1. morality and reason
Student: I am having some difficulty understanding Singer's
summary of the classical argument that to act rationally is to act
ethically. I would attempt to paraphrase it as follows: 1.
Universalization, to at least some extent, is essential to ethics. 2.
Reason is universally and objectively valid. Therefore, 3. In acting
rationally, one acts ethically. Does this capture the main idea? [DrC:
Good.]
Student: I also had a question about Singer's subsequent refutation
of this argument. His denial consists in stating that the above
argument is just as compatible with egoism as with disinterested
utilitarianism. But egoism, surely, does not capture the virtues of
ethics, so this argument is invalid. Is that roughly what Singer
means in the subsequent pages? [DrC: Good.]
2. voluntary euthanasia
Student: In regards to Singer,pg. 197, I
would like to disagree with Dr. Elisabeth
Kubler-Ross's claim that it is possible with
improved care to eliminate pain from the
terminally ill and therefore eliminate the
need for voluntary euthanasia. I think that
regardless of whether or not someone
'physical' pain is alleviated, that should play
no part in the emotional and psychological
pain a terminally ill individual experiences,
which can at times be far worse than any
physical pain. I think that the need for
voluntary euthanasia will never be
3. is value fragmented?
Student: I just read the essay a fragmentation of value by thomas
nagel, i really like it, he uses " exclusionary over-rationalization", a
term delineating those who strive to apply a "complete" all
encompassing moral theory, when in fact none exists, or those that
do are inadequate. I believe he would classify Singer as guilty of
this. For singer preference utilitarianism is a means used to
guide(dictate) action. i believe something along the lines of what
nagel postulates, that value is not reconcilable to one ordinance, it
derives from many separate facets of our being to which one does
not necessarily dominate over the other...
DrC: Thomas Nagel’s essay “the fragmentation of value” is thought-
provoking, I find. It certainly is a challenge to preference
utilitarianism, and to a lesser but still significant degree, to DV
utilitarianism.
4. morality and rewards
There is absolutely no reason why anyone should act morally if they
do not get any feeling of compassion, satisfactions and rewards
from doing so in our established social norms. A psychopath has no
choice but to do as he pleases since he cannot feel anything and
get any rewards but the unacceptable acts he engages in. I see it
as him possessing an invisible ring where he can do as he pleases
and not get caught (conscience). He has even more right to do as he
pleases especially since life is meaningless as religion being no more
people have nothing to believe in and only find pleasures in their
simple everyday lives. In the long run any atheist would agree life
was a meaningless random arrangement of particles experiencing
itself consciously and subjectively.
5. morality and rewards
Student: There is absolutely no reason why anyone should act
morally if they do not get any feeling of compassion, satisfactions
and rewards from doing so. A psychopath has no choice but to do as
he pleases since he cannot feel anything and get any rewards but
the unacceptable acts he engages in. I see it as him possessing an
invisible ring where he can do as he pleases and not get caught
(conscience). He has even more right to do as he pleases especially
since life is meaningless as religion being no more people have
nothing to believe in and only find pleasures in their simple
everyday lives.
DrC: You’re alluding to Gyges’ Ring. Let’s discuss that. The original
argument didn’t limit the implications of the Ring to psychopaths. It
was supposed to affect ordinary people. But Plato responded with
an idea akin to Mill’s `higher pleasures’ or the DV idea of symbolic
utility: a deeper self-interest leads one to do the right thing,
despite the temptations of the Ring. Or at least it can and may lead
one to do the right thing. Especially on the DV account, there are
no absolutes here.
6. symbolic and pschological utility
Student: I know you've had many questions regarding dv
utilitarianism, but I have one more! You actually already answered
this question in class, but I might need your explanation in written
form, as I didn't quite catch everything you said the first time. The
question is: how is symbolic utility different from expected
psychological utility; for example, something that reduces cognitive
dissonance.
DrC: SU attaches to one’s actions: it’s the meaning, expressiveness
or representative character of the deed. It can be compared to the
meaning of a sentence, like “Pass the salt!” The meaning is different
from the sentence’s subsequent effects, even when the effects are
intended, as when someone passes you the salt. Similarly, the
symbolic utility of doing the right thing is different from the
expectation of feeling good about oneself, which would be an
additional, EU reason to do the right thing. Just as the meaning of
a sentence isn’t reducible to what’s going on in a reader’s mind, so
too the meaning of an action isn’t reducible to psychological states.
SU is categorically different from EU, though they’re both utility.
7. the absurdity of being Canadian
Student: [Consider] the absurdity of discriminating people based on
arbitrary (largely) artificial boundaries (like state, or country lines).
Much like the Singer's argument for not discriminating based on
species membership, I see no morally defensible reasons to refuse
citizenship or refuge to those who need it. Not a day goes by in my
life that I don't ponder the absurdity of having been randomly
thrown into existence in the western world, and in the 21st
century. As absurd as it is that I should be here, it's even more
absurd (to me) to not allow a fellow human who was thrown into
existence elsewhere to not enter my "nation".
DrC: Absurdity is just the right idea here. It’s a contradiction or
tension between “appearance” and “reality”. The tug of appearance
can be strong and abiding, and it may not be the sort of thing we
can simply toss aside. Maybe the union of Mind and Matter in a
human being is absurd in this sense: mental appearance and
cerebral reality. The absurdity of being Canadian, with all the
specificities that implies, may be like that.
8. potentiality and experience
My pmail is in response to Don Marquis' "Why Abortion is Immoral",
which is I think the first work I have read that defends the anti-
abortion view. He establishes that it is wrong to take a life because
of the victim's future dreams, goals, accomplishments, feelings,
experiences, etc. So anybody who has a future with these
experiences should not be killed and it would be immoral to do so.
What troubles me about his argument is that infants have a much
larger spanning future to come than do anybody older than them,
say adults or seniors. Since an infant has a larger future that
would be interrupted than a senior, by Marquis' logic, he would
have to say it is more immoral to kill the infant than the senior.
However, if we extend this to fetuses, which he does, a fetus has
an even longer future to experience, so Marquis would have to hold
the life of a fetus above all other age groups. His argument seems
to say that the value of one's life diminishes as one ages, which is
an unwholesome thought.