Team: Phoenix Partners Proposed leveraged buyout of Fujifilm. Unlocking value of the Japanese conglomerate through the trimming of declining businesses while focusing on the burgeoning Informations Solutions business. Our strategy will deliver our GPs a return of 32.4% IRR.

1. Unlocking Long Term Value through Restructuring

2. Deal Team
i
Deal Team consists of both technical specialists and business consultants well versed in their area of expertise…
Darren Cheng
Structuring and
Execution
• BBM, SMU School of
Business
• Standard Chartered
Plc
• Seatown Holdings
• Sumitomo Mitsui
Banking Corporation
• Lumen Capital
Investor
Ernest Ong
M&A and
Corporate
Development
• BBM, SMU School of
Business
• Auric Pacific
• Seatown Holdings
• PwC
• IncuVest Asia
Josephine Soh
Consulting and
Business
Development
• BBM & BBA, SMU
School of Business
and Accountancy
• Parthenon-EY
• PwC
• DHL
• Telenor
Cao Yu
Mergers and
Acquisitions
• BBA, SMU School of
Accountancy
• Morgan Stanley
• Lazard
• TSR Partners

3. Executive Summary
1
We believe that Fujifilm has the potential to unlock tremendous value through 3 key levers and will exist as a more efficient organization
post restructuring
• Generating 43.6% of our returns, EBITDA growth is the biggest
driver of our IRR. We believe that the renewed focus in the
pharmaceuticals business coupled with our short, medium, and long
term strategies to boost Fujifilm’s growth will transform the firm into an
integrated healthcare solutions provider.
• We see EBITDA growing by 18.7% CAGR up our exit in FY2022 and
continue to grow post-IPO with the implementation of our proposed
strategy
#1 EBITDA Margins Expansion through improved operations
• Generating 18.0% of returns, value is
unlocked by levering the firm from 1.9x to 5.0x
in Total Debt/EBITDA, utilising Fujifilm's
available debt headroom
• While maintaining a healthy Debt Service
Coverage Ratio of ~1.5x, we could potentially
benefit from the lower of cost of capital
• The low cost of borrowing in Japan makes it
an attractive place for LBO transactions
• At the end of the 5 year projection period, we
expect to paydown ~71% of the total debt
and exit at a 0.54x Total Debt/Equity
#2 Lowering cost of capital through
increased leverage
• Generating 38.4% of our returns, we believe
that the firm is currently significantly
undervalued due to the prevalence of a
conglomerate discount
• Disposing low growth assets early in the post-
LBO strategy allows resources to be focused on
Fujifilm’s high growth pharmaceuticals
segment
• Aim at disposing businesses to strategic
investors which have higher willingness to pay
due to achievable synergies
• Exit as a more pure-play pharmaceuticals
company, with an attractive blended EV/EBITDA
of 13.9x
#3 Potential for valuation re-rating due to
perceived conglomerate discount
IRR 32.4%
MoM 3.5x

4. Screening Process
Note: 1. Based on Net Debt/EBITDA, 2. EV/EBITDA, 3. Full details in the appendix
Source: Team Analysis 2
Our screening methodology takes into account the firm’s external and internal environment, as well as signs of undervaluation,
opportunities for EBITDA expansion, and low net debt
Company
Attractiveness
of Industry
Firm’s Cash Flow
Stability
Firm’s Potential
to Grow
Debt Headroom1 Valuation2 Incompetence of
Management3
AMD 4 2 4 2 1 2
Micron 4 3 4 1 4 2
Kraft Heinz 1 4 2 1 3 1
Pepsi Co 1 4 2 3 4 4
GE 3 3 3 1 3 2
Mattel 2 2 2 1 1 3
2 3 3 4 4 4 2
Kodak 2 2 3 4 4 2
Our analysis shows that Fujifilm is the best LBO candidate

5. Company Profile
3
Company Overview 3-Year Share Price History with P/E Bands
0.00
1000000.0
2000000.0
3000000.0
4000000.0
5000000.0
6000000.0
7000000.0
8000000.0
9000000.0
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Dec-14 Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16 Jun-17 Dec-17
Max: 23.6x
High: 20.8x
Avg: 18.1x
Low: 16.0x
Min: 13.9x
Share Price (¥ )
52W Return: (4)%
52W Return: 8%
Institutions
28.8%
Corporations
1.5%
Individuals/Insiders
0.0%
Public
69.7%
Shares Outstanding
430.2mm
Holder Appointment
Stock
Held
Komori,
Shigetaka
Chairman &
CEO
22,500
Toda, Yuzo
CTO,
Corporate VP
11,600
Tamai, Koichi
CIO,
Corporate VP
7,600
Key Insiders
342 900 1,081
11%
9% 8%
14% 15% 13%
0%
10%
20%
0
500
1,000
Imaging Solutions Information Solutions Document Solutions
Revenue EBIT Margins EBITDA Margins
¥ (mm) Margins (%)
• Established in 1934, Fujifilm Holdings Corporation develops, produces,
distributes and services imaging, pharmaceutical and printing solutions
worldwide, headquartered in Tokyo, Japan
• Market Cap: ¥2,204bn; Enterprise Value: ¥2,151bn
• Derives revenue from 3 operating segments (% of Revenue):
o Imaging (15%): Offers photo imaging (e.g. Instax) and optical device
and electronic imaging (e.g. mirrorless/ DSLR cameras) products
globally, with strong acceptance in NA and EU
o Information (39%): Offers mainly pharmaceuticals (e.g. regenerative
medicine) and medical systems, and highly functional materials (e.g.
electronic/ fine chemicals and graphic inkjet systems)
o Document (46%): Offers office and printing products and leasing
services through 75% subsidiary Fuji Xerox
Segment Breakdown
Shareholder CompositionSummary Financials
FYE 31 Mar (¥ bn) 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A CAGR
Revenue 2,418.1 2,463.4 2,460.4 2,322.2 -1.34%
% growth 9.94% 1.87% -0.12% -5.62%
Adjusted EBITDA 219.4 229.7 246.5 231.2 1.75%
% margin 9.07% 9.32% 10.02% 9.95%
Adjusted EBIT 128.5 164.4 180.6 172.3 10.28%
% margin 5.31% 6.67% 7.34% 7.42%
Debt to EBITDA (x) 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.4
ROE (%) 3.9 5.5 5.8 6.5 18.56%
Key Products
Imaging Solutions Information Solutions Document Solutions
3Y High: ¥5,009
3Y Low: ¥3,455
Source: Company Filings, Bloomberg
Fujifilm Nikkei 225 (Rebased)

6. 2,151
389
3,001
858
(209)
1,963
Current EV Imaging
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Information
Solutions
Corporate
Center
Eliminations
SOTP
Valuation
Documents Canon
Seiko
Epson
Ricoh Fujifilm
Placing vs
peers
Market Share 29% 11% 27% 17% 3rd
Average EBITDA Margins 16% 17% 12% 13% 3rd
Average EBIT Margins 12% 14% 8% 8% 3rd
Average ROCE3 23% 27% 7% 8% 3rd
Situational Overview
Notes: 1. 4 year historical average segment results for various firms, 2. Information solutions segment, 3. CE represents segment assets, 4. Return on Research Capital = EBIT/R&D
Source: Company Filings, Euromonitor, Bloomberg 4
Imaging Canon1 Nikon1 Sony1 Fujifilm1 Placing
vs peers
Market Share 25% 15% 14% 13% 4th
Average EBITDA Margins 19% 12% 11% 10% 4th
Average EBIT Margins 15% 9% 6% 7% 3rd
Average ROCE3 41% 23% 36% 7% 4th
Industry Comparables Benchmarking Indicative SOTP Value
• Operational performance appears depressed with Fujifilm underperforming
peers in its various segments
• This demonstrates a lack of focus by management leading to inconsistent
results between operating segments
Operational “dis-synergies” could be unlocked in the event of a split
Pharmaceuticals
/Chemicals2
Takeda
Pharma
Johnson
&
Johnson
Novartis Fujifilm
Placing
vs peers
Average EBITDA Margins 20% 33% 22% 15% 4th
Average EBIT Margins 8% 27% 19% 9% 3rd
Average ROCE3 6% 21% 11% 6% 4th
Average R&D/Revenue 19% 12% 17% 7% 4th
Average RORC4 44% 221% 109% 131% 2nd
7.4x 8.1x 8.3x 14.9x 7.4x ~10.4x EV/EBITDA
• By marking the segments to peer multiples, the current valuation significantly
undermines the market value of the standalone business segments
• Using a bottoms-up SOTP approach we estimate that the indicative upside
is ~39.5%, with the business valued at 10.4x EV/EBITDA, significantly
higher than current trading multiples
Lack of focus limits operational efficiency, while valuations are mismatched due to perceived conglomerate discounting
SOTP Pure-play Implied
Valuations
Tremendous value could be unlocked by splitting up businesses
~¥850bn
unlocked
Existing
Enterprise
Value

7. Strategic Alternatives
Source: Broker Reports
5
After considering other strategic alternatives, we feel that an LBO is the preferred method of investing
Investor Activism
65.6%
55.2%
29.6%
68.6%
62.1%
46.7%
US UK Asia
2014 2015
Increasing activist success rates
between 2014 - 2015
• Investor activism would entail taking up a
small stake in the Fujifilm business and
asking management to split the business
• Japan has strong legal rights of
shareholders and is increasing its
emphasis on board governance
• Activist investor Dan Loeb has managed
to table for increasing shareholder’s
returns in Seven & I Corp.
• Fujifilm has a dispersed shareholder’s
structure which is favourable for a proxy
contest
• Launching a proxy contest however
entails high sunk costs with no guarantee
of success
Key Strategy Activist Tools
Financial
• Changing capital structure to reduce overall cost of
capital
• Return cash to shareholder’s through share
buybacks and dividends
• Public
Communication
• Shareholder’s
Proposal
Operational
• Spinning off unprofitable businesses and reinvest
proceeds into the pharmaceutical business
• Improve efficiency of core businesses
• Proxy Contest
• Shareholder’s
Proposal
A successful activist campaign may unlock value, however, activism is
is an expensive venture and subject to investor perception
• Similarly, we could co-participate in this buyout as a mezzanine investor
• This allows us to limit our downside risk but yet participate in the upside
unlocked through value creation
Proposed Structure incorporating a structured note with equity
warrants…
Our value proposition requires control in order to initiate value levers
and investing in Mezzanine fails to give us this leverage
Sources of Value
1. Coupon payable from cashflows derived from Fujifilm’s operating businesses.
2. Warrants allow us to buy into equity at low prices allowing cashflows derived from
asset sale to flow back in the form of dividend recap to mezzanine holders
3. During asset divestitures, issuers may opt to pay back the loan however incurring a
prepayment penalty charge
95% ownership
LP investor
SPV Mezzanine
5% ownership
Fujifilm
A B C
IRR ~10-15%
consisting of:
Prepayment
penalty
Equity
Participation
Coupon/
Payment-In-
Kind
1
2
3
Mezzanine Investing

8. Transaction Structure
Source: Bloomberg
6
Deal Structure Valuation Analysis
Institutions
1.5%28.8% 69.7%
Pre-LBO
Post-LBO
Selected Key
Management
79.9%0.1% 20.0%
Corporations Public Investors
Sources and Uses Capital Structure
Dispersed pre-LBO shareholding structure reduces the probability of
dissident blockholders rejecting the deal
Methodology Per Share Price Valuation Range
5,121 6,892
5,8004,800
MarketValues
Trading
Comparables
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
4,265 6,094
Current Price: ¥4,270
EV/EBITDA: 7.4x
Offer Price: ¥5,124
TV/EBITDA: 8.9x
Offer Premium: 20.0%
52W
Range
Since
IPO
Broker
Target
Prices
LTM
P/E
LTM
EV/EBITDA
5,7101,273
3,932 4,838
We propose to buyout Fujifilm at 8.9x EV/EBITDA at a 20% premium to the current price
697,056
2,680,985
697,056
348,528 1,000
749,876
187,469
Tranch A Tranch B Mezzanine Management: Phoenix
Partners
Bain Capital Total
Debt: ¥ 1,742,640m (65%) Equity: ¥ 938,345m (35%)Sources:
Amount
(¥'m)
x
EBITDA
%
Total:
Uses:
Amount
(¥'m)
x
EBITDA
%
Total:
Tranch A: 697,056 2.4x 21.2% Purchase Price: 2,645,120 9.1x 80.6%
Tranch B: 697,056 2.4x 21.2% Refinance Debt: 558,842 1.9x 17.0%
Mezzanine: 348,528 1.2x 10.6% Transaction Fees: 36,451 0.1x 1.1%
Excess Cash: 600,000 2.1x 18.3% Financing Fees: 40,572 0.1x 1.2%
Management: 1,000 0.0x 0.03% Total Uses: 3,280,985 11.3x 100.0%
Sponsor Equity: 937,345 3.2x 28.6%
Total Sources: 3,280,985 11.3x 100.0%

9. Overview of Strategic Plans
Notes: 1. Includes Graphic Systems division currently part of Information Solutions segment
7
Our post-transaction strategy is executed in 3 phases: Pruning, Weeding and Nurturing
Pruning: Uproot distractions from value
creation1
Weeding: Divesting the printing business at
attractive terms2
Nurturing: Unlocking massive value from
Healthcare3
• Slow growth trajectory which can only be
changed through a consolidation with a
similar sized competitor
• Repackaging Fujifilm’s printing solutions
segment to include graphic systems (ink)
business
• Asset sale to Xerox would fetch attractive
valuations due to market leader premium
and operational synergies from the
acquisition
• Brand-sticky customers in the cameras
industry result in high customer
acquisition costs
• Imaging solutions segment is shrinking
and unable to increase market share due
to lack of extensiveness of product range
• Existing appetite for M&A increases
feasibility of divestment in FY18-19
• Expand CDMO pipeline for OEM drug
manufacturing to capture industry growth
• Improving customer acquisition through
analytics of physician preferences
• Establishing an IoT feedback loop
through sale of medical wearables
• IPO exit in FY22 to unlock shareholder
value at expanded multiples
Imaging Solutions
Document Solutions
Information Solutions
2New Document
Solutions1
3
1 Proposed disposal through
trade sale to Nikon
Proposed disposal of newly
packaged Documents
division to Xerox
Pursue organic top line growth and
margin expansion; exit through IPO
Implementation Period
FY18-19
FY18-19
FY18-22

10. 2
Segment Overview
Source: Euromonitor, Various Company Websites
8
34%
25%
18%
22%
35%
27%
12% 14%
19%
Sony
Olympus
Canon
129 132
83
60
50
34
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
DSLR + Mirrorless Market Share Evolution Product Range Analysis Key Commentary
• Canon has been gaining market share in
Fujifilm’s key camera segments with their
extensive product range, excellent distribution
capability and strong brand loyalty
• A key consumer purchase criteria would be
the range and quality of camera bodies and
lenses. Canon possesses a strong advantage
in this, allowing them to capture new
customers and convert current users
• With Fujifilm’s current capabilities, it is
unlikely that they are able to compete
effectively and gain market share from
incumbents
55% 56%
63%
39% 37% 32%
5% 7% 5%
2015 2016 2017
Canon
Nikon
Pentax
DSLRMirorrless
TotalNo.ofCameraBodies
+CameraLenses
Globally, the market is expected to decline and Fujifilm does not have the requisite competitive advantage to gain market share
Global DSLR + Mirrorless Camera Market Key Market Developments Key Commentary
• Overall, the market is expected to decline and
there is limited room for growth. Consolidation
is expected to take place as camera
manufactures attempt to scale and lower costs
• Smartphones have become very close
substitutes and recent industry partnerships
and innovations such as Apple’s Portrait Mode
further threaten digital cameras
• Overall, a longer replacement cycle and
stronger substitutes drive the market’s
decline
Smartphones
• Image quality of smartphones have improved
tremendously, becoming a stronger substitute
for digital cameras. Industry partnerships such
as Huawei with Leica are an attempt from
camera lens manufacturers to stay relevant
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2015 2016 2017 F2022
¥ Bn
Longer Camera Replacement Cycles
• Replacement cycles of cameras have increased
significantly, as consumers have stopped
upgrading their camera, and are presumably
happy with their current camera. Moreover, new
product launches only have incremental
benefits, and lack any significant differentiating
factor to entice consumers
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

11. Disposal of Imaging Solutions to Strategic Buyers
Source: Bloomberg, Company Filings, Capital IQ
9
Nikon has been facing pressures to merge from industry pundits Nikon’s current product line are complementary to Fujifilm’s
A tie-up with Nikon will leverage on both company’s respective competencies
557
468
429
370 357
122 137 149 149
221
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
SLRs Mirrorless
…as the global Industry has moved from
SLRs into mirrorless cameras Mirrorless
SLRs
ProductMix
Merger would allow Nikon to gain access to its mirrorless sensor
technology and increase market share
Nikon’s failure to diversify product mix has since sparked
speculations of a merger with Fujifilm
-18%
-8%
-5%
-3%
Nikon Sony Canon Fujifilm
Japanese
Strategic
Players
703
457
383 352
247
105 87 65.6
Canon Fujifilm +
Nikon
Nikon Sony Panasonic Fujifilm Ricoh Olympus
Camera Subsegment Growth (¥ bn)Last 3 Year Revenue CAGR (%)
Other Strategic Buyers Exit Valuation
Total Digital Camera Market Sales (¥ Bn)
Acquirer Target
Deal
Value
(US$m)
2006 Sony
Konica
Minolta
-
2011 Blackstone Leica 179.0
2011 Ricoh Pentax 124.2
2012 Sony Olympus 640.0
2017 DJI Hasselblad -
Deal space has been active
We see appetite for acquirers
looking to expand capabilities
Prospective Buyer Universe
Chinese
Strategic
Players
200 400 600
Trading
Comparables
EV/ T12M EBITDA
EV/ 5 Year Avg
EBITDA
Precedent
Transactions
EV/T12M EBITDA
• Based on ¥47.9bn 2018E EBITDA, we derive a exit value of between ¥350 –
400Bn, valuing the camera business at 7.3x – 8.3x EV/2018E EBITDA
• We believe this to be conservative, using a lower exit multiple and not valuing
potential synergies between Fujifilm and strategic buyers. We note that the Sony’s
non-controlling stake in Olympus in 2012 was valued at 10.7x EV/T12M EBITDA.
Nikon’s revenues have halved since
2014…
Combined Revenue
¥350bn
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

12. Segment Overview
Note: 1. By EBITDA margins
Source: J.P. Morgan, Gartner, McKinsey, Various company annual reports 10
0
400
800
1,200
2016A 2017A 2018E 2019E 2020E
Others Global Services
Production Services Office Printers
Office Products
1,165
¥ Bn
1,081 1,080 1,060 1,040
2017– 2020
CAGR
-1.92%
-4.98%
0.10%
2.30%
-1.27%
-1.28%
Fuji Xerox Sales by Segment
• Document solutions is Fujifilm’s worst
performing business line1
• While there is slight growth in Global Services,
providing its clients value added services such
as print management and security, this
growth from Global Services alone is
insufficient and cannot reverse the overall
downward trend
• Moreover, Fujifilm has no cost advantage,
and lacks the expertise to pursue new
business lines
• With no pricing power and cost advantage,
Fujifilm does not have bright prospects
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fuji Xerox HP Canon Epson
• The printers and copiers market is expected to
decline at a -1.5% CAGR through to 2022
• As the market shrinks, consolidation is
underway and will pick up speed as
companies aim to gain scale and cut costs.
Going forward, scale and costs will be key
success factors
• Some firms have ventured into and expanded
their product line to include 3D printers. As
strong growth is expected in this industry,
many competitors have already entered and
built their presence in the market. Fujifilm is a
laggard and lacks knowledge and expertise
Digitization
• Digitalization of business processes and the
growth of digital business, are accelerating the
decline of printed pages
Consolidation
• HP acquired Samsung Printers in Nov 2017. By
1Q18, HP’s printer sales grew by 7.2%, while
margins improved by 10bps
Foray into 3D Printers
• HP and Ricoh now manufacture their own 3D
printers targeted at existing enterprise and
healthcare customers
• Canon, Ricoh, and Konica Minolta have been
reselling 3D printers to their existing clients
Key Commentary
Key Market Developments Key Commentary
Operating Margins Analysis
Proposed sale of documents segment based on dim prospects for and lack of competitive edge
15% 15% 13% 13% 12%
19% 21% 20% 21% 20%
19% 18% 20% 19% 20%
24% 24% 23% 22% 24%
23% 23% 24% 25% 25%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fuji Xerox Ricoh Canon HP Others
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions
Global Printers Market Share Evolution

13. 694 773 859
202
226
250
222
0
500
1000
1500
Bear Base Bull
Value from EBITDA (Documents) Value from EBITDA (Graphic Systems)
Value from Cost Synergies
650
1250 1250
2250
400
200
1000
COGS SG&A R&D Total Cost
Savings
Revenue
Synergies
Total
Synergies
Consolidate
manufacturing
footprint +
streamline
logistics
Remove
duplicative
G&A
Remove
duplicative
R&D
Cross selling, widened
product portfolio and
greater R&D firepower
to accelerate market
share gains
Disposal of Documents Solutions to Xerox
Notes: *Intercompany transactions have been deducted, 2. Fujifilm management guidance 2018 through proposed capital restructuring of Fuji Xerox, 3. Only 20% of FY22E cost
synergies priced in
Source: Company Filings, Bloomberg, Broker Reports, Team Estimates
11
Xerox the most suitable buyer of Fuji Xerox… …creating a new market leader in the printing solutions space
An upstream acquisition is currently the best way for Xerox to
immediately expand margins in the maturing documents market
Apart from market leadership, consolidation implies greater value
chain control and direct margin capture by Xerox
Evaluation of Synergies2 Exit Valuation
Conservative cost savings of US$1.25Bn and revenue enhancement
of US$1Bn per annum by 2022…
…allows us to dispose the business at a premium valuation even
before factoring revenue enhancement synergies in the sale price
2.1+ 2.1
1.8 1.8
1.2 1.1
0.8 0.7
0.4
New
Xerox
HP Inc Canon Ricoh Xerox Fuji
Xerox
Konica
Minolta
Seiko
Epson
Brother
(¥ Tn)
Combined Revenue
Smooth integration due
to existing partnerships
and brand coherence
~85% achievable by 2020
(US$ MM)
(US$ Bn)
Substantially all office products sold by
Xerox are produced by Fuji Xerox
(¥ Bn)
6.7x 7.5x 8.3x
With substantial cost and revenue synergies to be gained, a Fuji Xerox acquisition is an attractive and strategic proposition for Xerox
Exit Multiple (EV/EBITDA)
1
3
12.3
11.1 10.4 10.0
14.4%
13.7%
13.4%
13.0%
12%
13%
14%
15%
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
2014 2015 2016 2017
Xerox's Revenue (LHS) Xerox's EBITDA margins (RHS)
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

14. Segment Overview
Note: 1. Contract Development and Manufacturing Organization
Source: World Health Organization, Zion, McKinsey, Frost & Sullivan Company Presentations 12
Fujifilm can do more to capture the healthcare market in Asia which is expected to grow across Drugs, Devices, and Services
Disease ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17
Heart Disease 2 2 1 1 1
Respiratory
Disease
1 1 2 3 4
Lung Cancer 3 3 3 2 2
Stomach
Cancer
5 4 4 4 3
Liver Cancer - - 5 5 4
Diarrheal
Diseases
4 5 - - -
Change in Top 5 Diseases in Asia
Growing demand for drugs treating heart
disease, lung, stomach, and liver cancer
• Market expected to grow at 7.4% CAGR till 2021
Trends in Medical Device Segment
Medical Devices
• Globally, Asia Pacific recorded the highest
growth rate of 10% CAGR from 2013 to 2017.
This growth is expected to accelerate, reaching
13.2% till 2022.
Drivers of Growth
• Rising disposable incomes drive expenditures
on healthcare in hospitals, and at home.
• An aging population, growth in mobile and
broadband Internet services, and rising costs of
services drive demand for more at-home care
and portable medical devices.
Fujifilm can expand its product range to
manufacture consumer medical devices
Growth in Analytics within Healthcare
While there is opportunity in telehealth,
strong partnerships underpin its success
Telehealth
• Telehealth is expected to growth at 12% CAGR
till 2022, reaching a total market value of
$1.79Bn within Asia Pacific. This is in line with
the push to develop Smart Cities.
Key Factors for Success
• There is a need to establish a sustainable and
clear business model that involves hospitals and
patients, which is well supported by strong
network infrastructure and regulations.
• With a large volume of data exchanges, players
need strong network security measures.
Fujifilm’s Mismatched Drug Portfolio Inability to Market New Products Heavy Reliance on Hospitals as an End-user
Fujifilm should produce more drugs for
cancer and cardiovascular diseases
While Fujifilm has the ability to R&D many
new products, it’s unable to market them
Currently, Fujifilm does not sell any
medical devices targeted at consumers
Female
Medical Care
(28.9%)
Diagnostic Drugs
(38.1%)
Others
(21.1%)
CDMO1
(6.7%)
Cardiovascular
(2.7%)
Cancer
(2.7%)
436
1,109
1,487
2,626
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2014 2015 2016 2017
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
No.ofNewProducts
SalesGrowth
New Products Sales Growth
• All of Fujifilm’s medical devices are for use by
hospitals and medical professionals
o Endoscope
Utilizes HD
Imaging for
diagnosis
o Ultrasound
Utilizes
ultrasound
for imaging
o X-Ray
Utilizes X-
Ray for
imaging
o In-Vitro
Used for
fluid and
blood tests
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

15. Acquiring more cardiovascular and cancer related CDMO contracts Tailoring analytics process to Fujifilm
Insufficient exposure to growing trends
Enhancing our drugs and pharmaceuticals division
Notes: 1. IMS Health Group, 2. Japan Medical Data Center, 3. Japan Health Policy NOW, 4. National Health Insurance Japan
Source: SAS, Postgraduate Medical Journal, Company filings, Broker Reports, FDA 13
1. In the short term, we strengthen Fujifilm’s drug portfolio by
securing more cancer and cardiovascular CDMO clients
2. To effectively bring our enhanced drug portfolio to market, we
want to adopt an analytics-driven approach to marketing
BenefitsAnalytics ModelData Collected
• IMS Sales data1
• Census data
• Physician data
• Call center data
• CRM data on samples
• Data on promotions
• Managed care data
• Predict which
sales tactic (e.g.
samples, vouchers,
access to experts)
appeals most to
each physician
• Reduce ~50% of
physicians detailed
• Higher return per
physician, per
product
• Less sales staff
needed
By implementing analytics in our marketing, we will be able to
achieve higher profitability in our pharmaceuticals segment
AnalyticsModel
Data To Collect:
• JMDC Sales data2
• Census data
• Physician data
• Clinic data
• Call center data
• CRM data on samples
• Data on promotions
• Data from JHPN2
• Data from NHI Japan2
• Data from Science Ministry
• Data from expert speakers
Benefits
• By targeting physicians via a
personalized sales strategy,
Fujifilm can expect higher
returns per physician
• Reduce cost by optimizing
the use of samples
• Able to strengthen
relationship with physician
and clinic by possessing a
deeper understanding of them
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
ITK-1 T-817M FF-21101 FF-10101 FF-10102
FF-10501
T-4288
These CDMO contracts can help us to quickly align our portfolio
towards market trends, enhancing our offerings and returns
• In addition to cardiovascular drugs, focus on gastrointestinal and lung cancer,
Asia’s leading causes of cancer
• We want to target US and European companies who are seeking to expand
and penetrate Asia, specifically Japan
• Acquiring these CDMO clients can enable Fujifilm to quickly monetize these
drugs, while it develops its own cancer and cardiovascular drugs
• Some firms could be:
: Cancer Respiratory Diseases : Alzheimer's
• While Fujifilm’s pipeline consists mainly of caner drugs, this pipeline is
insufficient to capture market growth . Fujifilm needs to produce more drugs
targeted at cancer and cardiovascular diseases.
• On average, drugs take about 10 years to develop and launch. This is too slow,
hence we suggest Fujifilm target current players acquire them as CDMO
clients.1
Janssen Pharmaceuticals has achieved success through analytics
Fujifilm’s Drug Pipeline for the next 5 Years
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

16. Finding new markets for our ultrasound devices A healthcare ecosystem that creates value for all stakeholders
Venturing into medical wearables and IoT services
Source: Company website, Carleton University , Financial Times
14
3. In the medium term, we will penetrate the consumer market
capitalizing on existing capabilities in ultrasound
4. Building an integrated healthcare ecosystem in Japan by
offering IoT services to our customers
Foray into medical wearables allows us to target end-consumers,
building our presence in the healthcare industry
• Ultrasound sensors have a diverse range of applications in medical wearables
• Begin to research, develop, and manufacture miniature ultrasound probes
and sensors to target medical wearables manufacturers
• Current uses of ultrasound sensors in wearables include:
• Some clients are:
• Therapeutic Ultrasound Device
Used to relieve pain by producing waves to penetrate the skin.
Typically used by cancer patients
• Ultrasonic Cardiac Monitor
The device can detect and diagnose the cause of irregular
heartbeats. Used by at risk and current heart patients.
• Ultrasound Probe
Allows caregivers and patients to examine the body, find veins,
and to check the flow of fluids
Offering IoT services bridges the gap between hospitals,
manufacturers, and patients, solidifying our presence in healthcare
Hospital
Patients
Better products
Feedback
Benefits to stakeholders:
• Hospital:
Higher revenues, driven
by higher service levels
• Manufacturers:
Closer to market,
develop more relevant
products
• Patients:
Better service
quality
• We will develop analytics, to deliver data-backed insights to its
stakeholders
• We will partner with telcos (Softbank, KDDI, and NTT DoMoCo), who will
provide the network infrastructure to support IoT services
• This rides on the government’s push for industries to adopt and grow
Japan’s IoT landscape
• Enhancing Fujifilm’s product offerings, allowing it to better compete with
other healthcare players such as Fujitsu and Philips
• Future-proof Fujifilm’s business as it moves towards the digitization of
services, collects data, and focuses on newer technologies
Taking steps to become an IoT service provider
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

17. Impact of Strategies
15
Our strategies aim to better align Fujifilm's healthcare segment to market needs, and evolve Fujifilm into a future-ready healthcare company
-
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Post Exit
Enhanced Drug Portfolio Improved Marketing Tactics Miniaturise Ultrasound Sensors Venture into IoT
Our enhanced drug portfolio, improved
marketing tactics, and entry into consumer
medical wearables will foster deeper
relationships with physicians, hospitals,
clinics, and patients – essential in building
a holistic and value-creating ecosystem
that can meet Japan’s pressing healthcare
needs
Incremental Impact on Operating Income Key Commentary
¥ Mn
1 2 43Enhanced Drug
Portfolio
Improved
Marketing Tactics
Miniaturized
Ultrasound Sensors
Venture into IoT
• Expanding our drug
portfolio, thus selling
more types of drugs to
clinics and hospitals
• With the high
prevalence of lung and
stomach cancer, as
well as cardiovascular
diseases, we believe
that adding these
drugs can drive sales.
• By adopting an
analytics backed
personalized
marketing approach to
sales, we can increase
revenue per client and
reduce the cost to
serve per client,
growing the
profitability of our
customer accounts.
• An expanded product
range is able to drive
revenue growth.
• Entrance into
wearables help us to
fill an important gap in
our customer base,
and sets the stage for
us to provide a holistic
IoT service to all
players in healthcare.
• IoT services can be
provided to our current
clients helping us to
increase revenue per
customer.
• By building a strong
ecosystem, we are
better able to retain
customers, and will
also posses a stronger
value proposition.
14,750
31,840
47,794
66,575
100,777
With access to patients, hospitals,
physicians further complemented by strong
data analytics platforms, Fujifilm can
provide new insights
This added service can help us to
differentiate ourselves against competitors
and allow us to better attract and retain
customers in our ecosystem
After building a strong base in Japan, we
will be able to scale the business in other
parts of Asia, allowing us to achieved
sustained growth for Fujifilm in the coming
years.
~35% CAGR
2017A Operating Income:
¥82,959
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

18. Exit Strategy
Note: 1. P/E calculated based on NOPAT, IPO proceeds would be used to repay debt
16
# Unit Adj. 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E CAGR
Revenue ¥' m 793,707 854,380 905,073 973,712 1,047,483 7.2%
% Growth % n.m 7.6% 5.9% 7.6% 7.6%
EBITDA ¥' m 123,696 156,904 176,972 202,673 245,246 18.7%
% Growth % n.m 26.8% 12.8% 14.5% 21.0%
% Margin % 15.6% 18.4% 19.6% 20.8% 23.4%
NPATMI ¥' m NA 22,645 42,240 53,814 77,358 -41.3%
% Growth % n.m n.m 86.5% 27.4% 43.7%
% Margin % n.m 2.7% 4.7% 5.5% 7.4%
Pro-forma Key Financials of Information Solutions
We intend to re-IPO the firm as “Fuji Pharma”
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
LTM P/E
LTM EV/EBITDA
LTM P/E
LTM EV/EBITDA
TradingComparablesTradingComparables
Pharmaceuticals
Specialty
Chemicals
Indicative Valuation based on Pharma and Chemical Comps
¥2,848bn
1. We exit our investment at a blended EV/EBITDA of 13.9x based on our
EBIT-weighted comps set
2. This represents an indicative P/E1 on IPO at 15.0x and equity value of
¥2,848bn
IPO Story
We think that “Fuji Pharma”, with its renewed growth story driven by its
new position as an integrated healthcare solutions provider, will benefit
from an IPO exit:
• The full implementation of our IoT services will be realized in FY2023
• The LP consortium will exit 50% of our investment post-IPO lock up period
• Management will continue to retain a significant stake in the firm to
continue of alignment of interests
This is reasonable given the firm’s IPO growth story which should allow
it to command a premium valuation
We intend to retain our remaining 50% stake of Fuji Pharma due to our
conviction in its growth story
Information
Solutions
Document
Solutions
Imaging
Solutions

19. Management Plans and Incentives
Notes: 1. based on constituents of Nikkei 225
Source: Bloomberg, Company Filings 17
Evaluation of Skills and Value-Add by our Shareholders
Plugging the skill gap Management Compensation
Milestone 1
Restricted Stock (0.25%)
Management will receive 0.25% in
restricted stock upon completion of both
trade sales. Vesting period till IPO exit at
Year 5
Milestone 2
Stock Options (0.25%)
Second tranche of compensation comes
in upon the final IPO of the business
structured with tag-along rights upon exit
of the LP
1. Use of equity-based compensation to align risk-appetites of LP and
managers
2. Option to co-invest with LP consortium
3. Management non-compete clauses to prevent them from engaging in
solicitory behaviour
Fujifilm’s current board could welcome external advisers
Non-Exec
Directors
Expertise
Tatsuo Kawada Business, CEO of
Textile Firm
Makoto Kaiami Legal, District
Judge
Kunitaro Kitamura Supervisory,
Banking Executive
Executive
Directors
% Shares
Held
Tenure in
Fujifilm (yrs)
CEO 0.0040% 55
COO 0.0012% 41
CIO 0.0015% 15
CTO 0.0023% 45
CVP 0.0004% 38
CVP 0.0005% 38
Total:
0.0099%
Average:
39
Managers could do with better
shareholder alignment and a fresh set of
eyes
Only one 1 of 3 non-exec directors has
experience in expanding Fujifilm’s
network.
We choose Bain Capital is our co-investment partner due to:
their reputation for value creation, their experiences in the
field of pharmaceuticals and in Japan
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
-20 0 20 40 60
Positive relation between CEO ownership and shareholder’s returns1
% CEO
Ownership
% Avg
Shareholder
Returns
0.01 12.7
0.02 15.4
0.03 14.0
0.04 14.4
0.05 28.2
0.06 -6.0
0.07 31.5
Achieving management buy-in is vital for company performance
List of Pharmaceutical investments:
Year Acquired
Deal Size
(US$bn)
2014 Macromill 0.4
2017
Toshiba
Semicons
18.0
2017 Asatsu-DK Inc 1.4
2018
(pending)
Takata -
List of Japanese Investments:
Total Average 5 Year Shareholder’s Returns
CEOOwnership%
OutstandingShares
Skill Assessment of the current Board of Directors

20. Returns Analysis
18
Returns Attribution Analysis
Investors’ Returns Analysis
Returns to Phoenix Partners and Bain Capital # Units 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Common Equity
Initial Investment: ¥' m (937,345)
Dividends: ¥' m 433,394
Equity: ¥' m 2,805,847
Total Cash Flows: ¥' m (937,345) - 433,394 - - 2,805,847
Money-on-Money (MoM) Multiple: 3.5x
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): 32.4%
Returns to Management Team # Units 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Common Equity
Initial Investment: ¥' m (1,000)
Dividends: ¥' m 462
Equity: ¥' m 10,104
Total Cash Flows: ¥' m (1,000) - 462 - - 10,104
Money-on-Money (MoM) Multiple: 10.6x
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): 64.9%
Multiple value levers contribute to our solid 32.4% IRR
• EBITDA Growth (43.6%): By channelling
our resources to the growing Information
Solutions division
• Multiple Expansion (38.4%): By
unlocking the conglomerate discounted
and by the realisaiton of market values of
each individual segment
• Debt Paydown (18.0%): By utilizing
Fujifilm’s available debt headroom
IRR: 32.4%
MoM: 3.5x

21. Sensitivity Analysis
19
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. Exit Multiple (Healthcare):
EBITDA Exit Multiple:
11.9 x 12.4 x 12.9 x 13.4 x 13.9 x 14.4 x 14.9 x 15.4 x 15.9 x
4,484 5.0% 34.7% 35.8% 36.8% 37.8% 38.8% 39.7% 40.7% 41.5% 42.4%
4,697 10.0% 32.5% 33.6% 34.6% 35.6% 36.6% 37.5% 38.5% 39.4% 40.2%
4,911 15.0% 30.3% 31.4% 32.4% 33.5% 34.5% 35.4% 36.4% 37.3% 38.2%
5,124 20.0% 28.1% 29.3% 30.4% 31.4% 32.4% 33.4% 34.3% 35.3% 36.2%
5,338 25.0% 26.1% 27.2% 28.3% 29.4% 30.4% 31.4% 32.4% 33.3% 34.2%
5,551 30.0% 24.0% 25.2% 26.4% 27.4% 28.5% 29.5% 30.5% 31.4% 32.4%
5,765 35.0% 22.0% 23.3% 24.4% 25.5% 26.6% 27.7% 28.7% 29.6% 30.6%
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. Exit Multiple (Xerox)
EBITDA Exit Multiple:
5.5 x 6.0 x 6.5 x 7.0 x 7.5 x 8.0 x 8.5 x 9.0 x 9.5 x
4,484 5.0% 36.5% 37.1% 37.7% 38.2% 38.8% 39.4% 39.9% 40.4% 40.9%
4,697 10.0% 34.2% 34.8% 35.4% 36.0% 36.6% 37.2% 37.7% 38.2% 38.7%
4,911 15.0% 32.1% 32.7% 33.3% 33.9% 34.5% 35.0% 35.6% 36.1% 36.7%
5,124 20.0% 30.0% 30.6% 31.2% 31.8% 32.4% 33.0% 33.6% 34.1% 34.7%
5,338 25.0% 27.9% 28.6% 29.2% 29.8% 30.4% 31.0% 31.6% 32.2% 32.7%
5,551 30.0% 25.9% 26.6% 27.2% 27.9% 28.5% 29.1% 29.7% 30.3% 30.9%
5,765 35.0% 24.0% 24.7% 25.3% 26.0% 26.6% 27.2% 27.8% 28.4% 29.0%
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. Exit Multiple (Camera)
EBITDA Exit Multiple:
5.3 x 5.8 x 6.3 x 6.8 x 7.3 x 7.8 x 8.3 x 8.8 x 9.3 x
4,484 5.0% 38.0% 38.2% 38.4% 38.6% 38.8% 39.0% 39.2% 39.4% 39.6%
4,697 10.0% 35.8% 36.0% 36.2% 36.4% 36.6% 36.8% 37.0% 37.2% 37.4%
4,911 15.0% 33.6% 33.8% 34.0% 34.3% 34.5% 34.7% 34.9% 35.1% 35.3%
5,124 20.0% 31.6% 31.8% 32.0% 32.2% 32.4% 32.6% 32.8% 33.0% 33.3%
5,338 25.0% 29.6% 29.8% 30.0% 30.2% 30.4% 30.6% 30.9% 31.1% 31.3%
5,551 30.0% 27.6% 27.8% 28.1% 28.3% 28.5% 28.7% 28.9% 29.1% 29.4%
5,765 35.0% 25.7% 25.9% 26.2% 26.4% 26.6% 26.8% 27.1% 27.3% 27.5%
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:
IRR is insensitive to key variables, and possesses sufficient buffer to weather through market fluctuations

22. Risks and Mitigation
20
Pre-LBO Risks Post-LBO Risks
Evaluation of Pre-emptive Defences
• Board had sought to remove flip-in poison pill defences during the company’s
117th OGM
• Fujifilm does not have hidden cross-holding structures traditional of Japanese
firms that mask true ownership
• 6 out of 9 non-independent
directors makes hostile deal
unlikely to be approved
• These directors are unlikely to
vote against offer for fear of losing
their jobs
• Shareholder apathy has led to
Japanese shareholder’s
disapproval of hostile deals,
believing that they are value
destructive
• Fujifilm has an appointed
independent board to evaluate
potential acquisition offers
• Management buy-in allows them
to tag along as co-investors in
this deal
• Giving out golden parachutes to
executives
• Entering the investment with an
existing toehold stake to try and
nominate board members loyal
to our proposal
• Public white paper of proposed
plans to highlight value creation
by the Phoenix Partners’
consortium
Approval Risks Mitigation
Drugs from US and EU might not
possess the requisite regulatory
approval to be developed and
manufactured locally
Provide on-boarding and
regulatory support services to
these CDMO clients
Data protection laws in Japan
might restrict clinics and
physicians from revealing
personal data of patients
Work with the government in
coming up with specific clauses
for scientific research, with the
understanding that the Japanese
government is actively promoting
the pharmaceutical industry
Target customers might have
pre-existing contracts with other
suppliers
Provide attractive sales terms to
incentivise target customers to
select us as their supplier
1
2
3
We assessed Pre-LBO and Post-LBO risks, both of which can be mitigated by a significant extent

23. 0.23
3.45
13.10
18.60
27%
46%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
-
4.00
8.00
12.00
16.00
20.00
Before 1987 1987 - 1996 1997 - 2006 2007 - 2016
Avg Inbound M&A Transaction Value (USD Bn)
% Cross-border Deals of Total M&A Value (Avg)
Bonus Slide
Source: Mergermarket, Activist Insight, Private Equity International, Broker Reports
21
Reasons why LBO has not taken place What has changed? Relevant Information
Shareholder Apathy
• Shareholders in Japanese corporations
have not typically leveraged their rights to
force management to effect change, and
tend to support the status quo
• Results in management entrenchment
and increased M&A difficulty
• Case study: Failure to split up Sony
Corporation in 2013 (Daniel Loeb)
Size Does Matter
• Lack of compelling success cases of
Japanese corporate giants being
acquired
• Largely deters foreign investors looking
to buyout Japanese conglomerates
Regulatory and Ownership Trends
• Launch of Stewardship Code in 2014 forced
institutional investors to be more engaged in
investee companies decisions
• Increasing foreign ownership in Japan creates
more support to effect change
• Though lagging, increased shareholder
activism success rates indicate greater
openness to more active investing
Inflection Point for Inbound M&A
• Success cases have started appearing,
potentially starting an inbound M&A wave
targeted at assets of underperforming
conglomerates
• Hampered by accelerated deregulation of FDI
laws under PM Shinzo Abe (with the exception
of Japan’s media operators) since 2014
Major PE Firms Potentially Interested
1
2
We believe willingness to invest in this deal is
based on 2 key factors:
• Exposure to and experience in inbound Japan
M&A deals
• Expertise in growing Pharmaceutical supply
chain networks and developing IoT product
ecosystems
Recent Acquisitions of Japanese Conglomerates
Increasing Inbound Deal Value
The following Private Equity firms meet both criterion:
Date Acquirer Target Deal Size
03/16
Hon Hai/
Foxconn
SHARP
Corporation
US$2.5Bn
09/17
Bain Capital
(Consortium)
Toshiba
Memory
US$10.6Bn
Cultural and regulatory barriers would have previously decreased the attractiveness of this deal, but things have changed…

24. Appendix

25. Income Statement Projections
# Unit
Adjusted
2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Revenue ¥' m 793,707 854,380 905,073 973,712 1,047,483
% Growth % n.m 7.6% 5.9% 7.6% 7.6%
EBITDA ¥' m 121,384 152,278 169,736 192,629 232,181
% Growth % n.m 25.5% 11.5% 13.5% 20.5%
% Margin % 15.3% 17.8% 18.8% 19.8% 22.2%
D&A ¥' m (58,291) (45,844) (46,749) (48,334) (49,891)
EBIT ¥' m 63,093 106,434 122,987 144,295 182,290
% Growth % n.m 68.7% 15.6% 17.3% 26.3%
% Margin % 7.9% 12.5% 13.6% 14.8% 17.4%
Finance Costs ¥' m (68,224) (71,655) (62,875) (69,219) (76,775)
Other Expense ¥' m 848,694 (5,501) (5,501) (5,501) (5,501)
PBT ¥' m 843,562 29,278 54,610 69,575 100,013
% Growth % n.m n.m 86.5% 27.4% 43.7%
% Margin % n.m 3.4% 6.0% 7.1% 9.5%
NPATMI ¥' m 652,472 22,645 42,240 53,814 77,358
% Growth % n.m n.m 86.5% 27.4% 43.7%
% Margin % n.m 2.7% 4.7% 5.5% 7.4%
EPS ¥ n.m 44 82 105 150

26. Balance Sheet Projections
# Unit Adj. 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Cash and cash equivalents ¥' m 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
Notes and accounts receivable: ¥' m 678,387 436,112 461,987 497,023 534,679
Inventories ¥' m 361,954 238,784 249,643 264,697 276,076
Other current assets ¥' m 130,187 30,220 31,320 32,844 33,996
Total current assets ¥' m 1,370,528 905,116 942,950 994,565 1,044,751
Total investments and long-term receivables ¥' m 319,613 344,045 364,458 392,098 421,804
Net property, plant and equipment ¥' m 518,154 293,943 310,005 324,784 338,330
Goodwill, net ¥' m 659,052 659,052 659,052 659,052 659,052
Other intangible assets, net ¥' m 655,530 390,397 389,075 387,753 386,432
Other non-current assets ¥' m 127,817 125,113 122,408 119,703 116,998
Total long-term assets ¥' m 2,280,167 1,812,549 1,844,998 1,883,391 1,922,616
TOTAL ASSETS ¥' m 3,650,695 2,717,666 2,787,948 2,877,956 2,967,368
Notes and accounts payable: ¥' m 275,127 144,963 151,555 160,695 167,603
Accrued income taxes ¥' m 32,005 32,005 32,005 32,005 32,005
Accrued liabilities ¥' m 191,043 176,362 184,382 195,501 203,905
Other current liabilities ¥' m 93,098 (30,295) (31,672) (33,582) (35,026)
Total current liabilities ¥' m 591,272 323,036 336,270 354,618 368,487
Accrued pension and severance costs ¥' m 42,085 43,088 45,048 47,764 49,817
Deferred taxes liabitility ¥' m 136,195 329,660 329,660 329,660 329,660
Other long-term liabilities ¥' m 63,942 51,810 54,166 57,432 59,901
Revolver: ¥' m - - - - -
Tranch A ¥' m 522,937 - - - -
Tranch B ¥' m 690,086 303,500 261,529 214,633 142,487
Mezzanine: ¥' m 390,351 437,194 489,657 548,416 614,226
Total long-term liabilities ¥' m 1,845,596 1,165,251 1,180,060 1,197,905 1,196,091
TOTAL LIABILITIES ¥' m 2,436,869 1,488,287 1,516,330 1,552,523 1,564,578
Retained earnings ¥' m 41,666 291,034 333,274 387,088 464,446
Common Equity ¥' m 938,345 938,345 938,345 938,345 938,345
TOTAL EQUITY ¥' m 1,213,826 1,229,379 1,271,619 1,325,433 1,402,790

27. Cashflow Projections
# Unit Adj. 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Net income ¥' m 87,433 22,645 42,240 53,814 77,358
Adjustments:
Depreciation and amortization ¥' m 131,271 50,620 54,135 58,528 63,106
Accrual of PIK Interest: ¥' m 41,823 46,842 52,463 58,759 65,810
Other Adjustments ¥' m (46,086) (47,188) (35,345) (49,573) (56,151)
Net cash provided by operating activities ¥' m 214,442 72,920 113,493 121,528 150,123
Purchases of property, plant and equipment ¥' m (78,828) (38,738) (41,039) (44,149) (47,493)
Other ¥' m (30,483) (30,483) (30,483) (30,483) (30,483)
Net cash used in investing activities ¥' m (109,311) (69,221) (71,523) (74,632) (77,977)
Cash dividends paid to shareholders ¥' m - (433,857) - - -
Total Cash Flow Used to Repay Debt: ¥' m (181,089) (909,523) (41,970) (46,897) (72,146)
Net cash used in financing activities ¥' m (181,089) (1,343,380) (41,970) (46,897) (72,146)
Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents ¥' m (75,958) (1,339,681) - - -
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year ¥' m 275,958 1,539,681 200,000 200,000 200,000
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year ¥' m 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000

28. Debt Schedule
Interest LIBOR Prepay Principal Undrawn Years
Debt Tranche: %: ¥' m x EBITDA Rate: Floor: Allowed: Repayment: Fee: PIK:
Revolver: 15.0% - 0.0 x L + 100 1.00% Yes 0.0% 0.50%
Tranch A 40.0% 697,056 2.4 x L + 50 0.00% Yes 10.0%
Tranch B 40.0% 697,056 2.4 x L + 250 0.00% Yes 1.0%
Senior Notes: 0.0% - 0.0 x L + 150 1.00% No 0.0%
Subordinated Note: 0.0% - 0.0 x 5.0% 0.00% No 0.0%
Mezzanine: 20.0% 348,528 1.2 x 12.0% 0.00% No 0.0% 5
Total: 100.0% 1,742,640 6.0 x
# Unit Adj. 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Sources of Funds:
Beginning Cash Balance: 275,958 1,539,681 200,000 200,000 200,000
Less: Minimum Cash Balance: (200,000) (200,000) (200,000) (200,000) (200,000)
Plus: Cash Flow Available for Debt Repayment: 105,131 (430,158) 41,970 46,897 72,146
Subtotal Before Revolver: 181,089 909,523 41,970 46,897 72,146
Revolver Borrowing Required: - - - - -
Total Sources of Funds: 181,089 909,523 41,970 46,897 72,146
Uses of Funds:
Mandatory Debt Repayment:
Revolver: - - - - -
Tranch A 69,706 69,706 - - -
Tranch B 6,971 6,971 6,971 6,971 6,971
Mezzanine: - - - - -
Mandatory Repayment Total: 76,676 76,676 6,971 6,971 6,971
Optional Debt Repayment:
Revolver: - - - - -
Tranch A 104,413 453,232 - - -
Tranch B - 379,616 35,000 39,926 65,176
Mezzanine: - - - - -
Optional Repayment Total: 104,413 832,847 35,000 39,926 65,176
Cumulative Debt Paydown: 181,089 1,090,613 1,132,583 1,179,480 1,251,626
Cumulative Paydown % Initial Debt: 10.4% 62.6% 65.0% 67.7% 71.8%

29. Fujifilm Holdings Trading Comparables by Segment (1/2)

30. Fujifilm Holdings Trading Comparables by Segment (2/2)

31. Sensitivity Analysis (Operational)
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. % Debt:
% Debt
55.0% 57.5% 60.0% 62.5% 65.0% 67.5% 70.0% 72.5% 75.0%
4,484 5.0% 32.8% 34.1% 35.5% 37.1% 38.8% 40.7% 42.9% 45.4% 48.3%
4,697 10.0% 30.9% 32.1% 33.5% 34.9% 36.6% 38.4% 40.5% 42.9% 45.7%
4,911 15.0% 29.0% 30.2% 31.5% 32.9% 34.5% 36.2% 38.2% 40.5% 43.2%
5,124 20.0% 27.3% 28.4% 29.6% 30.9% 32.4% 34.1% 36.0% 38.2% 40.7%
5,338 25.0% 25.5% 26.6% 27.7% 29.0% 30.4% 32.0% 33.9% 35.9% 38.4%
5,551 30.0% 23.9% 24.9% 25.9% 27.1% 28.5% 30.0% 31.7% 33.7% 36.1%
5,765 35.0% 22.3% 23.2% 24.2% 25.3% 26.6% 28.1% 29.7% 31.6% 33.8%
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. Healthcare Revenue
Healthcare Revenue Annual Adjustments to Base Case
-10.0% -7.5% -5.0% -2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0%
4,484 5.0% 36.6% 37.2% 37.7% 38.3% 38.8% 39.3% 39.8% 40.3% 40.8%
4,697 10.0% 34.4% 35.0% 35.5% 36.1% 36.6% 37.1% 37.6% 38.2% 38.7%
4,911 15.0% 32.2% 32.8% 33.4% 33.9% 34.5% 35.0% 35.5% 36.1% 36.6%
5,124 20.0% 30.1% 30.7% 31.3% 31.9% 32.4% 33.0% 33.5% 34.0% 34.5%
5,338 25.0% 28.1% 28.7% 29.3% 29.9% 30.4% 31.0% 31.5% 32.1% 32.6%
5,551 30.0% 26.1% 26.7% 27.3% 27.9% 28.5% 29.1% 29.6% 30.2% 30.7%
5,765 35.0% 24.2% 24.8% 25.4% 26.0% 26.6% 27.2% 27.8% 28.3% 28.9%
Sensitivity Analysis - IRR and Purchase Premium vs. Healthcare Margin
Healthcare Margin Annual Adjustments to Base Case
-4.0% -3.0% -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
4,484 5.0% 34.1% 35.3% 36.5% 37.7% 38.8% 39.9% 40.9% 41.9% 42.9%
4,697 10.0% 31.8% 33.1% 34.3% 35.5% 36.6% 37.7% 38.7% 39.7% 40.7%
4,911 15.0% 29.5% 30.9% 32.1% 33.3% 34.5% 35.6% 36.6% 37.7% 38.7%
5,124 20.0% 27.4% 28.7% 30.0% 31.2% 32.4% 33.5% 34.6% 35.7% 36.7%
5,338 25.0% 25.3% 26.7% 28.0% 29.2% 30.4% 31.6% 32.7% 33.7% 34.8%
5,551 30.0% 23.3% 24.7% 26.0% 27.3% 28.5% 29.7% 30.8% 31.9% 32.9%
5,765 35.0% 21.2% 22.7% 24.1% 25.4% 26.6% 27.8% 28.9% 30.0% 31.1%
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:
Purchase
Premium and Per
Share Offer Price:

32. Ownership Percentage
Ownership Percentages: Pre-Deal: Post-Deal: Upon Exit
Rollover Investor Ownership %: 0.0% 0.0%
Existing Investor Ownership %: 100.0% 0.0%
New Investor Ownership %: 0.0% 99.9% 98.6%
Management Equity %: 0.1% 0.1%
Management Performance Kicker %: 0.3%
Mezzanine Kicker %: 1.0%
Total: 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

33. Bear Case Scenario
# Unit Adj. 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Revenue ¥' m 2,477,784 2,558,455 2,638,285 2,736,600 2,840,640
% Growth % n.m 3.3% 3.1% 3.7% 3.8%
EBITDA ¥' m 309,798 356,644 374,001 396,741 436,087
% Growth % n.m 15.1% 4.9% 6.1% 9.9%
% Margin % 12.5% 13.9% 14.2% 14.5% 15.4%
D&A ¥' m (126,257) (125,395) (124,139) (123,470) (122,678)
EBIT ¥' m 183,541 231,249 249,862 273,271 313,409
% Growth % n.m 26.0% 8.0% 9.4% 14.7%
% Margin % 7.4% 9.0% 9.5% 10.0% 11.0%
Finance Costs ¥' m (68,224) (71,655) (77,915) (86,557) (97,193)
Other Expense ¥' m (5,351) (5,501) (5,501) (5,501) (5,501)
PBT ¥' m 109,965 154,093 166,446 181,213 210,715
% Growth % n.m n.m 8.0% 8.9% 16.3%
% Margin % n.m 6.0% 6.3% 6.6% 7.4%
NPATMI ¥' m 85,055 119,187 128,741 140,163 162,982
% Growth % n.m n.m 8.0% 8.9% 16.3%
% Margin % n.m 4.7% 4.9% 5.1% 5.7%
EPS ¥ n.m 232 250 272 317
Returns to Phoenix Partners and Bain Capital # Units 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Common Equity
Initial Investment: ¥' m (937,345)
Dividends: ¥' m -
Equity: ¥' m 2,405,386
Total Cash Flows: ¥' m (937,345) - - - - 2,405,386
Money-on-Money (MoM) Multiple: 2.6x
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): 20.7%

34. Indicative Core Management Team
We don’t expect to make numerous changes to the core management team, whilst promoting COO Kenji as the new CEO
• Joined Fujifilm in 1977 working mainly in the accounting and finance fields
• Instrumental in positioning Fujifilm towards the healthcare segment during his tenure in the planning division
• Building a network of strategic partnerships with other key pharmaceutical giants like Takeda Pharmaceuticals and Merck
• Instrumental in Fujifilm’s M&A acquisitions of SonoSite and Toyama Pharmas
CEO – Kenji Sukeno, 63
COO – Kouichi Tamai, 66
• Joined Fujifilm in 2003
• Previously the General Manager of Medical Systems, Research & Development Center of Research & Development Management
Headquarters
• Worked as the Chief Innovation Officer of Fujifilm
CIO – Yuzo Toda, 72
• Joined Fujifilm in 1973
• Currently serves as a General Manager of Pharmaceutical Products Division at Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies UK Limited. He
has been Chief Technical Officer and Corporate Vice President of Fujifilm Holdings Corporation
• Initiated the Cosmetic and Supplement business, Pharmaceutical business and Regenerative business and ushered Fujifilm into
the new market segments

35. Screening Process
Firms Reasons for not choosing…
• Declining industry
• No opportunity for value creation
• Complex business makes would require tremendous
financial engineering
• Leveraged balance sheet
• Limited opportunities for restructuring
• Leveraged balance sheet
• Turnaround story accompanies execution risks
• Limited opportunities for EBITDA expansion in light of
3G Capital management
• Leveraged balance sheet
• Lofty valuations not supported by cashflows
• Limited opportunities for PE value creation
• Limited PE value-add storey
• Commoditized business susceptible to revenue
fluctuations
• Lack of management support for break up would entail
costly hostile takeover
• Pepsi market cap >US$150bn entails complex
structuring
Valuations of screen universe appear overpriced
Valuation Summary
By elimination, Fujifilm appears to be an attractive
LBO candidate
These three firms appear comfortably
valued with sufficient debt capacity to
increase leverage
33.7x
17.2x
13.5x
14.4x
13.2x
7.4x
5.1x
3.8x
(5.0) -- 5.0x 10.0x 15.0x 20.0x 25.0x 30.0x 35.0x 40.0x
AMD US Equity
MAT US Equity
PEP US Equity
KHC US Equity
GE US Equity
4901 JT Equity
MU US Equity
KODK US Equity
Net Debt to EBITDA EV to EBITDA
Valuations appear rich in today’s market, our methodology screens for undervaluation, opportunities for EBITDA expansion and low net
debt

36. Screening Process
Note: 1. Based on Net Debt/EBITDA, 2. EV/EBITDA, 3. Incompetence of management indicates potential for value add from our deal team
Source: Team Analysis
Company
Attractiveness
of Industry
Firm’s Cash Flow
Stability
Firm’s Potential
to Grow
Debt Headroom1 Valuation2 Incompetence of
Management
AMD
4: Demand for
microchips expected to
grow due to increasing
demand for
broadband, servers,
and digital devices
2: Recently
restructured their debt,
first positive net FCF in
2016
4: Firm is in a good
position to capture
growth driven by
blockchain and cloud
2: 0.6x 1: 33.7x
1: Management has
strong ability to
monetize near term
cryptocurrency trend
Micron
4: Demand for
microchips expected to
grow due to increasing
demand for
broadband, servers,
and digital devices
3: Falling DRAM and
NAN D prices have
affected the
company’s cash flow
negatively
4: Has good R&D
capabilities and is well
poised to capture
growth in microchips
with more chatter on
blockchain and cloud
1: 0.2x 4: 5.2x
2: New management
from SanDisk recently
onboarded, efforts
have yet to materialize
Kraft Heinz
1: Food is highly
commoditized only
opportunities are in
cost advantages, or
premiumization
4: Sells recession
proof products, cash
flows are highly stable
2: Margins are already
high ~39%. Most
growth will be
inorganic
1: 3.6x 3: 14.4x
1: Backed up by 3G
capital, many strategic
opportunities due to
Warren Buffet’s
connections
Pepsi Co
1: Food & beverage is
highly commoditized,
distribution and access
to emerging markets is
paramount.
Opportunities in either
in cost cutting or
premiumization
4: Highly stable,
dividend payouts have
been growing for ~43
years
2: Many of its brands
are market leaders in
their segment, unlikely
to have revolutionary
growth potential.
Margins have room for
slight improvement
3: 1.5x 4: 13.5x
1: Strong visionary
management,
especially CEO
Nooyi’s belief of
“Profits with Purpose”
Our screening methodology takes into account the firm’s external and internal environment, as well as signs of undervaluation,
opportunities for margin expansion, and low net debt

37. Screening Process
Note: 1. Based on Net Debt/EBITDA, 2. EV/EBITDA
Source: Team Analysis
Company
Attractiveness
of Industry
Firm’s Cash Flow
Stability
Firm’s Potential
to Grow
Debt Headroom1 Valuation2 Incompetence of
Management
GE
3: Industries such as
healthcare and
engineering are poised
to experience strong
growth
1: Did not have
enough cash to
maintain dividends,
slashed dividend by
50%
4: With many divisions,
GE has the opportunity
to spinoff subsidiaries
with limited synergies
and focus on
segments with higher
growth potential
1: 4.0x 3: 13.2x
2: Strong management
team, who are focused
on divesting unwanted
segments and
focusing on high
growth segments
Mattel
3: Rising disposable
incomes signal
increasing ability to
spend on children,
many trends changing
the industry and the
way children play
2: Experiencing
declining cash flow
2: Most of the famous
brands are controlled
by Hasbro, difficult to
create a blockbuster
character to monetize
1: 4.6x 1: 17.2x
3: Board of directors
have many old guards,
who are not very
receptive to change
2: Photocopiers and
cameras are not
expected to grow
much
3: Stable cash flows
supported by its
photocopiers segment
4: With many divisions,
it has the opportunity
to focus on segments
with higher growth
4: -0.6x 4: 7.4x
2: Management is able
to identify
opportunities for
growth and make the
right investments
Kodak
1: Printing industry is
not expected to grow
1: Company’s cash
balance has been
declining due to
operating losses
1: Company mainly
focuses on printing
and film which are low
growth industries
4: 0.4x 4: 3.8x
4: Management is
unable to diversify
business to protect
itself from declining
print business
Our screening methodology takes into account the firm’s external and internal environment, as well as signs of undervaluation,
opportunities for margin expansion, and low net debt

38. Transaction Structure
Notes: 1. Based on all public Japanese M&A transactions >US$1bn
Source: Bloomberg
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
800
1800
2800
3800
4800
5800
FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation (TSE:4901) - Volume FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation (TSE:4901) - Share Pricing
+1 SD
-1 SD
Mean
Offer Price
¥5,124
Price
represents
20% upside to
current price.
This values
the company
at 8.9x
TV/EBITDA
Average APAC M&A Deal Metrics
33x
25x
17x
11x 10x
4x
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0x
10x
20x
30x
40x
EV/EBITDA % Premium Paid
Price Chart of Fujifilm (since IPO in 1992)
Siam Makro PCL Zoll Medical Corp CP Pokphand Co Ltd Toll Holdings Ltd
Hutchison Whampoa
Ltd
Daihatsu Motor Co Ltd Target
CP ALL PCL Asahi Kasei Corp
Charoen Pokphand
Foods PCL
Japan Post Holdings
Co Ltd
CK Hutchison
Holdings Ltd
Toyota Motor Corp Acquirer
4,083 2,063 2,211 6,271 41,705 3,098
Transaction Value
(US$m)
Median
Premium Paid
on Japanese
M&As is ~17%1
Median
TV/EBITDA
on Japanese
M&As is 10x1
Offer premium of 20% is reasonable considering precedents

39. Guide to Cameras
Source: Company filings, Company websites, Bloomberg, Broker Reports
Understanding the different consumer cameras in the market
DSLR Mirrorless Compact Cameras
• Ability to change lenses
• Superior picture quality
• Heaviest
• Ability to change lenses
• Superior picture quality
• Medium Weight
• Fixed Lens
• Inferior Picture Quality
• Lightest

40. Nikon’s Failure to Break into the Mirrorless Market
Source: Company filings, Company websites, Bloomberg, Broker Reports
Produced in 2015, the J5 was a commercial flop…
But of course, the 1-inch sensor still remains far behind just about every mirrorless
competitor, meaning the J5 shouldn’t be the camera of choice for anyone concerned
with shallow depth of field, strong low-light performance, or the ability to mount lenses
from other systems. And despite the lack of interchangeable lenses, Sony’s RX100
line of compact cameras remain great buys, with the same size and resolution
sensor in smaller bodies with tiny collapsible zoom lenses that are faster than
anything Nikon offers for the 1 series.
The Verge Review:
"It has, although it's certainly not up to our total expectations," Nikon senior technical
manager Steve Heiner tells The Verge when asked whether the 1 series has
performed well. "I think we had bigger expectations. The problem is that we introduced
this into a market where there were competitors." Heiner says that Nikon "doubled the
market just by entering it" in 2011, and believes the series has greater potential. "I
think in the long term we're going to continue to build out the Nikon 1 Nikkor lens line,
and the more options that we make available will make these bodies and others
offerings more and more attractive. So it is doing well. It could do better."
Even the executives are not confident of the product:

41. Solutions and
Services
25%
Others
6%
Graphic
Communication
12%
Office Products
and Printers
57%
Synergy Analysis Between Xerox and Fuji Xerox (1/3)
Source: Company filings, Company websites, Bloomberg, Broker Reports
Xerox Currently Operates Mostly in Low Growth Markets Compatible Geographical Mix
Minimal sales territory overlap compared to sizeable competitors
Current Shareholding in Fuji Xerox Fuji Xerox FY17 Revenue Breakdown
Xerox is a major customer of Fuji Xerox for Office Products
Xerox Sales TerritoryFuji Xerox Sales Territory
APAC
Oceania
Canada
US
Developing
Markets
Developing
Markets
Europe
21
1
22
11
13
5
7
3Workflow Auto
SMB MPS
Production Color
A4 MFPs
Managed Document
Services
A3 MFPs
Production Mono
Single Function
Printers
Market Size ($Bn) CAGR
+10%
+6%
+4%
+3%
+1%
-6%
-12%
-10%
Growing Markets
Declining Markets
Largely declining market exposure necessitates inorganic growth
• Fuji Xerox was established as a JV between Fujifilm and Xerox in 1962 in
Tokyo, Japan
• Currently in the midst of discussing a merger where Xerox ceases to exist
while Fujifilm Holdings gains effective control of the combined assets, a
move largely opposed by Xerox block holder and activist investor, Carl Icahn
75% 25%
Xerox shareholders would be open to acquisition of Fuji Xerox
Current Ownership
Structure:
$9.5Bn
(FY17)
Solutions and Services
• Document services
tailored to various
industries or processes
• Provides high value-
added solutions through
system integration and
cloud-based services
Graphic Communications
• Provides solutions for
graphic communications,
in-plant and production
print with high-volume
requirements
Office Products and
Printers
• Helps customers
address various business
challenges related to
documents and
communications
• Supplies office products
such as multifunction
devices and printers to
large/ small and medium-
sized businesses
• Provides cloud-based or
mobile solution services
Initial shareholding of Fuji Xerox and initial partnerships with Xerox increases the ease of post-merger integration

42. Synergy Analysis Between Xerox and Fuji Xerox (2/3)
Fuji Xerox Market Leadership in Key Segments
A3 MFP Segment Japan MPS Segment A3 MFP Segment
Different core competencies between Xerox and Fuji Xerox make the deal complementary for both parties
Market
Share
Market
Position
35% 35% 61% 54% 47% 51%
#1 #1 #1 #1 #1 #1
Combined Company’s Strengths
Broad Global Scale
• Exposure to >180 countries
• #1 in equipment revenue market share
• Overall #1 in printing industry and
comparably sized with HP
• ~$120Bn total addressable opportunity
• > $18Bn in annual revenue
World-Class Innovation
• ~$1Bn combined R&D firepower
• 6 Innovation labs
• > 6,600 engineers
• ~18,880 combined patents
Strong Financial Profile
• > $1.25Bn annual cost synergies by 2022
• High double digit operating margins by
2022
• $1.5Bn FCF by 2020

43. Synergy Analysis Between Xerox and Fuji Xerox (3/3)
Notes: *Potential restructuring cost savings that can be unlocked at Fuji Xerox independent of acquisition, **Management Estimates
Source: Company filings, Company websites, Bloomberg, Broker Reports
Cost Savings Breakdown Cost Synergies Realisation Progression
Revenue Synergies Breakdown Incremental Revenue Opportunities
Revenue synergies are estimated at ~$1Bn
COGS
SG&A
R&D
Fuji Xerox JV
Savings*
• Plant footprint optimization
• Optimization of 3rd party outsourcers
• Improved design efficiency and scale
• Integrate supply chain and procurement
• Consolidation of central support functions i.e. Finance, HR
• Optimize selling related costs
• Purchasing scale
• Eliminate redundancies and optimize footprint of research centers
• Integrate device controllers
• Combine print drivers, apps, solutions, MPS tools to achieve best
in class solutions
• Manufacturing and R&D cost reduction
• Product portfolio optimization
• SG&A productivity initiatives
~85% cost savings realisable by FY20**
Global
Account
Coverage
Streamlined
Portfolio
Manufacturer
Margin
SMB
Transformation
• Improved win rates on global accounts and growth of existing
relationships
• Integrated global service delivery
• Strengthened distribution and global delivery capabilities
• More competitive portfolio and time-to-market
• Unified user experience
• Access to Fujifilm’s inkjet (Graphic Systems) and production IP
• Complete international entry for A3 portfolio
• Eliminate intercompany margin stacking
• Capture manufacturer margin in all markets
• Added flexibility for quoting process to increase win-rate on price-
competitive deals
• SMB (Small and Medium Businesses) channel transformation
• Competitive pricing for select target areas
• Expanded go-to-market through resellers and acquisitions
• Significant growth opportunity via market share gains and penetration of
~$100Bn production and industrial segment
• Additional opportunities to further diversify business leveraging strength of
combined relationships globally
• Enhanced innovation, strategy alignment and investment capacity to support
longer-term growth
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21
COGS SG&A R&D
100%
100%
100%
76%
100%
80%
58%
81%
81%
56%47%
47%
100% of cost savings are attainable by FY21, revenue

44. Competitors in Healthcare Industry
Daiichi-Sankyo Takeda Pharmaceuticals Astellas Pharmaceuticals
Company
Strategy
In the light of slow growth, Daiichi-
Sankyo aims to target the cancer
market and build a competitive
advantage in oncology.
Takeda’s current strategy is to
strengthen its foothold in its current
target areas – oncology, central
nervous system, and
gastroenterology.
With a current foothold in oncology,
Astellas aims to target new disease
areas (Muscle Diseases and
Ophthamology) via new
technologies (Fusion protein, gene
therapy, cell therapy).
Key Products
• Ulcer treatment
• Osteoperosis
• Antiplatelet agent
• Alzheimer’s disease
• Bone complications due to cancer
• Chron’s disease
• Lymphoma
• Depression
• Prostate cancer
• Urination disorder
• Post transplant treatment
• Pancreatic caner
Revenue
(¥ Bn)
955.1 1,807 1,377
2012 – 2017
Revenue CAGR
0.05% 4.5% 9.18%
Cancer is a key driver of growth. Fujifilm can focus on gastrointestinal and lung cancer.

45. Fujifilm is highly reliant on diagnostic drugs
FY17 YoY Change
¥ mm FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 Amount Percentage
Diagnostic Drugs 9,158 10,656 11,123 13,808 13,473 (335) -2.4%
Hormone Drugs 8,134 9,511 10,071 9,709 10,275 566 5.8%
Metablolic Drugs 1,584 2,003 2,893 2,706 2,828 122 4.5%
Circulatory Drugs 920 985 937 1,008 945 (63) -6.3%
Antibiotics & Chemotherapeutics 793 845 874 812 874 62 7.6%
In-vitro Diagnostics 802 799 742 695 805 110 15.8%
Urogenital & Genital Organ Drugs 406 437 464 486 492 6 1.2%
Dermatological Preparations 289 301 327 352 384 32 9.1%
Others 1,856 1,857 2,055 2,414 2,907 493 20.4%
CMO Business 1,226 1,818 2,190 2,236 2,401 165 7.4%
Total 25,174 29,215 31,680 34,229 35,387 1,158 3.4%
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
CMO Business
Others
Dermatological
Preparations
Urogenital & Genital
Organ Drugs
In-vitro Diagnostics
Antibiotics &
Chemotherapeutics
Circulatory Drugs
Metablolic Drugs
Hormone Drugs
Diagnostic Drugs
38.1%
29.0%
8.0%
2.7%
2.5%
2.3%
1.4%
1.1%
8.2%
6.8%
Sales Breakdown by Therapautic Category
Diagnostic Drugs
Hormone Drugs
Metablolic Drugs
Circulatory Drugs
Antibiotics &
Chemotherapeutics
In-vitro Diagnostics
Urogenital & Genital Organ
Drugs
Dermatological Preparations
Others
CMO Business
¥mm

46. Most of Fujifilm’s key drugs have declining sales
Product Name
Therapeutic Category FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
YoY Change
(¥ mm) Amount
Percentag
e
OYPALOMIN Injection Diagnostic Drugs 6,727 6,465 6,500 7,029 6,879 (150) -2.1%
LUNABELL Tablets (LD/ULD) Hormone Drugs 2,967 3,491 3,756 3,017 2,845 (172) -5.7%
IOPAGUE Injection Diagnostic Drugs 1,876 1,754 1,968 2,133 2,162 29 1.4%
OPTIRAY Injection Diagnostic Drugs - 1,861 1,972 1,927 1,923 (4) -0.2%
Filgrastim BS Injection Syringe Metabolic Drugs 243 539 1,344 1,481 1,671 190 12.8%
MAGNESCOPE Intravenous
Injection Diagnostic Drugs - - 57 1,310 1,353 43 3.3%
HMG Intramuscular Injection Hormone Drugs 854 901 939 917 891 (26) -2.8%
MDEXART Injection Hormone Drugs 682 680 724 813 866 53 6.5%
LIPIDOL Injection Diagnostic Drugs - - 24 722 643 (79) -10.9%
FAVOIR Tablets Hormone Drugs 301 394 456 537 601 64 11.9%
SOL-MELCORT for Injection Hormone Drugs 649 607 627 598 585 (13) -2.2%
FOLYRMON-P Injection Hormone Drugs 491 528 507 512 583 71 13.9%
UTROFESTAN Vaginal
Capsules Hormone Drugs - - - 254 578 324 127.6%
LIMAPROST ALFADEX
Tablets Metabolic Drugs 474 587 600 588 572 (16) -2.7%
ALPROSTADIL Injection Circulatory Drugs 586 609 550 593 536 (57) -9.6%
Total Top 15 Sales 16,567 19,538 20,481 22,440 22,695 255 1.1%
Pct. of Total Sales 65.8% 66.9% 64.6% 65.6% 64.1%
New Products - 436 1,109 1,487 2,626 1,139 76.6%
Other Products 7,381 7,423 7,900 8,065 7,664 (401) -5.0%
CMO Business (OLIC) 1,226 1,818 2,190 2,236 2,401 165 7.4%
Total 25,174 29,215 31,680 34,229 35,387 1,158 3.4%

47. Currently, Fujifilm does not have any cancer drugs
Breakdown by Medical Field
FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
YoY Change
(¥ mm) Amount Percentage
Acute Medical Care 14,059 15,663 17,082 19,997 20,264 267 1.3%
Medical Care for Women 7,969 9,400 9,943 9,582 10,212 630 6.6%
Others 1,919 2,333 2,463 2,413 2,509 96 4.0%
CMO Business (OLIC) 1,226 1,818 2,190 2,236 2,401 165 7.4%
Total 25,174 29,215 31,680 34,229 35,387 1,158 3.4%
Breakdown by Drug Category
FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
YoY Change
(¥ mm) Amount Percentage
Parenteral Injections 15,463 17,212 18,596 21,452 21,463 11 0.1%
Oral Medications 6,416 7,974 8,663 8,020 8,547 527 6.6%
External Preparation 1,243 1,399 1,477 1,818 2,165 347 19.1%
In-vitro Diagnostics, Others 825 811 752 701 811 110 15.7%
CMO Business (OLIC) 1,226 1,818 2,190 2,236 2,401 165 7.4%
Total 25,174 29,215 31,680 34,229 35,387 1,158 3.4%

48. We can do more to increase average sales per hospital
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
YoY Change
Amount Percentage
No. of Hospitals Adopting DPC System 1,505 1,496 1,585 1,580 1,667 1,664 (3) -0.2%
No. of DPC Hospitals with FujiPharma Coverage 1,333 1,339 1,492 1,505 1,622 1,629 7 0.4%
Coverage Ratio 88.6% 89.5% 94.1% 95.3% 97.3% 97.9%
Average Sales per Hospital (¥ '000) 4,268 4,383 4,775 5,470 6,373 6,533 160 2.5%

49. We can leverage on our CDMO business to boost sales growth
Product Name YoY Change
¥ mm
Therapeutic
Category FY17 FY18E Amount Percentage
OYPALOMIN Injection Diagnostic Drugs 6,879 6,775 (104) -1.5%
LUNABELL Tablets (LD/ULD) Hormone Drugs 2,845 2,910 65 2.3%
IOPAGUE Injection Diagnostic Drugs 2,162 2,560 398 18.4%
OPTIRAY Injection Diagnostic Drugs 1,923 2,075 152 7.9%
Filgrastim BS Injection Syringe Metabolic Drugs 1,671 1,725 54 3.2%
MAGNESCOPE Intravenous Injection Diagnostic Drugs 1,353 1,535 182 13.5%
HMG Intramuscular Injection Hormone Drugs 891 910 19 2.1%
DEXART Injection Hormone Drugs 866 866 - 0.0%
UTROFESTAN Vaginal Capsules Hormone Drugs 578 830 252 43.6%
DIENOGEST Tablets Hormone Drugs 307 690 383 124.8%
LIPIDOL Injection Diagnostic Drugs 643 660 17 2.6%
FAVOIR Tablets Hormone Drugs 601 640 39 6.5%
SOL-MELCORT for Injection Hormone Drugs 585 600 15 2.6%
LIMAPROST ALFADEX Tablets Metabolic Drugs 572 580 8 1.4%
FOLYRMON-P Injection Hormone Drugs 583 575 (8) -1.4%
Total Top 15 Sales 22,467 23,974 1,507 6.7%
Pct. of Total Sales 63.5% 62.9%
New Products 2,318 2,950 632 27.30%
Other Products 8,200 8,765 565 6.90%
CDMO Business (OLIC) 2,401 2,450 49 2%
Total 2,401 38,139 2,752 7.80%