigm that shifts the focus from internal
pathology to the problematic situation/environment in which
the client exists (Sue, Ivey, & Pedersen, 1996). Understand-
ing a client's situation/environment is a crucial consideration
when working with individuals who experience oppression,
discrimination, and prejudice within their community and in

society as a whole.
Many scholars (D, J, Goodman, 2001; L, A, Goodman et
al,, 2004; Vera & Speight, 2003) contend that if long-term
mental health is the paramount goal for clients, change must
occur at the societal and political levels, as well as in the
media, education, and all other social institutions, especially
in the cases of clients experiencing oppression. These argu-
ments pose a transition from a focus on the individual level
to a focus on the community and systemic levels of interven-
tion. This area of advocacy for clients and communities is
scarcely addressed or understood by many counselors and
is not covered in most counselor education programs. The
advocate role requires a combination of skills that can be
taught to counselors-in-training to help them expand their
interventions from individual-level work to work as an ally
in transforming systems to better address clients' needs and
to empower clients to advocate for themselves.
•Community Collaboration
in the Case of Danny
In the following sections, the eight Advocacy Competencies
within the community collaboration domain are individually
explored as they relate to the case of Danny,
Identify Environmental Factors That Impinge Upon
Students' and Clients' Development
The impact of environmental factors or human activities on
Danny's development seems to resonate from two systems:
the day-treatment school and issues related to the environment
in the van transporting him to the day-treatment school. The
day-treatment school's inability to discuss options, behav-
iors, and treatment with Danny and his mother fosters an

"us versus them" mentality instead of a collaborative "we"
effort. This factor created considerable friction between the
family system and the school. Friction with the school was
also exacerbated because the means of transportation, specifi-
cally the unchecked environment in the van, had significantly
impinged on the client's growth and development. Danny's
sense of self and dignity were hurt as a result of the intense
bullying coupled with oppression resulting from racial and
socioeconomic differences. The Stressors left Danny feeling
isolated and different, made him question his value and sense
of worth, and were reflected in his behavior at the school. The
awareness of these two environmental factors necessitates
that the counselor alert the school of concerns relating to
these issues.
Alert Community or School Groups With Common
Concerns Related to the Issue
Contacting the school can take many forms and follow many
avenues. The first aspect to alerting the school involves acquir-
ing consent from Danny and the family to advocate for them
and becoming their ally in seeking resolution to the problems.
This process validates their perspective on the situation, allows
them to express their emotions related to the issue, and clari-
fies how the system is affecting Danny and his family. After
consent is acquired, a decision needs to be made regarding
whether the counselor or the family will set up a meeting with
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the school or whether both will collaborate. Regardless of how
the school is contacted (i.e., calling vs. meeting in person,
collaboration vs. no collaboration), this step is essential in
aiding movement toward desired change. Creating an alliance
with the school is imperative in addressing Danny's concerns
related to the environment in the van that transports him to
school. In this case, it was apparent that Danny's mother was
angry and resentful toward the school for previous actions;
thus, her indignation can become a vector facilitating change
or restraining it. For example, if Danny's mother went to the
school in an aggressive and accusatory manner, the school
could resist changing. The school then becomes a restraining
force rather than a driving force in the process of attaining the
desired change. In confronting school officials, one should
relate exactly what has happened in a calm, clear manner
by simply presenting the concerns. Contacting other parties
involved is another essential component of this step. In this
case, the Department of Social Services was contacted because
it was already monitoring the case. Intersystems collaboration
is important to reinforce the need for change. Other situations
could necessitate multiple agency involvement, thus requiring
a balancing act to negotiate an acceptable resolution for the
parties involved.
Develop Alliances With Groups Working for Change
This step consists of creating alliances with the different
groups already involved in conjunction with those groups
committed to working for change. In Danny's case, the school
officials are the most essential desired ally because of the
amount of power they posses in dealing with the transporta-
tion arrangements and in dictating a respectful environment
in the van. Even though the transportation is subcontracted to
another agency, the school can become an ally in the effort to
pressure the transportation agency to deal with the situation
appropriately and to correct the behavior that hurts Danny.

Because the school holds contract power over the transporta-
tion company, it can require the company to incorporate new
hiring and training policies as a condition of employment. If a
successful alliance is developed with the school system as well
as with other organizations, enough pressure can be exerted
to enhance the school's motivation to change.
Use Effective Listening Skills to Gain
Understanding of the Group's Goals
The use of effective listening skills is a core component
of counseling and a vital part in facilitating the process of
change so that the environment supports Danny's learning
and thriving in the school. This statement is also true for ad-
vocacy work. When issues arise that necessitate an advocate's
role, emotions run high, requiring the use of effective listen-
ing skills in this stage of the advocacy process. By using this
skill, the counselor allows all parties to express their point of
view, which is critical during conflict resolution. In striving
to understand the different views, the counselor can assess
the helping and hindering forces involved in the discourse.
The ability to listen to all parties involved (i.e., what Danny
is saying, what Danny's mother is saying, what the school is
saying, and what other ally organizations are saying) takes
a considerable amount of skill and requires negotiating the
different realities involved. Arbitrating for a resolution can
be a complex process that requires attending, listening to,
and acknowledging differences as well as similarities in
views. Sometimes in the urge to speak, the most essential
component is lost because it is not heard or attended to. The
ability to listen effectively aids the process of creating alli-
ances by balancing the facultative and restraining forces to
reach a socially just solution.
Identify the Strengths and Resources That the

Group Members Bring to the Process of Systemic
Change
In the advocacy process, the variety of skills, strengths, and
resources that members bring vary considerably from situation
to situation. It is important to acknowledge the diversity of
views and contributions that different individuals bring to the
discussion table. In the case of Danny, the counselor possesses
the ability to negotiate the give-and-take of information among
systems using effective listening and communication skills
with the knowledge of the necessary components to create
systemic change. Danny and his family possess the real-life
experiences along with the motivation to promote change
within the system. :The school officials possess the resources
and the power to influence the transportation agency contract
in an effort to alter the behavior of the agency's drivers through
training and by holding the drivers accountable for managing
the environment in the van. The Department of Social Services
supplies the resources and power to influence the school of-
ficials through its policies and practices that may be out of
the reach of the counselor and Danny's family. Combined,
these strengths and resources can be used to work for change
to move from concept to reality.
Communicate Recognition of and Respect for
These Strengths and Resources
Respectful communication of the strengths and resources
creates two essential by-products: a .sense of empower-
ment and a sense of responsibility for action. Conceptually,
empowerment is the intimate interaction between one indi-
vidual and another that attempts to validate the reality ofthat
individual by considering his or her reality both socially and
systemically (Toporek, 2000). This type of empowerment
eventually leads to a sense of responsibly to act. With real-
ized awareness, the requirement for action is placed on all

individuals or group members to initiate within their area
of responsibility. Driven by the recognition and respect for
their individual strengths, counselors need to remember to
consider incorporating the skills that they bring to the collab-
orative process. In Danny's ease, it is important to recognize
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Lopez-Baez & Paylo
that all parties involved must be respected for the strengths
they bring and to suspend any stereotypical notions of those
coming to the table to discuss concerns related to Danny's
situation. Again, the ability to balance facilitating versus
restraining vectors for change is crucial in creating a new
balance, thus changing the system for Danny's well-being.
Identify and Offer the Skills That the Counselor
Can Bring to the Collaboration
Counselors typically have the training, the skill base, and the
personalities to be helpful in the collaboration process, Eriksen
(1997) contended that counselors can be instrumental in the
advocacy process essentially by using the existent qualities
learned and honed in their training, such as listening, ques-
tioning until understanding is reached, exploring from a not-
knowing position, and using clarifying skills. Eriksen (1997)
further contended that counselors possess "problem sensing and
problem solving; planning; educating; communicating; cheer-
leading; working as a team; building consensus; negotiating
conflict; changing systems; and gathering different views and
hammering them together into a solution" (p, 8), which are
skills

that are indispensable to the collaboration process. In the case
of Danny, the counselor has many of these skills to facilitate a
positive resolution to the problem. Timely use of those skills is
vital to sustaining change and empowering clients and systems
to maintain the changes through open dialogue.
Assess the Effect of Counselor's Interaction
With the Community
Consideration of the effects of the counselor's action on the
community allows for examination of the impact that the ac-
tions had on facilitating systemic change. In Danny's case,
community collaboration provided awareness of the issues
related to the environment in the transportation chosen by
the school system, yet it lacked a follow-through action that
actually addressed the bullying and disrespect due to racial
as well as socioeconomic circumstances, Speciñcally, this
endeavor resulted in verbal acknowledgment of the issue, but
there were no consequences for the driver, and no training
alternatives were implemented. As the counselor evaluated
the process and the actions taken, the counselor reevaluated
the community collaboration, which resulted in the counselor
assuming a new stance within the collaboration process.
If one applies Lewin's (1948) force field analysis to the
case of Danny, the following restraining forces to change can
be identified: the bus driver; the bullying; the school's attitude;
the mother's and the family's anger toward the school and the
situation; and, at a systemic level, the institutionalized racism
that the school seems to have incorporated into its functioning.
We encourage the reader to think of additional restraining
forces
to add to this list. The facilitative forces to change include the
counselor and his skill base to bring about change and the other
agencies' involvement with the case. Again, the reader is urged
to think of additional facilitative forces to change in this case.

•Systems Advocacy
Systems advocacy requires counselors to assume a leadership
role in implementing a systematic change plan that addresses
the issues (Lewis et al,, 2002), In Danny's case, the counsel-
or's evaluation of the interactions led to the realization that
both an ally role and a leadership role were needed. Because
of the inertia of the organizations involved toward taking
initiative and leadership, the endeavor to promote change
concerning the day-treatment school and transportation is-
sues had to be spearheaded by the counselor, who assumed a
position of leadership. This is not uncommon for counselors
because the pull toward homeostasis, or keeping the balance,
creates a roadblock to change. One frequently hears the phrase
"It has always been this way" as a testament to entropy, or
the need for systems to remain unchanged regardless of
the situation. Leadership is essential to the transition from
community collaboration to systems advocacy. In the fol-
lowing sections, the eight Advocacy Competencies within the
systems advocacy domain are individually explored as they
relate to the case of Danny.
Identify Environmental Factors Impinging on
Students' or Clients' Development
This Advocacy Competency involves a shift in focus from
the individual and his or her interpersonal difficulties to
the contribution of the system in creating and maintaining
such difficulties by sustaining policies that adversely affect
members of the system. As previously mentioned, the influ-
ences of the environmental factors on Danny's development
seem to originate from two agents: the day-treatment school
and the transportation company contracted by the school.
The school's inability to create an open dialogue with Danny
and his mother contributed to increased friction, creating the
need for intervention and advocacy on behalf of Danny and his

family. This lack of communication among Danny, his family,
and school officials, along with the transportation issue, was
significantly impinging on Danny's growth and development.
His sense of self was significantly impaired as a result of the
intense bullying that created a hostile environment, foster-
ing oppression due to racial and socioeconomic differences.
Isolated and alone, Danny withdrew from school, which
was once a pleasurable experience. Awareness of these two
environmental factors led the counselor to provide the school
officials with information in an attempt to create a sense of
urgency for them to act. Instilling a sense of responsibility
for Danny's well-being by showing the system's contribution
to the oppression of the individual paves the way for seeking
viable alternatives to change.
Provide and Interpret Data to Show the
Urgency for Change
This Advocacy Competency suggests that a system change
must be accompanied by information that supports the need
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Systems Advocacy
for change and demonstrates the adverse effects of not chang-
ing. Counselors receive training in research that allows them
to gather the necessary data in the form of statistics, reports,
and evidence-based interventions to support suggestions for
change and to document the adverse effects resulting from
current policies.

In Danny's case, the effects of bullying in the transportation
van can be backed up with current research on the deleterious
nature of bullying on self-esteem. Further evidence exists that
support the need for a safe environment on school buses and
for the training of personnel to combat bullying. Counselors
must be prepared to assemble reports evidencing the need
for systemic change and documenting the benefits of such
change. Again, from a Lewinian (1948) force field analysis
perspective, an excellent way to support facilitative vectors is
with data that reinforce the positive aspects of change.
In Collaboration With Other Stakeholders,
Develop a Vision to Guide Change
This Advocacy Competency is crucial in creating and sus-
taining change. As counselors attempt to bring about change,
they must identify other stakeholders who support change
through a common vision that guides change. This process
is equivalent to setting out on a journey armed with a road
map that leads to the desired destination. Although traveling
alone is sometimes necessary, a critical mass of like-minded
sojoumers aids in the process of bringing about change and
adds diverse perspectives that correct deviations from the
course. As one instance of injustice is identified, the question
of whether it is a one-time occurrence or a trend must be asked.
In correcting trends, one must bring about systemic change.
As other stakeholders become involved in the process, a plan
and vision emerges that, once implemented, can correct the
problem and strengthen the system's function.
Danny's case provides an illustration of how failure to re-
cruit the family's help in working with a school-age child can
escalate when the problem is systemic. Further complications
are added when the solution creates additional problems that
exacerbate the issues the child is facing. Superficially, the
problem can be viewed as individual, pertaining to just one

student. The question "How many more students like Danny
are facing similar situations?" begs to be asked. In closely ex-
amining a single case, one can identify a trend, and a systemic
solution may be what is needed. Significant social change
cannot happen until counselors think at a systemic level.
Analyze the Sources of Political Power
and Social Influence Within the System
Counseling is political in that it involves infiuencing the
system with change as the ultimate goal. Encouraging the
sharing of power through antioppressive strategies necessi-
tates knowledge ofthe political process and an understanding
of how to work within the system so that change is lasting.
Counselors are empowered by the knowledge acquired through
their training and by their professional status, which gives
them access to information, systems, and individuals who
can infiuence the system.
The case example of Danny illustrates how a counselor can
join forces with schools and community agencies in bringing
to notice the influence of prejudice behind bullying and its
effect on school-age children. School counselors have suc-
cessfiiUy secured fianding for antibullying campaigns in the
school. These campaigns infiuence the system and represent
professional political power at work.
Develop a Step-by-Step Plan for
Implementing the Change Process
The purpose of systemic change is to create a better system than
what currently exists. A systemic plan for change recognizes the
interrelationships and interdependencies among the parts ofthe
system, with the consequence that desired changes in one part
ofthe system are accompanied by changes in other parts, which

are necessary to support those desired changes. The plan also
recognizes the interrelationships and interdependencies between
the system and the community, with the consequence that all
stakeholders are given active ownership ofthe change effort.
A well-thought-out plan requires deliberate inclusion of
diverse viewpoints to correct for misguided generalizations.
Danny's case can generate a movement to help the school
system combat racism, deal with bullying, and rekindle par-
ent-school relationships.
Develop a Plan for Dealing With
Probable Responses to Change
Prochaska, Norcross, and DiClemente's ( 1994) Transtheoretical
Model provides a useful descriptive model of change. Although
developed for therapeutic purposes, this change model can be
applied to systemic change in that the individuals within the
system move through the levels or order provided by this model.
Although the Transtheoretical Model does not specify how or
why
people change, it does provide a simple description ofthe
change
category a system is in. The model provides a practical
overview
of organizing and implementing infiuence and persuasion in the
change process. It gives a reasonable schema for approaching
change and implementing it with a good chance of success.
Lewin's (1948) force field analysis is an ideal tool for
planning an approach to dealing with driving and restraining
forces in response to change. These forces that facilitate or
hinder change can be addressed to demonstrate a new, more
adaptive balance than the one that is currently oppressive to
different groups within the system. Figure 1 presents a possible
tool that illustrates the driving and restraining forces affecting

Danny's problematic situation.
Recognize and Deal With Resistance
Resistance is the system's healthy response to change because
it maintains the current balance ofthe system whether posi-
JournalofCounseling& Development • Summer 2009 • Volume
87 281
Lopez-Baez & Paylo
Driving Forces
The counselor and his
skill base to bring about
change
The other agencies' involve-
ment with the case (inter-
agency collaboration)
Current Condition
Resistance to acknowl-
. edge and deal with the
problem of racism
-« »•
Restraining Forces
The bus driver

The builying
The school's attitude
The mother's and the
family's anger toward the
school and situation
FIGURE 1
Counselor Tool for Charting and Studying Anticipated
Responses to Change
tive, negative, or indifferent. According to O'Grady (1993),
the ability to change is related to a combination of five fears:
(a) the fear of the unknown (because the unspoken message
from society is that when change occurs, one loses control),
(b) the fear of failure (because the thought that if one com-
mits to goals for change, there is a chance for failure), (c)
the fear of commitment (because commitment to one option
eliminates other options), (d) the fear of disapproval (because
with change, the individual risks forcing others to change in
their relationship with him or her), and (e) the fear of success
(because if change occurs, one wonders what other demands
will be made and whether success can be sustained). Coun-
selors must recognize these fears as part of healthy resistance
and address them accordingly.
Strategies for countering resistance can include reframing
the concept of resistance as natural. Consider resistance as a
form of positive change. If one can understand how people will
resist the flow of good ideas, then one may be in the process
of formulating a blueprint for change and learning for the
future. First, elicit the reasons for resisting. Then, diligently
list the objections. Consider even the apparently illogical

arguments, because that is where false assumptions and
expectations have been at work in opposing change. Action
requires creativity and logical thinking to coimter resistance
through understanding it.
Assess the Effect of Counselor's Advocacy Efforts
on the System and Constituents
The last systems Advocacy Competency is as important as any
other because assessing the effect of advocacy on the system
and its members reinforces and strengthens change. It also
provides feedback to the counselor regarding specific advo-
cacy actions that helped or hindered change. This feedback
can be used in the future to modify, enhance, or duplicate the
approach to advocacy used by the counselor. Of equal impor-
tance is the dissemination of this information as a reference
so that other counselors can replicate the approach.
The Advocacy Competencies outlined in this article need
to be taught, practiced, and documented through research
to increase counselors' effectiveness in their advocacy
work. The effectiveness of these competencies lies in their
implementation as well as in the documentation of their
successes and failures. It is imperative that a body of infor-
mation develops out of advocacy efforts to encourage others
to partake in these efforts. Teaching these competencies to
counselors-in-training is important, but practicing them is
vital lest they become theoretical models devoid of applica-
tion and implementation.
•References
Atkinson, D. R., Thompson, C. E., & Grant, S. K. (1993). A
three-
dimensional model for counseling racial/ethnic minorities. The
Counseling Psychologist. 21, 257-277.

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development:
Experiments by nature and design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Eriksen, K. (1997). Making an impact: A handbook on
counseling
advocacy. Washington, DC: Accelerated Development.
Goodman, D. J. (2001). Promoting diversity and social justice:
Educating people from privileged groups. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Goodman, L. A., Liang, B., Helms, J. E., Latta, R. E., Sparks,
E.,
& Weintraub, S. R. (2004). Training counseling psychologists
as social justice agents: Feminist and multicultural principles in
action. The Counseling Psychologist, 32. 793-837.
Lewin, K. (1948). Resolving social conflicts. New York:
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Lewis, J. A., Arnold, M. S., House, R., & Toporek, R. L.
(2002).
ACA Advocacy Competencies. Retrieved February 3,2009,
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Lewis, J. A., Lewis, M. D., Daniels, J. A., & D'Andrea, M. J.
(1998).
Community counseling: Empowerment strategies for a diverse
society (2nd ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
O'Grady, D. (1993). Taking the fear out of changing. Dayton,
OH:
Adams Media.

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Prochaska, J, O,, Norcross, J, C , & DiClemente, C, C, (1994),
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community (pp, 5-14), Greensboro, NC: Educational
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Journal ofCounseling & Development • Summer 2009 • Volume
87 283
The Dirty Dozen

Twelve Failures of the Hurricane Katrina Response and
How Psychology Can Help
Anahita Gheytanchi, Lisa Joseph, Elaine Gierlach, Satoko
Kimpara, Jennifer Housley,
Zeno E. Franco, and Larry E. Beutler
Pacific Graduate School of Psychology
This comprehensive analysis addresses the United States’
alarming lack of preparedness to respond effectively to a
massive disaster as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina. First,
a timeline of problematic response events during and after
Hurricane Katrina orients readers to some of the specific
problems encountered at different levels of government.
Second, a list of the “Dirty Dozen”—12 major failures that
have occurred in prior disasters, which also contributed to
inadequate response during and after Hurricane Katrina—
is presented. Third, this article encourages expanding psy-
chology’s role beyond the treatment of trauma to encom-
pass disaster planning and mitigation efforts from a
broader public health perspective. Finally, areas for im-
portant interdisciplinary research in human behavior that
will influence our nation’s overall preparedness for future
catastrophes are identified, and ways psychologists can
become personally involved beyond treating casualties are
discussed.
Keywords: Hurricane Katrina, response preparedness, les-
sons learned, disaster and role of psychology
We’ve got runners running from commander to commander. In
other words, we’re going to the sound of gunfire, as we used to
say in the Revolutionary War.

—Major General Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General,
Mississippi National Guard1
The 2005 hurricane season served to demonstrate thegrievous
shortcomings of the federal, state, and localdisaster response
efforts in the United States. De-
spite the wake-up call provided by 9/11, response agencies
at each of these levels were taken by surprise and were
unprepared to respond effectively to a mass disaster. The
response failures following Hurricane Katrina point to a
variety of systemic problems. In particular, the issue of
coordinated state and local government integration with the
U.S. military continues to prove particularly difficult. Lack
of effective disaster management becomes magnified when
coalitions made up of civil and military authorities form
decoupled command structures, often amplifying coordina-
tion and communication difficulties rather than improving
them (Drabek, 2003).
One of the pressing questions our nation faces is how
to optimize disaster response and maintain readiness for
all-hazards events. Despite tremendous investments of time
and money, these goals remain elusive. In fact, according
to some accounts, our nation’s ability to adequately re-
spond to catastrophic events has declined since the early
part of the last century (Winchester, 2005). For example, in
the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake, which oc-
curred at 5:12 a.m. on April 18, 1906, it took just 153
minutes for federal troops to be marched into the city and
put at the mayor’s disposal. By 4:00 a.m. on the morning of
April 19th—less than 24 hours after the earthquake oc-
curred—William Taft, then Secretary of War, ordered hos-
pital trains sent to California (Winchester, 2005). Using
what would be by today’s standards the most minimal of
communication technology, a rapid, national response was
initiated through a few terse telegraph messages.

In this article, we attempt to accomplish three tasks.
First, we offer a timeline of events that occurred during and
after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Second, we present
and discuss a list of 12 key failures that are common to all
catastrophic disasters, including Hurricane Katrina. Fi-
nally, we argue that the behavioral sciences—and psychol-
ogy in particular—are fundamentally linked to improving
Anahita Gheytanchi, Lisa Joseph, Elaine Gierlach, Satoko
Kimpara, Jen-
nifer Housley, Zeno E. Franco, and Larry E. Beutler, Pacific
Graduate
School of Psychology.
Zeno E. Franco is on appointment as a U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) fellow under the DHS Scholarship
and
Fellowship Program, which is administered by the Oak Ridge
Institute
for Science and Education (ORISE) for DHS through an
interagency
agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Oak
Ridge
Associated Universities’ ORISE is managed by DOE Contract
No.
DE-AC05– 000R22750. All of the opinions expressed in this
article are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies
and
views of DHS, DOE, or ORISE.
We thank Kathryn Yanick for managing the large number of
news
reports used to develop and cross-check the timelines of the
Hurricane

Katrina response.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Larry
E. Beutler, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, 935 East
Meadow
Drive, Palo Alto, CA 94303. E-mail: [email protected]
1 U.S. House of Representatives (2006, p. 174).
118 February–March 2007 ● American Psychologist
Copyright 2007 by the American Psychological Association
0003-066X/07/$12.00
Vol. 62, No. 2, 118 –130 DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.62.2.118
disaster management across all phases of these events, not
just in their immediate aftermath (Jacobs, 1995).
The Unfolding of Events in Hurricane
Katrina
Hurricane Katrina, named on Thursday, August 25, 2005,
as it formed in the Bahamas, was seen as a major threat
soon after becoming a Category 3 storm (Ripley, 2005). At
the urging of the Federal Emergency Management Admin-
istration (FEMA), on the same day, the President declared
an emergency in the state of Louisiana, allowing water,
food, and ice to be stockpiled at military bases around the
state. The system appeared to be working. Two days after
Katrina formed, the Emergency Operations Center in Baton
Rouge announced the ultimate fear: that the city of New
Orleans might flood. On Sunday, August 28th, Mayor C.
Ray Nagin recommended evacuation after the storm be-
came a Category 5 Hurricane. The evacuation order was
not mandatory. Freeways were jammed as those with the

ability to leave obeyed, but tens of thousands did not
because of financial constraints, lack of transportation op-
tions, concerns for pets and livestock, or because they had
been able to ride out prior storms (“Timeline: How the
Hurricane,” 2005).
The first 72 hours after a disaster are deemed to be the
most important period during which to assert order. How-
ever, in New Orleans, hesitation to coordinate effectively
started locally and infected the chain of command all the
way to Washington, DC. There was ambiguity as to who
was in charge, goods were not utilized, and police seemed
unwilling to work in the chaotic city (“FEMA in Chaos,”
2005; Ripley, 2005; Thompson, 2005).
Figures 1 and 2 depict timelines of key events, re-
sponses, and results at city, state, and federal levels of
response. Taken together, these timelines clearly illustrate
where the communication and coordination failures oc-
curred.
Despite billions of dollars spent following 9/11 to
improve emergency coordination, the response to Hurri-
cane Katrina utterly failed. An understanding of the behav-
ioral aspects of both disaster management personnel and
the civilians impacted by catastrophes is essential to im-
proving response performance. Psychologists must begin to
conceptualize their contribution to disaster response be-
yond just treating acute stress reactions in victims, instead
expanding their view to include the treatment of an entire
policy, planning, and response system that appears to be
badly broken.
The Dirty Dozen: Twelve Key Failures
1. Lack of Efficient Communication

One of the main shortcomings in the response efforts was
the lack of timely, effective communication between and
within state and federal agencies. The transmission of
accurate information about the impact of the disaster up the
command chain, the transmission of data about decisions
and the location of assets down the chain of command, and
the sharing of knowledge horizontally in peer-to-peer rela-
tionships are critical to forming shared situational aware-
ness (Beaubien, Baker, & Holtzman, 2003; Endsley, 2000).
Most other disaster management tasks, such as decision
making and coordination, are predicated on effective com-
munication. However, more communication does not nec-
essarily mean better communication (Härtel & Härtel,
1997).
Despite a well-established command and control pro-
tocol and the introduction of the new National Response
Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004), at
least four separate command structures were operating in
Katrina’s aftermath (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).
Two command structures were present within FEMA, pro-
foundly clouding the operational picture for the duration of
the recovery effort. Two distinct military commands were
also established—the Louisiana National Guard and the
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which never
came under joint control. This prevented adequate peer-to-
peer communication between military commanders and
resulted in several duplicated planning and execution tasks.
Further, NORTHCOM efforts remained outside of the
FEMA command structure for the duration of the incident
(for a more detailed discussion of communication issues,
see U.S. House of Representatives, 2006; Knauer, 2005).
A key communication error occurred when a FEMA
forward observer surveyed the levee breaches from the air

on the afternoon of August 29th and the White House was
not informed of the breach because the Department of
Homeland Security’s Operational Center viewed this as an
unconfirmed eyewitness report. Thus, the White House did
not have confirmation of levee failure until early Tuesday,
August 30th—some eight hours later. Had the observer’s
assessment been taken at face value or deconflicted expe-
Anahita
Gheytanchi
119February–March 2007 ● American Psychologist
ditiously, the White House may have recognized the grav-
ity of the situation sooner. The importance of this commu-
nication failure point cannot be overstated. A levee breach
was understood to require a complete evacuation of New
Orleans, necessitating immediate allocation of federal as-
sets (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).
2. Poor Coordination Plans
The distinction between communication and coordination
is subtle, yet important. Whereas communication has to do
with the movement of information between individuals or
teams to create shared situational awareness, coordination
refers to the movement of relief assets in an efficient
manner. Effective coordination is predicated on good com-
munication, but because of its emphasis on execution,
coordination must also rely on good decision rules, prior
training, availability of resources, and ability to actually
perform the task (Freeman & Serfaty, 2002). A number of
factors, including situational constraints, operator error,
competing tasks, insufficient training, or external problems,

may prevent optimal task execution (Endsley, 2000).
Several powerful examples of coordination failure
during the Katrina disaster can be found. For instance,
officials acknowledged that resources on the U.S.S. Bataan,
already in the Gulf of Mexico, were not effectively brought
to bear. Little use was made of the ship’s doctors, six
operating rooms, 600 hospital beds, or its ability to produce
10,000 gallons of water per day. The ship received con-
flicting orders, forcing it to abandon its efforts in the most
severely impacted areas following the storm (Knauer,
2005). Similarly, the Department of the Interior (DOI) tried
to assist FEMA by providing important assets to the
agency, but according to the DOI’s testimony, these efforts
failed (Meserve, 2006). Finally, despite repeated requests
to FEMA for buses, the Louisiana National Guard had no
transportation assets to speed the evacuation process
(Knauer, 2005). The lack of buses, rested and willing
Figure 1
State of Louisiana and City of New Orleans Response Timeline
Actions
Sun
Aug 28
Day 1
Mon
Aug 29
Day 2
Tues
Aug 30
Day 3

Wed
Aug 31
Day 4
Thurs
Sept 1
Day 5
Fri
Sept 2
Day 6
Sat
Sept 3
Day 7
Sun
Sept 4
Day 8
Mon
Sept 5
Day 9
Results
LA Nat-
n’l
guard
re-
quests
700
buses
Failure
to in-

voke
manda-
tory
evacua-
tions
results
in
100,000
left in
city at
landfall
Only
100
buses
arrive
Governor
requests
DOD
take over
Super-
dome
evacua-
tion with
out in-
forming
FEMA
Gover-
nor’s
support
request is
made
outside of
the uni-

fied com-
mand
system
Conven-
tion Center
opened to
relieve
over
crowding
at Super-
dome
Evacuees
entering
Conven-
tion Center
were not
checked
for weap-
ons, condi-
tions were
poor and
rapidly
deterio-
rated, no
one was in
command
Governor
formally
requests
federal
troops
and aid
to assist

with re-
covery
Natn’l
guard de-
layed arri-
val by 100
hours to
achieve
desired
troop
strength
Buses to
move
evacuees
out of
Conven-
tion Center
remain
unavail-
able
10,000
people
are still
in the
city of
New
Orleans
LA Natn’l
Guard
arrives at
Conven-
tion Center

to restore
order with
over
whelming
force
Mayor
Nagin
orders
manda-
tory
evacua-
tions
Gover-
nor &
Mayor
recom-
mend
evacua-
tions
Late for-
mal re-
quest
from
state
substan-
tially de-
lays fed-
eral re-
sponse
Shading denotes crisis
period

Note. LA Natn’l guard � Louisiana National Guard; DOD �
Department of Defense; FEMA � Federal Emergency
Management Administration.
drivers, and the synchronization of moving buses and se-
curity personnel to the Superdome, the Convention Center,
and Cloverleaf evacuation locations remained deeply prob-
lematic throughout the relief effort.
3. Ambiguous Authority Relationships: Who
Is in Charge?
Of all the coordination problems, the single most signifi-
cant failure was the Department of Homeland Security’s
decision to largely remain on a “pull” footing, waiting for
state and local government requests for pulling federal
resources into the disaster zone. Instead, because of the
predicted scope of Katrina, the National Response Plan
Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) should have been
invoked prior to landfall, allowing FEMA to switch to a
“push” stance—rushing assets to the area without waiting
for requests from local governments too overwhelmed to
assess their own needs (U.S. House of Representatives,
2006).
The NRP-CIA was never invoked during or after
Hurricane Katrina. Similarly, the Interagency Incident
Management Group, an emergency advisory team for the
Secretary of the DHS was never activated despite pressure
to do so from the White House. These failures forced some
FEMA officials in Louisiana to switch to a resource push
stance on an ad hoc basis, placing these officials in legal
jeopardy as they endeavored to individually correct FEMA’s

drifting course of action (U.S. House of Representatives,
2006).
Serious missteps were also apparent at the state and
local government levels. Despite intense pressure from
federal authorities to issue mandatory rather than recom-
mended evacuations, the Mayor of New Orleans was hes-
itant to do so prior to landfall because of the enormous cost
that is associated with this course of action (Ripley, 2005).
No “hasty plan” was put in place to shore up gaps in prior
disaster exercises delineating the responsibilities of those
responding to special needs evacuees, even though FEMA
Figure 2
Federal Response Timeline
Actions
Sun
Aug 28
Day 1
Mon
Aug 29
Day 2
Tues
Aug 30
Day 3
Wed
Aug 31
Day 4
Thurs
Sept 1

Day 5
Fri
Sept 2
Day 6
Sat
Sept 3
Day 7
Sun
Sept 4
Day 8
Mon
Sept 5
Day 9
Results
NOAA
De-
clares
Katrina
cate-
gory 5
storm
NRP-
CIA not
invoked
by DHS
Federal
re-
sponse

remains
in “pull”
mode
FEMA
official
flies over
levees,
reports
breach to
HSOC at
DHS.
HSOC
fails to
forward
FEMA
report to
White
House
Failure to
forward
levee
breach
report
delays
decision
to push
buses to
super-
dome
FEMA
argues
with

Gover-
nor
about
which
agency
should
provide
buses
FEMA &
National
Guard
work
overnight
to pre-
pare an
airlift
evacua-
tion plan
for the
Super-
dome
FEMA &
Guard
ready to
execute
Super-
dome
evacua-
tion plan
Evacua-
tion plan
counter-
manded

by
DOD,
resulting
in 24+
hour
delay in
evacua-
tion as
DOD
as-
sumes
control
FEMA
requests
DOD
take over
logistics.
Request
for-
warded
to Secre-
tary of
Defense
Active
duty mili-
tary be-
gin arriv-
ing in
small
numbers
Active
duty
military

arrive at
Super-
dome &
Conven-
tion
Center
in large
num-
bers
FEMA
request
for DOD
logistics
support
ap-
proved
Military
mission
assign-
ments
made
after
evacua-
tions
are
largely
com-
plete
Shading denotes crisis
period
Note. NOAA � National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration; NRP–CIA � National Response Plan

Catastrophic Incident Annex; DHS � Department of
Homeland Security; FEMA � Federal Emergency Management
Administration; HSOC � Homeland Security Operations Center.
encouraged the governor and the mayor to do so prior to
landfall (Ripley, 2005).
4. Who Should Be in Charge: Federal or State
Governments?
After Hurricane Katrina, public dissatisfaction with the
government’s response came to the forefront; 52% of the
public stated that the government had done a poor job in
preparing for Katrina, and 62% stated that the response was
too slow to those hardest hit (Ripley, 2005). The White
House preferred to assign blame to the mayor of New
Orleans, C. Ray Nagin, and the governor of Louisiana,
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, who stated that she verbally
asked President Bush for “everything you got” (Tumulty,
2005). More than a year after the storm, jurisdictional
issues continue to plague residents attempting to rebuild.
Unfortunately, lessons learned from prior hurricanes
about managing authority relationships between federal,
state, and local agencies have yet to be applied effectively.
For example, when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992,
Florida’s then-governor, Lawton Chiles, failed to formally
request federal assistance for three days after landfall.
Similarly, Governor Blanco verbally requested aid during
Katrina’s aftermath, but this was not enough to set in
motion a strong federal response. The statutes governing
disaster response emphasize state control and generally
require the state to provide a detailed, written request for

federal disaster assistance. Thus, the same three-day delay
in providing a formal request for aid that was faulted in
Hurricane Andrew also occurred in Hurricane Katrina,
more than a decade later (Knauer, 2005).
Part of the reason for this failure is the complexity of
the legal arrangements that govern and constrain federal
military involvement in domestic affairs. The Posse Comi-
tatus Act came into effect in 1878 and has been seen as
central to protecting the rights of states and as fundamental
to our modern democracy (Dowell, 1925; Lujan, 1997);
however, the law also creates roadblocks to the effective
use of military assets in catastrophic disasters. In response
to these concerns, the Stafford Act was passed in 1984 to
provide explicit statutory mechanisms for the deployment
of federal troops in a wide array of recovery functions in
the event of a disaster— but the process of requesting
federal aid is still complex. The legal intricacies created by
the Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts may be further
confounded in the South by the history of the Reconstruc-
tion and a deep-seated mistrust of the federal government.
Tragically, despite the presence of legal mechanisms
to form a unified command, the convolution of the laws
governing integrated state and federal response and the
historical baggage prevented federal assets from moving
into Louisiana fast enough. Furthermore, because of the
fear of overstepping the rules of Posse Comitatus, U.S.
military commanders did not invoke the doctrinal “imme-
diate response authority” vested in them, which had been
used in the 1906 earthquake.
5. Counterterrorism Versus All-Hazards
Response
Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters the

United States has experienced; natural disasters of this
magnitude dwarf the impact of terror attacks. In fact, Pres-
ident Bush compared the storm to a terrorist attack, stating
that the terrorists look at the storm’s devastation “and wish
they had caused it” (Sager, 2005, para. 1). The President
stated that the response to Hurricane Katrina was “not
acceptable” (Young & Borenstein, 2005, para. 1). How-
ever, the federal government has invested disproportion-
ately in counterterrorism at the expense of disaster pre-
paredness as a whole for the last several years, impairing
response to statistically more likely and more destructive
natural events. Of the $1.2 billion the DHS doles out for
disaster preparedness; $1.1 billion serves to combat terror-
ism, whereas barely $180 million has been allotted for
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (Young & Borenstein,
2005).
6. Ambiguous Training Standards and Lack
of Preparation
Hurricane Katrina exposed the lack of training and system-
atic qualification standards for disaster response agencies
and individual decision makers. The qualifications of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, as well
as those of FEMA director Michael Brown, were roundly
questioned in congressional hearings following the disas-
ter. With no previous experience in disaster management,
disaster response, or counterterrorism, Mr. Chertoff was
blamed for many of the failures. Mr. Brown, according to
his own testimony, was upset and confused by his assign-
ment as FEMA Principal Federal Official for Hurricane
Katrina, as he was not a qualified disaster manager and was
not on the roster of potential principal federal officials
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).
Lisa Joseph

Training standards and performance assessment of
disaster management professionals remain murky subjects
five years after 9/11. Training expectations for first re-
sponders, state emergency commanders, and federal offi-
cials are terribly cumbersome. To date, much of the money
granted to states through the DHS has not been spent, and
trainings offered often replicate prior learning rather than
extending competencies.
These problems are not limited to Louisiana. An in-
vestigative report in Santa Clara County, California,
showed that only $1 million of homeland security training
money had been spent, just 15% of the $6.8 million set
aside; those coordinating the spending lacked data on what
training the county’s 2,800 police officers and 1,500 fire-
fighters received before homeland security money arrived;
and a countywide committee was months from finalizing an
overall training plan even though federal monies started
flowing two years ago (Jacobs, 2005; for a more detailed
discussion, see Government Accounting Office, 2005).
Standards for accrediting individual disaster managers
and disaster response agencies are set by the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM, 2006) and
the Emergency Management Accreditation Program
(EMAP, 2004), respectively. The IAEM Certified Emer-
gency Manager designation is based on three years of
emergency response experience, possession of a bachelor’s
degree or equivalent, 200 hours of training, self-defined
contributions to the field, written responses to disaster
scenarios, and a 100-item multiple choice exam (IAEM,
2006). No verification of actual performance appears to be

necessary for this certification. The sample items for the
multiple choice exam are not specific to any particular
emergency manager’s duties and appear to be answerable
using little more than common sense. Similar concerns
exist with EMAP accreditation of response agencies. No
ties between accreditation and actual disaster management
performance are in evidence in the EMAP program.
7. Where Is the Learning in “Lessons
Learned”?
A tremendous amount is made of “lessons learned” and
“after-action reports” in the aftermath of major disasters
and training exercises. Yet despite their promise, knowl-
edge management approaches appear to be ineffective in
substantively impacting future performance. The U.S. mil-
itary, large corporations, and high-reliability organizations
have allocated considerable financial and staff time re-
sources to developing complex, technically sophisticated
lessons learned systems (LLS). However, researchers in
this field note that “in spite of significant investments in
these systems, their ability to promote knowledge sharing
is limited . . . large repositories of lessons exist, their in-
formation is not being used” (Weber, Aha, & Becerra-
Fernandez, 2001, p. 17).
In order to begin addressing the well-understood vul-
nerabilities in Louisiana, FEMA organized and funded a
multi-agency exercise in 2004 based on a fictional storm
called “Hurricane Pam” (U.S. House of Representatives,
2006). Congressional investigators called the exercise “pre-
scient” in its predictions. However, many of the lessons
taken from the Hurricane Pam exercise, as well as from
prior hurricanes and other major natural disasters, were not
implemented in Katrina. FEMA officials charged that the

State of Louisiana and local governments failed to follow
through on problem areas that were identified in the Hur-
ricane Pam exercise, whereas several local governments
expressed that they believed FEMA’s role was determined
in the exercise and that the agency did not act as it did
during the exercise (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).
LLS rely on a five-step process that includes collec-
tion of the lesson, validating or verifying the accuracy of
the lesson, storing the lesson, disseminating the lesson, and
reusing the lesson (Weber, Aha, Muñoz-Ávila, & Breslow,
2000). Substantial effort has been put into addressing the
first three steps, yet problems in dissemination and reuse of
lessons learned continue to plague knowledge management
systems. Reuse is typically inhibited by poor representa-
tions of problem antecedents, and LLS are rarely integrated
into organizational decision-making processes (Weber et
al., 2001). Although technical solutions are often funded,
knowledge management is also clearly a human enterprise.
Personality factors and differences in integrative complex-
ity may play an unexplored role in disaster managers’
ability to capture, process, and accurately apply lessons
learned from prior events to the impending problems of a
new catastrophe (Tetlock, 2005; Wilson, 2002).
8. Performance Assessment Not Integrated
Into the Process
The training and evaluation of intrateam performance
are not simple. However, these tasks become exponen-
tially more difficult when developing appropriate edu-
Elaine
Gierlach

cation and assessment techniques for large-scale joint
coalition command and control networks. A comprehen-
sive performance assessment system that provides
benchmarks for actual (not planned) disaster response
performance within and between major response agen-
cies is needed. This system should be developed by
disaster management experts and should integrate be-
havioral science research and psychometric rigor (Flin,
1997; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; McLaugh-
lin, Doezema, & Sklar, 2002).
In military terminology, disaster recovery may be seen
as a joint response within the individual state’s control,
utilizing peer level organizations such as police, fire, and
emergency medical technician (EMT) services. However,
if the disaster is complex enough, the event may require
federal assistance and military support. Federalization of a
disaster further disperses teams and command systems at
geographical and organizational levels. As federalization of
a disaster occurs, the scope of the effort may be seen as
transitioning from a joint operation within a state’s existing
command structure to a coalition environment with multi-
ple, decoupled command elements, in which the probability
of emergent behavior and improvisation increases substan-
tially (Mendonça & Wallace, 2004). No adequate perfor-
mance evaluation system for ad hoc disaster coalition per-
formance is in existence at present (Franco, Joseph, &
Beutler, 2005).
9. The Geography of Poverty: Are Race and
SES Response Factors?
Hurricane Katrina is not the first major storm to impact
poor, largely Black communities disproportionately. An

almost forgotten storm, the Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928,
destroyed much of the Florida Keys. The similarities be-
tween the two hurricanes are at once striking and disturb-
ing. Both storms led to the breach of poorly constructed
levees responsible for the majority of the fatalities. The
Okeechobee Lake, surrounded by migrant farming commu-
nities, drew workers from the South and from the Carib-
bean islands. Although the physical destruction impacted
the communities fairly evenly, it is estimated that three
fourths of the dead were Black migrant workers. Further-
more, resentment about racial inequity in the recovery
effort still lingers in Florida—75 years later (Kleinberg,
2003).
In neighborhoods such as New Orleans’s Ninth Ward,
residents lacked access to quality education, housing, and
employment opportunities that are available in surrounding
communities. In the last three decades, suburban popula-
tions have increased three times as much as urban popula-
tions, resulting in a decentralization of jobs and an overall
decrease in employment in urban areas (Berube & Katz,
2005). In addition, federal and state tax laws favored hous-
ing development in suburban neighborhoods, whereas de-
velopment in urban neighborhoods dwindled (Berube &
Katz, 2005). Poverty in neighborhoods such as New Or-
leans’s Ninth Ward became increasingly concentrated, with
fewer chances to escape the cycle of poverty. The lack of
essential resources, shelter, transportation, and information
were fatal deficits for the poverty-stricken Katrina victims.
Evacuation plans involved the use of services and resources
not available to many residents in New Orleans.
Despite the American Psychological Association’s
(APA, 2003) adoption of a Resolution on Poverty and
Socioeconomic Status, research, policy formation, and

awareness of the consequences of disaster on those who are
poor has not received enough attention. For those who had
doubts, Katrina reconfirmed the perception that the federal
government does not care for the nation’s sick, poor, el-
derly, and minority citizens in times of crisis.
10. Rumor and Chaos
Although the conditions necessary to incite panic rarely
occur, the possibility for unnecessary, deeply disruptive
secondary chaos is a real threat in catastrophic disasters.
There is some research on panicked flight, outbreaks of
multiple unexplained symptoms, rumor, and urban legends
(Allport & Postman, 1947; Pastel, 2001). However, ques-
tions remain about individual and group behavior in com-
plex, risk-laden, and ambiguous situations, especially as
some of the assumptions of Allport and Postman’s work are
increasingly being challenged (Miller, 1992).
Many charged that New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin
handled public communication poorly, as he sent out a
“desperate SOS,” described “hundreds of armed gang
members” performing violent acts at the Superdome, and
grossly overestimated the number of deaths the hurricane
would cause (Knauer, 2005). Once picked up by the mass
media, these stories took on the proverbial “life of their
own.” Search and rescue flights were halted in response to
reports of gunshots (which turned out often to be fired to
attract the attention of responders, not to drive them away),
hospital evacuations were suspended, drivers requested
Satoko
Kimpara

armed escorts, and responders shifted to a riot control
footing. What started out as rumor quickly became a costly
self-fulfilling prophesy that led to greater separation be-
tween hurricane victims and their rescuers rather than a
collaborative relief effort (“Convoys Bring Relief”, 2005).
Although much of the country later viewed Mayor
Nagin’s commentary and the rumors of rapes and murder at
the Superdome as irrational, as behavioral scientists we
must examine this phenomenon with care. The role of
rumor and urban legend in marginalized communities is
multifaceted—African Americans have a historical mis-
trust of the government, White Americans, corporations,
and other mainstream institutions. Unfortunately, these per-
ceptions are rooted in actual events (Freimuth et al., 2001).
Inner-city rumors are one way communities develop
and maintain interpersonal bonds and a collective sense of
identity and negotiate the meaning of marginalized status
(Miller, 1992). Contrary to the suggestion that those who
promote rumor are highly suggestible, uncritical, or irra-
tional (Le Bon, 1899/1960), the folkloric perspective ar-
gues that rumors are meaningful, are sometimes accurate,
and assist groups in negotiating ambiguity and defining
potential future actions (Miller, 1992). From this perspec-
tive, rumor can be viewed as the most ancient form of mass
communication (Kampferer, 1990), providing warning
about events that threaten group survival (Benford, 1999).
In the case of Katrina, rumors and the mayor’s com-
munication may have served as a way of circling the
wagons, preparing people for the worst, creating social
cues for mutual aid, signaling the need for help from the
outside community, while also expressing a profoundly
ambivalent message to the federal government—“We want

your help, but we’ve learned from experience that we can’t
trust you.” This is not to say that Mayor Nagin’s comments
were effective or responsible, but they may have been the
best information people had in the absence of more con-
crete crisis communication from state and federal officials.
11. Personal and Community Preparedness
The response of state and local governments, as well as that
of individuals, appeared to differ between Louisiana and
some of the municipalities in Mississippi that were also
devastated by the storm. The residents of New Orleans who
were unable to escape the storm have been characterized as
clamoring for government assistance rather than relying on
their own ingenuity. In contrast, the response in Mississippi
was cast as one in which individuals and religious organi-
zations came to each others’ aid during the time when
government resources were unavailable.
This issue is complex because of competing political
interests that color reporting of the events, but it is none-
theless something that must be probed. Some suggest that
years of dependence on government assistance, the corrup-
tion of local government, and a focus on external rather
than internal control created a culture of dependence in the
Big Easy. Others charge that these views sweep under the
carpet the fact that Blacks and Whites, Mississippians and
Louisianans, and rich and poor were all terribly impacted
by the devastation— but that the poor had considerably less
access to resources that would help them regain their foot-
ing (e.g., homeowners insurance).
The sharp political contrasts between the two states,
their responses to Katrina, and the subsequent meaning
making of the event can perhaps best be seen in this
statement by Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour

(2006):
Our people didn’t whine or mope around; they’re not into vic-
timhood. Immediately after the storm passed through, they
hitched up their britches and began helping themselves and
help-
ing their neighbors. The stories of ordinary people performing
extraordinary acts of courage and selflessness are extremely
com-
mon. The first responders, law enforcement, national guard, and
military; but also neighbors helping neighbors, churches helping
the needy and poor people more interested in others getting
assistance. That Mississippi spirit was obvious to people across
the country and around the world. (para.18)
In contrast, sociologist Steven Lukes (2005) argued
that the breakdown of institutions in the wake of Katrina
left a fundamental division between people: “[A] divide
appears between those who have means of escape and
survival and those who, until help arrives, have not” (para.
13). He went on to note that in the disaster,
[W]e caught a glimpse of the kind of powerlessness on which
we
do not normally reflect: the sudden unavailability of social ob-
jects, actions and relations. If there is no-one to pay and the
waters
are rising, you can’t buy and you can’t even loot. The authority
of
a policeman, even being a policeman can begin to lose meaning
in the chaos of the Superdome. What began to appear for a brief
period until social institutions began to re-acquire their grip
was
what Giorgio Agamben has called “bare life”—the
powerlessness
to live social lives fit for human beings. (Lukes, 2005, para. 14)

For a population that uses public transportation to
engage in daily activities, there should be little surprise that
Jennifer
Housley
the removal of public services left those in New Orleans
dependent on federal rescue. This interpretation subtly sug-
gests that government is an object of attachment for all of
us, and for those at the bottom rungs of society, its removal
and the ensuing perception of abandonment may be partic-
ularly dysregulating.
12. Disaster Mental Health and the Role of
Mental Health Professionals
As psychologists struggle to develop the best evidence-
based intervention for traumas, questions remain about
how best to intervene in a community after a traumatic
event. Opponents of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing
(CISD), a structured group debriefing intervention pro-
vided within 72 hours of exposure to a traumatic event,
claim that there is little evidence to support the efficacy of
this approach. One of the issues regarding interventions
such as CISD is that most people may neither want nor be
in need of this manner of “professional help.” Although
extreme distress is common in the immediate aftermath
of a traumatic event, most survivors will recover spon-
taneously.
CISD was originally developed for first responders
and later adapted for civilian and military survivors (Mitch-

ell, 1983). Unfortunately, research on the efficacy of this
application has largely failed to demonstrate clear benefits.
The predominant opinion among scientists who have stud-
ied CISD effects is that individuals who receive it fare
poorly, even compared with those individuals who receive
no treatment at all (e.g., Litz & Gray, 2004; Litz, Gray,
Bryant, & Adler, 2002; McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003).
Not only does CISD fail to remove immediate symptoms
effectively, but a growing body of evidence suggests that it
fails to prevent subsequent posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) (Bisson, McFarlane, & Rose, 2000; Gist & Wood-
all, 2000).
Contemporary views suggest that interventions that
tailor their focus and procedures to individual needs, that
focus on early posttrauma, and that focus on functional
recovery rather than psychopathology may be more ad-
vantageous than those that emphasize treatment of
“mental illnesses.” Psychological First Aid (PFA; Na-
tional Child Traumatic Stress Network and National
Center for PTSD, 2006) is swiftly becoming the new
state-of-the-art model for early intervention. PFA ac-
counts for the fact that the incidence rate of PTSD one
year after exposure is barely above normative rates (e.g.,
Galea et al., 2002; Galea et al., 2003; Housley & Beutler,
in press). The model also relies on self-efficacy as a
driving force in recovery, which is a focal mediator of
posttraumatic recovery (Benight & Bandura, 2004). The
objectives of PFA can be conceptualized as aiding the
adaptive coping and problem-solving skills of survivors
who are identified as at risk (Young, 2006). PFA seeks to
identify victims’ needs and fosters the belief in one’s
own capacity to overcome trauma.
More extended interventions can be incorporated

into the PFA model as client assessment warrants. For
example, the Palo Alto Medical Reserve Corps
(PAMRC) has developed a three-stage intervention pro-
gram that provides intervention options for varying post-
trauma time frames. Although the model of treatment
developed by the PAMRC is designed to be true to the
principles of effective treatment as outlined by the joint
APA Division 12/North American Chapter of the Soci-
ety for Psychotherapy Research Task Force (Castonguay
& Beutler, 2006), the specific techniques used in the
interventions are extracted from empirically supported
interventions to fit strategic needs and principles (Hous-
ley & Beutler, in press).
However, although alternatives to CISD are becoming
more plentiful and more research is being performed on
them, there is continued reticence in the mental health
community to explore and adopt these new skills. A deeper
understanding of disaster, of the traumatic responses it
generates, and of the resilience often found in “victims”
and a willingness to use less prescriptive and more client-
focused interventions are central to providing effective
mental health services in the aftermath of major disasters
(Beutler, Reyes, Franco, & Housley, 2006).
An Ounce of Prevention: How
Psychology Can Help
The events of September 11, 2001, raised the specter of a
disaster that could fundamentally disable our country, a
disaster of such magnitude that the economic, governmen-
tal, and social fabric of the nation might not be able to be
sewn back together. What will ensure social and govern-
ment continuity in the event of a disaster “double punch”—
for example, if a severe natural disaster coincidently oc-
curred on the heels of a major terrorist attack? Our
government continues to focus primarily on technical so-

Zeno E.
Franco
lutions to address disaster preparedness and recovery. Yet
in the aftermath of a catastrophic event, when such tech-
nical assets are unavailable or destroyed, it is human be-
havior—and often human behavior alone—that determines
the efficacy and rapidity of disaster recovery efforts.
Unfortunately, psychology as a discipline continues to
view its role in disasters as narrowly focused on the final
phases of these events, with much of the research, policy,
and practice emphasis placed on treating trauma, rather
than on its prevention. Instead, a comprehensive approach
aimed at embedding psychological science throughout the
five phases of disasters—planning, crisis communication,
response, relief, and recovery—is needed (Jacobs, 1995).
Such a stance would view psychology as a core component
of a broad, interdisciplinary effort to mitigate disasters
within a public health framework.
Yet while it is clear that psychology has much to offer
in terms of national preparedness, this goal remains elusive
nearly five years after 9/11. A search of PsycINFO shows
that just three APA journal articles with the search terms
“national preparedness” (n � 0), “emergency prepared-
ness” (n � 1), “disaster preparedness” (n � 0), or “home-
land security” (n � 2) are present in the literature, along
with a handful of books (e.g., Mangelsdorff, 2006). To be
sure, basic research in related areas is being performed, and
these efforts are being published in a variety of transdisci-

plinary journals, but few concentrated efforts have been
made to integrate this information and translate these find-
ings into actionable information for policymakers and di-
saster managers and to encourage disaster research to enter
the mainstream of formal psychological inquiry. With this
systemic approach in mind, it is possible to see how a
variety of psychology subdisciplines may contribute to
efforts to strengthen national preparedness across the 12
problem areas we have delineated.
Communication, Coordination, and
Command
The first five failures identified here revolve around prob-
lems in communication, coordination, planning, and com-
mand in the initial phases of disaster management. Military
and cognitive psychologists have led the way in these
areas, but broader involvement from industrial/organiza-
tional, personality, clinical, political, and international psy-
chology would help resolve unanswered questions about
how to manage joint military– civilian disaster teams.
For example, personality and clinical psychologists
may be able to explore individual disaster managers’ apti-
tude for command. Aircraft pilots and military personnel
have been repeatedly demonstrated to differ from norma-
tive population samples using objective personality mea-
surements, and variations within these military populations
have been noted (Bartone, Snook, & Tremble, 2002; Boyd,
Patterson, & Thompson, 2005; Wakcher, Cross, & Black-
man, 2003). However, initial work to identify a stable set of
personality characteristics that predict emergency com-
mander performance has not met with similar success (Flin
& Slaven, 1996). Further, little research has been con-
ducted on the personality and cognitive factors found in
successful large-scale coalition leaders or members (see,

e.g., Sutton & Edelman, 2005).
The psychoanalytic perspective may also offer impor-
tant insights into the “managerial ignorance” evident in
Hurricane Katrina. It has been hypothesized that managers
use defensive, narcissistic techniques to manage their own
self-esteem, which is deeply meshed with the identity of
the employing agency (Roux-Dufort, 2005). Psychoana-
lytic theory suggests that managers frequently use rational-
ization, denial, and self-serving biases such as escalating
commitment to prior actions in order to maintain self-
esteem in the midst of worsening crises (Roux-Dufort,
2005). Although these speculations have not been re-
searched to date, they offer important hypotheses that may
help us understand some of the failures that occurred dur-
ing the Katrina rescue effort.
Problems associated with authority transfer in govern-
ment response to disaster illuminate an important intersec-
tion between political and narrative psychology. As men-
tioned earlier, the actions taken in Hurricane Katrina point
to a long-standing resentment of the federal government in
the South. These feelings of resentment may have impacted
governors’ willingness to formally request federal assis-
tance during Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew. The psy-
chocultural narrative and identity of the affected region
may deeply impact a leader’s sense making of a disaster,
and this narrative may ultimately serve to broaden or cir-
cumscribe the field of options the leader views as viable
(Ross, 2003; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006).
There is also room for traditional, game-theory-based
political psychology research on human behavior during
disasters. For instance, a disaster provides a powerful su-
perordinate goal (Sherif, 1958) for the individuals charged
with its mitigation. Yet, it is clear that the interest of

disaster managers’ parent agencies and other influences
Larry E.
Beutler
often conflict with optimal disaster response (Pearson &
Clair, 1998). Why are some managers more concerned
about maintaining the image of their agency while others
“defect” to embrace the extra-agency goals of an ephemeral
disaster response coalition?
Learning, Training, and Performance
Assessment
The next three failures identified in the foregoing para-
graphs address ambiguity in training standards, problems
with LLS, and difficulties in designing appropriate perfor-
mance assessment mechanisms for large-scale disaster re-
sponse efforts. Educational, learning, cognitive, and moti-
vation psychologists and psychometrists are uniquely
positioned to assist in these areas.
For example, basic research in cognitive psychology
research has been performed with teams and individuals
involved in high-risk, high-consequence tasks for some
time (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Yet while the negative con-
sequences of irrationality and cognitive biases have been
demonstrated to impair crisis decision making, the appli-
cation of this knowledge for coalition disaster teams in
cognitively ergonomic lessons learned and decision sup-
port systems lags, making these groups vulnerable to de-
cisioning failure (Franco et al., 2005).

The other side of the training coin involves assessing
skill and implementation. The psychometrics of human
performance assessment is a multifaceted field, requiring a
fine balance between reliability and ecological validity
(Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 1990; Wass, Van der Vleuten,
Shatzer, & Jones, 2001). The difficulties of accurately
assessing actual performance become even more nuanced
as the scale of evaluation moves upward to involve perfor-
mance of multiple federal civilian and military agencies
interacting with state and local systems. Instrumentation
techniques, statistical procedures (see, e.g., Muijtjens,
Kramer, Kaufman, & Van der Vleuten, 2003), and critical
insight that might be offered by psychologists and psy-
chometrists are currently applied in the evaluation of indi-
vidual high-reliability teams but are not greatly evidenced
in the evaluation of larger scale coalition disaster manage-
ment performance (Franco et al., 2005).
Poverty, Rumor, and Community
Preparedness
The three areas identified for improvement here include
addressing issues of poverty and other marginalizing fac-
tors; creating effective, contextually appropriate crisis
communication systems; and improving personal and com-
munity preparedness. Subdisciplines of psychology that are
particularly suited to these tasks include community, me-
dia, social issues, aging, object relations, theoretical, and
social psychology—among others.
For example, Lloyd Etheredge’s (1977) psychody-
namic government dependency model predicts with strik-
ing accuracy what happened in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina: Mayor Ray Nagin’s paradoxical demands for more
federal involvement combined with resentment at potential
federal interference and control; Governor Blanco’s simul-

taneous demands for more federal action that she also
blocked by not formalizing her requests; and progressive
demoralization, bewilderment, and fury from a civilian
population toward the federal government—met with equal
disbelief and anger from federal officials— ultimately lead-
ing to stalemate and unnecessary civilian deaths, trauma,
and unrest (for a discussion of psychoanalytic theory ap-
plication to governance, see e.g., Gerson, 2004; Thomas,
1979).
Disaster Mental Health
Although many strides have been made in the conceptual-
ization and delivery of disaster mental health service over
the last two decades, such as the development of APA’s
Disaster Response Network (Jacobs, 1995) and the intro-
duction of the PFA manual, improvements are still needed.
In this area, the collaboration of those involved in forensic
psychology, ethics, death and dying studies, and the psy-
chology of religion will be particularly informative.
For instance, in major disasters, the dead are often
recovered in various states of dismemberment and decay.
In previous disasters, some family members were deeply
troubled by mortuary staff who prevented access to the
bodies of their deceased loved ones (Dix, 1998). It is
conceivable that mishandling of the interaction between the
living and the dead may increase memory consolidation of
the traumatic event, elevating the risk of psychological
injury (Shalev et al., 1998). PFA training for clinicians
should include information on how to address the handling
of the dead with survivors in ways that are sensitive to
personal preference, level of trauma exposure, cultural
considerations, and religious background.
Finally, further work is needed to train disaster mental

health specialists in the legal and liability intricacies sur-
rounding intervention in the aftermath of mass-casualty
situations (Abdel-Monem & Bulling, 2005). Psychologists
in disaster response settings face unique legal and ethical
problems that involve their own proficiency and adherence
to professional standards and the supervision of other li-
censed and unlicensed mental health workers in situations
where there is greater risk of coercion and impropriety.
Conclusion
Psychologists should endeavor to engage more directly
with disaster planning agencies, such as the National Emer-
gency Management Association and state offices of emer-
gency management, as well as develop closer links with
first response teams in their own localities. These linkages
will allow psychologists to educate responders in the clin-
ical care of mass trauma victims and provide lawmakers a
greater understanding of how basic psychological princi-
ples can be used to improve disaster management. Finally,
disasters create unexpected juxtapositions that allow sub-
fields to interact in novel ways, forming new nexus points
for research in human behavior. A few examples of impor-
tant areas for further integration of the behavioral sciences
in overall disaster management have been offered here;
however, a much wider constellation of legal, policy, and
procedural issues exists, which the field of psychology
must begin to inform.
The security of the nation, both from terror attacks and
from natural events, is fundamentally based on the behav-
ioral responses of its citizens. An interdisciplinary ap-

proach to the field of disaster management that views
psychology as a central element—rather than second to
engineering or information science—will lead to stronger,
more resilient communities, result in better decisions on the
part of government, and hopefully reduce the need for
clinical care in future catastrophes.
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